Search results for 'Epistemology, Intuition, Knowledge, Philosophy, Rationality' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Ernest Sosa (1996). Rational Intuition: Bealer on its Nature and Epistemic Status. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):151--162.score: 955.0
    A discussion of George Bealer's conception and defense of rational intuition as a basis of philosophical knowledge, under three main heads: a) the phenomenology of intellectual intuition; b) the status of such intuition as a basic source of evidence, and the explanation of what gives it that status; and c) the defense of intuition against those who would reject it and exclude it on principle from the set of valid sources of evidence.
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  2. Michel Paty (2010). Nouveauté et Émergence dans la Quête des Fondements. Principia 8 (1):19-54.score: 270.0
    Novelty and emergence in the quest for foundations. The search for firm foundations for a given knowledge, notably in the case of a formalized one, can be seen as a particular case of the search for deeper intelligibility. It generally brings to modifying the structural elements of the received knowledge (this having to do with questions of ontological relativity and epistemological holism), letting appear new elements of thought and of ‘reality’, emergent conceptual structures on the ground of the preceding ones. (...)
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  3. Mark Kaplan (1983). Decision Theory as Philosophy. Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.score: 142.0
    Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have the (...)
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  4. Timothy Williamson (2005). I *-Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):1-23.score: 140.0
    A striking feature of the traditional armchair method of philosophy is the use of imaginary examples: for instance, of Gettier cases as counterexamples to the justified true belief analysis of knowledge. The use of such examples is often thought to involve some sort of a priori rational intuition, which crude rationalists regard as a virtue and crude empiricists as a vice. It is argued here that, on the contrary, what is involved is simply an application of our general cognitive capacity (...)
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  5. Timothy Williamson (2005). The Presidential Address: Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105:1 - 23.score: 140.0
    A striking feature of the traditional armchair method of philosophy is the use of imaginary examples: for instance, of Gettier cases as counterexamples to the justified true belief analysis of knowledge. The use of such examples is often thought to involve some sort of a priori rational intuition, which crude rationalists regard as a virtue and crude empiricists as a vice. It is argued here that, on the contrary, what is involved is simply an application of our general cognitive capacity (...)
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  6. Ben Woodard (2010). Mad Speculation and Absolute Inhumanism: Lovecraft, Ligotti, and the Weirding of Philosophy. Continent 1 (1):3-13.score: 140.0
    continent. 1.1 (2011): 3-13. / 0/ – Introduction I want to propose, as a trajectory into the philosophically weird, an absurd theoretical claim and pursue it, or perhaps more accurately, construct it as I point to it, collecting the ground work behind me like the Perpetual Train from China Mieville's Iron Council which puts down track as it moves reclaiming it along the way. The strange trajectory is the following: Kant's critical philosophy and much of continental philosophy which has followed, (...)
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  7. J. Van Brakel (1998). Epistemische deugden en hun verantwoording. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 60 (2):243 - 268.score: 127.0
    In this paper I argue that all proposals for demarcation criteria distinguishing between scientific and non-scientific knowledge, have failed. Moreover, there is not a single set of epistemic virtues that characterizes 'good' knowledge, nor is there such a set that characterizes science. There are many different epistemic virtues and no universal rules about how they are to be applied in particular cases. Different virtues may dominate in different knowledge domains. In the 'same' domain there are neither universal nor domainspecific rules (...)
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  8. George Bealer (2000). A Theory of the a Priori. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):1–30.score: 120.0
    The topic of a priori knowledge is approached through the theory of evidence. A shortcoming in traditional formulations of moderate rationalism and moderate empiricism is that they fail to explain why rational intuition and phenomenal experience count as basic sources of evidence. This explanatory gap is filled by modal reliabilism -- the theory that there is a qualified modal tie between basic sources of evidence and the truth. This tie to the truth is then explained by the theory of concept (...)
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  9. Nenad Miscevic (2001). Apriority and Conceptual Kinematics. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):21-48.score: 69.0
    The paper critically discusses the Chalmers and Jackson strategy of accounting for the dynamics of conceptual intuitions. In contrast to this strategy, it is argued that concepts alone do not determine in advance rational responses to new evidence. An initial concept is often revised in the light of new data, the revision being guided by the goal of detecting the deep causal structure of the domain investigated. Using examples from the history of science (concept Reflex Arc) as an illustration, it (...)
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