25 found
Sort by:
  1. Eric Lormand, Self-Defense: A Practical Guide.
    On September 11th, an apparent gang of nineteen people set to work, equipped with the little tools you use to unseal the tape on cardboard boxes. About an hour later, they destroyed several giant buildings and four jumbo airplanes, murdering several thousand people from all over the world and from all walks of life.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Eric Lormand, smOTHERed VOICES in The A2 News.
    Most Americans believe what our media tell them, that Israel is a nation under attack by Palestinians. That is a lie. The truth is that Israel is a nation bent on driving Palestinians from their land through economic hardship, confiscation, humiliation, intimidation, and by killing them. Israel has maintained a brutal and illegal occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip for decades, not unlike the German occupation of Europe during World War II.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Eric Lormand, What Wouldn�T Jesus Do?
    That�s how we ought to think about Jesus. It�s usually agreed by both Christians and non Christians, even by vehement anti-Christians, that Jesus as presented in the four gospels is perfectly ideal, morally. Many of his most simple teachings (e.g., the "Golden Rule") seem brilliant, and many of the actions that seem most natural to him (e.g., seeking to forgive those who crucify him because "they know not what they do") are, at times, amazing. But we should scour the record (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Eric Lormand, But Momma Never Told Me About Philosophy Papers.
    Besides coming up with something interesting to think about and to say, there is one primary secret to writing a good philosophy paper. But it wouldn’t be much of a secret if I told you, would it? No … wait … it’s..
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Eric Lormand, Connectionist Content.
    If the arguments of chapter 1 are correct, associationist connectionist models (such as ultralocal ones) yield the clearest alternatives to the LOT hypothesis. While it may be that such models cannot provide a general account of cognition, they may account for important aspects of cognition, such as low-level perception (e.g., with the interactive activation model of reading) or the mechanisms which distinguish experts from novices at a given skill (e.g., with dependency-network models). Since these models stand a fighting chance of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Eric Lormand, Connectionist Languages of Thought.
    Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) have presented an influential argument to the effect that any viable connectionist account of human cognition must implement a language of thought. Their basic strategy is to argue that connectionist models that do not implement a language of thought fail to account for the systematic relations among propositional attitudes. Several critics of the LOT hypothesis have tried to pinpoint flaws in Fodor and Pylyshyn’s argument (Smolensky 1989; Clark, 1989; Chalmers, 1990; Braddon-Mitchell and Fitzpatrick, 1990). One thing (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Eric Lormand, How to (Start a) Search for Truth.
    Meet longtime Tarot reader and renowned occultist Renée O’Cards. Wracked with guilt over her epistemic irresponsibility, seized with fear of being deceived by a malignant demon, and prone to escape into sleep and dreams for unknown time periods, she turns to the consolation of First Philosophy.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Eric Lormand, Pshaw!
    Since my proposed framework for meaning (in Holist" and Atomist") is neither simply a psychosemantic holism nor simply a psychosemantic atomism, but a marriage in which the two have become one, we might call it a psychosemantic holism-atomism wedlock (PSHAW). In this paper I want to.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Eric Lormand, Function: Under Construction.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Eric Lormand (2005). Phenomenal Impressions. In T.S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oup. 316--353.
  11. Eric Lormand (2004). The Explanatory Stopgap. Philosophical Review 113 (3):303-57.
    Is there an explanatory gap between raw feels and raw material? Some philosophers argue, and many other people believe, that scientific explanations of conscious experience cannot be as satisfying as typical scientific explanations elsewhere, even in our wildest dreams. The underlying philosophical claims are.
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Eric Lormand (2000). Comments on "a Neurofunctional Theory of Visual Consciousness". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):260-266.
  13. Eric Lormand (2000). Shoemaker and "Inner Sense". Philosophical Topics 28 (2):147-170.
    In the last of his three Royce Lectures called "Self‑Knowledge and 'Inner Sense'", Sydney Shoemaker attempts to reconcile two commitments: (1) that experiences have "qualia", nonrepresentational features that constitute what it is like to have the experiences, and (2) that perceptual experiences seem "diaphanous", yielding to introspection only the way they represent the environment, not intrinsic or otherwise nonrepresentational qualia. On the idea that we internally sense qualia�that we sense what our experiences are like�one way to explain apparent diaphanousness is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Eric Lormand, Steps Toward a Science of Consciousness?
