Search results for 'Essentialism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. John S. Wilkins, Essentialism in Biology.score: 24.0
    Essentialism in philosophy is the position that things, especially kinds of things, have essences, or sets of properties, that all members of the kind must have, and the combination of which only members of the kind do, in fact, have. It is usually thought to derive from classical Greek philosophy and in particular from Aristotle’s notion of “what it is to be” something. In biology, it has been claimed that pre-evolutionary views of living kinds, or as they are sometimes (...)
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  2. David Yates (2013). The Essence of Dispositional Essentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):93-128.score: 24.0
    Dispositional essentialists argue that physical properties have their causal roles essentially. This is typically taken to mean that physical properties are identical to dispositions. I argue that this is untenable, and that we must instead say that properties bestow dispositions. I explore what it is for a property to have such a role essentially. Dispositional essentialists argue for their view by citing certain epistemological and metaphysical implications, and I appeal to these implications to place desiderata on the concept of essence (...)
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  3. George Bealer (1987). The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophical Perspectives 1:289-365.score: 24.0
    Scientific essentialism is the view that some necessities (e.g., water = H2O) can be known only with the aid of empirical science. The thesis of the paper is that scientific essentialism does not extend to the central questions of philosophy and that these questions can be answered a priori. The argument is that the evidence required for the defense of scientific essentialism (e.g., twin earth intuitions) is reliable only if the intuitions required by philosophy to answer its (...)
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  4. Todd Buras (2006). Counterpart Theory, Natural Properties, and Essentialism. Journal of Philosophy 103 (1):27-42.score: 24.0
    David Lewis advised essentialists to judge his counterpart theory a false friend. He also argued that counterpart theory needs natural properties. This essay argues that natural properties are all essentialists need to find a true friend in counterpart theory. Section one explains why Lewis takes counterpart theory to be anti-essentialist and why he thinks it needs natural properties. Section two establishes the connection between the natural properties counterpart theory needs and the essentialist consequences Lewis disavows. Section three answers two objections: (...)
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  5. Sonia Roca-Royes (2011). Essentialism Vis-À-Vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism. Philosophy Compass 6 (1):54-64.score: 24.0
    Pace Necessitism – roughly, the view that existence is not contingent – essential properties provide necessary conditions for the existence of objects. Sufficiency properties, by contrast, provide sufficient conditions, and individual essences provide necessary and sufficient conditions. This paper explains how these kinds of properties can be used to illuminate the ontological status of merely possible objects and to construct a respectable possibilist ontology. The paper also reviews two points of interaction between essentialism and modal logic. First, we will (...)
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  6. Tuomas E. Tahko (forthcoming). Natural Kind Essentialism Revisited. Mind.score: 24.0
    Recent work on Natural Kind Essentialism has taken a deflationary turn. The assumptions about the grounds of essentialist truths concerning natural kinds familiar from the Kripke-Putnam framework are now considered questionable. The source of the problem, however, has not been sufficiently explicated. The paper focuses on the Twin Earth scenario and it will be demonstrated that the essentialist principle at its core (which I call IDENT) – necessarily, a sample of a chemical substance, A, is of the same kind (...)
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  7. Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2009). How Scientific is Scientific Essentialism? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):85 - 101.score: 24.0
    Scientific essentialism holds that: (1) each scientific kind is associated with the same set of properties in every possible world; and (2) every individual member of a scientific kind belongs to that kind in every possible world in which it exists. Recently, Ellis (Scientific essentialism, 2001 ; The philosophy of nature 2002 ) has provided the most sustained defense of scientific essentialism, though he does not clearly distinguish these two claims. In this paper, I argue that both (...)
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  8. Rupert Read & Wes Sharrock (2002). Thomas Kuhn's Misunderstood Relation to Kripke-Putnam Essentialism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 33 (1):151-8.score: 24.0
    Kuhn's ‘taxonomic conception’ of natural kinds enables him to defend and re-specify the notion of incommensurability against the idea that it is reference, not meaning/use, that is overwhelmingly important. Kuhn's ghost still lacks any reason to believe that referentialist essentialism undercuts his central arguments in SSR – and indeed, any reason to believe that such essentialism is even coherent, considered as a doctrine about anything remotely resembling our actual science. The actual relation of Kuhn to Kripke-Putnam essentialism, (...)
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  9. Jerome C. Wakefield (2003). The Chinese Room Argument Reconsidered: Essentialism, Indeterminacy, and Strong AI. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 13 (2):285-319.score: 24.0
    I argue that John Searle's (1980) influential Chinese room argument (CRA) against computationalism and strong AI survives existing objections, including Block's (1998) internalized systems reply, Fodor's (1991b) deviant causal chain reply, and Hauser's (1997) unconscious content reply. However, a new ``essentialist'' reply I construct shows that the CRA as presented by Searle is an unsound argument that relies on a question-begging appeal to intuition. My diagnosis of the CRA relies on an interpretation of computationalism as a scientific theory about the (...)
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  10. David S. Oderberg (2007). Real Essentialism. Routledge.score: 24.0
    Contemporary essentialism and real essentialism -- Against modalism -- Reductionism : the illusory search for inner constitution -- Why real essentialism? -- Some varieties of anti-essentialism -- Empiricist anti-essentialism -- Quinean animadversions -- Popper : avoiding what-is questions -- Wittgenstein : the shadow of grammar -- The reality and knowability of essence -- Why essences are real -- The problem of the universal accidental -- An empirical test for essence? -- Coming to know essence -- (...)
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  11. Makmiller Pedroso (2012). Essentialism, History, and Biological Taxa. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (1):182-190.score: 24.0
    de Queiroz (1995), Griffiths (1999) and LaPorte (2004) offer a new version of essentialism called "historical essentialism". According to this version of essentialism, relations of common ancestry are essential features of biological taxa. The main type of argument for this essentialism proposed by Griffiths (1999) and LaPorte (2004) is that the dominant school of classification, cladism, defines biological taxa in terms of common ancestry. The goal of this paper is to show that this argument for historical (...)
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  12. Jussi Jylkkä, Henry Railo & Jussi Haukioja (2009). Psychological Essentialism and Semantic Externalism: Evidence for Externalism in Lay Speakers' Language Use. Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):37-60.score: 24.0
    Some experimental studies have recently claimed to undermine semantic externalism about natural kind terms. However, it is unclear how philosophical accounts of reference can be experimentally tested. We present two externalistic adaptations of psychological placeholder essentialism, a strict externalist and a hybrid externalist view, which are experimentally testable. We examine Braisby's et al. (1996) study which claims to undermine externalism, and argue that the study fails in its aims. We conducted two experiments, the results of which undermine internalism and (...)
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  13. Bence Nanay (2011). Three Ways of Resisting Essentialism About Natural Kinds. In J. K. Campbell & M. H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 8. MIT Press. 175--97.score: 24.0
    Essentialism about natural kinds has three tenets. The first tenet is that all and only members of a natural kind has some essential properties. The second tenet is that these essential properties play a causal role. The third tenet is that they are explanatorily relevant. I examine the prospects of questioning these tenets and point out that arguing against the first and the second tenets of kind-essentialism would involve taking parts in some of the grand debates of philosophy. (...)
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  14. B. D. Ellis (2001). Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge University Press.score: 24.0
    Scientific Essentialism defends the view that the fundamental laws of nature depend on the essential properties of the things on which they are said to operate, and are therefore not independent of them. These laws are not imposed upon the world by God, the forces of nature, or anything else, but rather are immanent in the world. Ellis argues that ours is a dynamic world consisting of more or less transient objects which are constantly interacting with each other, and (...)
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  15. Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi (2000). Topological Essentialism. Philosophical Studies 100 (3):217-236.score: 24.0
    Considering topology as an extension of mereology, this paper analyses topological variants of mereological essentialism (the thesis that an object could not have different parts than the ones it has). In particular, we examine de dicto and de re versions of two theses: (i) that an object cannot change its external connections (e.g., adjacent objects cannot be separated), and (ii) that an object cannot change its topological genus (e.g., a doughnut cannot turn into a sphere). Stronger forms of structural (...)
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  16. Moti Mizrahi (2014). Essentialism: Metaphysical or Psychological? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (40):65-72.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I argue that Psychological Essentialism (PE), the view that essences are a heuristic or mental shortcut, is a better explanation for modal intuitions than Metaphysical Essentialism (ME), the view that objects have essences, or more precisely, that (at least some) objects have (at least some) essential properties. If this is correct, then the mere fact that we have modal intuitions is not a strong reason to believe that objects have essential properties.
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  17. Emily S. Lee (2011). The Epistemology of the Question of Authenticity, in Place of Strategic Essentialism. Hypatia 26 (2):258--279.score: 24.0
    The question of authenticity centers in the lives of women of color to invite and restrict their representative roles. For this reason, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Uma Narayan advocate responding with strategic essentialism. This paper argues against such a strategy and proposes an epistemic understanding of the question of authentic- ity. The question stems from a kernel of truth—the connection between experience and knowledge. But a coherence theory of knowledge better captures the sociality and the holism of experience and (...)
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  18. Mary P. Winsor (2003). Non-Essentialist Methods in Pre-Darwinian Taxonomy. Biology and Philosophy 18 (3):387-400.score: 24.0
    The current widespread belief that taxonomic methods used before Darwin were essentialist is ill-founded. The essentialist method developed by followers of Plato and Aristotle required definitions to state properties that are always present. Polythetic groups do not obey that requirement, whatever may have been the ontological beliefs of the taxonomist recognizing such groups. Two distinct methods of forming higher taxa, by chaining and by examplar, were widely used in the period between Linnaeus and Darwin, and both generated polythetic groups. Philosopher (...)
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  19. D. Gene Witmer (2003). Dupre's Anti-Essentialist Objection to Reductionism. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):181-200.score: 24.0
    In his 'The Disorder of Things' John Dupré presents an objection to reductionism which I call the 'anti-essentialist objection': it is that reductionism requires essentialism, and essentialism is false. I unpack the objection and assess its cogency. Once the objection is clearly in view, it is likely to appeal to those who think conceptual analysis a bankrupt project. I offer on behalf of the reductionist two strategies for responding, one which seeks to rehabilitate conceptual analysis and one (more (...)
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  20. William A. Bauer (2013). Dispositional Essentialism and the Nature of Powerful Properties. Disputatio 5 (35).score: 24.0
    Dispositional essentialism maintains that all sparse properties are essentially powerful. Two conceptions of sparse properties appear compatible with dispositional essentialism: sparse properties as pure powers or as powerful qualities. This paper compares the two views, criticizes the powerful qualities view, and then develops a new theory of pure powers, termed Point Theory. This theory neutralizes the main advantage powerful qualities appear to possess over pure powers—explaining the existence of powers during latency periods. The paper discusses the relation between (...)
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  21. Stephen K. McLeod (2006). Why Essentialism Requires Two Senses of Necessity. Ratio 19 (1):77–91.score: 24.0
    I set up a dilemma, concerning metaphysical modality de re, for the essentialist opponent of a ‘two senses’ view of necessity. I focus specifically on Frank Jackson's two-dimensional account in his From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). I set out the background to Jackson's conception of conceptual analysis and his rejection of a two senses view. I proceed to outline two purportedly objective (as opposed to epistemic) differences between metaphysical and logical necessity. I conclude that since one (...)
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  22. Paul Thom (2003). De Re Modality and the New Essentialism: A Dilemma. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (4):189-199.score: 24.0
    In his book The Philosophy of Nature, Ellis presents "the new essentialism" as resting on the notions of a property, an intrinsic property, an essential property, natural necessity and possibility, a natural kind, a fixed natural kind, and a natural law. The present paper argues that (1) the central notions in this group are susceptible of a logical analysis, (2) Ellis's notion of natural possibility has a historical precedent in the work of Ab�elard, (3) the notion of natural possibility (...)
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  23. David N. Stamos (2005). Pre-Darwinian Taxonomy and Essentialism – a Reply to Marywinsor. Biology and Philosophy 20 (1):79-96.score: 24.0
    Mary Winsor (2003) argues against the received view that pre-Darwinian taxonomy was characterized mainly by essentialism. She argues, instead, that the methods of pre-Darwinian taxonomists, in spite of whatever their beliefs, were that of clusterists, so that the received view, propagated mainly by certain modern biologists and philosophers of biology, should at last be put to rest as a myth. I argue that shes right when it comes to higher taxa, but wrong when it comes the most important category (...)
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  24. Aaron Segal (2014). Causal Essentialism and Mereological Monism. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):227-255.score: 24.0
    Several philosophers have recently defended Causal Essentialism—the view that every property confers causal powers, and whatever powers it confers, it confers essentially. I argue that on the face of it, Causal Essentialism implies a form of Monism, and in particular, the thesis I call ‘Mereological Monism’: that there is some concretum that is a part of every concretum. However, there are three escape routes, three views which are such that if one of them is true, Causal Essentialism (...)
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  25. B. D. Ellis (2002). The Philosophy of Nature: A Guide to the New Essentialism. Acumen.score: 24.0
    In "The Philosophy of Nature," Brian Ellis provides a clear and forthright general summation of, and introduction to, the new essentialist position. Although the theory that the laws of nature are immanent in things, rather than imposed on them from without, is an ancient one, much recent work has been done to revive interest in essentialism and "The Philosophy of Nature" is a distinctive contribution to this lively current debate. Brian Ellis exposes the philosophical and scientific credentials of the (...)
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  26. Tim Dalgleish (1997). An Anti-Anti-Essentialist View of the Emotions: A Reply to Kupperman. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):85-90.score: 24.0
    Kupperman (1995) advances an anti-essentialist view of emotions in which he suggests that there can be emotion without feeling or affect, emotion without corresponding motivation, and emotion without an intentional relation to an object such that the emotion is about that object in some way. In this reply to Kupperman's essay, I suggest a number of problems with his rejection of the essentialist position. I argue that in his discussion of feelings Kupperman is crucially not clear about the distinction between (...)
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  27. Neil Pickering (2013). Extending Disorder: Essentialism, Family Resemblance and Secondary Sense. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (2):185-195.score: 24.0
    It is commonly thought that mental disorder is a valid concept only in so far as it is an extension of or continuous with the concept of physical disorder. A valid extension has to meet two criteria: determination and coherence. Essentialists meet these criteria through necessary and sufficient conditions for being a disorder. Two Wittgensteinian alternatives to essentialism are considered and assessed against the two criteria. These are the family resemblance approach and the secondary sense approach. Where the focus (...)
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  28. Jussi Haukioja (forthcoming). On Deriving Essentialism From the Theory of Reference. Philosophical Studies:1-11.score: 24.0
    Causal theories of reference for natural kind terms are widely agreed to play a central role in arguments for the claim that theoretical identity statements such as “Water is H2O” are necessary, if true. However, there is also fairly wide-spread agreement, due to the arguments of Nathan Salmon (in Reference and Essence), that causal theories of reference do not alone establish such essentialism about natural kinds: an independent, non-trivial essentialist premise is also needed. In this paper I will question (...)
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  29. Makmiller Pedroso (2014). Origin Essentialism in Biology. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):60-81.score: 24.0
    Kripke argues for origin essentialism, the view that the same individual cannot have multiple origins. Sober hypothesises that Kripke's origin essentialism applies to biological species. This paper shows that Sober's hypothesis fails. Because Kripke's original argument is invalid, it cannot vindicate Sober's proposal. Salmon offers an influential reformulation of Kripke's argument but his argument fails to extend to species: the notion of an individual's origin is too narrow to apply to species, and Salmon's argument rests on a thought (...)
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  30. Meredith Meyer, Sarah-Jane Leslie, Susan Gelman & Sarah Stilwell (2013). Essentialist Beliefs About Bodily Transplants in the United States and India. Cognitive Science 37 (1):668-710.score: 24.0
    Psychological essentialism is the belief that some internal, unseen essence or force determines the common outward appearances and behaviors of category members. We investigated whether reasoning about transplants of bodily elements showed evidence of essentialist thinking. Both Americans and Indians endorsed the possibility of transplants conferring donors' personality, behavior, and luck on recipients, consistent with essentialism. Respondents also endorsed essentialist effects even when denying that transplants would change a recipient's category membership (e.g., predicting that a recipient of a (...)
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  31. Andrei Cimpian & Erika Salomon (forthcoming). The Inherence Heuristic: An Intuitive Means of Making Sense of the World, and a Potential Precursor to Psychological Essentialism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences:1-78.score: 24.0
    We propose that human reasoning relies on an inherence heuristic, an implicit cognitive process that leads people to explain observed patterns (e.g., girls wear pink) in terms of the inherent features of their constituents (e.g., pink is an inherently feminine color). We then demonstrate how this proposed heuristic can provide a unified account for a broad set of findings spanning areas of research that might at first appear unrelated (e.g., system justification, nominal realism, is–ought errors in moral reasoning). By revealing (...)
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  32. Charissa S. Varma (2009). Threads That Guide or Ties That Bind: William Kirby and the Essentialism Story. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Biology 42 (1):119 - 149.score: 24.0
    Nineteenth-century British entomologist William Kirby is best known for his generic division of bees based on tongues and his vigorous defence of natural theology. Focusing on these aspects of Kirby's work has lead many current scholars to characterise Kirby as an "essentialist." As a result of this characterisation, many important aspects of his work, Monographia Apum Angliœ (1802) have been over-looked or misunderstood. Kirby's religious devotion, for example, have lead some scholars to assume Kirby used the term "type" for connecting (...)
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  33. Brian Ellis (2010). An Essentialist Perspective on the Problem of Induction. Principia 2 (1):103-124.score: 22.0
    If one believes, as Hume did, that all events are loose and separate, then the problem of induction is probably insoluble. Anything could happen. But if one thinks, as scientific essentialists do, that the laws of nature are immanent in the world, and depend on the essential natures of things, then there are strong constraints on what could possibly happen. Given these constraints, the problem of induction may be soluble. For these constraints greatly strengthen the case for conceptual and theoretical (...)
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  34. John S. Wilkins (forthcoming). Biological Essentialism and the Tidal Change of Natural Kinds. Science and Education.score: 21.0
    The vision of natural kinds that is most common in the modern philosophy of biology, particularly with respect to the question whether species and other taxa are natural kinds, is based on a revision of the notion by Mill in A System of Logic. However, there was another conception that Whewell had previously captured well, which taxonomists have always employed, of kinds as being types that need not have necessary and sufficient characters and properties, or essences. These competing views employ (...)
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  35. Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein Versus Van Fraassen: Part Two: Aim-Oriented Empiricism and Scientific Essentialism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):81-101.score: 21.0
    In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism provides decisive grounds for accepting scientific realism and rejecting instrumentalism. But it goes further than this. Aim-oriented empiricism implies that physicalism is a central part of current (conjectural) scientific knowledge. Furthermore, we can and need, I argue, to interpret fundamental physical theories as attributing necessitating physical properties to fundamental physical entities.
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  36. Brian Ellis & Caroline Lierse (1994). Dispositional Essentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):27 – 45.score: 21.0
  37. Matthew J. Barker (2013). Essentialism. In Byron Kaldis (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences.score: 21.0
  38. Don A. Merrell (2005). Token Physicalism is Not Immune to Kripke's Essentialist Anti-Physicalist Argument. Philosophia 32 (1-4):383-388.score: 21.0
  39. Elizabeth H. Flanagan (2000). Essentialism and a Folk-Taxonomic Approach to the Classification of Psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):183-189.score: 21.0
  40. James D. Carney & P. von Bretzel (1973). Modern Materialism and Essentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (May):78-81.score: 21.0
  41. Toby Handfield (2001). Dispositional Essentialism and the Possibility of a Law-Abiding Miracle. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):484-494.score: 21.0
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  42. Stephen K. McLeod (2008). Knowledge of Necessity: Logical Positivism and Kripkean Essentialism. Philosophy 83 (324):179-191.score: 21.0
    By the lights of a central logical positivist thesis in modal epistemology, for every necessary truth that we know, we know it a priori and for every contingent truth that we know, we know it a posteriori. Kripke attacks on both flanks, arguing that we know necessary a posteriori truths and that we probably know contingent a priori truths. In a reflection of Kripke's confidence in his own arguments, the first of these Kripkean claims is far more widely accepted than (...)
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  43. Joseph S. Alper & Jon Beckwith (2000). On the Philosophical Analysis of Genetic Essentialism. Science and Engineering Ethics 6 (3):311-314.score: 21.0
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  44. Ross Inman (2014). De Re Essentialism, Species, and Modal Ambiguity. Metaphysica 15 (1).score: 21.0
    I offer a concise critique of a recurring line of reasoning advanced by Joseph LaPorte and Samir Okasha that all modern species concepts render the view that biological organisms essentially belong to their species empirically untenable. The argument, I claim, trades on a crucial modal ambiguity that collapses the de re/de dicto distinction. Contra their claim that the continued adherence of such a view on behalf of contemporary metaphysicians stems from the latter’s ignorance of developments in modern biology, the modal (...)
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  45. Marjorie Rhodes, Sarah-Jane Leslie & Christina Tworek (2012). Cultural Transmission of Social Essentialism. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (34):13526-13531.score: 21.0
  46. Frank Jackson (1995). Essentialism, Mental Properties, and Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:253-268.score: 21.0
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  47. Elisabeth A. Lloyd & Stephen Crowley, Essentialism and Human Nature. Encyclopedia of Life Sciences.score: 21.0
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  48. Andrew Shtulman & Laura Schulz (2008). The Relation Between Essentialist Beliefs and Evolutionary Reasoning. Cognitive Science 32 (6):1049-1062.score: 21.0
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  49. Karol Janicki (1999). Against Essentialism: Toward Language Awareness. Lincom Europa.score: 21.0
  50. M. Rocca Della (1993). Kripke's Essentialist Arguments Against the Identity Theory. Philosophical Studies 69 (1):101-112.score: 21.0
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