Two decades after the publication of Clifford and Marcus' volume Writing Culture, this collection provides a fresh and diverse reassessment of the debates that ...
Anthropologists now openly acknowledge that social anthropology can no longer fulfill its traditional aim of providing holistic, objective representations of people of "exotic" cultures. After Writing Culture asks what theoretical and practical role contemporary anthropology can play in our increasingly unpredictable and complex world. With fourteen articles written by well-known anthropologists, the work explores some of the directions in which contemporary anthropology is moving, following the questions raised by the "writing culture" debates of the 1980s. Some of the chapters cover: (...) the concept of caste in Indian society, Scottish ethnography, how dreams are culturally conceptualized, representations of the family, theme parks and the anthropologist in Japan, people's place in the landscape of Northern Australia, and representing the identity of the New Zealand Maori. (shrink)
In what does philosophical progress consist? 'Vertical' progress corresponds to development within a specific paradigm/framework for theorizing (of the sort associated, revolutions aside, with science); 'horizontal' progress corresponds to the identification and cultivation of diverse paradigms (of the sort associated, conservativism aside, with art and pure mathematics). Philosophical progress seems to involve both horizontal and vertical dimensions, in a way that is somewhat puzzling: philosophers work in a number of competing frameworks (like artists or mathematicians), while typically maintaining that only (...) one of these is correct (like scientists). I diagnose this situation as reflecting that we are presently quite far from the end of inquiry into philosophical methodology. The good news is that we appear to be making advances on this score. The bad news is that failure to recognize or make explicit that our standards are in flux often leads to dogmatism, as I illustrate by attention to three assumptions presently operative in metaphysical and metametaphysical contexts. I close by identifying a tension between vertical and horizontal progress in philosophy, and suggesting an updated version of Carnap's principle of tolerance for new philosophical forms. (shrink)
In this paper I try to explain a strange omission in Hume’s methodological descriptions in his first Enquiry. In the course of this explanation I reveal a kind of rationalistic tendency of the latter work. It seems to contrast with “experimental method” of his early Treatise of Human Nature, but, as I show that there is no discrepancy between the actual methods of both works, I make an attempt to explain the change in Hume’s characterization of his own methods. This (...) attempt leads to the question about his interpretation of the science of human nature. I argue that his view on this science was not a constant one and that initially he identified this science with his account of passions. As this presupposes the primacy of Book 2 of his Treatise I try to find new confirmations of the old hypothesis that this Book had been written before the Book 1, dealing with understanding. Finally, I show that this discussion of Hume’s methodology may be of some interest to proponents of conceptual analysis. -/- . (shrink)
Since the 1950s, Donald T. Campbell has been one of the most influential contributors to the methodology of the social sciences. A distinguished psychologist, he has published scores of widely cited journal articles, and two awards, in social psychology and in public policy, have been named in his honor. This book is the first to collect his most significant papers, and it demonstrates the breadth and originality of his work.
Frank Knight (1921) famously distinguished the epistemic modes of certainty, risk, and uncertainty in order to characterize situations where deterministic, probabilistic or possibilistic foreknowledge is available. Because our probabilistic knowledge is limited, i.e. because many systems, e.g. the global climate, cannot be described and predicted probabilistically in a reliable way, Knight's third category, possibilistic foreknowledge, is not simply swept by the probabilistic mode. This raises the question how to justify possibilistic predictionsincluding the identi cation of the worst case. The development of (...) such a modal methodology is particularly vital with respect to predictions of climate change. I show that a methodological dilemma emerges when possibilistic predictions are framed in traditional terms and argue that a more nuanced conceptual framework, distinguishing dierent types of possibility, should be used in order to convey our uncertain knowledge about the future. The new conceptual scheme, however, questions the applicability of standard rules of rational decision-making, thus generating new challenges. (shrink)
Is methodology fruitless? Intense controversy has resulted from attempts to understand economics through philosophy of science. This collection clarifies and responds to the issues raised, arguing that methodology is an essential activity.
Maurice Hauriou (1856-1929) -- Methodology -- Hauriou's general methodology -- Legal methodology -- Sociological methodolgy -- Methodological interplay of law and social science -- Application of methodology to large groups -- Philosophical methodology -- The philosophical status of Hauriou's methodology.
