Search results for 'Eric F. LaRock' (try it on Scholar)

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Profile: Eric LaRock (Oakland University)
  1. Eric LaRock (2008). Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process? International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):201-229.score: 240.0
    I argue on the basis of recent findings in neuroscience that consciousness is not a brain process, and then explore some alternative, non-reductive options concerning the metaphysical relationship between consciousness and the brain, such as weak and strong accounts of the emergence of consciousness and the constitution view of consciousness. I propose an Aristotelian account of the strong emergence of consciousness. This account motivates a wider ontology than reductive physicalism and makes reference to formal causation as a way explaining the (...)
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  2. Eric LaRock (2007). Disambiguation, Binding, and the Unity of Visual Consciousness. Theory and Psychology 17 (6):747-77.score: 240.0
    Recent findings in neuroscience strongly suggest that an object’s features (e.g., its color, texture, shape, etc.) are represented in separate areas of the visual cortex. Although represented in separate neuronal areas, somehow the feature representations are brought together as a single, unified object of visual consciousness. This raises a question of binding: how do neural activities in separate areas of the visual cortex function to produce a feature-unified object of visual consciousness? Several prominent neuroscientists have adopted neural synchrony and attention-based (...)
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  3. George A. Mashour & Eric LaRock (2008). Inverse Zombies, Anesthesia Awareness, and the Hard Problem of Unconsciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1163-1168.score: 240.0
    Philosophical (p-) zombies are constructs that possess all of the behavioral features and responses of a sentient human being, yet are not conscious. P-zombies are intimately linked to the hard problem of consciousness and have been invoked as arguments against physicalist approaches. But what if we were to invert the characteristics of p-zombies? Such an inverse (i-) zombie would possess all of the behavioral features and responses of an insensate being yet would nonetheless be conscious. While p-zombies are logically possible (...)
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  4. Konstantinos Kafetsios & Eric LaRock (2005). Cognition and Emotion: Aristotelian Affinities with Contemporary Emotion Research. Theory and Psychology 15 (5):639-657.score: 240.0
    We provide a critique of the usual functionalist, cognition-first reading of Aristotle’s theory of emotion and then offer an alternative understanding of Aristotle's theory of cognition and emotion that brings to bear certain biological considerations evidenced in his arguments on the integration of form and matter (hylomorphism) and the hierarchical organization of the biological world. This, of course, does not suggest that we are critical of all varieties of functionalism, but only those which fail to utilize and incorporate findings in (...)
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  5. Eric LaRock (2010). Cognition and Consciousness: Kantian Affinities with Contemporary Vision Research. Kant-Studien 101 (4):445-464.score: 240.0
    After providing a critique of Andreas Engel's neural mechanistic approach to object feature binding (OFB), I develop a Kantian approach to OFB that bears affinity with recent findings in cognitive psychology. I also address the diachronic object unity (DOU) problem and discuss the shortcomings of a purely neural mechanistic approach to this problem. Finally, I motivate a Kantian approach to DOU which suggests that DOU requires the persisting character of the cognizing subject. If plausible, the cognizing subject could make an (...)
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  6. Eric LaRock (2006). Why Neural Synchrony Fails to Explain the Unity of Visual Consciousness. Behavior and Philosophy 34:39-58.score: 240.0
    A central issue in philosophy and neuroscience is the problem of unified visual consciousness. This problem has arisen because we now know that an object's stimulus features (e.g., its color, texture, shape, etc.) generate activity in separate areas of the visual cortex (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). For example, recent evidence indicates that there are very few, if any, neural connections between specific visual areas, such as those that correlate with color and motion (Bartels & Zeki, 2006; Zeki, 2003). So (...)
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  7. Eric LaRock (2002). Against the Functionalist Reading of Aristotle's Philosophy of Perception and Emotion. International Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2):231-258.score: 240.0
    Examining the literature on Aristotelian psychology can leave one with the impression that his theory of perception and emotion is credible primarily because it accords with contemporary functionalism, a physicalist theory that has achieved orthodoxy in contemporary philosophy of mind. In my view, squeezing Aristotle into a functionalist mold is a mistake, for functionalism entaiIs at least two theses that Aristotle would reject: (1) that material types make no essential difference to perception and emotion (and to mental states in general), (...)
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  8. Eric LaRock (2013). Aristotle and Agent-Directed Neuroplasticity. International Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):385-408.score: 240.0
    I propose an Aristotelian approach to agent causation that is consistent with the hypothesis of strong emergence. This approach motivates a wider ontology than materialism by maintaining (1) that the agent is generated by the brain without being reducible to it on grounds of the unity of experience and (2) that the agent possesses (formal) causal power to affect (i.e., mold, sculpt, or organize) the brain on grounds of agent-directed neuroplasticity. After providing recent empirical evidence for the strong emergence of (...)
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  9. Eric LaRock (2007). Intrinsic Perspectives, Object Feature Binding, and Visual Consciousness. Theory and Psychology 17 (6):799-09.score: 240.0
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  10. Eric LaRock (2013). From Biological Naturalism to Emergent Subject Dualism. Philosophia Christi 15 (1):97-118.score: 240.0
    I argue (1) that Searle's reductive stance about mental causation is unwarranted on evolutionary, logical, and neuroscientific grounds; and (2) that his theory of weak emergence, called biological naturalism, fails to provide a satisfactory account of objectual unity and subject unity. Finally I propose a stronger variety of emergence called emergent subject dualism (ESD) to fill the gaps in Searle's account, and support ESD on grounds of recent evidence in neuroscience. Hence I show how it is possible, if not also (...)
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  11. Eric Larock (2001). Tiempo, Mente E Identidad Personal, Según Agustín. Augustinus: Revista Trimestral Publicada Por Los Padres Agustinos Recoletos 46 (182-83):251-270.score: 240.0
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  12. Eric LaRock (2012). An Empirical Case Against Central State Materialism. Philosophia Christi 14 (2):409-428.score: 240.0
    I argue on empirical grounds (1) that consciousness is not nothing but a self-scanning mechanism in the central nervous system; (2) that consciousness is not reducible to an epistemic ability, such as the ability to recognize an object; (3) that mind could not merely be a (material) cause that is apt to bring about a certain range of behaviors; and (4) that recent empirical investigations reveal new problems and new evidence that should compel advocates of causal functionalism (of the sort (...)
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  13. Eric LaRock (2001). Dualistic Interaction, Neural Dependence, and Aquinas's Composite View. Philosophia Christi 3 (2):459-472.score: 240.0
    I explicate the Churchland's dualistic interaction and neural dependence objections to Cartesian dualism and argue that Aquinas’s conception of Aristotelian hylomorphism provides a way out of those objections. -/- .
     
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