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Profile: Eric Vogelstein (Duquesne University)
  1. Eric Vogelstein (2014). Competence and Ability. Bioethics 28 (5):235-244.
    It is nearly universally thought that the kind of decision-making competence that gives one a strong prima facie right to make one's own medical decisions essentially involves having an ability (or abilities) of some sort, or having a certain level or degree of ability (or abilities). When put under philosophical scrutiny, however, this kind of theory does not hold up. I will argue that being competent does not essentially involve abilities, and I will propose and defend a theory of decision-making (...)
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  2. Eric Vogelstein (2014). The Nature and Value of Bioethics Expertise. Bioethics 28 (9).
    In this article, I address the extent to which experts in bioethics can contribute to healthcare delivery by way of aid in clinical decision-making and policy-formation. I argue that experts in bioethics are moral experts, in that their substantive moral views are more likely to be correct than those of non-bioethicists, all else being equal, but that such expertise is of use in a relatively limited class of cases. In so doing, I respond to two recent arguments against the view (...)
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  3. Eric Vogelstein (2013). Moral Normativity. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1083-1095.
    It is a platitude that morality is normative, but a substantive and interesting question whether morality is normative in a robust and important way; and although it is often assumed that morality is indeed robustly normative, that view is by no means uncontroversial, and a compelling argument for it is conspicuously lacking. In this paper, I provide such an argument. I argue, based on plausible claims about the relationship between moral wrongs and moral criticizability, and the relationship between criticizability and (...)
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  4. Eric Vogelstein (2012). Subjective Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257.
    In recent years, the notion of a reason has come to occupy a central place in both metaethics and normative theory more broadly. Indeed, many philosophers have come to view reasons as providing the basis of normativity itself . The common conception is that reasons are facts that count in favor of some act or attitude. More recently, philosophers have begun to appreciate a distinction between objective and subjective reasons, where (roughly) objective reasons are determined by the facts, while subjective (...)
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  5. Eric Vogelstein (2011). Morality, Reasons, and Sentiments. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):421-432.
    Morality is commonly thought to be normative in a robust and important way. This is commonly cashed out in terms of normative reasons. It is also commonly thought that morality is necessarily and universally normative, i.e., that moral reasons are reasons for any possible moral agent. Taking these commonplaces for granted, I argue for a novel view of moral normativity. I challenge the standard view that moral reasons are reasons to act. I suggest that moral reasons are reasons for having (...)
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  6. Eric Vogelstein (2004). Religious Pluralism and Justified Christian Belief: A Reply to Silver. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55 (3):187-192.
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  7. Eric Vogelstein (2004). The Consistency of Plantinga's Argument Against Naturalism. Philo 7 (1):122-125.
    Matthew Tedesco has argued that Alvin Plantinga’s argument that belief in naturalistic evolution is self-defeating entails, according to a parallel argument, that theistic belief is self-defeating for the same reasons. I defend Plantinga against this charge by arguing that the parallel argument is unsound.
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