Search results for 'Evaluative' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  67
    John Danaher (forthcoming). An Evaluative Conservative Case for Biomedical Enhancement. Journal of Medical Ethics:medethics-2015-103307.
    It is widely believed that a conservative moral outlook is opposed to biomedical forms of human enhancement. In this paper, I argue that this widespread belief is incorrect. Using Cohen’s evaluative conservatism as my starting point, I argue that there are strong conservative reasons to prioritise the development of biomedical enhancements. In particular, I suggest that biomedical enhancement may be essential if we are to maintain our current evaluative equilibrium (i.e. the set of values that undergird and permeate (...)
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  2. Brent G. Kyle (2013). How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? Philosophers' Imprint 13 (1):1-20.
    Ethicists are typically willing to grant that thick terms (e.g. ‘courageous’ and ‘murder’) are somehow associated with evaluations. But they tend to disagree about what exactly this relationship is. Does a thick term’s evaluation come by way of its semantic content? Or is the evaluation pragmatically associated with the thick term (e.g. via conversational implicature)? In this paper, I argue that thick terms are semantically associated with evaluations. In particular, I argue that many thick concepts (if not all) conceptually entail (...)
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  3. Christine Tappolet (2014). The Normativity of Evaluative Concepts. In Anne Reboul (ed.), Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan, Volume 2. 39-54.
    It is generally accepted that there are two kinds of normative concepts : evaluative concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. The question that is raised by this distinction is how it is possible to claim that evaluative concepts are normative. Given that deontic concepts appear to be at the heart of normativity, the bigger the gap between evaluative and deontic concepts, the less it appears plausible to say that evaluative concepts are normative. (...)
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  4. Douglas W. Portmore, Foundational Consequentialism and Its Primary Evaluative Focal Point.
    Following Shelly Kagan’s useful terminology, foundational consequentialists are those who hold that the ranking of outcomes is at the foundation of all moral assessment. That is, they hold that moral assessments of right and wrong, virtuous and vicious, morally good and morally bad, etc. are all ultimately a function of how outcomes rank. But foundational consequentialists disagree on what is to be directly evaluated in terms of the ranking of outcomes, which is to say that they disagree on what the (...)
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  5. Christine Tappolet (1995). The Sense and Reference of Evaluative Terms. In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference one Hundred Years later. Kluwer 113--127.
    What account of evaluative expressions, such as ‘is beautiful’, ‘is generous’ or ‘is good’, should a Fregean adopt? Given Frege’s claim that predicates can have both a sense and a reference in addition to their extension, an interesting range of only partially explored theoretical possibilities opens to Frege and his followers. My intention here is to briefly present these putative possibilities and explore one of them, namely David Wiggins’ claim that evaluative predicates refer to non-natural concepts and have (...)
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  6.  79
    Logi Gunnarsson (2008). The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):305 - 326.
    The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status than the great apes. Animalism—moral (...)
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  7.  56
    Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2012). From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements. Dialogue 51 (1):55-77.
    ABSTRACT: Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then (...)
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  8.  48
    Dan López de Sa (2006). The Case Against Evaluative Realism. Theoria 21 (3):277-294.
    In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitive causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considerations ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had.
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  9.  19
    Dan López de Sa (2006). The Case Against Evaluative Realism. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (57):277-294.
    In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitibve causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considerations ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had.
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  10.  43
    Jack C. Lyons (forthcoming). Perception and Intuition of Evaluative Properties. In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception.
    Outside of philosophy, ‘intuition’ means something like ‘knowing without knowing how you know’. Intuition in this broad sense is an important epistemological category. I distinguish intuition from perception and perception from perceptual experience, in order to discuss the distinctive psychological and epistemological status of evaluative property attributions. Although it is doubtful that we perceptually experience many evaluative properties and also somewhat unlikely that we perceive many evaluative properties, it is highly plausible that we intuit many instances of (...)
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  11.  24
    Gavin Brent Sullivan (2007). Wittgenstein and the Grammar of Pride: The Relevance of Philosophy to Studies of Self-Evaluative Emotions. New Ideas in Psychology 25 (3):233-252.
    In this paper, Wittgenstein's philosophical approach and remarks are used to highlight features of pride that are not represented in contemporary psychological theories. Wittgenstein's scattered philosophical and autobiographical remarks on pride are arranged in order to engage with aspects of pride (e.g., as a self-conscious emotion) that can appear to have only empirical answers. Important themes to emerge in the resulting surview include the temptation to talk of pride as having or being a structure, the role of personal context in (...)
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  12.  2
    Ramon J. Rhine (1965). Preference for a Positive Evaluative Response in Concept Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 70 (6):632.
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  13. Michelle Montague (2014). Evaluative Phenomenology. In S. Roser C. Todd (ed.), Emotion and Value. Oxford University Press 32-51.
     
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  14. David Plunkett & Timothy Sundell (2013). Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (23).
    In constructing semantic theories of normative and evaluative terms, philosophers have commonly deployed a certain type of disagreement -based argument. The premise of the argument observes the possibility of genuine disagreement between users of a certain normative or evaluative term, while the conclusion of the argument is that, however differently those speakers employ the term, they must mean the same thing by it. After all, if they did not, then they would not really disagree. We argue that in (...)
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  15. Christine Tappolet (2013). Evaluative Vs. Deontic Concepts. In Hugh Lafollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell 1791-99.
    Ethical thought is articulated around normative concepts. Standard examples of normative concepts are good, reason, right, ought, and obligatory. Theorists often treat the normative as an undifferentiated domain. Even so, it is common to distinguish between two kinds of normative concepts: evaluative or axiological concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. This encyclopedia entry discusses the many differences between the two kinds of concepts.
     
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  16.  12
    J. Kovacs (2013). Honorary Authorship Epidemic in Scholarly Publications? How the Current Use of Citation-Based Evaluative Metrics Make (Pseudo)Honorary Authors From Honest Contributors of Every Multi-Author Article. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (8):509-512.
    The current use of citation-based metrics to evaluate the research output of individual researchers is highly discriminatory because they are uniformly applied to authors of single-author articles as well as contributors of multi-author papers. In the latter case, these quantitative measures are counted, as if each contributor were the single author of the full article. In this way, each and every contributor is assigned the full impact-factor score and all the citations that the article has received. This has a multiplication (...)
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  17. Bennett W. Helm (2009). Emotions as Evaluative Feelings. Emotion Review 1 (3):248--55.
    The phenomenology of emotions has traditionally been understood in terms of bodily sensations they involve. This is a mistake. We should instead understand their phenomenology in terms of their distinctively evaluative intentionality. Emotions are essentially affective modes of response to the ways our circumstances come to matter to us, and so they are ways of being pleased or pained by those circumstances. Making sense of the intentionality and phenomenology of emotions in this way requires rejecting traditional understandings of intentionality (...)
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  18.  25
    Alexander Greenberg & Christopher Cowie (2016). Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    We respond to Conor McHugh's claim that an evaluative account of the normative relation between belief and truth is preferable to a prescriptive account. We claim that his arguments fail to establish this. We then draw a more general sceptical conclusion: we take our arguments to put pressure on any attempt to show that an evaluative account will fare better than a prescriptive account. We briefly express scepticism about whether McHugh's more recent ‘fitting attitude’ account fares better.
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  19. A. Field (2000). I Like It, but I'm Not Sure Why: Can Evaluative Conditioning Occur Without Conscious Awareness? Consciousness and Cognition 9 (1):13-36.
    There is good evidence that, in general, autonomic conditioning in humans occurs only when subjects can verbalize the contingencies of conditioning. However, one form of conditioning, evaluative conditioning (EC), seems exceptional in that a growing body of evidence suggests that it can occur without conscious contingency awareness. As such, EC offers a unique insight into what role contingency awareness might play in associative learning. Despite this evidence, there are reasons to doubt that evaluative conditioning can occur without conscious (...)
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  20.  34
    Paulo Sousa & Carlos Mauro (2013). The Evaluative Nature of the Folk Concepts of Weakness and Strength of Will. Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):487-509.
    This article examines the evaluative nature of the folk concepts of weakness and strength of will and hypothesizes that their evaluative nature is strongly connected to the folk concepts of blame and credit. We probed how people apply the concepts of weakness and strength of will to prototypical and non-prototypical scenarios. While regarding prototypical scenarios the great majority applied these concepts according to the predictions following from traditional philosophical analyses. When presented with non-prototypical scenarios, people were divided. Some, (...)
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  21.  7
    Nicholas J. J. Smith (2014). Is Evaluative Compositionality a Requirement of Rationality? Mind 123 (490):457-502.
    This paper presents a new solution to the problems for orthodox decision theory posed by the Pasadena game and its relatives. I argue that a key question raised by consideration of these gambles is whether evaluative compositionality (as I term it) is a requirement of rationality: is the value that an ideally rational agent places on a gamble determined by the values that she places on its possible outcomes, together with their mode of composition into the gamble (i.e. the (...)
