Search results for 'Epistemology' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Naturalizing Of Epistemology (2002). The Sciences and Epistemology. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press.score: 150.0
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  2. Boudewijn de Bruin (2008). Epistemic Logic and Epistemology. In Vincent F. Hendricks & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 21.0
    This paper contributes to an increasing literature strengthening the connection between epistemic logic and epistemology (Van Benthem, Hendricks). I give a survey of the most important applications of epistemic logic in epistemology. I show how it is used in the history of philosophy (Steiner's reconstruction of Descartes' sceptical argument), in solutions to Moore's paradox (Hintikka), in discussions about the relation between knowledge and belief (Lenzen) and in an alleged refutation of verificationism (Fitch) and I examine an early argument (...)
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  3. John Turri & Ori Friedman (forthcoming). Winners and Losers in the Folk Epistemology of Lotteries. In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology.score: 21.0
    We conducted five experiments that reveal some main contours of the folk epistemology of lotteries. The folk tend to think that you don't know that your lottery ticket lost, based on the long odds ("statistical cases"); by contrast, the folk tend to think that you do know that your lottery ticket lost, based on a news report ("testimonial cases"). We evaluate three previous explanations for why people deny knowledge in statistical cases: the justification account, the chance account, and the (...)
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  4. Georg Brun & Dominique Kuenzle (2008). A New Role for Emotions in Epistemology. In Georg Brun, Ulvi Dogluoglu & Dominique Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions. Ashgate Publishing Company. 1--31.score: 21.0
    This chapter provides an overview of the issues involved in recent debates about the epistemological relevance of emotions. We first survey some key issues in epistemology and the theory of emotions that inform various assessments of emotions’ potential significance in epistemology. We then distinguish five epistemic functions that have been claimed for emotions: motivational force, salience and relevance, access to facts and beliefs, non-propositional contributions to knowledge and understanding, and epistemic efficiency. We identify two core issues in the (...)
     
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  5. Nancy Daukas (2011). Altogether Now: A Virtue-Theoretic Approach to Pluralism in Feminist Epistemology In. In Heidi Grasswick (ed.), Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Power in Knowledge.score: 21.0
    In this paper I develop and support a feminist virtue epistemology and bring it into conversation with feminist contextual empiricism and feminist standpoint theory. The virtue theory I develop is centered on the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness, which foregrounds the social/political character of knowledge practices and products, and the differences between epistemic agencies that perpetuate, on the one hand, and displace, on the other hand, normative patterns of unjust epistemic discrimination. I argue that my view answers important questions regarding (...)
     
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  6. Francis Remedios, Orienting Social Epistemology. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective.score: 19.0
    Comparison of Steve Fuller's and Alvin Goldman's social epistemologies.
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  7. Susanna Siegel & Nicholas Silins (forthcoming). The Epistemology of Perception. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. Oxford.score: 18.0
    An overview of the epistemology of perception, covering the nature of justification, immediate justification, the relationship between the metaphysics of perceptual experience and its rational role, the rational role of attention, and cognitive penetrability. The published version will contain a smaller bibliography, due to space constraints in the volume.
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  8. W. V. Quine (1969). Epistemology Naturalized. In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.score: 18.0
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  9. George Bealer (2002). Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. 71--125.score: 18.0
    The paper begins with a clarification of the notions of intuition (and, in particular, modal intuition), modal error, conceivability, metaphysical possibility, and epistemic possibility. It is argued that two-dimensionalism is the wrong framework for modal epistemology and that a certain nonreductionist approach to the theory of concepts and propositions is required instead. Finally, there is an examination of moderate rationalism.
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  10. Stephen R. Grimm (2011). On Intellectualism in Epistemology. Mind 120 (479):705-733.score: 18.0
    According to ‘orthodox’ epistemology, it has recently been said, whether or not a true belief amounts to knowledge depends exclusively on truth-related factors: for example, on whether the true belief was formed in a reliable way, or was supported by good evidence, and so on. Jason Stanley refers to this as the ‘intellectualist’ component of orthodox epistemology, and Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath describe it as orthodox epistemology’s commitment to a ‘purely epistemic’ account of knowledge — that (...)