In traditional armchair methodology, philosophers attempt to challenge a thesis of the form ‘F iff G’ or ‘F only if G’ by describing a scenario that elicits the intuition that what has been described is an F that isn’t G. If they succeed, then the judgment that there is, or could be, an F that is not G counts as good prima facie evidence against the target thesis. Moreover, if these intuitions remain compelling after further (good faith) reflection, then (...) traditional armchair methodology takes the judgment to be serious (though not infallible) evidence against the target thesis—call it secunda facie evidence—that should not be discounted as long as those intuitions retain their force. Some philosophers, however, suggest that this methodology is incompatible with epistemological naturalism, the view that philosophical inquiry should be sensitive to empirical observations, and argue that traditional armchair methodology must deemphasize the role of intuitions in philosophical inquiry. In my view, however, this would be a mistake: as I will argue, the most effective way to promote philosophical progress is to treat intuitions as having the (prima and secunda) evidential status I’ve described. But I will also argue that philosophical inquiry can produce a theory that is sensitive to empirical observations and the growth of empirical knowledge, even if it gives intuitions the prima- and secunda-facie evidential status that traditional armchair methodology demands—and thus that traditional armchair methodology, if properly practiced, need not be abandoned by naturalists, or even (except for a few exceptions) be much revised. (shrink)
Reflexivity is an essential part of the research process. It provides the perspective necessary for successful interpretation of field research and the development of insightful conclusions. In their new overview of the problems of reflexivity and interpretation Alvesson and Sk[um]oldberg have provided an invaluable guide to this central aspect of research methodology. The authors review and critically discuss the major intellectual streams, and highlight their problems and possibilities in empirical work - hermeneutics, critical theory, postmodernism and poststructuralism, discourse analysis, (...) geneaology and feminism. Possible implications of different kinds of empirical work are explored. A large part of the book is devoted to the development and exemplification of a reflexive methodology. This draws upon insights of how culture, language, selective perception, subjective forms of cognition, ideology all, in complicated way, permeate scientific activity. The book makes explicit the links between techniques used in empirical research and different research traditions, making possible a theoretically-informed approach to qualitative research. The text helps researchers avoid the pitfall of naivete whilst pointing the way to a more open-minded, creative interaction between theoretical frameworks and empirical research. (shrink)
This volume constitutes a lucid introduction to methodology in social research. It will enable social science researchers trained in a particular field to look beyond and relate to other methodological domains.
This is a comprehensive and authoritative reference collection in the philosophy and methodology of the social sciences. The source materials selected are drawn from debates within the natural sciences as well as social scientific practice. This four volume set covers the traditional literature on the philosophy of the social sciences, and the contemporary philosophical and methodological debates developing at the heart of the disciplinary and interdisciplinary groups in the social sciences. It addresses the needs of researchers and academics who (...) are grappling with the relationship between questions of knowledge construction and the problems of social scientific method. (shrink)
On the question of precisely what role common sense (or related datum like folk psychology, trust in pre-theoretic/intuitive judgments, etc.) should have in reigning in the possible excesses of our philosophical methods, the so-called ‘continental’ answer to this question, for the vast majority, would be “as little as possible”, whereas the analytic answer for the vast majority would be “a reasonably central one”. While this difference at the level of both rhetoric and meta-philosophy is sometimes – perhaps often – problematised (...) by the actual philosophical practices of representative philosophers of either tradition, I will argue that this norm (and its absence) nonetheless continues to play an important justificatory role in relation to the use of some rather different methodological practices. In particular, many analytic philosophers not only explicitly invoke the value of common sense, but they also implicitly value it via techniques like conceptual analysis that want to explicate folk psychology and/or lay bare what is already embedded in the linguistic norms of a given culture, the widespread use of thought experiments and the way they function as ‘intuition pumps’, as well as the general aim to achieve ‘reflective equilibrium’ between our intuitions and reflective judgments in epistemology and political philosophy. Such methods, I will argue, enshrine a conservative, or, more positively, a modest understanding of the philosophical project in that it is invested in cohering with both a given body of knowledge and common sense. These methods are notably less perspicuous in continental philosophy. To bring some of the reasons why this might be so to the fore, this paper considers Deleuze’s sustained attack on both good and common sense, which he argues are fundamental to the prevalence of a dogmatic image of thought. If Deleuze is right about this, and if the analytic tradition distils and perfects certain methods that are closely associated with this image of thought, then we have here a rather stark methodological contrast that calls for elaboration and evaluation. (shrink)
This book evaluates the increasingly wide variety of intellectual resources for research methods and methodologies and investigates what constitutes good educational research. Written by a distinguished international group of philosophers of education Questions what sorts of research can usefully inform policy and practice, and what inferences can be drawn from different kinds of research Demonstrates the critical engagement of philosophers of education with the wider educational research community and illustrates the benefits that can accrue from such engagement.