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  22. Dustin R. Stokes (2006). The Evaluative Character of Imaginative Resistance. British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (4):287-405.
    A fiction may prescribe imagining that a pig can talk or tell the future. A fiction may prescribe imagining that torturing innocent persons is a good thing. We generally comply with imaginative prescriptions like the former, but not always with prescriptions like the latter: we imagine non-evaluative fictions without difficulty but sometimes resist imagining value-rich fictions. Thus arises the puzzle of imaginative resistance. Most analyses of the phenomenon focus on the content of the relevant imaginings. The present analysis focuses (...)
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  23.  8
    Jérôme Dokic & Stéphane Lemaire (2015). Are Emotions Evaluative Modes? Dialectica 69 (3):271-292.
    Following Meinong, many philosophers have been attracted by the view that emotions have intrinsically evaluative correctness conditions. On one version of this view, emotions have evaluative contents. On another version, emotions are evaluative attitudes; they are evaluative at the level of intentional mode rather than content. We raise objections against the latter version, showing that the only two ways of implementing it are hopeless. Either emotions are manifestly evaluative or they are not. In the former (...)
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  24.  12
    E. P. Fulcher & M. Hammerl (2001). When All is Revealed: A Dissociation Between Evaluative Learning and Contingency Awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (4):524-549.
    Three experiments are reported that address the issue of awareness in evaluative learning in two different sensory modalities: visual and haptic. Attempts were made to manipulate the degree of awareness through a reduction technique (by use of a distractor task in Experiments 1 and 2 and by subliminally presenting affective stimuli in Experiment 3) and an induction technique (by unveiling the evaluative learning effect and requiring participants to try to discount the influence of the affective stimuli). The results (...)
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  25.  14
    Thomas Holden (2016). Hobbes on the Function of Evaluative Speech. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):123-144.
    Hobbes’s interpreters have struggled to find a plausible semantics for evaluative language in his writings. I argue that this search is misguided. Hobbes offers neither an account of the reference of evaluative terms nor a theory of the truth-conditions for evaluative statements. Rather, he sees evaluative language simply as having the non-representational function of prescribing actions and practical attitudes, its superficially representational appearance notwithstanding. I marshal the evidence for this prescriptivist reading of Hobbes on evaluative (...)
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  26.  6
    Jan de Houwer, Hilde Hendrickx & Frank Baeyens (1997). Evaluative Learning with “Subliminally” Presented Stimuli. Consciousness and Cognition 6 (1):87-107.
    Evaluative learning refers to the change in the affective evaluation of a previously neutral stimulus that occurs after the stimulus has been associated with a second, positive or negative, affective stimulus . Four experiments are reported in which the AS was presented very briefly. Significant evaluative learning was observed in participants who did not notice the presentation of the affective stimuli or could not discriminate between the briefly presented positive and negative ASi when asked to do so . (...)
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  27.  25
    A. P. Field (2000). Evaluative Conditioning is Pavlovian Conditioning: Issues of Definition, Measurement, and the Theoretical Importance of Contingency Awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (1):41-49.
    In her commentary of Field (1999), Hammerl (1999) has drawn attention to several interesting points concerning the issue of contingency awareness in evaluative conditioning. First, she comments on several contentious issues arising from Field's review of the evaluative conditioning literature, second she critiques the data from his pilot study and finally she argues the case that EC is a distinct form of conditioning that can occur in the absence of contingency awareness. With reference to these criticisms, this reply (...)
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  28.  2
    Ted Nannicelli (2016). In Defence of the Objectivity of Evaluative Television Criticism. Screen 57 (2):124-143.
    The prevailing view in television studies is that evaluative criticism involves the expression of wholly subjective tastes or attitudes. Moreover, the idea that evaluative judgements could be in any way objective or truthful tends to be greeted with deep scepticism and suspicion. This essay argues that the prevailing view – ‘expressivism’ – is unsatisfactory and unsustainable, and it advances a moderate version of objectivism.
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  29.  31
    Ricard Zapata-Barrero (2010). Theorizing State Behavior in International Migrations: An Evaluative Ethical Framework. Social Research: An International Quarterly 77 (1):325-352.
    We are really just at the beginning of analysing the connection between ethics, border management and migration policies. In this framework of the debate, I would like to propose a line of analysis centred, not so much what States do in the area of migration policies but rather theorize about the behaviour toward the demand for entry by people from other States. That is, how the States behave rather than what the States do in migration policies. This analysis implies entering (...)
