Search results for 'Evaluative' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Brent G. Kyle (2013). How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? Philosophers' Imprint 13 (1):1-20.score: 24.0
    Ethicists are typically willing to grant that thick terms (e.g. ‘courageous’ and ‘murder’) are somehow associated with evaluations. But they tend to disagree about what exactly this relationship is. Does a thick term’s evaluation come by way of its semantic content? Or is the evaluation pragmatically associated with the thick term (e.g. via conversational implicature)? In this paper, I argue that thick terms are semantically associated with evaluations. In particular, I argue that many thick concepts (if not all) conceptually entail (...)
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  2. Christine Tappolet, The Normativity of Evaluative Concepts. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan.score: 24.0
    It is generally accepted that there are two kinds of normative concepts: evaluative concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. The question that is raised by this distinction is how it is possible to claim that evaluative concepts are normative. Given that deontic concepts appear to be at the heart of normativity, the bigger the gap between evaluative and deontic concepts, the less it appears plausible to say that evaluative concepts are normative. After (...)
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  3. Logi Gunnarsson (2008). The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):305 - 326.score: 24.0
    The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status than the great apes. Animalism—moral (...)
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  4. Christine Tappolet (1995). The Sense and Reference of Evaluative Terms. In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference one Hundred Years later. Kluwer. 113--127.score: 24.0
    What account of evaluative expressions, such as ‘is beautiful’, ‘is generous’ or ‘is good’, should a Fregean adopt? Given Frege’s claim that predicates can have both a sense and a reference in addition to their extension, an interesting range of only partially explored theoretical possibilities opens to Frege and his followers. My intention here is to briefly present these putative possibilities and explore one of them, namely David Wiggins’ claim that evaluative predicates refer to non-natural concepts and have (...)
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  5. Douglas W. Portmore, Foundational Consequentialism and Its Primary Evaluative Focal Point.score: 24.0
    Following Shelly Kagan’s useful terminology, foundational consequentialists are those who hold that the ranking of outcomes is at the foundation of all moral assessment. That is, they hold that moral assessments of right and wrong, virtuous and vicious, morally good and morally bad, etc. are all ultimately a function of how outcomes rank. But foundational consequentialists disagree on what is to be directly evaluated in terms of the ranking of outcomes, which is to say that they disagree on what the (...)
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  6. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2012). From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements. Dialogue 51 (1):55-77.score: 24.0
    ABSTRACT: Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then (...)
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  7. Pieter Jan Stallen Anna C. Bolders, Guido P. H. Band (2012). Evaluative Conditioning Induces Changes in Sound Valence. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 24.0
    Evaluative Conditioning (EC) has hardly been tested in the auditory domain, but it is a potentially valuable research tool. In Experiment 1 we investigated whether the affective evaluation of short environmental sounds can be changed using affective words as unconditioned stimuli (US). Congruence effects on an affective priming task (APT) for conditioned sounds demonstrated successful EC. Subjective ratings for sounds paired with negative words changed accordingly. In Experiment 2 we investigated whether the acquired valence remains stable after repeated presentation (...)
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  8. Gavin Brent Sullivan (2007). Wittgenstein and the Grammar of Pride: The Relevance of Philosophy to Studies of Self-Evaluative Emotions. New Ideas in Psychology 25 (3):233-252.score: 21.0
    In this paper, Wittgenstein's philosophical approach and remarks are used to highlight features of pride that are not represented in contemporary psychological theories. Wittgenstein's scattered philosophical and autobiographical remarks on pride are arranged in order to engage with aspects of pride (e.g., as a self-conscious emotion) that can appear to have only empirical answers. Important themes to emerge in the resulting surview include the temptation to talk of pride as having or being a structure, the role of personal context in (...)
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  9. Ramon J. Rhine (1965). Preference for a Positive Evaluative Response in Concept Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 70 (6):632.score: 21.0
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  10. Jennie Louise (2006). Right Motive, Wrong Action: Direct Consequentialism and Evaluative Conflict. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (1):65 - 85.score: 20.0
    In this paper I look at attempts to develop forms of consequentialism which do not have a feature considered problematic in Direct Consequentialist theories (that is, those consequentialist theories that apply the criterion of rightness directly in the evaluation of any set of options). The problematic feature in question (which I refer to as ‘evaluative conflict’) is the possibility that, for example, a right motive might lead an agent to perform a wrong act. Theories aiming to avoid this phenomenon (...)