This book evaluates the increasingly wide variety of intellectual resources for research methods and methodologies and investigates what constitutes good educational research. Written by a distinguished international group of philosophers of education Questions what sorts of research can usefully inform policy and practice, and what inferences can be drawn from different kinds of research Demonstrates the critical engagement of philosophers of education with the wider educational research community and illustrates the benefits that can accrue from such engagement.
The Nicomachean Ethics is generally thought to be a “dialectical” work, aimed at resolving aporia in a set of endoxa, which it takes as its starting-point. I argue that Aristotle’s aim in the treatise is, rather, to produce definitions of key ethical terms, and that his starting-points are limited to evaluative and discriminative judgments of a certain sort, which are demanded by the nature of the discipline and are not endoxa. I discuss also how the definitions are reached (focusing on (...) the cases of the virtues of character) and the roles that aporiai do play in the process. (shrink)
Ever since the formation of the field of economic methodology in the 1990s, doubts have been raised about its discursive closure from both inside and outside the field. Rather than embarking on a programmatic discussion, I present a historical narrative regarding the conditions of the formation of the field, which may have necessitated this closure. These conditions are found in the role methodological reflections played in the formalist revolution of the 1950s and in its critique in the 1970s. Both (...) episodes gave occasion to, but did not require the import of philosophy of science in the mid-1970s. Since the 1980s, when the field became separately established through post-Popperian methodology, it remains an open question whether this imposition still holds. (shrink)
Provision of education for children under five has recently become a political concern. At the same time, this relatively small field has been attracting increased research attention, with many early years practitioners seeking routes to initial and higher degrees. This book offers essential guidance for researchers and newcomers to the field, outlining opportunities in research as well as useful, sensitive and appropriate methods for researching childhood education.
This collection brings together the essays of one of the foremost American philosophers of economics. Cumulatively they offer fresh perspectives on foundational questions such as: what sort of science is economics? and how successful can economists be in acquiring knowledge of their subject matter?
AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO ENGLISH EDITION The English edition of Granice Nauki is essentially different from the original text. Chapter VII is completely changed. ...
ELEMENTARY LOGIC GR. C. MOISIL Institute of Mathematics, Rumanian Academy, Bucharest, Rumania 1. We shall consider a typified logic of propositions. ...
I address the topic of pragmatic methodology as a practitioner in applied microeconomics who has been working in the still nascent field of the ?economics of organization?. My purpose is both to make explicit the methodology out of which transaction cost economics works and to suggest that other theories of economic organization do the same. Conceivably convergence will develop in the process, maybe even a consensus. At a minimum, it will be useful to have each implicit methodology (...) made explicit. I begin with some contrasting views on methodology. Section 2 sets out the rudiments of pragmatic methodology. Section 3 examines how transaction cost economics responds to the four precepts of pragmatic methodology. Additional methodological considerations that are posed by transaction cost economics are discussed in section 4. Concluding remarks follow. (shrink)
This paper focuses on Ludwig von Mises methodological apriorism. It uses Wittgenstein's private language argument as the basis for a critique of Mises's claim to have found apodictically certain foundations for economic analysis. It is argued instead that Mises's methodology is more fruitfully viewed as an exercise in social ontology, the objective of which is to outline key features of the socio-economic world that social scientific research ought to take into account if it is to be fruitful. The implications (...) of this perspective for three key methodological issues, namely the relationship between theory and history, the possibility of naturalism, and the place of Austrian economics within the discipline of economics as a whole, are brought out. (shrink)
Even if falsificationism in the strict Popper-Lakatos sense may be too harsh for economics, falsifiability and refutability are eminent criteria for theory appraisal. Hausman's (1997) revision of his (1992) methodology of economics does not come sufficiently close to meeting such a methodological requirement and risks allowing the prioritising of irrefutable theories over empirical phenomena. It therefore needs further advancement.
The paper is a reminiscence of T.W. Hutchison by way of a retrospective view of our debate over the relationship between the ideas of Karl Popper, F. A. Hayek, and Ludwig von Mises on methodology. Our dispute was part of a larger debate over the relevance of Popper's thought for economic methodology. Its place within the larger debate is also explored.