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  30.  4
    Rita Finkbeiner (2012). Evaluative Meaning: German Idiomatic Patterns, Context, and the Category Fo Cause. Pragmatics and Cognition 20 (1):107-134.
    Linguistic evaluation has become an important area of inquiry in recent years. In the traditions of, e.g., lexical semantics, phraseology, corpus linguistics, and interactional linguistics, a large inventory of linguistic means have been identified by which speakers can express evaluative meanings. However, the class of German sentential idioms, e.g., Das kannst du dir in die Haare schmieren , has not gained much attention. This paper explores how the evaluative meaning of German sentential idioms is constructed syntactically, semantically, and (...)
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  31.  25
    Adam Moore (2000). Employee Monitoring and Computer Technology: Evaluative Surveillance V. Privacy. Business Ethics Quarterly 10 (3):697-709.
    In this article I address the tension between evaluative surveillance and privacy against the backdrop of the current explosion of information technology. More specifically, and after a brief analysis of privacy rights, I argue that knowledge of the different kinds ofsurveillance used at any given company should be made explicit to the employees. Moreover, there will be certain kinds of evaluativemonitoring that violate privacy rights and should not be used in most cases.
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  32.  12
    Gary G. Berntson, Greg J. Norman & John T. Cacioppo (2011). Comment: Laterality and Evaluative Bivalence: A Neuroevolutionary Perspective. Emotion Review 3 (3):344-346.
    Rutherford and Lindell (2011) review an extensive literature on lateralization of emotion. As they note, an important issue surrounding this question is the nature of emotion, which bears on what, precisely, is lateralized. The present comments are intended to broaden the context of the review, by considering lateralization from the standpoint of a bivariate model of evaluative processes and a neuroevolutionary perspective.
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  33.  8
    Paul Biegler & Patrick Vargas (2016). Feeling Is Believing: Evaluative Conditioning and the Ethics of Pharmaceutical Advertising. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 13 (2):271-279.
    A central goal in regulating direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription pharmaceuticals is to ensure that explicit drug claims are truthful. Yet imagery can also alter viewer attitudes, and the degree to which this occurs in DTCA is uncertain. Addressing this data gap, we provide evidence that positive feelings produced by images can promote favourable beliefs about pharmaceuticals. We had participants view a fictitious anti-influenza drug paired with unrelated images that elicited either positive, neutral or negative feelings. Participants who viewed positive images (...)
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  34.  14
    Velda Chen & Peter D. Drummond (2008). Fear of Negative Evaluation Augments Negative Affect and Somatic Symptoms in Social-Evaluative Situations. Cognition and Emotion 22 (1):21-43.
    (2008). Fear of negative evaluation augments negative affect and somatic symptoms in social-evaluative situations. Cognition & Emotion: Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 21-43.
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  35.  30
    Eamon P. Fulcher & Marianne Hammerl (2001). When All is Considered: Evaluative Learning Does Not Require Contingency Awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (4):567-573.
    We argue that the effects of evaluative learning may occur (a) without conscious perception of the affective stimuli, (b) without awareness of the stimulus contingencies, and (c) without any awareness that learning has occurred at all. Whether the three experiments reported in our target article provide conclusive evidence for either or any of these assertions is discussed in the commentaries of De Houwer and Field. We respond with the argument that when considered alongside other studies carried out over the (...)
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  36.  14
    Henning Gibbons (2009). Evaluative Priming From Subliminal Emotional Words: Insights From Event-Related Potentials and Individual Differences Related to Anxiety. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):383-400.
    The present ERP study investigated effects of subliminal emotional words on preference judgments about subsequent visual target stimuli . Each target was preceded by a masked 17-ms emotional adjective. Four classes of prime words were distinguished according to the combinations of positive/negative valence and high/low arousal. Targets were liked significantly more after positive-arousing primes , relative to negative-arousing , positive-nonarousing , and negative-nonarousing primes . In the target ERP, amplitude of right-hemisphere positive slow wave was increased after positive-arousing compared to (...)
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  37.  25
    Eveline T. Feteris (2008). The Rational Reconstruction of Weighing and Balancing on the Basis of Teleological-Evaluative Considerations in the Justification of Judicial Decisions. Ratio Juris 21 (4):481-495.
    In this contribution the author develops an argumentation model for the reconstruction of weighing and balancing on the basis of teleological-evaluative considerations. The model is intended as a heuristic and critical tool for the rational reconstruction of the justification of judicial decisions. From the perspective of a rational discussion, it makes explicit the choices underlying the weighing and balancing on the basis of goals and values so that they can be made explicit and submitted to rational critique.