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  11. Roger Crisp (2010). Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):22-40.score: 18.0
    The aim of this essay is to test the claim that epistemologists—virtue epistemologists in particular—have much to learn from virtue ethics. The essay begins with an outline of virtue ethics itself. This section concludes that a pure form of virtue ethics is likely to be unattractive, so the virtue epistemologist should examine the "impure" views of real philosophers. Aristotle is usually held up as the paradigm virtue ethicist. His doctrine of the mean is described, and it is explained how that (...)
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  12. Sylvia Wenmackers (2011). Philosophy of Probability: Foundations, Epistemology, and Computation. Dissertation, University of Groningenscore: 18.0
    This dissertation is a contribution to formal and computational philosophy. -/- In the first part, we show that by exploiting the parallels between large, yet finite lotteries on the one hand and countably infinite lotteries on the other, we gain insights in the foundations of probability theory as well as in epistemology. Case 1: Infinite lotteries. We discuss how the concept of a fair finite lottery can best be extended to denumerably infinite lotteries. The solution boils down to the (...)
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  13. Guy Axtell & J. Adam Carter (2008). Just the Right Thickness: A Defense of Second-Wave Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Papers 37 (3):413-434.score: 18.0
    Abstract Do the central aims of epistemology, like those of moral philosophy, require that we designate some important place for those concepts located between the thin-normative and the non-normative? Put another way, does epistemology need ?thick? evaluative concepts? There are inveterate traditions in analytic epistemology which, having legitimized a certain way of viewing the nature and scope of epistemology's subject matter, give this question a negative verdict; further, they have carried with them a tacit commitment to (...)
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  14. Barbara Forrest (2011). The Non-Epistemology of Intelligent Design: Its Implications for Public Policy. Synthese 178 (2):331 - 379.score: 18.0
    Intelligent design creationism (ID) is a religious belief requiring a supernatural creator's interventions in the natural order. ID thus brings with it, as does supernatural theism by its nature, intractable epistemological difficulties. Despite these difficulties and despite ID's defeat in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District (2005), ID creationists' continuing efforts to promote the teaching of ID in public school science classrooms threaten both science education and the separation of church and state guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution. I examine (...)
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  15. Guy Axtell (1997). Recent Work on Virtue Epistemology. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):1 - 26.score: 18.0
    This article traces a growing interest among epistemologists in the intellectuals of epistemic virtues. These are cognitive dispositions exercised in the formation of beliefs. Attempts to give intellectual virtues a central normative and/or explanatory role in epistemology occur together with renewed interest in the ethics/epistemology analogy, and in the role of intellectual virtue in Aristotle's epistemology. The central distinction drawn here is between two opposed forms of virtue epistemology, virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. The article develops (...)
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  16. B. J. C. Madison (2011). Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):47-58.score: 18.0
    One thing nearly all epistemologists agree upon is that Gettier cases are decisive counterexamples to the tripartite analysis of knowledge; whatever else is true of knowledge, it is not merely belief that is both justified and true. They now agree that knowledge is not justified true belief because this is consistent with there being too much luck present in the cases, and that knowledge excludes such luck. This is to endorse what has become known as the 'anti-luck platitude'. <br /><br (...)
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  17. Jason Baehr (2006). Character, Reliability and Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):193–212.score: 18.0
    Standard characterizations of virtue epistemology divide the field into two camps: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Virtue reliabilists think of intellectual virtues as reliable cognitive faculties or abilities, while virtue responsibilists conceive of them as good intellectual character traits. I argue that responsibilist character virtues sometimes satisfy the conditions of a reliabilist conception of intellectual virtue, and that consequently virtue reliabilists, and reliabilists in general, must pay closer attention to matters of intellectual character. This leads to several new questions (...)
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  18. Abrol Fairweather (2012). Duhem–Quine Virtue Epistemology. Synthese 187 (2):673-692.score: 18.0
    The Duhem-Quine Thesis is the claim that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation because any empirical test requires assuming the truth of one or more auxiliary hypotheses. This is taken by many philosophers, and is assumed here, to support the further thesis that theory choice is underdetermined by empirical evidence. This inquiry is focused strictly on the axiological commitments engendered in solutions to underdetermination, specifically those of Pierre Duhem and W. V. Quine. Duhem resolves underdetermination by (...)
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  19. Jason Kawall (2006). On the Moral Epistemology of Ideal Observer Theories. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):359 - 374.score: 18.0
    In this paper I attempt to defuse a set of epistemic worries commonly raised against ideal observer theories. The worries arise because of the omniscience often attributed to ideal observers -- how can we, as finite humans, ever have access to the moral judgements or reactions of omniscient beings? I argue that many of the same concerns arise with respect to other moral theories (and that these concerns do not in fact reveal genuine flaws in any of these theories), and (...)
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  20. Margaret P. Gilbert (2004). Collective Epistemology. Episteme 1 (2):95--107.score: 18.0
    This paper introduces the author's approach to everyday ascriptions of collective cognitive states as in such statements as we believe he is lying. Collective epistemology deals with these ascriptions attempting to understand them and the phenomena in question.
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  21. Mark Silcox (2006). Virtue Epistemology and Moral Luck. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2):179--192.score: 18.0
    Thomas Nagel has proposed that the existence of moral luck mandates a general attitude of skepticism in ethics. One popular way of arguing against Nagel’s claim is to insist that the phenomenon of moral luck itself is an illusion , in the sense that situations in which it seems to occur may be plausibly re-described so as to show that agents need not be held responsible for the unlucky outcomes of their actions. Here I argue that this strategy for explaining (...)
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  22. Ernest Sosa (2009). Précis of "A Virtue Epistemology" (Oxford University Press, 2007). Philosophical Studies 144 (1):107 - 109.score: 18.0
    This is a summary of "A Virtue Epistemology", the book that is the subject of this book symposium.
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  23. Sonia Roca-Royes (2010). Modal Epistemology, Modal Concepts and the Integration Challenge. Dialectica 64 (3):335-361.score: 18.0
    The paper argues against Peacocke's moderate rationalism in modality. In the first part, I show, by identifying an argumentative gap in its epistemology, that Peacocke's account has not met the Integration Challenge. I then argue that we should modify the account's metaphysics of modal concepts in order to avoid implausible consequences with regards to their possession conditions. This modification generates no extra explanatory gap. Yet, once the minimal modification that avoids those implausible consequences is made, the resulting account cannot (...)
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  24. Irwin Goldstein (1996). Ontology, Epistemology, and Private Ostensive Definition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):137-147.score: 18.0
    People see five kinds of views in epistemology and ontology as hinging on there being words a person can learn only by private ostensive definitions, through direct acquaintance with his own sensations: skepticism about other minds, 2. skepticism about an external world, 3. foundationalism, 4. dualism, and 5. phenomenalism. People think Wittgenstein refuted these views by showing, they believe, no word is learnable only by private ostensive definition. I defend these five views from Wittgenstein’s attack.
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  25. Robert Lockie (2008). Problems for Virtue Theories in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):169 - 191.score: 18.0
    This paper identifies and criticizes certain fundamental commitments of virtue theories in epistemology. A basic question for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’––a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism. Virtues approaches so-conceived are opposed. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology are overturned. Problems with the pluralism of virtues theories are identified––problems with (...)
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  26. Alexander Bird (2010). The Epistemology of Science—a Bird's-Eye View. Synthese 175 (1):5 - 16.score: 18.0
    In this paper I outline my conception of the epistemology of science, by reference to my published papers, showing how the ideas presented there fit together. In particular I discuss the aim of science, scientific progress, the nature of scientific evidence, the failings of empiricism, inference to the best (or only) explanation, and Kuhnian psychology of discovery. Throughout, I emphasize the significance of the concept of scientific knowledge.
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  27. J. Adam Carter (2014). Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2).score: 18.0
    Robust Virtue Epistemology (RVE) maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti-luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. (...)
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  28. C. Legg (2012). The Hardness of the Iconic Must: Can Peirce's Existential Graphs Assist Modal Epistemology? Philosophia Mathematica 20 (1):1-24.score: 18.0
    Charles Peirce's diagrammatic logic — the Existential Graphs — is presented as a tool for illuminating how we know necessity, in answer to Benacerraf's famous challenge that most ‘semantics for mathematics’ do not ‘fit an acceptable epistemology’. It is suggested that necessary reasoning is in essence a recognition that a certain structure has the particular structure that it has. This means that, contra Hume and his contemporary heirs, necessity is observable. One just needs to pay attention, not merely to (...)
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  29. N. Ángel Pinillos (2011). Some Recent Work in Experimental Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 6 (10):675-688.score: 18.0
    In this paper I survey some recent developments in experimental philosophy and discuss their bearing on two leading theories in epistemology: Contextualism and Interest Relative Invariantism. In the first part of the paper, I survey some general issues of how experimental philosophy may be relevant to assessing contextualism and IRI. In the second part, I discuss and critique some of the recent experimental work.
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  30. Duncan Pritchard (2007). Anti-Luck Epistemology. Synthese 158 (3):277 - 297.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I do three things. First, I offer an overview of an anti-luck epistemology, as set out in my book, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005). Second, I attempt to meet some of the main criticisms that one might level against the key theses that I propose in this work. And finally, third, I sketch some of the ways in which the strategy of anti-luck epistemology can be developed in new directions.
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  31. J. Adam Carter & Martin Peterson (forthcoming). On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle. Erkenntnis:1-13.score: 18.0
    In this paper we present two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for one who aspires to defend the precautionary principle. The first puzzle involves an application of contextualism in epistemology; and the second puzzle concerns the task of defending a plausible version of the precautionary principle that would not be invalidated by the de minimis principle.
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  32. Christoph Kelp (2011). In Defence of Virtue Epistemology. Synthese 179 (3):409-33.score: 18.0
    In a number of recent papers Duncan Pritchard argues that virtue epistemology's central ability condition—one knows that p if and only if one has attained cognitive success (true belief) because of the exercise of intellectual ability—is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. This paper discusses and dismisses a number of responses to Pritchard's objections and develops a new way of defending virtue epistemology against them.
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  33. Jason S. Baehr (2006). Character in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):479--514.score: 18.0
    This paper examines the claim made by certain virtue epistemologists that intellectual character virtues like fair-mindedness, open-mindedness and intellectual courage merit an important and fundamental role in epistemology. I begin by considering whether these traits merit an important role in the analysis of knowledge. I argue that they do not and that in fact they are unlikely to be of much relevance to any of the traditional problems in epistemology. This presents a serious challenge for virtue epistemology. (...)
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  34. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2006). Genetic Epistemology and Piaget's Philosophy of Science: Piaget Vs. Kuhn on Scientific Progress. Theory and Psychology 16 (2):203-224.score: 18.0
    This paper concerns Jean Piaget's (1896–1980) philosophy of science and, in particular, the picture of scientific development suggested by his theory of genetic epistemology. The aims of the paper are threefold: (1) to examine genetic epistemology as a theory concerning the growth of knowledge both in the individual and in science; (2) to explicate Piaget's view of ‘scientific progress’, which is grounded in his theory of equilibration; and (3) to juxtapose Piaget's notion of progress with Thomas Kuhn's (1922–1996). (...)
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  35. Evelyn Brister (2009). Feminist Epistemology, Contextualism, and Philosophical Skepticism. Metaphilosophy 40 (5):671-688.score: 18.0
    Abstract: This essay explores the relation between feminist epistemology and the problem of philosophical skepticism. Even though feminist epistemology has not typically focused on skepticism as a problem, I argue that a feminist contextualist epistemology may solve many of the difficulties facing recent contextualist responses to skepticism. Philosophical skepticism appears to succeed in casting doubt on the very possibility of knowledge by shifting our attention to abnormal contexts. I argue that this shift in context constitutes an attempt (...)
