Search results for 'Error' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Alessandro Giordani & Luca Mari (2014). Modeling Measurement: Error and Uncertainty. In Marcel Boumans, Giora Hon & Arthur Petersen (eds.), Error and Uncertainty in Scientific Practice. Pickering & Chatto. 79-96.score: 27.0
    In the last few decades the role played by models and modeling activities has become a central topic in the scientific enterprise. In particular, it has been highlighted both that the development of models constitutes a crucial step for understanding the world and that the developed models operate as mediators between theories and the world. Such perspective is exploited here to cope with the issue as to whether error-based and uncertainty-based modeling of measurement are incompatible, and thus alternative with (...)
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  2. Simon Prosser (2012). Sources of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. In Simon Prosser Francois Recanati (ed.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. 158-179.score: 27.0
    Saying ┌ that ψ is F ┐ when one should have said ┌ that φ is F ┐ involves making one of two different kinds of error. Either the wrong nominal term (┌ ψ ┐ instead of ┌ φ ┐) is ascribed to the right object or the right nominal term is ascribed to the wrong object. Judgments susceptible to one kind of error are immune to the other. Indexical terms such as ‘here’ and ‘now’ exhibit a corresponding (...)
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  3. Chris Daly & David Liggins (2010). In Defence of Error Theory. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):209-230.score: 24.0
    Many contemporary philosophers rate error theories poorly. We identify the arguments these philosophers invoke, and expose their deficiencies. We thereby show that the prospects for error theory have been systematically underestimated. By undermining general arguments against all error theories, we leave it open whether any more particular arguments against particular error theories are more successful. The merits of error theories need to be settled on a case-by-case basis: there is no good general argument against (...) theories. (shrink)
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  4. George Bealer (2004). The Origins of Modal Error. Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.score: 24.0
    Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source - namely, the failure to distinguish (...)
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  5. Hallvard Lillehammer (2003). Debunking Morality: Evolutionary Naturalism and Moral Error Theory. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 18 (4):567-581.score: 24.0
    The paper distinguishes three strategies by means of which empirical discoveries about the nature of morality can be used to undermine moral judgements. On the first strategy, moral judgements are shown to be unjustified in virtue of being shown to rest on ignorance or false belief. On the second strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false by being shown to entail claims inconsistent with the relevant empirical discoveries. On the third strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false in (...)
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  6. Bart Streumer (2013). Can We Believe the Error Theory? Journal of Philosophy 110 (4):194-212.score: 24.0
    According to the error theory, normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, I argue that we cannot believe the error theory, and that this means that there is no reason for us to believe this theory. It may be thought that this is a problem for the error theory, but I argue that it is not. Instead, I argue, our inability to believe the error theory (...)
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  7. Richard Rowland (2013). Moral Error Theory and the Argument From Epistemic Reasons. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-24.score: 24.0
    In this paper I defend what I call the argument from epistemic reasons against the moral error theory. I argue that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief and that this is bad news for the moral error theory since, if there are no epistemic reasons for belief, no one knows anything. If no one knows anything, then no one knows that there is thought when they are thinking, and no one (...)
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  8. Terence Rajivan Edward (2011). Are There Uncontroversial Error Theories? Philosophical Pathways (162).score: 24.0
    This paper evaluates an argument for the meta-philosophical conclusion that in order to produce a viable objection to a particular error theory, the objection must not be applicable to any error theory. The reason given for this conclusion is that error theories about some discourses are uncontroversial. But the examples given of uncontroversial error theories are not good ones, nor do there appear to be other examples available.
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  9. Nadeem Hussain (2010). Error Theory and Fictionalism. In John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics. Routledge.score: 24.0
    This paper surveys contemporary accounts of error theory and fictionalism. It introduces these categories to those new to metaethics by beginning with moral nihilism, the view that nothing really is right or wrong. One main motivation is that the scientific worldview seems to have no place for rightness or wrongness. Within contemporary metaethics there is a family of theories that makes similar claims. These are the theories that are usually classified as forms of error theory or fictionalism though (...)
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  10. Hallvard Lillehammer (2011). Constructivism and the Error Theory. In Christian Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum.score: 24.0
    This paper presents a comparative evaluation of constructivist and error theoretic accounts of moral claims. It is argued that constructivism has distinct advantages over error theory.
