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Erik Myin [34]Erik| Zahidi Myin [1]
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Profile: Erik Myin (University of Antwerp)
  1. Erik Myin, Towards an Analytic Phenomenology: The Concepts Of.
    In this paper, we present an account of phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is experience, and the problem of phenomenal consciousness is to explain how physical processes?behavioral, neural, computational?can produce experience. Numerous thinkers have argued that phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained in functional, neural or information-processing terms (e.g. Block 1990, 1994; Chalmers 1996). Different arguments have been put forward. For example, it has been argued that two individuals could be exactly alike in functional/computational/behavioral measures, but differ in the character of their (...)
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  2. Jan Degenaar & Erik Myin (forthcoming). Representation-Hunger Reconsidered. Synthese:1-10.
    According to a standard representationalist view cognitive capacities depend on internal content-carrying states. Recent alternatives to this view have been met with the reaction that they have, at best, limited scope, because a large range of cognitive phenomena—those involving absent and abstract features—require representational explanations. Here we challenge the idea that the consideration of cognition regarding the absent and the abstract can move the debate about representationalism along. Whether or not cognition involving the absent and the abstract requires the positing (...)
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  3. Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin (2014). Neural Representations Not Needed - No More Pleas, Please. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):241-256.
    Colombo (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2012) argues that we have compelling reasons to posit neural representations because doing so yields unique explanatory purchase in central cases of social norm compliance. We aim to show that there is no positive substance to Colombo’s plea—nothing that ought to move us to endorse representationalism in this domain, on any level. We point out that exposing the vices of the phenomenological arguments against representationalism does not, on its own, advance the case for representationalism (...)
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  4. Jan Degenaar & Erik Myin (2013). The Structure of Color Experience and the Existence of Surface Colors. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-17.
    Color experience is structured. Some ?unique? colors (red, green, yellow, and blue) appear as ?pure,? or containing no trace of any other color. Others can be considered as a mixture of these colors, or as ?binary colors.? According to a widespread assumption, this unique/binary structure of color experience is to be explained in terms of neurophysiological structuring (e.g., by opponent processes) and has no genuine explanatory basis in the physical stimulus. The argument from structure builds on these assumptions to argue (...)
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  5. Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin (2012). Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. The Mit Press.
    In this book, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition that holds that some kinds of minds -- basic minds -- are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of ...
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  6. Erik Myin & Karim Zahidi (2012). Uitgebreid, complementair, of omvattend? Het waar en het hoe van het mentale. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift Voor Wijsbegeerte 104 (3).
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  7. Erik| Zahidi Myin & Karim Zahidi (2012). Het bereik van het mentale. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 74 (1):103.
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  8. Ed Cooke & Erik Myin (2011). Is Trilled Smell Possible? How the Structure of Olfaction Determines the Phenomenology of Smell. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (11-12):59-95.
    Smell 'sensations' are among the most mysterious of conscious experiences, and have been cited in defense of the thesis that the character of perceptual experience is independent of the physical events that seem to give rise to it. Here we review the scientific literature on olfaction, and we argue that olfaction has a distinctive profile in relation to the other modalities, on four counts: in the physical nature of the stimulus, in the sensorimotor interactions that characterize its use, in the (...)
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  9. Erik Myin (2011). Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):295 - 299.
  10. Malika Auvray & Erik Myin (2009). Perception With Compensatory Devices: From Sensory Substitution to Sensorimotor Extension. Cognitive Science 33 (6):1036–1058.
    Sensory substitution devices provide through an unusual sensory modality (the substituting modality, e.g., audition) access to features of the world that are normally accessed through another sensory modality (the substituted modality, e.g., vision). In this article, we address the question of which sensory modality the acquired perception belongs to. We have recourse to the four traditional criteria that have been used to define sensory modalities: sensory organ, stimuli, properties, and qualitative experience (Grice, 1962), to which we have added the criteria (...)