While there exist numerous applications of Kuhn's analysis of scientific revolutions to economics, there is yet to be an application to econometrics. The present paper addresses this via an analysis of the often-documented transition between the textbook and LSE methodologies witnessed in British time series econometrics. This exercise allows a number of issues to be raised. First, it will be questioned whether the observed transition in econometrics is an appropriate subject for analysis within the Kuhnian framework. This is the primary (...) concern of the paper. Second, the adoption of Kuhn's approach will allow the witnessed transition in econometric methodology to be viewed from a different perspective to that permitted by more conventional historical accounts. This is seen to lead a number of interesting conclusions. Third, implications of the present study for Kuhn's analysis will be discussed. (shrink)
This essay addresses the question, raised by Frank Hahn, of whether the study, by economists, of economic methodology is in practice beneficial. After considering what this statement could mean, and discussing the example of Lionel Robbins, it draws a number of conclusions: that methodological statements have unintended, context-dependent consequences, and that these may result from factors that should have nothing to do with economics.
(2013). Introduction: Methodology, systemic risk, and the economics profession. Journal of Economic Methodology: Vol. 20, Methodology, Systemic Risk, and the Economics Profession, pp. 1-5. doi: 10.1080/1350178X.2013.774842.
It is argued that rather than a well defined F?Twist, Milton Friedman's ?Methodology of positive economics? offers an F?Mix: a pool of ambiguous and inconsistent ingredients that can be used for putting together a number of different methodological positions. This concerns issues such as the very concept of being unrealistic, the goal of predictive tests, the as?if formulation of theories, explanatory unification, social construction, and more. Both friends and foes of Friedman's essay have ignored its open?ended unclarities. Their removal (...) may help create common ground for more focused debate in economics. (shrink)
The practice of neoclassical economics is characterized as an ?axiomatic positivism?, which is far removed from the official (Popper-Lakatos) methodology of neoclassicism. Hausman (1992) attempts to provide a full revision of that official methodology, for which he takes recourse to the methodological work of J.S. Mill. Hausman's methodology is problematical because of: (1) an inadequate distinction between a normative and a descriptive methodology; (2) an insufficient consideration of the empirical stages of theory appraisal; (3) a misleading (...) account of the tendential character of economic generalizations, as revealed by his treatment of them as ceteris paribus formulations. Further, an arbitrary part of the theory assessment in Hausman's approach seems to run in praxeological terms, apparently divorced from the methodological appraisal. (shrink)
The paper attempts to think through some aspects of a methodology for tendencies, taking Menger as an important source of inspiration. The contrast between laws and tendencies is emphasized, whereby laws posit necessary connections between cause and effect and refer to historically specific events and tendencies describe loose connections between cause and effect and refer to broad Hayekian patterns of events. Emphasis is placed on the importance of isolating as well as ?patterning? abstraction for the social sciences, which is (...) traced back to Menger. The implications for method of these two forms of abstraction are elaborated. Some topical controversies are discussed along the way, such as the rigour/relevance dilemma, the realisticness of the rationality principle and the intra-Austrian dispute between the radical subjectivists and the ?middle grounders?. The use and importance of an Aristotelian ontology, prevalent in Menger, is discussed as well. (shrink)
One way of inducing economists to pay more attention to methodology is for methodologists to take up problems that practicing economists will see as relevant to their work and discuss them in a non-technical manner. The paper provides some examples of how methodologists could aid practicing economists in this way. The examples used are the validity of the new classical's insistence on reductionism, the tension between those who want to ground economic theory rigorously, and those willing to work with (...) informal theory, and the related tension between the claimed reliance on ?scientific? theory and the actual reliance on informal evidence, conflicting interpretations of what science and theories are, and some low-level but important problems in econometrics. (shrink)
The paper questions Weintraub's thesis that ?Methodology doesn't matter?. It is argued that the thesis is unclear, and when clarified on the basis of textual evidence from Weintraub himself, it is false (or else trivially true). It is also pointed out that Weintraub's argument for the thesis is based on what he denounces, namely ?Methodology? (of a second degree); it turns out to be a ?Methodological? argument against ?Methodology?. The thesis also gives a distorted picture of what (...) many methodologists of economics actually are doing. On the other hand, Weintraub's arguments for why the history of economic thought might matter also apply to much of economic methodology. It is concluded that methodology might matter. (shrink)
Bagehot wrote on the methodology of Ricardian political economy some years after the appearance of marginalism. The purpose of this paper is to examine and evaluate his methodological positions. Bagehot made some significant contributions concerning the nature of economic explanation, the relevance of economic assumptions and the limits of the validity of economic theories. His positions were strongly influenced by social anthropology and Darwinian evolutionism. Bagehot's originality lies in his evolutionist view of the Ricardian political economy, (...) a view that led him to limit its validity and to reinforce its realisticness, at a time when economics was about to take an opposite direction. (shrink)
(2013). The Elgar companion to recent economic methodology. Journal of Economic Methodology: Vol. 20, Methodology, Systemic Risk, and the Economics Profession, pp. 81-86. doi: 10.1080/1350178X.2013.774853.