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  11. Toby Svoboda (2011). Hybridizing Moral Expressivism and Moral Error Theory. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1):37-48.score: 24.0
    Philosophers should consider a hybrid meta-ethical theory that includes elements of both moral expressivism and moral error theory. Proponents of such an expressivist-error theory hold that all moral utterances are either expressions of attitudes or expressions of false beliefs. Such a hybrid theory has two advantages over pure expressivism, because hybrid theorists can offer a more plausible account of the moral utterances that seem to be used to express beliefs, and hybrid theorists can provide a simpler solution to (...)
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  12. Andy Hamilton (2009). Memory and Self-Consciousness: Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. [REVIEW] Synthese 171 (3):409 - 417.score: 24.0
    In The Blue Book, Wittgenstein defined a category of uses of “I” which he termed “I”-as-subject, contrasting them with “I”-as-object uses. The hallmark of this category is immunity to error through misidentification (IEM). This article extends Wittgenstein’s characterisation to the case of memory-judgments, discusses the significance of IEM for self-consciousness—developing the idea that having a first-person thought involves thinking about oneself in a distinctive way in which one cannot think of anyone or anything else—and refutes a common objection to (...)
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  13. Bradford Cokelet (2008). Ideal Agency and the Possibility of Error. Ethics 118 (2):315-323.score: 24.0
    In “Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error," Douglas Lavin claims to have discovered a paradox deep in the heart of Christine Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian project. I argue that Lavin's criticism rests on a mistaken conception of ideal agency. In particular, he falsely assumes that since it is no accident that an ideal agent lives up to sound norms, it must have been impossible for her to deviate from them.
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  14. Hallvard Lillehammer (2013). A Distinction Without a Difference? Good Advice for Moral Error Theorists. Ratio 26 (3):373-390.score: 24.0
    This paper explores the prospects of different forms of moral error theory. It is argued that only a suitably local error theory would make good sense of the fact that it is possible to give and receive genuinely good moral advice.
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  15. Paul Bloomfield (2013). Error Theory and the Concept of Morality. Metaphilosophy 44 (4):451-469.score: 24.0
    Error theories about morality often take as their starting point the supposed queerness of morality, and those resisting these arguments often try to argue by analogy that morality is no more queer than other unproblematic subject matters. Here, error theory (as exemplified primarily by the work of Richard Joyce) is resisted first by arguing that it assumes a common, modern, and peculiarly social conception of morality. Then error theorists point out that the social nature of morality requires (...)
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  16. Timothy Williamson (2002). Reply to Machina and Deutsch on Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margins for Error. Acta Analytica 17 (1):47-61.score: 24.0
    In their paper “Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margins for Error” Kenton Machina and Harry Deutsch criticize the epistemic theory of vagueness. This paper answers their objections. The main issues discussed are: the relation between meaning and use; the principle of bivalence; the ontology of vaguely specified classes; the proper form of margin for error principles; iterations of epistemic operators and semantic compositionality; the relation or lack of it between quantum mechanics and theories of vagueness.
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  17. Masaharu Mizumoto & Masato Ishikawa (2005). Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Bodily Illusion Experiment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (7):3-19.score: 24.0
    In this paper we introduce a paradigm of experiment which, we believe, is of interest both in psychology and philosophy. There the subject wears an HMD (head-mount display), and a camera is set up at the upper corner of the room, in which the subject is. As a result, the subject observes his own body through the HMD. We will mainly focus on the philosophical relevance of this experiment, especially to the thesis of so-called 'immunity to error through misidentification (...)
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  18. Jeffrey Helzner (2012). On the Representation of Error. Synthese 186 (2):601-613.score: 24.0
    Though he maintained a significant interest in theoretical aspects of measurement, Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. was critical of the representational theory that in many ways has come to dominate discussions concerning the foundations of measurement. In particular, Kyburg (in Savage and Ehrlich (eds) Philosophical and foundational issues in measurement theory, 1992 ) asserts that the representational theory of measurement, as introduced in (Scott and Suppes, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 23:113–128, 1958 ) and developed in (Krantz et al., Foundations of measurment: (...)
