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Profile: Eric Chwang (University of Colorado, Boulder)
  1. Eric Chwang (2012). Cluster Randomization and Political Philosophy. Bioethics 26 (9):476-484.
    In this paper, I will argue that, while the ethical issues raised by cluster randomization can be challenging, they are not new. My thesis divides neatly into two parts. In the first, easier part I argue that many of the ethical challenges posed by cluster randomized human subjects research are clearly present in other types of human subjects research, and so are not novel. In the second, more difficult part I discuss the thorniest ethical challenge for cluster randomized research – (...)
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  2. Eric Chwang (2011). Why Athletic Doping Should Be Banned. Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (1):33-49.
    So long as a ban is enforceable, large private athletic institutions—such as Major League Baseball and the National Collegiate Athletic Association—should not allow their athletes to take performance-enhancing drugs. The argument I present is game-theoretic: though each athlete prefers unilateral permission to dope over a universal ban, he also prefers a universal ban over universal permission to dope. That is because, while doping improves absolute measures of performance, it does not improve relative performance if many athletes dope. Large private athletic (...)
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  3. Eric Chwang (2010). A Puzzle About Consent in Research and in Practice. Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (3):258-272.
    In this paper, I will examine a puzzling discrepancy between the way clinicians are allowed to treat their patients and the way researchers are allowed to treat their subjects: in certain cases, researchers are legally required to disclose quite a bit more information when obtaining consent from prospective subjects than clinicians are when obtaining consent from prospective patients. I will argue that the proper resolution of this puzzling discrepancy must appeal to a pragmatic criterion of disclosure for informed consent: that (...)
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  4. Eric Chwang (2010). Against Risk-Benefit Review of Prisoner Research. Bioethics 24 (1):14-22.
    The 2006 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, 'Ethical Considerations for Research Involving Prisoners', recommended five main changes to current US Common Rule regulations on prisoner research. Their third recommendation was to shift from a category-based to a risk-benefit approach to research review, similar to current guidelines on pediatric research. However, prisoners are not children, so risk-benefit constraints on prisoner research must be justified in a different way from those on pediatric research. In this paper I argue that additional risk-benefit constraints (...)
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  5. Eric Chwang (2009). A Defense of Subsequent Consent. Journal of Social Philosophy 40 (1):117-131.
    Subsequent consent can be morally efficacious. First, it licenses nostalgia and dismissiveness no more than its prior cousin does. Second, it's coherent because linked to the mental state of not minding. Third, it's just as vulnerable to bilking as prior consent is, as is clear once we distinguish between basing moral assessments on expectations versus on actual outcomes. Fourth, mind control is illegitimate because it short circuits the subject's will, not because its consent is subsequent. Finally, our intuitions about rape (...)
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  6. Eric Chwang (2009). Futility Clarified. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 37 (3):487-495.
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  7. Eric Chwang (2008). Against the Inalienable Right to Withdraw From Research. Bioethics 22 (7):370-378.
    In this paper I argue, against the current consensus, that the right to withdraw from research is sometimes alienable. In other words, research subjects are sometimes morally permitted to waive their right to withdraw. The argument proceeds in three major steps. In the first step, I argue that rights typically should be presumed alienable, both because that is not illegitimately coercive and because the general paternalistic motivation for keeping them inalienable is untenable. In the second step of the argument, I (...)
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