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  11. Erik Myin & Daniel D. Hutto (2009). Enacting is Enough. Psyche 15 (1):24-30.
    In the action-space account of color, an emphasis is laid on implicit knowledge when it comes to experience, and explanatory ambitions are expressed. If the knowledge claims are interpreted in a strong way, the action-space account becomes a form of conservative enactivism, which is a kind of cognitivism. Only if the knowledge claims are weakly interpreted, the action space-account can be seen as a distinctive form of enactivism, but then all reductive explanatory ambitions must be abandoned.
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  12. Erik Myin & Johan Veldeman (2007). Yesterday Life, Tomorrow Consciousness?: The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach, Christof Koch . Englewood, CO: Roberts, 2004, (429 Pp; $45.00 Hbk; ISBN 0974707708). [REVIEW] Biological Theory 2 (4):424-427.
  13. J. Kevin O'Regan & Erik Myin (2007). Phenomenal Consciousness Lite: No Thanks! Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):520-521.
    The target article appeals to recent empirical data to support the idea that there is more to phenomenality than is available to access consciousness. However, this claim is based on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that some kind of cortical processing must be phenomenal. The article also considerably weakens Block's original distinction between a truly nonfunctional phenomenal consciousness and a functional access consciousness. The new form of phenomenal consciousness seems to be a poor-man's cognitive access.
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  14. Erik Myin & Lars De Nul (2006). Feelings and Objects. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
  15. J. Kevin O'Regan, Erik Myin & Alva Noë (2006). Skill, Corporality and Alerting Capacity in an Account of Sensory Consciousness. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.
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  16. Erik Myin (2005). Sensory Consciousness Explained (Better) in Terms of 'Corporality' and 'Alerting Capacity'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):369-387.
    How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do (...)
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  17. Erik Myin (2004). Peer Commentary on Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Quining Kinds of Content: The Primacy of Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):72-77.
  18. Erik Myin (2004). Quining Kinds of Content: The Primacy of Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):72-76.
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  19. Inez Myin-Germeys & Erik Myin (2004). Getting Real About Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):801-802.
    The idea that experience is essentially subjective rather than of the real world is paradoxical and deeply flawed. The external world is, much more than a mere constraint, essential to meaningfully describe experience and neural activity. This is illustrated by an analysis of the phenomenology of veridical perception and by the study of experience in psychopathology by the Experience Sampling Method (ESM).
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  20. Erik Myin (2003). An Account of Color Without a Subject? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):42-43.
    While color realism is endorsed, Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) case for it stretches the notion of “physical property” beyond acceptable bounds. It is argued that a satisfactory account of color should do much more to respond to antirealist intuitions that flow from the specificity of color experience, and a pointer to an approach that does so is provided.
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  21. Erik Myin & J. Kevin O'Regan (2002). Perceptual Consciousness, Access to Modality and Skill Theories: A Way to Naturalize Phenomenology? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (1):27-45.
  22. Erik Myin & Sonja Smets (2002). Could Dancing Be Coupled Oscillation? – The Interactive Approach to Linguistic Communication and Dynamical Systems Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (5):634-635.
    Although we applaud the interactivist approach to language and communication taken in the target article, we notice that Shanker & King (S&K) give little attention to the theoretical frameworks developed by dynamical system theorists. We point out how the dynamical idea of causality, viewed as multidirectional across multiple scales of organization, could further strengthen the position taken in the target article.
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  23. Bart Van Kerkhove & Erik Myin (2002). Direct Perception in Mathematics: A Case for Episemological Priority. Logique Et Analyse 45 (179-180):357-72.
     
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  24. Erik Myin (2001). Color and the Duplication Assumption. Synthese 129 (1):61-77.