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  36. Jared Bates (2004). Reflective Equilibrium and Underdetermination in Epistemology. Acta Analytica 19 (32):45-64.score: 18.0
    The basic aim of Alvin Goldman’s approach to epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is naturalistic; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition aim to identify the naturalistic, nonnormative criteria on which justified belief supervenes (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). The basic method of Goldman’s epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is the reflective equilibrium test; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition are tested against our intuitions about cases of justified and unjustified belief (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). I (...)
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  37. Thomas Kroedel (2012). Counterfactuals and the Epistemology of Modality. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (12).score: 18.0
    The paper provides an explanation of our knowledge of metaphysical modality, or modal knowledge, from our ability to evaluate counterfactual conditionals. The latter ability lends itself to an evolutionary explanation since it enables us to learn from mistakes. Different logical principles linking counterfactuals to metaphysical modality can be employed to extend this explanation to the epistemology of modality. While the epistemological use of some of these principles is either philosophically implausible or empirically inadequate, the equivalence of ‘Necessarily p’ with (...)
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  38. Qilin Li, Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology, Epistemic Normativity and the Gettier Problem.score: 18.0
    In this paper, it is argued that there are (at least) two different kinds of ‘epistemic normativity’ in epistemology, which can be scrutinized and revealed by some comparison with some naturalistic studies of ethics. The first kind of epistemic normativity can be naturalized, but the other not. The doctrines of Quine’s naturalized epistemology is firstly introduced; then Kim’s critique of Quine’s proposal is examined. It is argued that Quine’s naturalized epistemology is able to save some room for (...)
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  39. Deborah Osberg, Gert Biesta & Paul Cilliers (2008). From Representation to Emergence: Complexity's Challenge to the Epistemology of Schooling. Educational Philosophy and Theory 40 (1):213–227.score: 18.0
    In modern, Western societies the purpose of schooling is to ensure that school-goers acquire knowledge of pre-existing practices, events, entities and so on. The knowledge that is learned is then tested to see if the learner has acquired a correct or adequate understanding of it. For this reason, it can be argued that schooling is organised around a representational epistemology: one which holds that knowledge is an accurate representation of something that is separate from knowledge itself. Since the object (...)
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  40. Helen Beebee & Markus Schrenk (eds.) (2010). Hume. Metaphysics and Epistemology. mentis.score: 18.0
    The articles in this special issue of the yearbook Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy all concern, in one way or another, Hume’s epistemology and metaphysics. -/- There are discussions of our knowledge of causal powers, the extent to which conceivability is a guide to modality, and testimony; there are also discussions of our ideas of space and time, the role in Hume’s thought of the psychological mechanism of ‘completing the union’, the role of impressions, and Hume’s argument against (...)
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  41. Sarah Bachelard (2009). 'Foolishness to Greeks': Plantinga and the Epistemology of Christian Belief. Sophia 48 (2):105-118.score: 18.0
    A central theme in the Christian contemplative tradition is that knowing God is much more like ‘unknowing’ than it is like possessing rationally acceptable beliefs. Knowledge of God is expressed, in this tradition, in metaphors of woundedness, darkness, silence, suffering, and desire. Philosophers of religion, on the other hand, tend to explore the possibilities of knowing God in terms of rational acceptability, epistemic rights, cognitive responsibility, and propositional belief. These languages seem to point to very different accounts of how it (...)
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  42. Leslie Marsh & Christian Onof (2008). Stigmergic Epistemology, Stigmergic Cognition. Cognitive Systems Research 9 (1-2).score: 18.0
    To know is to cognize, to cognize is to be a culturally bounded, rationality-bounded and environmentally located agent. Knowledge and cognition are thus dual aspects of human sociality. If social epistemology has the formation, acquisition, mediation, transmission and dissemination of knowledge in complex communities of knowers as its subject matter, then its third party character is essentially stigmergic. In its most generic formulation, stigmergy is the phenomenon of indirect communication mediated by modifications of the environment. Extending this notion one (...)
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  43. Michael Bradie (1986). Assessing Evolutionary Epistemology. Biology and Philosophy 1 (4):401-459.score: 18.0
    There are two interrelated but distinct programs which go by the name evolutionary epistemology. One attempts to account for the characteristics of cognitive mechanisms in animals and humans by a straightforward extension of the biological theory of evolution to those aspects or traits of animals which are the biological substrates of cognitive activity, e.g., their brains, sensory systems, motor systems, etc. (EEM program). The other program attempts to account for the evaluation of ideas, scientific theories and culture in general (...)
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  44. Anthony Skelton (2013). Sidgwick’s Argument for Utilitarianism and His Moral Epistemology: A Reply to David Phillips. Revue d'Etudes Benthamiennes 12.score: 18.0
    David Phillips’s Sidgwickian Ethics is a penetrating contribution to the scholarly and philosophical understanding of Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics. This note focuses on Phillips’s understanding of (aspects of) Sidgwick’s argument for utilitarianism and the moral epistemology to which he subscribes. In § I, I briefly outline the basic features of the argument that Sidgwick provides for utilitarianism, noting some disagreements with Phillips along the way. In § II, I raise some objections to Phillips’s account of the (...) underlying the argument. In § III, I reply to the claim that there is a puzzle at the heart of Sidgwick’s epistemology. In § IV, I respond to Phillips’s claim that Sidgwick is unfair in his argument against the (deontological) morality of common sense. (shrink)
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  45. Duncan Pritchard (2003). Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck. Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.score: 18.0
    The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call “veritic” epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been concerned with a very different type of epistemic luck, what I (...)
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  46. Anthony Robert Booth (2008). Deontology in Ethics and Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):530-545.score: 18.0
    Abstract: In this article, I consider some of the similarities and differences between deontologism in ethics and epistemology. In particular, I highlight two salient differences between them. I aim to show that by highlighting these differences we can see that epistemic deontologism does not imply epistemic internalism and that it is not a thesis primarily about epistemic permissibility . These differences are: (1) deontologism in epistemology has a quasi -teleological feature (not shared with moral deontologism) in that it (...)
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  47. Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.) (2006). The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Testimony is a crucial source of knowledge: we are to a large extent reliant upon what others tell us. It has been the subject of much recent interest in epistemology, and this volume collects twelve original essays on the topic by some of the world's leading philosophers. It will be the starting point for future research in this fertile field. Contributors include Robert Audi, C. A. J. Coady, Elizabeth Fricker, Richard Fumerton, Sanford C. Goldberg, Peter Graham, Jennifer Lackey, Keith (...)
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  48. Mark Balaguer (1995). A Platonist Epistemology. Synthese 103 (3):303 - 325.score: 18.0
    A response is given here to Benacerraf's 1973 argument that mathematical platonism is incompatible with a naturalistic epistemology. Unlike almost all previous platonist responses to Benacerraf, the response given here is positive rather than negative; that is, rather than trying to find a problem with Benacerraf's argument, I accept his challenge and meet it head on by constructing an epistemology of abstract (i.e., aspatial and atemporal) mathematical objects. Thus, I show that spatio-temporal creatures like ourselves can attain knowledge (...)
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  49. Tristram McPherson (2012). Mark Schroeder's Hypotheticalism: Agent-Neutrality, Moral Epistemology, and Methodology. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 157 (3):445-453.score: 18.0
    Symposium contribution on Mark Schroeder's Slaves of the Passions. Argues that Schroeder's account of agent-neutral reasons cannot be made to work, that the limited scope of his distinctive proposal in the epistemology of reasons undermines its plausibility, and that Schroeder faces an uncomfortable tension between the initial motivation for his view and the details of the view he develops.
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  50. Amalia Amaya (2007). Formal Models of Coherence and Legal Epistemology. Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):429-447.score: 18.0
    This paper argues that formal models of coherence are useful for constructing a legal epistemology. Two main formal approaches to coherence are examined: coherence-based models of belief revision and the theory of coherence as constraint satisfaction. It is shown that these approaches shed light on central aspects of a coherentist legal epistemology, such as the concept of coherence, the dynamics of coherentist justification in law, and the mechanisms whereby coherence may be built in the course of legal decision-making.
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