    "Beats the heck out of me! I have some prejudices, but no idea of how to begin to look for a defensible answer. And neither does anyone else." That’s the discussion of conscious experience offered by one of our most brilliant and readable psychologists, in his new 650-page book, modestly titled How the Mind Works. There is no widely accepted scientific program for researching consciousness. Speculation on the subject has been considered safe, careerwise, mainly for moonlighting physicists or physiologists whose (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Eric Lormand (1998). The Frame Problem. In Robert A. Wilson & Frank F. Keil (eds.), Mit Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (Mitecs). Mit Press.
    From its humble origins labeling a technical annoyance for a particular AI formalism, the term "frame problem" has grown to cover issues confronting broader research programs in AI. In philosophy, the term has come to encompass allegedly fundamental, but merely superficially related, objections to computational models of mind in AI and beyond.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Eric Lormand (1996). Consciousness. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
    Philosophers have used the term ‘consciousness’ for four main topics: knowledge in general, intentionality, introspection (and the knowledge it specifically generates) and phenomenal experience (sections 1-2). This entry discusses the last two uses (see other entries on the former two). Something within one’s mind is ‘introspectively conscious’ just in case one introspects it (or is poised to do so). Introspection is often thought to deliver one’s primary knowledge of one’s mental life. An experience or other mental entity is ‘phenomenally conscious’ (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Eric Lormand (1996). How to Be a Meaning Holist. Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):51-73.
    Meaning holists hold, roughly, that each representation in a linguistic or mental system depends semantically on every other representation in the system. The main difficulty for holism is the threat it poses to meaning stability--shared meaning between representations in two systems. If meanings are holistically dependent, then semantic differences anywhere seem to balloon into semantic differences everywhere. My positive aim is to show how holism, even at its most extreme, can accommodate and also increase meaning stability. My negative aim is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Eric Lormand, Inner Sense Until Proven Guilty.
    Can one sense one’s own mind, as one senses nonmental entities in one’s environment and body? According to many contemporary philosophers of mind, the fraudulent commonsense idea of a "mind’s eye" obstructs clearheaded attempts to explain introspection and consciousness. I concede that inner sense cannot directly explain consciousness and introspection in all their forms, but I do think a carefully specified kind of inner sense can account for one very special kind of introspective consciousness. It is special because it is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Eric Lormand (1996). Nonphenomenal Consciousness. Noûs 30 (2):242-61.
    There is not a uniform kind of consciousness common to all conscious mental states: beliefs, emotions, perceptual experiences, pains, moods, verbal thoughts, and so on. Instead, we need a distinction between phenomenal and nonphenomenal consciousness. As if consciousness simpliciter were not mysterious enough, philosophers have recently focused their worries on phenomenal (or qualitative) consciousness, the kind that explains or constitutes there being "something it.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Eric Lormand, What Qualitative Consciousness is Like.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Eric Lormand (1994). Qualia! (Now Showing at a Theater Near You). Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):127-156.
    Despite such widespread acclaim, there are some influential theater critics who have panned Qualia!
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Eric Lormand (1994). The Holorobophobe's Dilemma. In Kenneth M. Ford & Z. Pylylshyn (eds.), The Robot's Dilemma Revisited. Ablex. 61--88.
    Much research in AI (and cognitive science, more broadly) proceeds on the assumption that there is a difference between being well-informed and being smart. Being well-informed has to do, roughly, with the content of one’s representations--with their truth and the range of subjects they cover. Being smart, on the other hand, has to do with one’s ability to process these representations and with packaging them in a form that allows them to be processed efficiently. The main theoretical concern of artificial (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Eric Lormand (1991). Classical and Connectionist Models. Dissertation, Mit
    Much of the philosophical interest of cognitive science stems from its potential relevance to the mind/body problem. The mind/body problem concerns whether both mental and physical phenomena exist, and if so, whether they are distinct. In this chapter I want to portray the classical and connectionist frameworks in cognitive science as potential sources of evidence for or against a particular strategy for solving the mind/body problem. It is not my aim to offer a full assessment of these two frameworks in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Eric Lormand (1990). Framing the Frame Problem. Synthese 82 (3):353-74.
    The frame problem is widely reputed among philosophers to be one of the deepest and most difficult problems of cognitive science. This paper discusses three recent attempts to display this problem: Dennett's problem of ignoring obviously irrelevant knowledge, Haugeland's problem of efficiently keeping track of salient side effects, and Fodor's problem of avoiding the use of kooky concepts. In a negative vein, it is argued that these problems bear nothing but a superficial similarity to the frame problem of AI, so (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Eric Lormand (1985). Toward a Theory of Moods. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):385-407.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation