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Profile: Eric Schwitzgebel (University of California, Riverside)
Profile: Eric Schwitzgebel (University of California, Riverside)
  1. Eric Schwitzgebel (forthcoming). 2010: Belief. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  2. Eric Schwitzgebel (forthcoming). Consciousness and the Self.
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  3. Eric Schwitzgebel (forthcoming). If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious. Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    If you’re a materialist, you probably think that rabbits are conscious. And you ought to think that. After all, rabbits are a lot like us, biologically and neurophysiologically. If you’re a materialist, you probably also think that conscious experience would be present in a wide range of naturally-evolved alien beings behaviorally very similar to us even if they are physiologically very different. And you ought to think that. After all, to deny it seems insupportable Earthly chauvinism. But a materialist who (...)
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  4. Eric Schwitzgebel (2014). The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind. Philosophical Explorations.:1-18.
    The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2014.910675.
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  5. James Konow, Eric Schwitzgebel, Cristina Bicchieri, Jason Dana & María Jiménez-Buedo (2013). Experiments In Economics And Philosophy. Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):151-153.
    Not so long ago, many economists and philosophers felt that their disciplines had no use for experimental methods. An experimental study was, by its nature, ‘not economics’ or ‘not philosophy’ – psychology maybe. Opinion has changed dramatically. This issue of Economics and Philosophy represents a collection of recent contributions to experimental research that explicitly deal with empirical findings or methodological questions in the intersection of the two disciplines. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first such collection dedicated (...)
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  6. Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel (2013). Knowing That P Without Believing That P. Noûs 47 (2):371-384.
    Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P. Accordingly, (...)
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  7. Joshua Rust & Eric Schwitzgebel (2013). Ethicists' and Nonethicists' Responsiveness to Student E‐Mails: Relationships Among Expressed Normative Attitude, Self‐Described Behavior, and Empirically Observed Behavior. Metaphilosophy 44 (3):350-371.
    Do professional ethicists behave any morally better than other professors do? Do they show any greater consistency between their normative attitudes and their behavior? In response to a survey question, a large majority of professors (83 percent of ethicists, 83 percent of nonethicist philosophers, and 85 percent of nonphilosophers) expressed the view that “not consistently responding to student e-mails” is morally bad. A similarly large majority of professors claimed to respond to at least 95 percent of student e-mails. These professors, (...)
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  8. Eric Schwitzgebel (2013). Are Ethicists Any More Likely to Pay Their Registration Fees at Professional Meetings? Economics and Philosophy 29 (3):371-380.
    Lists of paid registrants at Pacific Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association from 2006–2008 were compared with lists of people appearing as presenters, commentators or chairs on the meeting programme those same years. These were years in which fee payment depended primarily on an honour system rather than on enforcement. Seventy-four per cent of ethicist participants and 76% of non-ethicist participants appear to have paid their meeting registration fees: not a statistically significant difference. This finding of no difference survives (...)
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  9. Eric Schwitzgebel (2013). Précis: Perplexities of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1161-1163.
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  10. Eric Schwitzgebel (2013). Reply to Kriegel, Smithies, and Spener. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1195-1206.
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  11. Eric Schwitzgebel & Joshua Rust (2013). The Moral Behavior of Ethics Professors: Relationships Among Self-Reported Behavior, Expressed Normative Attitude, and Directly Observed Behavior. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-35.
    Do philosophy professors specializing in ethics behave, on average, any morally better than do other professors? If not, do they at least behave more consistently with their expressed values? These questions have never been systematically studied. We examine the self-reported moral attitudes and moral behavior of 198 ethics professors, 208 non-ethicist philosophers, and 167 professors in departments other than philosophy on eight moral issues: academic society membership, voting, staying in touch with one's mother, vegetarianism, organ and blood donation, responsiveness to (...)
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  12. Eric Schwitzgebel (2012). Introspection, What? In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 29--48.
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  13. Eric Schwitzgebel (2012). Mad Belief? Neuroethics 5 (1):13-17.
    “Mad belief” (in analogy with Lewisian “mad pain”) would be a belief state with none of the causal role characteristic of belief—a state not caused or apt to have been caused by any of the sorts of events that usually cause belief and involving no disposition toward the usual behavioral or other manifestations of belief. On token-functionalist views of belief, mad belief in this sense is conceptually impossible. Cases of delusion—or at least some cases of delusion—might be cases of belief (...)
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  14. Eric Schwitzgebel (2012). Self-Ignorance. In JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self. Cambridge University Press.
    Philosophers tend to be pretty impressed by human self-knowledge. Descartes (1641/1984) thought our knowledge of our own stream of experience was the secure and indubitable foundation upon which to build our knowledge of the rest of the world. Hume – who was capable of being skeptical about almost anything – said that the only existences we can be certain of are our own sensory and imagistic experiences (1739/1978, p. 212). Perhaps the most prominent writer on self-knowledge in contemporary philosophy is (...)
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  15. Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman (2012). Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers. Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153.
    We examined the effects of order of presentation on the moral judgments of professional philosophers and two comparison groups. All groups showed similar-sized order effects on their judgments about hypothetical moral scenarios targeting the doctrine of the double effect, the action-omission distinction, and the principle of moral luck. Philosophers' endorsements of related general moral principles were also substantially influenced by the order in which the hypothetical scenarios had previously been presented. Thus, philosophical expertise does not appear to enhance the stability (...)
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  16. Eric Schwitzgebel, Joshua Rust, Linus Ta-Lun Huang, Alan T. Moore & Justin Coates (2012). Ethicists' Courtesy at Philosophy Conferences. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):331-340.
    If philosophical moral reflection tends to promote moral behavior, one might think that professional ethicists would behave morally better than do socially comparable non-ethicists. We examined three types of courteous and discourteous behavior at American Philosophical Association conferences: talking audibly while the speaker is talking (versus remaining silent), allowing the door to slam shut while entering or exiting mid-session (versus attempting to close the door quietly), and leaving behind clutter at the end of a session (versus leaving one's seat tidy). (...)
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  17. Russell Hurlburt & Eric Schwitzgebel (2011). Little or No Experience Outside of Attention? Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):234.
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  18. Russell Hurlburt & Eric Schwitzgebel (2011). Methodological Pluralism, Armchair Introspection, and DES as the Epistemic Tribunal. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):253.
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  19. Russell Hurlburt & Eric Schwitzgebel (2011). Presuppositions and Background Assumptions. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):206-233.
     
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  20. Eric Schwitzgebel (2011). Knowing Your Own Beliefs. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (supplement):41-62.
    How do you know your own beliefs? And how well do you know them? The two questions are related. I’ll recommend a pluralist answer to the first question. The answer to the second question, I’ll suggest, varies depending on features of the case.
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  21. Eric Schwitzgebel (2011). Perplexities of Consciousness. A Bradford Book.
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  22. Eric Schwitzgebel (2011). The Philosophical and Psychological Context of DES. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):288-294.
     
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  23. Eric Schwitzgebel, Joshua Rust, Linus Ta-Lun Huang, Alan T. Moore & D. Justin Coates (2011). Ethicists' Courtesy at Philosophy Conferences. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):331 - 340.
    If philosophical moral reflection tends to promote moral behavior, one might think that professional ethicists would behave morally better than do socially comparable non-ethicists. We examined three types of courteous and discourteous behavior at American Philosophical Association conferences: talking audibly while the speaker is talking (versus remaining silent), allowing the door to slam shut while entering or exiting mid-session (versus attempting to close the door quietly), and leaving behind clutter at the end of a session (versus leaving one's seat tidy). (...)
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  24. Eric Schwitzgebel (2010). Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.
    People often sincerely assert or judge one thing (for example, that all the races are intellectually equal) while at the same time being disposed to act in a way evidently quite contrary to the espoused attitude (for example, in a way that seems to suggest an implicit assumption of the intellectual superiority of their own race). Such cases should be regarded as ‘in-between’ cases of believing, in which it's neither quite right to ascribe the belief in question nor quite right (...)
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  25. Eric Schwitzgebel, Introspection. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  26. Eric Schwitzgebel & Joshua Rust (2010). Do Ethicists and Political Philosophers Vote More Often Than Other Professors? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):189-199.
    If philosophical moral reflection improves moral behavior, one might expect ethics professors to behave morally better than socially similar non-ethicists. Under the assumption that forms of political engagement such as voting have moral worth, we looked at the rate at which a sample of professional ethicists—and political philosophers as a subgroup of ethicists—voted in eight years’ worth of elections. We compared ethicists’ and political philosophers’ voting rates with the voting rates of three other groups: philosophers not specializing in ethics, political (...)
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  27. Eric Schwitzgebel (2009). Do Ethicists Steal More Books? Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):711-725.
    If explicit cognition about morality promotes moral behavior then one might expect ethics professors to behave particularly well. However, professional ethicists' behavior has never been empirically studied. The present research examined the rates at which ethics books are missing from leading academic libraries, compared to other philosophy books similar in age and popularity. Study 1 found that relatively obscure, contemporary ethics books of the sort likely to be borrowed mainly by professors and advanced students of philosophy were actually about 50% (...)
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  28. Eric Schwitzgebel, When Our Eyes Are Closed, What, If Anything, Do We Visually Experience? Draft Available on Author's Homepage; Final Version in 2011 Monograph.
    This chapter raises a number of questions, not adequately addressed by any researcher to date, about what we see when our eyes are closed. In the historical literature, the question most frequently discussed was what we see when our eyes are closed in the dark (and so entirely or almost entirely deprived of light). In 1819, Purkinje, who was the first to write extensively about this, says he sees "wandering cloudy stripes" that shrink slowly toward the center of the field. (...)
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  29. Eric Schwitzgebel & Joshua Rust (2009). The Moral Behaviour of Ethicists: Peer Opinion. Mind 118 (472):1043 - 1059.
    If philosophical moral reflection tends to improve moral behaviour, one might expect that professional ethicists will, on average, behave morally better than non-ethicists. One potential source of insight into the moral behaviour of ethicists is philosophers' opinions about ethicists' behaviour. At the 2007 Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, we used chocolate to entice 277 passers-by to complete anonymous questionnaires without their knowing the topic of those questionnaires in advance. Version I of the questionnaire asked respondents to compare, (...)
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  30. Eric Schwitzgebel (2008). Fidelo Leonore.
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  31. Eric Schwitzgebel (2008). Thoughts on Conjugal Love. In Fidelo Leonore.
    June 4, 2003 Two friends recently asked me to contribute something to their wedding ceremony. Since I’m a philosophy professor, I thought I would take the occasion to reflect a bit on the nature of conjugal love, the distinctive kind of love between a husband and wife. The common view that love is a feeling is, I think, quite misguided. Feelings come and go, while love is steady. Feelings are “passions” in the classic sense of ‘passion’ which shares a root (...)
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  32. Eric Schwitzgebel (2008). The Unreliability of Naive Introspection. Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.
    We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. Examples highlighted in this paper include: emotional experience, peripheral vision, and the phenomenology of thought. Philosophical foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward.
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  33. Eric Schwitzgebel & Josh Dever (2008). The Two Envelope Paradox and Using Variables Within the Expectation Formula. Sorites.
    You are presented with a choice between two envelopes. You know one envelope contains twice as much money as the other, but you don't know which contains more. You arbitrarily choose one envelope -- call it Envelope A -- but don't open it. Call the amount of money in that envelope X. Since your choice was arbitrary, the other envelope (Envelope B) is 50% likely to be the envelope with more and 50% likely to be the envelope with less. But, (...)
     
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  34. Russell T. Hurlburt & Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic. MIT Press.
    On a remarkably thin base of evidence – largely the spectral analysis of points of light – astronomers possess, or appear to possess, an abundance of knowledge about the structure and history of the universe. We likewise know more than might even have been imagined a few centuries ago about the nature of physical matter, about the mechanisms of life, about the ancient past. Enormous theoretical and methodological ingenuity has been required to obtain such knowledge; it does not invite easy (...)
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  35. Russell T. Hurlburt & Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). Part One Proponent Meets Skeptic. In Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic.
    On a remarkably thin base of evidence – largely the spectral analysis of points of light – astronomers possess, or appear to possess, an abundance of knowledge about the structure and history of the universe. We likewise know more than might even have been imagined a few centuries ago about the nature of physical matter, about the mechanisms of life, about the ancient past. Enormous theoretical and methodological ingenuity has been required to obtain such knowledge; it does not invite easy (...)
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  36. Russell Hurlburt & Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). Part Two The Interviews. In Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic. MIT Press.
    This chapter and the next five chapters – one for each sampling day – present annotated transcripts of our interviews with Melanie. We remind the reader of the context of the interviews. This was understood to be a private, personal exercise between Russ and <span class='Hi'>Eric</span> – the result of Russ saying to <span class='Hi'>Eric</span>, let’s you and I, who have publicly opposed positions, perform some sampling together and see what happens. Russ has long sampling experience, but perhaps he’s been (...)
