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Eric Wiland [23]Eric G. Wiland [1]Eric Gartner Wiland [1]
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Profile: Eric Wiland (University of Missouri, St. Louis)
  1. John Brunero & Eric Wiland (2013). Metaethics and Ethics. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  2. Eric Wiland (2012). Reasons. Continuum.
  3. Eric Wiland (2010). The Incoherence Objection in Moral Theory. Acta Analytica 25 (3):279-284.
    J.J.C. Smart famously complained that rule utilitarianism is incoherent, and that rule utilitarians are guilty of rule worship . Much has been said about whether Smart’s complaint is justified, but I will assume for the sake of argument that Smart was on to something. Instead, I have three other goals. First, I want to show that Smart’s complaint is a specific instance of a more general objection to a moral theory—what I will call the Incoherence Objection. Second, I want to (...)
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  4. Eric Wiland (2010). The Limits of Maximization. Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):99-116.
    A nagging problem for the consequentialist is the fact that a person who chooses the action-option that seems to her to maximize good consequences all toooften does not produce consequences as good as she would have produced had she thought about her decision in some other fashion. In response, indirect consequentialists typically recommend that one take advantage of whatever benefits the employment of a nonconsequentialist decision procedure may provide. But I argue here that the consequentialist cannot straightforwardly appropriate the decision (...)
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  5. Eric Wiland (2009). Book Reviews Shafer‐Landau, Russ , Ed. Oxford Studies in Metaethics . Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. 327. $39.95 (Paper). [REVIEW] Ethics 120 (1):202-205.
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  6. Eric Wiland (2008). On Indirectly Self-Defeating Moral Theories. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (3):384-393.
    Derek Parfit has notably argued that while a moral theory should not be directly self-defeating, there is nothing necessarily wrong with a moral theory that is only indirectly self-defeating. Here I resist this line of argument. I argue instead that indirectly self-defeating moral theories are indeed problematic. Parfit tries to sidestep the oddities of indirectly self-defeating theories by focusing on the choice of dispositions rather than actions. But the very considerations that can make it impossible to achieve a theory's aims (...)
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  7. Eric Wiland (2007). How Indirect Can Indirect Utilitarianism Be? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):275-301.
    Most act-utilitarians now reject the direct utilitarianism of Bentham. They do so because they are convinced of what I call the paradox of utilitarianism -- the thought that one cannot maximize happiness if one is trying to maximize happiness. Instead, they adopt some form of indirect utilitarianism (IU), arguing that the optimal decision procedure may differ markedly from the criterion of rightness for actions. Here I distinguish between six different versions of indirect utilitarianism, arguing that the weaker versions of IU (...)
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  8. Eric Wiland (2007). Intentional Action and "in Order To". Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):113-118.
    I. Thanks largely to Joshua Knobe, philosophers now frequently empirically investigate the folk psychological concept of intentional action. Knobe (2003, 2004a, 2004b) argues that application of this concept is often surprisingly sensitive to one’s moral views. In particular, it seems that people are much more willing to regard a bit of behavior as intentional, if they think that the action in question is bad or wrong. There is much controversy about both the design and the interpretation of the experiments Knobe (...)
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  9. Eric Wiland (2005). Monkeys, Typewriters, and Objective Consequentialism. Ratio 18 (3):352–360.
  10. Eric Wiland (2004). Trusting Advice and Weakness of Will. Social Theory and Practice 30 (3):371-389.
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  11. Eric Wiland (2003). Psychologism, Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):68–78.
    Psychologism is the view that practical reasons are psychological states. It is widely thought that psychologism is supported by the following principle governing explanation: TF. The difference between false and true beliefs on A's part cannot alter the form of the explanation which will be appropriate to A's actions. (TF) seems to imply that we always need to cite agents' beliefs when explaining their actions, no matter whether those beliefs are true or false. And this seems to vindicate psychologism. I (...)
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  12. Eric Wiland (2003). Some Advice for Moral Psychologists. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):299–310.
    Recently, philosophers have employed the notion of advice to tackle a variety of philosophical problems. In particular, Michael Smith and Nomy Arpaly have in different ways related the notion of advice to the notion of a reason for action. Here I argue that both accounts are flawed, because each operates with a simplistic picture of the way advice works. I conclude that it would be wise to take more time to analyze what advice is and how it in fact works, (...)
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  13. Eric G. Wiland (2003). Stories, Autobiographies, and Moral Inquiry. Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (2):188–198.
  14. Eric Wiland (2002). Theories of Practical Reason. Metaphilosophy 33 (4):450-467.
    Leading theories of practical reason can be grouped into one of four families: psychologism, realism, compatibilism, and Aristotelianism. Although there are many differences among the theories within each family, I ignore these in order to ask which family is most likely to deliver a satisfactory philosophical account of reasons for action. I articulate three requirements we should expect any adequate theory of practical reason to meet: it should account for how reasons explain action, how reasons justify action, and how an (...)
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  15. Eric Wiland (2002). 598 AUTHOR Jack Weir Patricia H. Werhane. Journal of Value Inquiry 36:597-598.
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  16. Eric Wiland (2002). On the Rationality of Desiring the Forbidden. Analysis 62 (4):296–299.
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  17. Eric Wiland (2001). Joseph Hamburger, John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control:John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control. Ethics 111 (3):637-638.
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  18. Eric Wiland (2000). Advice and Moral Objectivity. Philosophical Papers 29 (1):1-19.
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  19. Eric Wiland (2000). A Fallacy in Korsgaard's Argument for Moral Obligation. Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (1):103-104.
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  20. Eric Wiland (2000). Good Advice and Rational Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):561-569.
    This paper launches a new criticism of Michael Smith’s advice model of internalism. Whereas Robert Neal Johnson argues that Smith’s advice model collapses into the example model of internalism, the author contends that taking advice seriously pushes us instead toward some version of externalism. The advice model of internalism misportrays the logic of accepting advice. Agents do not have epistemic access to what their fully rational selves would advise them to do, and so it is necessary for a model of (...)
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  21. Eric Wiland (2000). Personal Identity and Quasi-Responsibility. In A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer. 77--87.
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  22. Eric Wiland (1999). Nicholas Smith, Strong Hermeneutics Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 19 (1):66-68.
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  23. Eric Wiland (1999). Nicholas Smith, Strong Hermeneutics. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 19:66-68.
     
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  24. Eric Wiland (1998). Is There Ethical Knowledge? Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):63-68.
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