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  11. Jean Pierre Malrieu (1999). Evaluative Semantics: Cognition, Language, and Ideology. Routledge.score: 20.0
    Evaluative Semantics proposes a strongly postmodernist theory of cognition, ideology and discourse in which the structure and internal consistency of ideology resemble those of evaluative knowledge of the mind. The strength of this book is that it goes beyond purely theoretical claims to propose an original connectionist model of evaluative interpretation. Malrieu's new semantics makes a unique contribution to the literature of cognitive science, linguistics, and discourse analysis.
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  12. Bennett W. Helm (2009). Emotions as Evaluative Feelings. Emotion Review 1 (3):248--55.score: 18.0
    The phenomenology of emotions has traditionally been understood in terms of bodily sensations they involve. This is a mistake. We should instead understand their phenomenology in terms of their distinctively evaluative intentionality. Emotions are essentially affective modes of response to the ways our circumstances come to matter to us, and so they are ways of being pleased or pained by those circumstances. Making sense of the intentionality and phenomenology of emotions in this way requires rejecting traditional understandings of intentionality (...)
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  13. Dustin R. Stokes (2006). The Evaluative Character of Imaginative Resistance. British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (4):287-405.score: 18.0
    A fiction may prescribe imagining that a pig can talk or tell the future. A fiction may prescribe imagining that torturing innocent persons is a good thing. We generally comply with imaginative prescriptions like the former, but not always with prescriptions like the latter: we imagine non-evaluative fictions without difficulty but sometimes resist imagining value-rich fictions. Thus arises the puzzle of imaginative resistance. Most analyses of the phenomenon focus on the content of the relevant imaginings. The present analysis focuses (...)
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  14. Christine Tappolet (forthcoming). Evaluative Vs. Deontic Concepts. In Hugh Lafollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 18.0
    Ethical thought is articulated around normative concepts. Standard examples of normative concepts are good, reason, right, ought, and obligatory. Theorists often treat the normative as an undifferentiated domain. Even so, it is common to distinguish between two kinds of normative concepts: evaluative or axiological concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. This encyclopedia entry discusses the many differences between the two kinds of concepts.
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  15. A. Field (2000). I Like It, but I'm Not Sure Why: Can Evaluative Conditioning Occur Without Conscious Awareness? Consciousness and Cognition 9 (1):13-36.score: 18.0
    There is good evidence that, in general, autonomic conditioning in humans occurs only when subjects can verbalize the contingencies of conditioning. However, one form of conditioning, evaluative conditioning (EC), seems exceptional in that a growing body of evidence suggests that it can occur without conscious contingency awareness. As such, EC offers a unique insight into what role contingency awareness might play in associative learning. Despite this evidence, there are reasons to doubt that evaluative conditioning can occur without conscious (...)
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  16. David Plunkett & Timothy Sundell (2013). Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (23).score: 18.0
    In constructing semantic theories of normative and evaluative terms, philosophers have commonly deployed a certain type of disagreement-based argument. The premise of the argument observes the possibility of genuine disagreement between users of a certain normative or evaluative term, while the conclusion of the argument is that, however differently those speakers employ the term, they must mean the same thing by it. After all, if they did not, then they would not really disagree. We argue that in many (...)
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  17. Eamon P. Fulcher & Marianne Hammerl (2001). When All is Considered: Evaluative Learning Does Not Require Contingency Awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (4):567-573.score: 18.0
    We argue that the effects of evaluative learning may occur (a) without conscious perception of the affective stimuli, (b) without awareness of the stimulus contingencies, and (c) without any awareness that learning has occurred at all. Whether the three experiments reported in our target article provide conclusive evidence for either or any of these assertions is discussed in the commentaries of De Houwer and Field. We respond with the argument that when considered alongside other studies carried out over the (...)
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  18. A. P. Field (2000). Evaluative Conditioning is Pavlovian Conditioning: Issues of Definition, Measurement, and the Theoretical Importance of Contingency Awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (1):41-49.score: 18.0
    In her commentary of Field (1999), Hammerl (1999) has drawn attention to several interesting points concerning the issue of contingency awareness in evaluative conditioning. First, she comments on several contentious issues arising from Field's review of the evaluative conditioning literature, second she critiques the data from his pilot study and finally she argues the case that EC is a distinct form of conditioning that can occur in the absence of contingency awareness. With reference to these criticisms, this reply (...)
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  19. Eveline T. Feteris (2008). The Rational Reconstruction of Weighing and Balancing on the Basis of Teleological-Evaluative Considerations in the Justification of Judicial Decisions. Ratio Juris 21 (4):481-495.score: 18.0
    In this contribution the author develops an argumentation model for the reconstruction of weighing and balancing on the basis of teleological-evaluative considerations. The model is intended as a heuristic and critical tool for the rational reconstruction of the justification of judicial decisions. From the perspective of a rational discussion, it makes explicit the choices underlying the weighing and balancing on the basis of goals and values so that they can be made explicit and submitted to rational critique.
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  20. Joel Smith (2014). Are Emotions Embodied Evaluative Attitudes? [REVIEW] Disputatio 6 (38):93-106.score: 18.0
    Deonna and Teroni’s The Emotions is both an excellent introduction to philosophical work on emotions and a novel defence of their own Attitudinal Theory. After summarising their discussion of the literature I describe and evaluate their positive view. I challenge their theory on three fronts: their claim that emotions are a form of bodily awareness, their account of what makes an emotion correct, and their account of what justifies an emotion.
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  21. Justina Díaz Legaspe (2013). The Relativity of Evaluative Sentences: Disagreeing Over Disagreement. Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 54 (127):211-226.score: 18.0
    Evaluative sentences (moral judgments, expressions of taste, epistemic modals) are relative to the speaker's standards. Lately, a phenomenon has challenged the traditional explanation of this relativity: whenever two speakers disagree over them they contradict each other without being at fault. Hence, it is thought that the correction of the assertions involved must be relative to an unprivileged standard not necessarily the speaker's. I will claim instead that so far, neither this nor any other proposal has provided an explanation of (...)
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  22. Kenneth Reid Beesley (1982). Evaluative Adjectives as One-Place Predicates Dm Montague Grammar. Journal of Semantics 1 (3-4):195-249.score: 18.0
    In this paper I will argue that evaluative adjectives, such as good, bad, clever and skilful, should be analysed as one-place predicates in logical translation. This approach, which is basically the traditional logical treatment of ‘absolute’ adjectives, is to be contrasted with the approach in Montague (1974a) and Parsons (1972), wherein all adjectives are translated as two-place predicates, i.e. as semantic attributives. The move away from the Montague-Parsons analysis is not new: Bartsch (1972. 1975), McConnell-Ginet (1973), Kamp (1975), Siegel (...)
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  23. Bernard Hodgson (1988). Economic Science and Ethical Neutrality II: The Intransigence of Evaluative Concepts. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 7 (5):321 - 335.score: 18.0
    This paper returns to a perennial controversy I examined in a previous paper in the Journal of Business Ethics (Vol. 2, 1983). Is economic theory an ethically neutral discipline or do its statements presuppose a commitment to moral values? Once again this issue is addressed via a case study of the neo-classical theory of rational choice. In the present paper I focus on behaviourist forms of operationalist attempts to short-circuit any argument that would seek to infer moral presuppositions from the (...)
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  24. J. Kovacs (2013). Honorary Authorship Epidemic in Scholarly Publications? How the Current Use of Citation-Based Evaluative Metrics Make (Pseudo)Honorary Authors From Honest Contributors of Every Multi-Author Article. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (8):509-512.score: 18.0
    The current use of citation-based metrics to evaluate the research output of individual researchers is highly discriminatory because they are uniformly applied to authors of single-author articles as well as contributors of multi-author papers. In the latter case, these quantitative measures are counted, as if each contributor were the single author of the full article. In this way, each and every contributor is assigned the full impact-factor score and all the citations that the article has received. This has a multiplication (...)
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  25. John L. Pollock (2001). Evaluative Cognition. Noûs 35 (3):325–364.score: 18.0
    Cognitive agents form beliefs representing the world, evaluate the world as represented, form plans for making the world more to their liking, and perform actions executing the plans. Then the cycle repeats. This is the doxastic-conative loop, diagrammed in figure one.1 Both human beings and the autonomous rational agents envisaged in AI are cognitive agents in this sense. The cognition of a cognitive agent can be subdivided into two parts. Epistemic cognition is that kind of cognition responsible for producing and (...)
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  26. Paulo Sousa & Carlos Mauro (forthcoming). The Evaluative Nature of the Folk Concepts of Weakness and Strength of Will. :1-23.score: 18.0
    The evaluative nature of the folk concepts of weakness and strength of will. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.843057.
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  27. Gary G. Berntson, Greg J. Norman & John T. Cacioppo (2011). Comment: Laterality and Evaluative Bivalence: A Neuroevolutionary Perspective. Emotion Review 3 (3):344-346.score: 18.0
    Rutherford and Lindell (2011) review an extensive literature on lateralization of emotion. As they note, an important issue surrounding this question is the nature of emotion, which bears on what, precisely, is lateralized. The present comments are intended to broaden the context of the review, by considering lateralization from the standpoint of a bivariate model of evaluative processes and a neuroevolutionary perspective.
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  28. A. P. Field (2001). When All is Still Concealed: Are We Closer to Understanding the Mechanisms Underlying Evaluative Conditioning? Consciousness and Cognition 10 (4):559-566.score: 18.0
    Fulcher and Hammerl's (2001) important exploration of the role of contingency awareness in evaluative conditioning (EC) raises a lot of issues for discussion: (1) what boundaries, if any, exist between EC and affective learning paradigms?; (2) if EC does occur without awareness does this mean it is nonpropositional learning?; (3) is EC driven by stimulus-response (S-R), rather than stimulus-stimulus (S-S), associations and if so should it then surprise us that contingency awareness is not important?; and (4) if S-R associations (...)
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  29. Dan López de Sa (2006). The Case Against Evaluative Realism. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (57):277-294.score: 18.0
    In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitibve causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considerations ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had.
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  30. E. P. Fulcher & M. Hammerl (2001). When All is Revealed: A Dissociation Between Evaluative Learning and Contingency Awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (4):524-549.score: 18.0
    Three experiments are reported that address the issue of awareness in evaluative learning in two different sensory modalities: visual and haptic. Attempts were made to manipulate the degree of awareness through a reduction technique (by use of a distractor task in Experiments 1 and 2 and by subliminally presenting affective stimuli in Experiment 3) and an induction technique (by unveiling the evaluative learning effect and requiring participants to try to discount the influence of the affective stimuli). The results (...)
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  31. Jonathan M. Weinberg (2011). What is Evaluative Normativity, That We (Maybe) Should Avoid It? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):274-275.score: 18.0
    Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that we should avoid evaluative normativity in our psychological theorizing. But there are two crucial issues lacking clarity in their presentation of evaluative normativity. One of them can be resolved through disambiguation, but the other points to a deeper problem: Evaluative normativity is too tightly-woven in our theorizing to be easily disentangled and discarded.
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  32. Velda Chen & Peter D. Drummond (2008). Fear of Negative Evaluation Augments Negative Affect and Somatic Symptoms in Social-Evaluative Situations. Cognition and Emotion 22 (1):21-43.score: 18.0
    (2008). Fear of negative evaluation augments negative affect and somatic symptoms in social-evaluative situations. Cognition & Emotion: Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 21-43.
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  33. Dan López de Sa (2006). The Case Against Evaluative Realism. Theoria 21 (3):277-294.score: 18.0
    In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitive causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considerations ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had.
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  34. Xinyan Jiang (2008). Moral Perception and Its Evaluative Dimension. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:215-220.score: 18.0
    Moral Perception is the moral agent’s perception of the morally significant situation. In recent decades, the question about the role of moral perception in the moral life has drawn more and more attention in contemporary ethical theories. It has been widely acknowledged that the virtuous person perceives a given morally significant situation differently from others. But, current discussions of moral perception have been focused on the cognitive function of moral perception i.e., moral perception's making a certain feature of a given (...)
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  35. Agustin Ibanez, Ezequiel Gleichgerrcht, Esteban Hurtado, Ramiro González, Andrés Haye & Facundo F. Manes (2010). Early Neural Markers of Implicit Attitudes: N170 Modulated by Intergroup and Evaluative Contexts in IAT. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 4.score: 18.0
    The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is the most popular measure to evaluate implicit attitudes. Nevertheless, its neural correlates are not yet fully understood. We examined event related potentials (ERPs) in response to face- and word- processing while indigenous and non-indigenous participants performed an IAT displaying faces (ingroup and outgroup members) and words (positive and negative valence) as targets of category judgments. The N170 component was modulated by valence of words and by ingroup/outgroup face categorization. Contextual effects (face-words implicitly associated in (...)
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  36. Greg J. Norman, Catherine J. Norris, Jackie Gollan, Tiffany A. Ito, Louise C. Hawkley, Jeff T. Larsen, John T. Cacioppo & Gary G. Berntson (2011). Current Emotion Research in Psychophysiology: The Neurobiology of Evaluative Bivalence. Emotion Review 3 (3):349-359.score: 18.0
    Evaluative processes have their roots in early evolutionary history, as survival is dependent on an organism’s ability to identify and respond appropriately to positive, rewarding or otherwise salubrious stimuli as well as to negative, noxious, or injurious stimuli. Consequently, evaluative processes are ubiquitous in the animal kingdom and are represented at multiple levels of the nervous system, including the lowest levels of the neuraxis. While evolution has sculpted higher level evaluative systems into complex and sophisticated information-processing networks, (...)
