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  1. Eric Christian Barnes (2014). The Roots of Predictivism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:46-53.
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  2. Eric Christian Barnes (2013). Freedom, Creativity, and Manipulation. Noûs 48 (4):n/a-n/a.
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  3. Eric Christian Barnes (2008). Evidence and Leverage: Comment on Roush. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):549-557.
    provides a sustained and ambitious development of the basic idea that knowledge is true belief that tracks the truth. In this essay, I provide a quick synopsis of Roush's book and offer a substantive discussion of her analysis of scientific evidence. Roush argues that, for e to serve as evidence for h, it should be easier to determine the truth value of e than it is to determine the truth value of h, an ideal she refers to as ‘leverage’. She (...)
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  4. Eric Christian Barnes (2008). Review: Review Article: Evidence and Leverage: Comment on Roush. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):549 - 557.
    Sherrilyn Roush's Tracking Truth provides a sustained and ambitious development of the basic idea that knowledge is true belief that tracks the truth. In this essay, I provide a quick synopsis of Roush's book and offer a substantive discussion of her analysis of scientific evidence. Roush argues that, for e to serve as evidence for h, it should be easier to determine the truth value of e than it is to determine the truth value of h, an ideal she refers (...)
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  5. Eric Christian Barnes (1998). Probabilities and Epistemic Pluralism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):31-47.
    A pluralistic scientific method is one that incorporates a variety of points of view in scientific inquiry. This paper investigates one example of pluralistic method: the use of weighted averaging in probability estimation. I consider two methods of weight determination, one based on disjoint evidence possession and the other on track record. I argue that weighted averaging provides a rational procedure for probability estimation under certain conditions. I consider a strategy for calculating ‘mixed weights’ which incorporate mixed information about agent (...)
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