Part of Keynes? 'struggle of escape from habitual modes of thought and expression' (Keynes 1960: viii) involves an implicit attempt to break with the methodology as well as the theory of the past. Unfortunately the rhetorical strategy Keynes adopted in The General Theoryblurred this attempt. As a result, it is only by examining both the methodology and rhetoric embedded in this work that it becomes possible to understand the book as a coherent whole. This paper demonstrates the validity (...) of taking such an approach. (shrink)
This paper examines two conflicting views that have emerged within the recent methodological literature regarding the relationship between Friedman's famous essay and the formalist revolution. I focus on three influential contributors to this ongoing debate: Mark Blaug, Terence Hutchison, and Thomas Mayer. Blaug and Hutchison have argued repeatedly that Friedman's essay licensed the formalist revolution while Mayer has argued precisely the opposite; the formalist revolution was a result of not following Friedman's methodological advice. The juxtaposition of these (...) views is particularly interesting since the authors disagree sharply about the impact of Friedman's essay, and yet seem to agree about most other aspects of economic methodology. (shrink)
Hutchison's 1938 essay has been mainly interpreted as introducing positivism and ultra-empiricism into economics. Such interpretations misrepresent his position. While he clearly drew on logical positivism, his methodology stems from a more moderate form of empiricism. However the issue at stake is not the exact degree of Hutchison's empiricism, but rather the extent to which such negative labelling has trivialised his position and distracted attention from the main concern of his 1938 essay. This was to mount a sustained and (...) systematic criticism of the traditional abstract-deductive method in economics. In its place Hutchison sought to promote a more empirical, inductive approach. The paper is concerned with demonstrating the extent to which Machlup failed to provide evidence of Hutchison's ultra-empiricism. It thereby seeks to clear the way towards a reappraisal of Hutchison's methodology and towards a reappraisal of its relevance in our post-positivist era. (shrink)
This paper reviews some of the key responses to Hahn's famous retiring remarks and argues that none has satisfactorily addressed Hahn's suggestion that a discipline does not need to consciously discuss its foundations as it can rely on an evolutionary process to select them. The paper presents a general counter to Hahn on this point which, when applied to contemporary economics, supplies a strong case for the study of methodology now. The particular strength of the case now turns on (...) the current ferment at the foundations of the discipline over the rational choice model. (shrink)
Imre Lakatos' philosophical and scientific papers are published here in two volumes. Volume I brings together his very influential but scattered papers on the philosophy of the physical sciences, and includes one important unpublished essay on the effect of Newton's scientific achievement. Volume II presents his work on the philosophy of mathematics (much of it unpublished), together with some critical essays on contemporary philosophers of science and some famous polemical writings on political and educational issues. Imre Lakatos had an influence (...) out of all proportion to the length of his philosophical career. This collection exhibits and confirms the originality, range and the essential unity of his work. It demonstrates too the force and spirit he brought to every issue with which he engaged, from his most abstract mathematical work to his passionate 'Letter to the director of the LSE'. Lakatos' ideas are now the focus of widespread and increasing interest, and these volumes should make possible for the first time their study as a whole and their proper assessment. (shrink)
This paper considers the debate surrounding the elucidation of Laka-tosian novel facts in Keynesian macroeconomics. An analysis of this debate highlights how, in the process of using methodologies to appraise economics, economic methodologists have been forced into adopting the methodology of historiographic research programmes (MHRP) as a method of appraising methodologies. It is argued here that the failure to find Lakatosian novel facts in Keynesian macroeconomics has prompted economic methodologists to consider the appropriateness of MHRP as a method of (...) meta-methodological appraisal. This paper suggests that the failure to find Lakatosian novel facts in economics must necessarily lead economic methodologists into a Kuhnian-type investigation of what it is that economists actually do. (shrink)
This paper outlines some of the main methodological issues to arise in macroeconomics, making the case that the methodological issues arising in macroeconomics are just as important as those arising in microeconomics and that they merit more attention. Focusing on the symposium to which it forms the Introduction, the paper discusses three such issues: can macroeconomic theories be tested? Do macroeconomic theories change in response to evidence? Is contemporary macroeconomics in good methodological shape?
The main arguments currently held for and against the use of self-reports in economics are presented in their relation to well-known events in the history of the discipline: the ?measurement without theory?, the ?full-cost?, and the ?economic expectations? controversies. Doing so, the paper highlights the so far neglected role of George Katona's behavioral economics in these methodological discussions.
Economists often try to make plausible inferences from a sizable empirical literature addressing a particular measurement, direction-of-effect, or testing issue. There are serious methodological problems associated with drawing such inferences. This article sets out some of these problems in order to make a case for their importance. After discussing these problems, the paper presents three case study examples of inference difficulties in specific literatures. It then proposes a new hypothesis about the time pattern of publication bias in empirical economics literatures. (...) As support for this hypothesis, it presents evidence that ?reversals in findings? in empirical literatures in economics are not uncommon. Similarities are pointed out between the focus on inference problems in this paper, and the meta-analysis literatures in psychology and medical clinical trials. (shrink)
Friedman's essay argued that the primary criterion of validity for economic models was not descriptive fidelity, but the accuracy and importance of the predictions generated by its implications. His argument was directed against a major current of mid?twentieth?century economics that sought to alter neoclassical theory by displacing the competitive firm as a centerpiece of price theory. The success of Friedman's counter argument was due not only to its cogency but also to major improvements in econometric techniques, data sources and computational (...) capabilities during the last fifty years. As a result contemporary challenges to neoclassical facilities can proceed without resort to the methodological gambits against which Friedman inveighed fifty years ago. A striking example of such a contemporary challenge is the attack on the ?Law of One Price? in the field of Finance. (shrink)
ABSRACT: An increasing number of writers (for example, Kim ((1992), (1999)), Bechtel and Mundale (1999), Keeley (2000), Bickle (2003), Polger (2004), and Shapiro ((2000), (2004))) have attacked the existence of multiple realization and wider views of the special sciences built upon it. We examine the two most important arguments against multiple realization and show that neither is successful. Furthermore, we also defend an alternative, positive view of the ontology, and methodology, of the special science. In contrast to the claims (...) of recent critics, we show that methodological connections between the neurosciences and psychology are plausibly often the result of multiple realization. (shrink)
A debate is raging over philosophical methodology. It is a debate between philosophical traditionalists and science-oriented philosophical naturalists concerning the legitimacy of the widespread use of intuitions in philosophy. Not everyone finds the term ‘intuition’ the best label for what philosophers rely upon in the relevant sector of their practice. Instead of “intuitions” some prefer to talk of intuitive judgments, thought experiments, or what have you. Nonetheless, “intuition” is the most commonly used term in the territory, so I shall (...) not abandon it, though other terms will be used as well. Described fairly neutrally, the philosophical activity in question consists of specifying a hypothetical scenario and rendering an intuitive judgment about the correctness or incorrectness of classifying it under a stipulated heading. Does a given predicate ‘F’ apply to an event, an individual, a pair of objects, etc. in the scenario? Putting the question less linguistically, is a certain property or relation exemplified in the scenario? The central question in the debate is whether, when intuitions or intuitive judgments are formed about such cases, they provide good evidence for some type of philosophical conclusion. For instance, are they good evidence for a conclusion of the form “Case C is/is not an instance of F”? Philosophers’ ultimate interest is not in cases per se. Cases are examined as a means to determining the content or composition of the referent of ‘F’ (where the referent may be a property, a kind, a meaning, or a concept). But this further determination is not in the foreground -- though it definitely cannot be ignored. (shrink)
According to some critics, traditional armchair philosophical methodology relies in an illicit way on intuitions. But the particular structure of the critique is not often carefully articulated?a significant omission, since some of the critics? arguments for skepticism about philosophy threaten to generalize to skepticism in general. More recently, some experimentalist critics have attempted to articulate a critique that is especially tailored to affect traditional methods, without generalizing too widely. Such critiques are more reasonable, and more worthy of serious consideration, (...) than are blunter critiques that generalize far too widely. I argue that a careful (empirical!) examination of extant philosophical practices shows that traditional philosophical methods can meet these more reasonable challenges. (shrink)
David Lewis’s genuine modal realism is a controversial thesis in modal metaphysics. Charles Chihara and Ross Cameron have each argued that Lewis’s defence of his thesis involves his committing serious methodological errors; in particular, that his replies to two well-known and important objections are question-begging. Scott Shalkowski has further argued that Lewis’s attempt to analyse modal talk in non-modal terms is viciously circular. This paper considers the methodology which Lewis uses to argue for his thesis, and the paper tries (...) to show that it is guilty of no methodological errors. (shrink)
In this paper, I offer both a brief study of Collingwood's conception of historical explanation and epistemological historicity, and an examination of the influence of Collingwood's work on the historical methodology of Quentin Skinner and on Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy. Collingwood's work on the philosophy of history manifests a tension between the realist implications of the doctrine of reenactment and the logic of question and answer on the one hand, and, on the other, the constructionist tendency of the rest of (...) his work on the logic of historical inquiry and on the hermeneutic character of his more general conception of human historicity. This tension is displayed in the divergent interpretations of Collingwood by Quentin Skinner and Hans-Georg Gadamer, and in the inherent difficulties of each man's philosophy of history. I argue that the weaknesses of Skinner's methodological historicism are present already in his reading of Collingwood and reflect the difficulties inherent in understanding Collingwood as offering primarily a methodology of history. I also claim that Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy, while presenting a more plausible reading of Collingwood, suffers from tensions similar to those within Collingwood's work between the logic of explanation and the logic of practical recommendation, and between the character of historical explanation and the character of philosophical understanding. (shrink)
In spite of the enormous interdisciplinary interest in consciousness these days, sorely lacking are general methodologies in terms of which individual research efforts across disciplines can be seen as contributing to a common end. In the paper I outline such a methodology. The central idea is that empirically studying our conception of consciousness—what we have in mind when we think about consciousness—can lead to progress on consciousness itself. The paper clarifies and motivates that idea.
The present study is concerned the viability of the primary method in contemporary philosophy, i.e., conceptual analysis. Starting out by tracing the roots of this methodology to Platonic philosophy, the study questions whether such a methodology makes sense when divorced from Platonic philosophy, and develops a framework for a kind of analysis that is more in keeping with recent psychological research on categorization. Finally, it is shown that this kind of analysis can be applied to the concept of (...) justification in a manner that furthers the epistemological goal of providing intellectual guidance. (shrink)
Heterophenomenology is a third-person methodology proposed by Daniel Dennett for using first-person reports as scientific evidence. I argue that heterophenomenology can be improved by making six changes: (i) setting aside consciousness, (ii) including other sources of first-person data besides first-person reports, (iii) abandoning agnosticism as to the truth value of the reports in favor of the most plausible assumptions we can make about what can be learned from the data, (iv) interpreting first-person reports (and other first-person behaviors) directly in (...) terms of target mental states rather than in terms of beliefs about them, (v) dropping any residual commitment to incorrigibility of first-person reports, and (vi) recognizing that thirdperson methodology does have positive effects on scientific practices. When these changes are made, heterophenomenology turns into the self-measurement methodology of firstperson data that I have defended in previous papers. (shrink)
In this paper I investigate current issues in the methodology of philosophy. In particular, the epistemology of intuition and the status of empirical work on the use of intuition in philosophy.
In this article, the author offers a discussion of the evidential role of the Galilean constant in the history of physics. The author argues that measurable constants help theories constrain data. Theories are engines for research, and this helps explain why the Duhem-Quine thesis does not undermine scientific practice. The author connects his argument to discussion of two famous papers in the history of economic methodology, Milton Friedman's 'Methodology of Positive Economics', which appealed to example of Galilean Law (...) of Fall in its argument; and Vernon Smith's 'Economics in the Laboratory'. While the author offers some criticism of Friedman and Smith, most of the article is a friendly reinterpretation of their insights. (shrink)
The main point of this paper is to contribute to understanding Milton Friedman’s (1953) “The Methodology of Positive Economics” (hereafter F1953), one of the most influential statements of economic methodology of the twentieth century, and, in doing so, help discern the non trivial but complex role of philosophic ideas in the shaping of economic theorizing and economists’ self-conception. It also aims to contribute to a better understanding of the theoretical origins of the so-called ‘Chicago’ school of economics. In (...) this paper, I first present detailed textual evidence of the familiarity of George Stigler with the early work of Talcott Parsons, the most important American translator and disseminator of Max Weber’s ideas, who also helped create sociology as a distinct discipline in the United States. The Chicago-Parsons link is no surprise because historians have known that Frank Knight and Parsons corresponded, first about translating Weber and then about matters of mutual interest. Knight, who was a doctoral advisor to Stigler and teacher of Milton Friedman, was not merely the first American translator of Weber, but remained keenly and, perhaps, increasingly interested in Weber throughout his life. I am unfamiliar with any investigation of the Weberian influence on Knight’s students. I show that Stigler praises Parsons’ treatment of Alfred Marshall, who plays an outsized role in Friedman’s self-conception of economics and economic theory. I also show that Stigler calls attention to the methodological similarity between Friedman and Parsons. Finally, I turn to F1953, and I show, first, that some of its most distinctive and philosophically interesting claims echo Parsons’ treatment of methodological matters; second that once alerted one can note Weberian terminology in F1953. (shrink)
In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis’ Modal Realism is unobtainable. I consider two familiar objections to Lewisian realism – the modal irrelevance objection and the epistemological objection – and argue that Lewis’ response to each is unsatisfactory because they presuppose claims that only the Lewisian realist will accept. Since, I argue, warrant for Lewisian realism can only be obtained if we have a response to each objection that does not presuppose the truth of Lewisian realism, this circularity (...) is vicious. I end by contrasting Lewis’ methodology with Forrest’s in order to illustrate a rival method that does not fall victim to the objection I lay against Lewis. (shrink)
This collection of essays, first published two decades ago, presents central feminist critiques and analyses of natural and social sciences and their philosophies. Unfortunately, in spite of the brilliant body of research and scholarship in these fields in subsequent decades, the insights of these essays remain as timely now as they were then: philosophy and the sciences still presume kinds of social innocence to which they are not entitled. The essays focus on Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Marx; on (...) the 'adversary method' model of philosophic reasoning; on principles of individuation on philosophical ontology and philosophy of language; on individualistic assumptions in psychology; functionalism in sociological and biological theory; evolutionary theory; the methodology of political science; and conceptions of objective inquiry in the sciences. In taking insights of both Liberal and Marxian women's movements into the purportedly most abstract and value-free areas of Western thought, these essays chart sexist and androcentric assumptions, claims and practices in the cognitive, technical cores of Western sciences and their philosophies. They begin to identify the distinctive aspects of women's experiences and locations in male-supremacist social structures which can provide resources needed for the creation of post-androcentric thinking in research, scholarship, and public policy. Such uses of feminist insights remain controversial today, and even among some feminists. These authors were all junior researchers and scholars two decades ago; today many are among the most distinguished senior scholars in their fields. Their work here provides a splendid opportunity for upper-level undergraduate and graduate students in philosophy and the social sciences to explore some of the most intriguing and controversial challenges to disciplinary projects and to public policy today. (shrink)
Mark Schroeder’s Hypotheticalism: agent-neutrality, moral epistemology, and methodology Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9657-2 Authors Tristram McPherson, Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota Duluth, 361 A. B. Anderson Hall, 1121 University Drive, Duluth, MN 55812, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
In this essay, I review the relationship between Charles Darwin's methodology and the philosophy of science of Sir John F. W. Herschel. Darwin's exposure to Herschel's philosophy was, I argue, significant. Further, when we construct an appropriate reading of Herschel's philosophy of science (a surprisingly difficult feat), we can see that Darwin's three-part argument in the Origin is crafted in order to strictly adhere to Herschel's methodological guidelines.
What is distinctive about my views in epistemology? One thing is that my concern with epistemology is a concern with methodology. Furthermore, I reject psychologism about logic and reject the idea that deductive rules like modus ponens are in any way rules of inference. I accept a kind of methodological conservatism and reject methodological theories that appeal to special foundations, analytic truth, or a priori justification. Although I believe that there are significant practical aspects of theoretical reasoning, I reject (...) the suggestion that theoretical reasoning is a special case of practical reasoning applied to a special epistemic goal. I also believe that a methodological epistemology that is concerned with the reliability of inferential methods can benefit from an appreciation of important relevant concepts and results about reliability in statistical learning theory. (shrink)
The paper engages the conceptual question of the nature of rights. First, moral methodology for developing criteria to judge the adequacy of theories for the concept of rights is discussed. Standard methodologies for conceptual theory, such as analysis of language practices, appealing to intuitions to test and correct hypotheses, and mixtures of these with appeals to substantive moral values, are shown to fail in important ways to give us reasons to adopt one or another view of the concept. An (...) alternative methodology is proposed which appeals to the distinct role of concepts in our value scheme (the added value of being able to employ such concepts in our moral judgments). This is then used to develop criteria for a successful theory of rights. Two existing theories are shown, as a matter of illustration, to fail to satisfy the criteria, and finally an alternative theory of rights which does satisfy these criteria is proposed and defended. (shrink)
