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Profile: Erhan Demircioglu (Middle East Technical University)
  1. Erhan Demircioglu (2013). Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.
    Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the conceptual independence of phenomenal (...)
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  2. Erhan Demircioglu (2012). Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  3. Erhan Demircioglu (2012). Christopher Hill: Consciousness. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 77 (1):149-154.
    Christopher Hill: Consciousness Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s10670-012-9373-8 Authors Erhan Demircioglu, Koc University, Rumeli Feneri Yolu, 34450 Sariyer, Istanbul, Turkey Journal Erkenntnis Online ISSN 1572-8420 Print ISSN 0165-0106.
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  4. Erhan Demircioglu (2011). Supervenience and Reductive Physicalism. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (1):25-35.
    Supervenience physicalism attempts to combine non-reductionism about properties with a physical determination thesis in such a way as to ensure physicalism. I argue that this attempt is unsuccessful: the specific supervenience relation in question is either strong enough to ensure reductionism, as in the case of strong supervenience, or too weak to yield physical determination, as in the case of global supervenience. The argument develops in three stages. First, I propose a distinction between two types of reductionism, definitional and scientific, (...)
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