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  37. Jacqui Poltera (2005). Is Personal Identity Evaluative? South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):87-96.score: 18.0
    Martha Nussbaum subscribes to the view that our identity is an evaluative question determined by our common, deeply held beliefs about what is worthwhile in human life. In so doing, she asserts that for an account of ethics to have “philosophical power” it needs to be grounded in an account of human nature that is both evaluative and internal. I focus on Nussbaum's claim that personal identity has to include the necessary features of practical rationality and sociability. Although (...)
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  38. Robert C. Radtke (1967). Effects of Verbally Mediated Drive on a Motor Response and Evaluative Ratings. Journal of Experimental Psychology 73 (1):22.score: 17.0
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  39. Jan de Houwer (2006). Using the Implicit Association Test Does Not Rule Out an Impact of Conscious Propositional Knowledge on Evaluative Conditioning. Learning and Motivation 37 (2):176-187.score: 17.0
  40. Jack Martin (2011). The Interactivist Social Ontology of Persons: A Descriptive and Evaluative Synthesis, with Two Suggestions. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 21 (1):173-183.score: 16.0
    Within the interactivist, process approach to metaphysics, Bickhard (Social life and social knowledge: toward a process account of development. Lawrence Erlbaum, New York, 2008a; Topoi 27: 139–149, 2008b; New Ideas Psychol, in press) has developed a social ontology of persons that avoids many well-known philosophical difficulties concerning the genesis, development, and application of the rational and moral capabilities and responsibilities that characterize persons. Interactivism positions developing persons inside sets of social conventions within which they participate in their own constitution as (...)
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  41. Piotr Winkielman, Norbert Schwarz, Tetra Fazendeiro & Rolf Reber (2003). The Hedonic Marking of Processing Fluency: Implications for Evaluative Judgment. In Jochen Musch & Karl C. Klauer (eds.), The Psychology of Evaluation: Affective Processes in Cognition and Emotion. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.score: 16.0
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  42. Klaus Fiedler (2003). The Hidden Vicissitudes of the Priming Paradigm in Evaluative Judgment Research. In Jochen Musch & Karl C. Klauer (eds.), The Psychology of Evaluation: Affective Processes in Cognition and Emotion. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 109--137.score: 16.0
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  43. Dirk Hermans, Frank Baeyens & Paul Eelen (2003). On the Acquisition and Activation of Evaluative Information in Memory: The Study of Evaluative Learning and Affective Priming Combined. In Jochen Musch & Karl C. Klauer (eds.), The Psychology of Evaluation: Affective Processes in Cognition and Emotion. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 139--168.score: 16.0
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  44. Michael D. Robinson, P. Vargas & Emily G. Crawford (2003). Putting Process Into Personality, Appraisal, and Emotion: Evaluative Processing as a Missing Link. In Jochen Musch & Karl C. Klauer (eds.), The Psychology of Evaluation: Affective Processes in Cognition and Emotion. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 275--306.score: 16.0
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  45. Joshua Knobe & Gabriel Mendlow (2004). The Good, the Bad and the Blameworthy: Understanding the Role of Evaluative Reasoning in Folk Psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):252-258.score: 15.0
    People ordinarily make sense of their own behavior and that of others by invoking concepts like belief, desire, and intention. Philosophers refer to this network of concepts and related principles as 'folk psychology.' The prevailing view of folk psychology among philosophers of mind and psychologists is that it is a proto-scientific theory whose function is to explain and predict behavior.
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  46. James W. Lamb (1993). Evaluative Compatibilism and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Journal of Philosophy 60 (10):517-27.score: 15.0
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  47. Matti Eklund, The Descriptive and the Evaluative.score: 15.0
    (For colloquium talk in Aarhus, Denmark.).
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  48. Darryl F. Wright (2008). Evaluative Concepts and Objective Values: Rand on Moral Objectivity. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):149-181.score: 15.0
    Those familiar with Ayn Rand's ethical writings may know that she discusses issues in metaethics, and that she defended the objectivity of morality during the heyday of early non-cognitivism. But neither her metaethics, in general, nor her views on moral objectivity, in particular, have received wide study. This article elucidates some aspects of her thought in these areas, focusing on Rand's conception of the way in which moral values serve a biologically based human need, and on her account of moral (...)
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  49. Philip T. Montague (1975). On the Relation of Natural Properties to Normative and Evaluative Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (3):341-351.score: 15.0
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  50. G. M. Matthews (1958). `Evaluative and Descriptive'. Mind 67 (267):335-343.score: 15.0
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