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Profile: Eric Marcus (Auburn University)
  1. Eric Marcus, Defending Naïve Realism About Mental Properties.
    _metaphysically transparent_: we do not arrive at a better understanding of the realm of facts that make such talk true or false when we abandon ordinary mental concepts in favor of naturalistic concepts—or, for that matter, in favor of supernaturalistic concepts, although _super_naturalism will not be my concern here. Rather, it is ordinary mental concepts themselves that provide the best framework for understanding the metaphysics of mind. In this essay, I will be concerned just with naïve realism about mental _properties_. (...)
     
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  2. Eric Marcus (2013). Summary. Analysis 73 (3):499-501.
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  3. Eric Marcus (2012). Rational Causation. Harvard University Press.
  4. Eric Marcus (2010). Life and Action. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):749-751.
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  5. Eric Marcus (2009). Why There Are No Token States. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:215-241.
    The thesis that mental states are physical states enjoys widespread popularity. After the abandonment of typeidentity theories, however, this thesis has typically been framed in terms of state tokens. I argue that token states are a philosopher’s fiction, and that debates about the identity of mental and physical state tokens thus rest on a mistake.
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  6. Eric Marcus (2006). Events, Sortals, and the Mind-Body Problem. Synthese 150 (1):99-129.
    In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about object-identity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are token identical (...)
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  7. Eric Marcus (2006). Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339.
    There has been much written in recent years about whether a pair of subjects could have visual experiences that represented the colors of objects in their environment in precisely the same way, despite differing significantly in what it was like to undergo them, differing that is, in their qualitative character. The possibility of spectrum inversion has been so much debated1 in large part because of the threat that it would pose to the more general doctrine of Intentionalism, according to which (...)
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  8. Eric Marcus (2005). Mental Causation in a Physical World. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):27-50.
    Abstract: It is generally accepted that the most serious threat to the possibility of mental causation is posed by the causal self-sufficiency of physical causal processes. I argue, however, that this feature of the world, which I articulate in principle I call Completeness, in fact poses no genuine threat to mental causation. Some find Completeness threatening to mental causation because they confuse it with a stronger principle, which I call Closure. Others do not simply conflate Completeness and Closure, but (...)
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  9. Eric Marcus (2004). Why Zombies Are Inconceivable. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):477-90.
    I argue that zombies are inconceivable. More precisely, I argue that the conceivability-intuition that is used to demonstrate their possibility has been misconstrued. Thought experiments alleged to feature zombies founder on the fact that, on the one hand, they _must_ involve first-person imagining, and yet, on the other hand, _cannot_. Philosophers who take themselves to have imagined zombies have unwittingly conflated imagining a creature who lacks consciousness with imagining a creature without also imagining the consciousness it may or may not (...)
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  10. Eric Marcus (2001). Mental Causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):57 - 83.
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  11. Eric Marcus (2001). Mental Causation: Unnaturalized but Not Unnatural. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):57-83.
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  12. Eric Marcus (2000). On the Sortal Dependence of Event Identity. Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):83-89.
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