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  19. Ragnar Francén Olinder (2013). Moral Relativism, Error-Theory, and Ascriptions of Mistakes. Journal of Philosophy 110 (10):564-580.score: 24.0
    Moral error-theorists and relativists agree that there are no absolute moral facts, but disagree whether that makes all moral judgments false. Who is right? This paper examines a type of objection used by moral error-theorists against relativists, and vice versa: objections from implausible ascriptions of mistakes. Relativists (and others) object to error-theory that it implausibly implies that people, in having moral beliefs, are systematically mistaken about what exists. Error-theorists (and others) object to relativism that it implausibly (...)
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  20. Jérôme Dokic & Paul Égré (2009). Margin for Error and the Transparency of Knowledge. Synthese 166 (1):1 - 20.score: 24.0
    In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the principle (KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely “that if one knows something, then one knows that one knows it”. Williamson’s argument proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, he shows that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and additional epistemic principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them is a reflective (...)
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  21. Ben Fraser (2013). Moral Error Theories and Folk Metaethics. Philosophical Psychology (6):1-18.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I distinguish between two error theories of morality: one couched in terms of truth (ET1); the other in terms of justification (ET2). I then present two arguments: the Poisoned Presupposition Argument for ET1; and the Evolutionary Debunking Argument for ET2. I go on to show how assessing these arguments requires paying attention to empirical moral psychology, in particular, work on folk metaethics. After criticizing extant work, I suggest avenues for future research.
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  22. Wouter Floris Kalf (2013). Moral Error Theory, Entailment and Presupposition. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):923-937.score: 24.0
    According to moral error theory, moral discourse is error-ridden. Establishing error theory requires establishing two claims. These are that moral discourse carries a non-negotiable commitment to there being a moral reality and that there is no such reality. This paper concerns the first and so-called non-negotiable commitment claim. It starts by identifying the two existing argumentative strategies for settling that claim. The standard strategy is to argue for a relation of conceptual entailment between the moral statements that (...)
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  23. Wendy S. Parker (2008). Computer Simulation Through an Error-Statistical Lens. Synthese 163 (3):371 - 384.score: 24.0
    After showing how Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical philosophy of science might be applied to address important questions about the evidential status of computer simulation results, I argue that an error-statistical perspective offers an interesting new way of thinking about computer simulation models and has the potential to significantly improve the practice of simulation model evaluation. Though intended primarily as a contribution to the epistemology of simulation, the analysis also serves to fill in details of Mayo’s epistemology of experiment.
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  24. Matt Lutz (2014). The 'Now What' Problem for Error Theory. Philosophical Studies 171 (2):351-371.score: 24.0
    Error theorists hold that, although our first-order moral thought and discourse commits us to the existence of moral truths, there are no such truths. Holding this position in metaethics puts the error theorist in an uncomfortable position regarding first-order morality. When it comes to our pre-theoretic moral commitments, what should the error theorist think? What should she say? What should she do? I call this the ‘Now What’ Problem for error theory. This paper suggests a framework (...)
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  25. R. Joyce (2000). Darwinian Ethics and Error. Biology and Philosophy 15 (5):713-732.score: 24.0
    Suppose that the human tendency to think of certain actions andomissions as morally required – a notion that surely lies at the heart of moral discourse – is a trait that has been naturallyselected for. Many have thought that from this premise we canjustify or vindicate moral concepts. I argue that this is mistaken, and defend Michael Ruse''s view that the moreplausible implication is an error theory – the idea thatmorality is an illusion foisted upon us by evolution. Thenaturalistic (...)
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  26. James A. Ryan (1997). Taking the 'Error' Out of Ruse's Error Theory. Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):385-397.score: 24.0
    Michael Ruses Darwinian metaethics has come under just criticism from Peter Woolcock (1993). But with modification it remains defensible. Ruse (1986) holds that people ordinarily have a false belief that there are objective moral obligations. He argues that the evolutionary story should be taken as an error theory, i.e., as a theory which explains the belief that there are obligations as arising from non-rational causes, rather than from inference or evidential reasons. Woolcock quite rightly objects that this position entails (...)
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  27. Deborah Mayo & Jean Miller (2008). The Error Statistical Philosopher as Normative Naturalist. Synthese 163 (3):305 - 314.score: 24.0
    We argue for a naturalistic account for appraising scientific methods that carries non-trivial normative force. We develop our approach by comparison with Laudan’s (American Philosophical Quarterly 24:19–31, 1987, Philosophy of Science 57:20–33, 1990) “normative naturalism” based on correlating means (various scientific methods) with ends (e.g., reliability). We argue that such a meta-methodology based on means–ends correlations is unreliable and cannot achieve its normative goals. We suggest another approach for meta-methodology based on a conglomeration of tools and strategies (from statistical modeling, (...)
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  28. Jonathan Ellis (2006). Color, Error, and Explanatory Power. Dialectica 60 (2):171-179.score: 24.0
    At least since Democritus, philosophers have been fond of the idea that material objects do not “really” have color. One such view is the error theory, according to which our ordinary judgments ascribing colors to objects are all erroneous, false; no object has any color at all. The error theorist proposes that everything that is so, including the fact that material objects appear to us to have color, can be explained without ever attributing color to objects—by appealing merely (...)
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  29. R. P. Farrell & C. A. Hooker (2009). Error, Error-Statistics and Self-Directed Anticipative Learning. Foundations of Science 14 (4):249-271.score: 24.0
    Error is protean, ubiquitous and crucial in scientific process. In this paper it is argued that understanding scientific process requires what is currently absent: an adaptable, context-sensitive functional role for error in science that naturally harnesses error identification and avoidance to positive, success-driven, science. This paper develops a new account of scientific process of this sort, error and success driving Self-Directed Anticipative Learning (SDAL) cycling, using a recent re-analysis of ape-language research as test example. The example (...)
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  30. Elisa Freschi (2010). Facing the Boundaries of Epistemology: Kumārila on Error and Negative Cognition. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (1):39-48.score: 24.0
    Kumārila’s commitment to the explanation of cognitive experiences not confined to valid cognition alone, allows a detailed discussion of border-line cases (such as doubt and error) and the admittance of absent entities as separate instances of cognitive objects. Are such absent entities only the negative side of positive entities? Are they, hence, fully relative (since a cow could be said to be the absent side of a horse and vice versa)? Through the analysis of a debated passage of the (...)
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  31. Jiji Zhang (2008). Error Probabilities for Inference of Causal Directions. Synthese 163 (3):409 - 418.score: 24.0
    A main message from the causal modelling literature in the last several decades is that under some plausible assumptions, there can be statistically consistent procedures for inferring (features of) the causal structure of a set of random variables from observational data. But whether we can control the error probabilities with a finite sample size depends on the kind of consistency the procedures can achieve. It has been shown that in general, under the standard causal Markov and Faithfulness assumptions, the (...)
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  32. Bo Petersson (2011). Axel Hägerström and His Early Version of Error Theory. Theoria 77 (1):55-70.score: 24.0
    In 1910–11 Axel Hägerström introduced an emotive theory of ethics asserting moral propositions and valuations in general to be neither true nor false. However, it is less well known that he modified his theory in the following year, now making a distinction between what he called primary and secondary valuations. From 1912 onwards, he restricted his emotive theory to primary valuations only, and applied an error theory to secondary ones. According to Hägerström, secondary valuations state that objects have special (...)
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  33. Cheryl Rathert & Win Phillips (2010). Medical Error Disclosure Training: Evidence for Values-Based Ethical Environments. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 97 (3):491 - 503.score: 24.0
    Disclosure of medical and errors to patients has been increasingly mandated in the U. S. and Canada. Thus, some health systems are developing formal disclosure policies. The present study examines how disclosure training may impact staff and the organization. We argue that organizations that support "disclose and apologize" activities, as opposed to "deny and defend," are demonstrating values-based ethics. Specifically, we hypothesized that when health care clinicians are trained and supported in error disclosure, this may signal a valuesbased ethical (...)
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  34. Göran Sundholm (2012). Error. Topoi 31 (1):87-92.score: 24.0
    The possibility of error is related to the existence a norm. Connections are spelled out to the notion of infallibility and to that of a modifying predicate, to traditional truth theories in connection with “truth of things”, as well as the primacy of the negative cases, for instance “ false friend”.
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  35. David M. Zientek (2010). Medical Error, Malpractice and Complications: A Moral Geography. [REVIEW] HEC Forum 22 (2):145-157.score: 24.0
    This essay reviews and defines avoidable medical error, malpractice and complication. The relevant ethical principles pertaining to unanticipated medical outcomes are identified. In light of these principles I critically review the moral culpability of the agents in each circumstance and the resulting obligations to patients, their families, and the health care system in general. While I touch on some legal implications, a full discussion of legal obligations and liability issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
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  36. Hallvard Lillehammer & Niklas Möller (forthcoming). We Can Believe the Error Theory. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-7.score: 24.0
    Bart Streumer argues that it is not possible for us to believe the error theory, where by ‘error theory’ he means the claim that our normative beliefs are committed to the existence of normative properties even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, we argue that it is indeed possible to believe the error theory. First, we suggest a critical improvement to Streumer’s argument. As it stands, one crucial premise of that argument—that we cannot have (...)
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  37. David Spector (2013). Margin for Error Semantics and Signal Perception. Synthese 190 (15):3247-3263.score: 24.0
    A joint modelling of objective worlds and subjective perceptions within two-dimensional semantics eliminates the margin for error principle and solves the epistemic sorites paradox. Two objective knowledge modalities can be defined in two-dimensional frames accounting for subjective perceptions: “necessary knowledge” (NK) and “possible knowledge” (PK), the latter being better suited to the interpretation of knowledge utterances. Two-dimensional semantics can in some cases be reduced to one-dimensional ones, by defining accessibility relations between objective worlds that reflect subjective perceptions: NK and (...)
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  38. Sherrilyn Roush (2013). Justification and the Growth of Error. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):527-551.score: 24.0
    It is widely accepted that in fallible reasoning potential error necessarily increases with every additional step, whether inferences or premises, because it grows in the same way that the probability of a lengthening conjunction shrinks. As it stands, this is disappointing but, I will argue, not out of keeping with our experience. However, consulting an expert, proof-checking, constructing gap-free proofs, and gathering more evidence for a given conclusion also add more steps, and we think these actions have the potential (...)
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  39. Gérard Battail (2014). Barbieri’s Organic Codes Enable Error Correction of Genomes. Biosemiotics 7 (2):259-277.score: 24.0
    Barbieri introduced and developed the concept of organic codes. The most basic of them is the genetic code, a set of correspondence rules between otherwise unrelated sequences: strings of nucleotides on the one hand, polypeptidic chains on the other hand. Barbieri noticed that it implies ‘coding by convention’ as arbitrary as the semantic relations a language establishes between words and outer objects. Moreover, the major transitions in life evolution originated in new organic codes similarly involving conventional rules. Independently, dealing with (...)
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  40. Arvid Båve (2014). Charity and Error‐Theoretic Nominalism. Ratio 27 (4):n/a-n/a.score: 24.0
    I here investigate whether there is any version of the principle of charity both strong enough to conflict with an error-theoretic version of nominalism about abstract objects , and supported by the considerations adduced in favour of interpretive charity in the literature. I argue that in order to be strong enough, the principle, which I call “”, would have to read, “For all expressions e, an acceptable interpretation must make true a sufficiently high ratio of accepted sentences containing e”. (...)
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  41. Kent Staley (2008). Error-Statistical Elimination of Alternative Hypotheses. Synthese 163 (3):397 - 408.score: 24.0
    I consider the error-statistical account as both a theory of evidence and as a theory of inference. I seek to show how inferences regarding the truth of hypotheses can be upheld by avoiding a certain kind of alternative hypothesis problem. In addition to the testing of assumptions behind the experimental model, I discuss the role of judgments of implausibility. A benefit of my analysis is that it reveals a continuity in the application of error-statistical assessment to low-level empirical (...)
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  42. John Mizzoni (2010). Evolution and Error Theory. Social Science Information 49 (2):165-194.score: 24.0
    Error theorists argue that there is a fundamental mistake, an error of some kind, at the heart of commonsense morality. They have drawn on evolutionary theory to support some of their claims. This article looks at four different models of evolution and assesses what implications can be drawn from them concerning commonsense morality and the claims of the error theorists Mackie, Ruse and Joyce. The author first spells out the main points of error theory, then discusses (...)