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  37. Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic. The MIT Press.
    In this book the two discuss to what extent it is possible to describe our inner experience accurately.
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  38. Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). Do You Have Constant Tactile Experience of Your Feet in Your Shoes? Or is Experience Limited to What's in Attention? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):5-35.
    According to rich views of consciousness (e.g., James, Searle), we have a constant, complex flow of experience (or 'phenomenology') in multiple modalities simultaneously. According to thin views (e.g., Dennett, Mack and Rock), conscious experience is limited to one or a few topics, regions, objects, or modalities at a time. Existing introspective and empirical arguments on this issue (including arguments from 'inattentional blindness') generally beg the question. Participants in the present experiment wore beepers during everyday activity. When a beep sounded, they (...)
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  39. Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). Human Nature and Moral Education in Mencius, Xunzi, Hobbes, and Rousseau. History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (2):147 - 168.
    (2007) History of Philosophy Quarterly. 24, 147-168.
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  40. Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). No Unchallengeable Epistemic Authority, of Any Sort, Regarding Our Own Conscious Experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).
    Dennett argues that we can be mistaken about our own conscious experience. Despite this, he repeatedly asserts that we can or do have unchallengeable authority of some sort in our reports about that experience. This assertion takes three forms. First, Dennett compares our authority to the authority of an author over his fictional world. Unfortunately, that appears to involve denying that there are actual facts about experience that subjects may be truly or falsely reporting. Second, Dennett sometimes seems to say (...)
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  41. Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). No Unchallengeable Epistemic Authority, of Any Sort, Regarding Our Own Conscious Experience – Contra Dennett? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):107-113.
    Dennett argues that we can be mistaken about our own conscious experience. Despite this, he repeatedly asserts that we can or do have unchallengeable authority of some sort in our reports about that experience. This assertion takes three forms. First, Dennett compares our authority to the authority of an author over his fictional world. Unfortunately, that appears to involve denying that there are actual facts about experience that subjects may be truly or falsely reporting. Second, Dennett sometimes seems to say (...)
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  42. Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). Describing Inner Experience? Conclusion. In Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic.
    <span class='Hi'>Melanie</span> makes a number of interesting claims in these interviews – claims which, if true, reveal much about one person’s stream of conscious experience. But the question is, are her claims true? What license do we have to believe them? In my mind, this is the first and most central question that must be answered. Let’s grant this from the outset: <span class='Hi'>Melanie</span> is a sincere and conscientious subject, Russ a careful and evenhanded interviewer. What they deliver is probably (...)
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  43. Eric Schwitzgebel, Belief. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  44. Eric Schwitzgebel (2006). Do Things Look Flat? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):589-599.
    Does a penny viewed at an angle in some sense look elliptical, as though projected on a two-dimensional surface? Many philosophers have said such things, from Malebranche (1674/1997) and Hume (1739/1978), through early 20th-century sense-data theorists, to Tye (2000) and Noë (2004). I confess that it doesn't seem this way to me, though I'm somewhat baffled by the phenomenology and pessimistic about our ability to resolve the dispute. I raise geometrical complaints against the view and conjecture that views of this (...)
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  45. Eric Schwitzgebel (2005). Difference Tone Training: A Demonstration Adapted From Titchener's Experimental Psychology. Psyche 11 (6).
  46. Eric Schwitzgebel (2004). Introspective Training Apprehensively Defended: Reflections on Titchener's Lab Manual. In Anthony I. Jack (ed.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic. 11--7.
  47. Eric Schwitzgebel (2004). Introspective Training: Reflections on Titchener's Lab Manual. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7):58-76.
  48. Eric Schwitzgebel (2002). A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief. Noûs 36 (2):249-75.
    This paper describes and defends in detail a novel account of belief, an account inspired by Ryle's dispositional characterization of belief, but emphasizing irreducibly phenomenal and cognitive dispositions as well as behavioral dispositions. Potential externalist and functionalist objections are considered, as well as concerns motivated by the inevitably ceteris paribus nature of the relevant dispositional attributions. It is argued that a dispositional account of belief is particularly well-suited to handle what might be called "in-between" cases of believing - cases in (...)
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