12 found
Order:
See also:
Profile: Erhan Demircioglu (Koc University)
  1.  93
    Erhan Demircioglu (2015). Recognitional Identification and the Knowledge Argument. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):325-340.
    Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge about experiences is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. Some physicalists (e.g., John Perry) have countered by arguing that what Jackson’s Mary, the perfect scientist who acquires all physical knowledge about experiencing red while being locked in a monochromatic room, lacks before experiencing red is merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity, and that since lacking a piece of recognitional knowledge (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  26
    Erhan Demircioglu (2016). Against McGinn's Mysterianism. Cilicia Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-10.
    There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  21
    Erhan Demircioglu (forthcoming). Human Cognitive Closure and Mysterianism: Reply to Kriegel. Acta Analytica:1-8.
    In this paper, I respond to Kriegel’s criticism of McGinn’s mysterianism (the thesis that humans are cognitively closed with respect to the solution of the mind-body problem). Kriegel objects to a particular argument for the possibility of human cognitive closure and also gives a direct argument against mysterianism. I intend to show that neither the objection nor the argument is convincing.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  50
    Erhan Demircioglu (forthcoming). Naïve Realism and Phenomenological Directness: Reply to Millar. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    In this paper, I respond to Millar’s recent criticism of naïve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view to naïve realism. I intend to show that Millar’s arguments are not convincing.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  46
    Erhan Demircioglu (2015). The Puzzle of Consciousness. Cilicia Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):76-85.
    In this article, I aim to present some of the reasons why consciousness is viewed as an intractable problem by many philosophers. Furthermore, I will argue that if these reasons are properly appreciated, then McGinn's mysterianism may not sound as far-fetched as it would otherwise sound.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  56
    Erhan Demircioglu (2015). The Given in Perceptual Experience. Synthese 1 (8):1-27.
    How are we to account for the epistemic contribution of our perceptual experiences to the reasonableness of our perceptual beliefs? It is well known that a conception heavily influenced by Cartesian thinking has it that experiences do not enable the experiencing subject to have direct epistemic contact with the external world; rather, they are regarded as openness to a kind of private inner realm that is interposed between the subject and the world. It turns out that if one wants to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Erhan Demircioglu (2013). Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.
    Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the conceptual independence of phenomenal (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  79
    Erhan Demircioglu (2012). Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  9.  66
    Erhan Demircioglu (2011). Supervenience and Reductive Physicalism. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (1):25-35.
    Supervenience physicalism attempts to combine non-reductionism about properties with a physical determination thesis in such a way as to ensure physicalism. I argue that this attempt is unsuccessful: the specific supervenience relation in question is either strong enough to ensure reductionism, as in the case of strong supervenience, or too weak to yield physical determination, as in the case of global supervenience. The argument develops in three stages. First, I propose a distinction between two types of reductionism, definitional and scientific, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  49
    Erhan Demircioglu (2012). Christopher Hill: Consciousness. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 77 (1):149-154.
    Christopher Hill: Consciousness Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s10670-012-9373-8 Authors Erhan Demircioglu, Koc University, Rumeli Feneri Yolu, 34450 Sariyer, Istanbul, Turkey Journal Erkenntnis Online ISSN 1572-8420 Print ISSN 0165-0106.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Erhan Demircioglu (2014). Gareth Evans on Proper Names. Felsefe Tartismalari 50:1-9.
    The central aim of this paper is to argue against Evans’ hybrid theory of reference. I will show that Evans’ theory makes false predictions in the case of some thought-experiments. The paper has two sections. After providing a short presentation of Evans’ theory in the first section, I will move on to criticize it in the second section.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Erhan Demircioğlu (2004). Contingent A Priori and Two Kinds of Necessity. Felsefe Tartismalari 32:47-64.
    Kripke argues that the existence of a priori contingent truths shows the falsity of the traditional idea that the notions of necessity and a priority are coextensional. In this paper, I maintain that the traditional coexistensionality thesis is defendable. I contend that the propositions that are alleged to be a priori contingent truths by Kripke are propositions that express contingent facts and, at the same time, are necessarily true. That they are necessarily true is not (...)
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography