9 found
  1. Eric Hiddleston (2005). A Causal Theory of Counterfactuals. Noûs 39 (4):632–657.
    I develop an account of counterfactual conditionals using “causal models”, and argue that this account is preferable to the currently standard account in terms of “similarity of possible worlds” due to David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. I diagnose the attraction of counterfactual theories of causation, and argue that it is illusory.
    Direct download (7 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  2.  80
    Eric Hiddleston (2011). Second-Order Properties and Three Varieties of Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 153 (3):397 - 415.
    This paper investigates whether there is an acceptable version of Functionalism that avoids commitment to second-order properties. I argue that the answer is "no". I consider two reductionist versions of Functionalism, and argue that both are compatible with multiple realization as such. There is a more specific type of multiple realization that poses difficulties for these views, however. The only apparent Functionalist solution is to accept second-order properties.
    Direct download (8 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  3.  63
    Eric Hiddleston (2005). Causal Powers. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):27-59.
    Nancy Cartwright offers an account of causal powers, and argues that it explains some important general features of scientific method. Patricia Cheng argues that this theory is superior as a psychological theory of learning to standard models of conditioning. I extend and develop the theory, and argue that it provides the best explanation of a number of problem cases for philosophical theories of causation, including preemption, overdetermination and puzzles about transitivity. Hitchcock and Halpern & Pearl on ‘actual causes’ Problems and (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  4.  10
    Eric Hiddleston (2011). Reductionism and the Micro-Macro Mirroring Thesis. Synthese 181 (2):209 - 226.
    This paper concerns reductionist views about psychology and the special sciences more generally. I identify a metaphysical assumption in reductionist views which I dub the 'Micro-Macro Mirroring Thesis'. The Mirroring Thesis says that the relation between the entities of any legitimate higher-level science and their lowerlevel realizers is similar to that between the entities of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. I argue that reductionism implies the Thesis, and that the Thesis is not a priori. It is more difficult to tell whether (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography  
  5.  15
    Eric Hiddleston (2005). Timothy O'Connor, Persons and Causes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Noûs 39 (3):541–556.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography  
  6. Eric Hiddleston (2005). Critical Notice: Timothy O'Connor, Persons and Causes. Noûs 39 (3):541-56.
  7. Eric Hiddleston (2005). Critical Notice: Timothy O'Connor, Persons and Causes. Noûs 39 (3):541-56.
  8. Eric Hiddleston (2001). Causation and Causal Relevance. Dissertation, Cornell University
    I argue against counterfactual theories of causation , develop a pragmatic version of the Covering Law view, and offer a causal theory of counterfactuals. ;The initial idea of CTCs is that event a causes event b if b would not have occurred, if a had not occurred. David Lewis proposes this view as a solution to problems of "effects" and "epiphenomena". I argue that CTCs cannot solve these problems. Covering Law theories can, but only by rejecting traditional Humean accounts of (...)
    Export citation  
    My bibliography  
  9. Eric Hiddleston, Humean Supervenience, Chance, and Magic.
    Export citation  
    My bibliography