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  43. John Nemec (2012). The Two Pratyabhijñā Theories of Error. Journal of Indian Philosophy 40 (2):225-257.score: 24.0
    In this essay, it is argued that Abhinavagupta’s theory of error, the apūrṇakhyāti theory, synthesizes two distinguishable Pratyabhijñā treatments of error that were developed in three phases prior to him. The first theory was developed in two stages, initially by Somānanda in the Śivadṛṣṭi (ŚD) and subsequently by Utpaladeva in his Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās (ĪPK) and his short autocommentary thereon, the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvṛtti (ĪPVṛ). This theory served to explain individual acts of misperception, and it was developed with the philosophy of the (...)
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  44. Nicolas Fillion & Robert M. Corless (2014). On the Epistemological Analysis of Modeling and Computational Error in the Mathematical Sciences. Synthese 191 (7):1451-1467.score: 24.0
    Interest in the computational aspects of modeling has been steadily growing in philosophy of science. This paper aims to advance the discussion by articulating the way in which modeling and computational errors are related and by explaining the significance of error management strategies for the rational reconstruction of scientific practice. To this end, we first characterize the role and nature of modeling error in relation to a recipe for model construction known as Euler’s recipe. We then describe a (...)
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  45. [deleted]S. Hoffmann, E. Wascher & M. Falkenstein (2011). Personality and Error Monitoring: An Update. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6:171-171.score: 24.0
    People differ considerably with respect to their ability to initiate and maintain cognitive control. A core control function is the processing and evaluation of errors from which we learn to prevent maladaptive behavior. People strongly differ in the degree of error processing, and how errors are interpreted and appraised. In the present study it was investigated whether a correlate of error monitoring, the error negativity (Ne or ERN), is related to personality factors. Therefore the EEG was measured (...)
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  46. Lucy A. K. Kumar (2013). Information, Meaning, and Error in Biology. Biological Theory 9 (1):1-11.score: 24.0
    Whether “information” exists in biology, and in what sense, has been a topic of much recent discussion. I explore Shannon, Dretskean, and teleosemantic theories, and analyze whether or not they are able to give a successful naturalistic account of information—specifically accounts of meaning and error—in biological systems. I argue that the Shannon and Dretskean theories are unable to account for either, but that the teleosemantic theory is able to account for meaning. However, I argue that it is unable to (...)
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  47. Claudia Danielmeier & Markus Ullsperger (2011). Post-Error Adjustments. Frontiers in Psychology 2.score: 24.0
    When our brain detects an error, this process changes how we react on ensuing trials. People show post-error adaptations, potentially to improve their performance in the near future. At least three types of behavioral post-error adjustments have been observed. These are post-error slowing (PES), post-error reduction of interference (PERI), and post-error improvement in accuracy (PIA). Apart from these behavioral changes, post-error adaptations have also been observed on a neuronal level with functional magnetic resonance (...)
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  48. [deleted]Tilmann A. Klein, Claudia Danielmeier & Markus Md Phd Ullsperger (2013). Editorial for E-Book: Error Awareness – Insights From Cognitive Neuroscience, Psychiatry and Neurology. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7:830.score: 24.0
    Editorial for E-Book: Error Awareness – Insights from Cognitive Neuroscience, Psychiatry and Neurology.
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  49. Josep Monserrat Molas (2010). Naturaleza del error y sentido de la corrección de la diéresis en El político de Platón. Daimon 51:151-169.score: 24.0
    Llegados al final del periplo para definir al rey y al político, el Forastero y el joven Sócrates se encuentran en un callejón sin salida; no han podido determinar el perfil de cada uno de ellos. La narración del mito será la enmienda del método utilizado hasta ahora, i.e. la diéresis o división, que los ha llevado a una situación aporética. El Forastero muestra que se han cometido dos errores a lo largo del recorrido: el primero ha sido confundir lo (...)
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  50. Frederick Rosen (2006). The Philosophy of Error and Liberty of Thought: J.S. Mill on Logical Fallacies. Informal Logic 26 (2):121-147.score: 24.0
    Most recent discussions of John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic (1843) neglect the fifth book concerned with logical fallacies. Mill not only follows the revival of interest in the traditional Aristotelian doctrine of fallacies in Richard Whately and Augustus De Morgan, but he also develops new categories and an original analysis which enhance the study of fallacies within the context of what he calls ‘the philosophy of error’. After an exploration of this approach, the essay relates the philosophy of (...)
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