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Profile: Eric Funkhouser (University of Arkansas, Fayetteville)
  1. Eric Funkhouser, Practical Self-­Deception.
    Philosophical accounts of self-­‐deception almost invariably treat it as a phenomenon concerning belief. But this article argues that, in the very same sense that we can be self-­‐deceived about belief, we can be self-­‐deceived about matters that concern our practical identities — e.g., our desires, emotions, values, and lifestyles. Given that our practical identities are at least as important as our status as believers, philosophical accounts of self-­‐deception should accommodate such practical self-­‐deception.
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  2. Eric Funkhouser (2009). Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 341-369.
    In traditional Frankfurt cases some conditions that make an outcome unavoidable fail to bring about that outcome. These are cases of causal preemption. I defend this interpretation of traditional Frankfurt cases, and its application to free will, against a dilemma raised by various libertarians. But I go on to argue that Frankfurt cases involving gen- uine (symmetric) causal overdetermination are even more effective at achieving the compatibilist’s purposes. Such cases avoid the “flicker of freedom” debate and better display the central (...)
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  3. Eric Funkhouser (2009). Self-Deception and the Limits of Folk Psychology. Social Theory and Practice 35 (1):1-13.
    This article considers the product of self-deception. Many assume, or argue, that the product of self-deception is a belief. I argue against this being a general truth by outlining some of the ways in which the self-deceived can be deeply conflicted, such that there is no fact of the matter concerning what they believe. These situations are not adequately addressed by many accounts of self-deception. Further, I argue that this task requires going beyond our folk psychological classifications.
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  4. Eric Funkhouser & Shannon Spaulding (2009). Imagination and Other Scripts. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):291-314.
    One version of the Humean Theory of Motivation holds that all actions can be causally explained by reference to a belief–desire pair. Some have argued that pretense presents counter-examples to this principle, as pretense is instead causally explained by a belief-like imagining and a desire-like imagining. We argue against this claim by denying imagination the power of motivation. Still, we allow imagination a role in guiding action as a script . We generalize the script concept to show how things besides (...)
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  5. Eric Funkhouser (2007). A Liberal Conception of Multiple Realizability. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):467-494.
    While the concept of multiple realizability is widely used, it is seldom rigorously characterized. This paper defends a liberal conception of multiple realizability as sameness of type through _any_ differences in the (lower-level) conditions that give rise to instances of that type. This kind of “sameness through difference” is contrasted with another type of asymmetric dependency relation between properties, multiple _specification_. This liberal conception is then defended from objections, and it is augmented by a concept of relativized multiple realizability. The (...)
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  6. Eric Funkhouser (2007). Multiple Realizability. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):303–315.
    b>: This article explains the concept of multiple realizability and its role in the philosophy of mind. In particular, I consider what is required for the multiple realizability of psychological kinds, the relevance of multiple realizability to the reducibility and autonomy of psychology, as well as further refinements of the concept that would prove helpful.
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  7. Eric Funkhouser (2006). Comments on David Palmer's "Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Determinism. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (2):91-93.
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  8. Eric Funkhouser (2006). Comments on David Palmer's. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (2):91-93.
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  9. Eric Funkhouser (2006). On Privileging God's Moral Goodness. Faith and Philosophy 23 (4):409-422.
    Prima facie, there is an incompatibility between God’s alleged omnipotence and impeccability. I argue that this incompat- ibility is more than prima facie. Attempts to avoid this appearance of incompatibility by allowing that there are commonplace states of affairs that an omnipotent being cannot bring about are unsuc- cessful. Instead, we should accept that God is not omnipotent. This is acceptable since it is a mistake to hold that omnipotence is a perfection. God’s moral perfection should be privileged over God’s (...)
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  10. Eric Funkhouser (2006). The Determinable-Determinate Relation. Noûs 40 (3):548–569.
    The properties colored and red stand in a special relation. Namely, red is a determinate of colored, and colored is determinable relative to red. Many other properties are similarly related. The determination relation is an interesting topic of logical investigation in its own right, and the prominent philosophical inquiries into this relation have, accordingly, operated at a high level of abstraction.1 It is time to return to these investigations, not just as a logical amusement, but for the payoffs such investigation (...)
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  11. Eric Funkhouser (2005). Do the Self-Deceived Get What They Want? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):295-312.
    Two of the most basic questions regarding self-deception remain unsettled: What do self-deceivers want? What do self-deceivers get? I argue that self-deceivers are motivated by a desire to believe. However, in significant contrast with Alfred Mele’s account of self-deception, I argue that self-deceivers do not satisfy this desire. Instead, the end-state of self-deception is a false higher-order belief. This shows all self-deception to be a failure of self-knowledge.
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  12. Eric Funkhouser (2004). Review of Anna-Sofia Maurin, If Tropes. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (2).
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  13. Eric Funkhouser (2003). Willing Belief and the Norm of Truth. Philosophical Studies 115 (2):179-95.
    Bernard Williams has argued that, because belief aims at getting the truth right, it is a conceptual truth that we cannot directly will to believe. Manyothers have adopted Williams claim that believers necessarily respect truth-conducive reasons and evidence. By presenting increasingly stronger cases, I argue that, on the contrary, believers can quite consciously disregard the demand for truth-conducive reasons and evidence. The irrationality of those who would directly will to believe is not any greater than that displayed by some actual (...)
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  14. Eric Funkhouser (2002). Three Varieties of Causal Overdetermination. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4):335-351.
    Causal overdetermination worries arise in a number of domains, but most notably in the philosophy of mind. ln discussions of such worries, alleged examples of causal overdetermination are uniformly viewed as primajzcie problematic. While all alleged cases of overdetermination might (or might not) be problematic, I aim to show that they are so for different reasons. Examples of causal overdetermination neatly divide into three varieties, corresponding to the connections between the mechanisms and the properties of the causes. Future debates over (...)
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