    Susan Hurley has attacked the ''Duplication Assumption'', the assumption thatcreatures with exactly the same internal states could function exactly alike inenvironments that are systematically distorted. She argues that the dynamicalinterdependence of action and perception is highly problematic for the DuplicationAssumption when it involves spatial states and capacities, whereas no such problemsarise when it involves color states and capacities. I will try to establish that theDuplication Assumption makes even less sense for lightness than for some ofthe spatial cases. This is due (...)
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  25. Erik Myin (2001). Constrained Inversions of Sensations. Philosophica (Belgium) 68 (2):31-40.
    Inverted sensation arguments such as the inverted spectrum thought experiment are often criticized for relying on an unconstrained notion of 'qualia'. In reply to this criticism, 'qualia-free' arguments for inversion have been proposed, in which only physical changes happen: inversions in the world, such as the replacement of surface colors by their complements, and a rewiring of peripheral input cables to more central areas in the nervous system. I show why such constrained inversion arguments won't work. The first problem is (...)
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  26. Erik Myin (2001). Editorial Introduction. Synthese 129 (1):1-2.
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  27. Erik Myin (2001). Fragmentation, Coherence, and the Perception/Action Divide. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):231-231.
    I discuss Stoffregen & Bardy's theory from the perspective of the complementary aspect of input conflict, namely, imput coherence - the unity of perception. In a classical approach this leads to the famous The conceptual framework the authors construct leaves no space for a binding problem to arise. A remaining problem of perceptual conflict, arising in cases of inversion of the visual field can be handled by the theory the authors propose.
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  28. Kevin J. O'Regan, Erik Myin & No (2001). Toward an Analytic Phenomenology: The Concepts of "Bodiliness" and "Grabbiness". In A. Carsetti (ed.), Seeing and Thinking. Reflections on Kanizsa's Studies in Visual Cognition. Kluwer.
    In this paper, we present an account of phenomenal con- sciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is experience, and the _problem _of phenomenal consciousness is to explain how physical processes.
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  29. Erik Myin (2000). Direct Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW] Psycoloquy.
    One can distinguish the descriptive view of self-consciousness from the philosophical framework of the theory of nonconceptual content. Propositional attitudes can be ascribed without commitment to the existence of internal states that bear different species of content. The descriptive view can be coupled to this alternative view.
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  30. Erik Myin (2000). Two Sciences of Perception and Visual Art: Editorial Introduction to the Brussels Papers. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8-9):8-9.
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  31. Axel Cleeremans & Erik Myin (1999). A Short Review of Consciousness in Action by Susan Hurley. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 3:455-458.
    Consider Susan Hurley's depiction of mainstream views of the mind: "The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling" (p. 401). This particular sandwich (with perception as the bottom loaf and action as the top loaf) tastes foul to Hurley, who devotes most of "Consciousness in Action" to a systematic and sometimes extraordinarily detailed critique of what has otherwise been dubbed "classical" models of the mind. This critique then provides the basis for her alternative proposal, in which (...)
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  32. Erik Myin (1999). Beyond Intrinsicness and Dazzling Blacks. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6):964-965.
    Palmer's target article is surely one of the most scientifically detailed and knowledgeable treatments of spectrum inversion ever. Unfortunately, it is built on a very shaky philosophical foundation, the notion of the "intrinsic". In the article's ontology, there are two kinds of properties of mental states, intrinsic properties and relational properties. The whole point of the article is that these aspects of experience are mutually exclusive: the intrinsic is nonrelational and the relational is nonintrinsic.
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  33. Erik Myin (1998). Holism, Functionalism and Visual Awareness. Communication and Cognition 31 (1):3-19.
  34. Erik Myin (1998). Trading in Form for Content and Taking the Sting Out of the Mind-Body Problem. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):766-766.
    Analytical isomorphism is an instance of the demand for a transparent relation between vehicle and content, which is central to the mind-body problem. One can abandon transparency without begging the question with regard to the mind-body problem.
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  35. Erik Myin (1993). Some Problems for Fodor's Theory of Content. Philosophica 50 (2):101-122.