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Resnik presents a position in the philosophy of mathematics that combines realism, naturalism, and structuralism. The book is well written and, much to Resnik’s credit, it does not rely on sophisticated mathematics to make its philosophical points. Part 1, “Problems and Positions,” explains Resnik’s mathematical realism, argues that indispensability arguments provide a justification for it, and provides cogent criticism of antirealist alternatives that try to undermine such arguments. Part 2, “.

Postmodern theorists have proposed startling claims about the nature of science. The Strong Programme in the sociology of knowledge argues that it is illegitimate to use evaluative notions, like truth and falsity, in analyzing why a scientific community accepts some theories while rejecting others. This thesis suggests that political and social factors play decisive roles in the justification of our scientific beliefs. Others argue that science is based on men’s ways of knowing and that we need to develop a new (...) science based on women’s ways of knowing. The general approach to science in the work of these postmodernists is to argue that science is not a privileged way of understanding the world but a socially constructed enterprise that can be criticized in a manner similar to the way in which we might criticize other social institutions like governments or professional sports organizations. (shrink)

Maddy’s book is an examination of an important question for the philosophy of mathematics: what justifies the axioms of set theory? In part 1, entitled “The Problem,” Maddy provides a summary of the philosophical and mathematical beginnings of set theory and highlights the importance that certain questions play in current debates about the foundations of the theory. Part 2, “Realism,” reviews three versions of mathematical realism and gives reasons for abandoning these views. Part 3, “Naturalism,” furnishes a look at Maddy’s (...) new philosophy of mathematics, Mathematical Naturalism, and explains the way it diagnoses the problem of justifying new axioms. (shrink)

In his new book, Friedman tackles the common interpretation of logical positivism that describes the movement as a radically empiricist philosophy. He claims that fully to understand logical positivism we must view it in its historical context. Logical positivism does have roots in empiricism, but it is also descended from Kant. Indeed, the questions that were of central importance to the positivists are clearly Kantian. Moreover, the early positivists were active participants in a philosophical community with neo-Kantians and phenomenologists. Friedman (...) argues that the legacy of positivism is a new conception of a priori knowledge and its role in empirical science and not a new version of empiricism. (shrink)

Epistemological realism is the view that it is logically and nomologically possible for a person to have a warrant for believing in a scientific theory. Anti-realism is the negation of this position. Kukla asks if there are any arguments that would rationally compel us to become realists or anti-realists. His conclusion is depressing: the conflict is an irreproachable irreconcilability. It is irreproachable because neither side has made an error of logic or fact in reaching their opinions and it is irreconcilable (...) since there are no facts that can or should persuade a person to switch from belief in one to belief in the other. The failure to produce any completely successful argument combined with the fact that there has been a generation of intensive arguments about realism suggests that we should be prepared for the debate to end in stalemate. (shrink)

Book reviewed:Jerrold J. Katz, Semantic Theory.

Cartwright’s self-proclaimed philosophical heritage includes Aristotle and Otto Neurath. Her Aristotelianism includes the view that the aim of science is the identification of the capacities of things in nature. From Neurath she takes a “patchwork” view of theories according to which theories do not fit into an unified whole in which higher-order sciences reduce, in some way, to lower-order sciences. Instead, theories work for particular kinds of phenomena and there is no guarantee that any theory will work outside of those (...) situations for which it was constructed. Cartwright maintains that theories and laws may provide true descriptions of the world, but no one theory or set of laws is universal. She argues that, since laws and theories are not universal, all laws are ceteris paribus. The achievement of science does not rest on knowledge of laws, but knowledge of the capacities that the things in the world possess. (shrink)

The “culture wars” include debates about the “social construction” of X, where X includes, but is not limited to, quarks, the child viewer of television, and Zulu nationalism. Ian Hacking, with his usual erudition and style, analyzes the nature of “social construction” and uncovers the political and philosophical issues that drive these debates. Unlike most of the books associated with these “wars,” Hacking's book is not polemical, but rather attempts to understand the nature of the conflict without taking up sides.