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  38.  6
    Farideh Salili & Kit‐Tai Hau (1994). The Effect of Teachers’ Evaluative Feedback on Chinese Students’ Perception of Ability: A Cultural and Situational Analysis. Educational Studies 20 (2):223-236.
    The research explored the effect of teachers’ evaluative feedback on students’ perception of ability. The subjects were 758 Chinese students from elementary schools, high schools, and a university in Hong Kong. Subjects rated ability and effort of two hypothetical students who achieved identical results in a mathematics test but received different feedback from the teacher. They also rated the teacher's perception of their own and their friends’ ability and effort in a similar situation after a real mathematics test. The (...)
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  39.  9
    A. P. Field (2001). When All is Still Concealed: Are We Closer to Understanding the Mechanisms Underlying Evaluative Conditioning? Consciousness and Cognition 10 (4):559-566.
    Fulcher and Hammerl's (2001) important exploration of the role of contingency awareness in evaluative conditioning (EC) raises a lot of issues for discussion: (1) what boundaries, if any, exist between EC and affective learning paradigms?; (2) if EC does occur without awareness does this mean it is nonpropositional learning?; (3) is EC driven by stimulus-response (S-R), rather than stimulus-stimulus (S-S), associations and if so should it then surprise us that contingency awareness is not important?; and (4) if S-R associations (...)
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  40.  4
    Maximilian Fochler, Ulrike Felt & Ruth Müller (2016). Unsustainable Growth, Hyper-Competition, and Worth in Life Science Research: Narrowing Evaluative Repertoires in Doctoral and Postdoctoral Scientists’ Work and Lives. Minerva 54 (2):175-200.
    There is a crisis of valuation practices in the current academic life sciences, triggered by unsustainable growth and “hyper-competition.” Quantitative metrics in evaluating researchers are seen as replacing deeper considerations of the quality and novelty of work, as well as substantive care for the societal implications of research. Junior researchers are frequently mentioned as those most strongly affected by these dynamics. However, their own perceptions of these issues are much less frequently considered. This paper aims at contributing to a better (...)
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  41.  22
    John L. Pollock (2001). Evaluative Cognition. Noûs 35 (3):325–364.
    Cognitive agents form beliefs representing the world, evaluate the world as represented, form plans for making the world more to their liking, and perform actions executing the plans. Then the cycle repeats. This is the doxastic-conative loop, diagrammed in figure one.1 Both human beings and the autonomous rational agents envisaged in AI are cognitive agents in this sense. The cognition of a cognitive agent can be subdivided into two parts. Epistemic cognition is that kind of cognition responsible for producing and (...)
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  42.  6
    Julie Dickson (2015). Ours is a Broad Church: Indirectly Evaluative Legal Philosophy as a Facet of Jurisprudential Inquiry. Jurisprudence 6 (2):207-230.
    Questions concerning the aims and aspirations, criteria of success and even proper delineation of the subject matter of theories of law have given rise to some of the most intractable and contentious debates in contemporary legal philosophy. In this article, I outline my vision of the remit and character of legal philosophy, with particular emphasis on the methodological approach with which I am most concerned in my own work, and which I refer to here as ‘indirectly evaluative legal philosophy’. (...)
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  43.  25
    Justina Díaz Legaspe (2013). The Relativity of Evaluative Sentences: Disagreeing Over Disagreement. Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 54 (127):211-226.
    Evaluative sentences (moral judgments, expressions of taste, epistemic modals) are relative to the speaker's standards. Lately, a phenomenon has challenged the traditional explanation of this relativity: whenever two speakers disagree over them they contradict each other without being at fault. Hence, it is thought that the correction of the assertions involved must be relative to an unprivileged standard not necessarily the speaker's. I will claim instead that so far, neither this nor any other proposal has provided an explanation of (...)
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  44.  50
    Jennie Louise (2006). Right Motive, Wrong Action: Direct Consequentialism and Evaluative Conflict. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (1):65 - 85.
    In this paper I look at attempts to develop forms of consequentialism which do not have a feature considered problematic in Direct Consequentialist theories (that is, those consequentialist theories that apply the criterion of rightness directly in the evaluation of any set of options). The problematic feature in question (which I refer to as ‘evaluative conflict’) is the possibility that, for example, a right motive might lead an agent to perform a wrong act. Theories aiming to avoid this phenomenon (...)
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  45.  8
    Simone Neuber (2015). Evaluative Beliefs in a Thought Theoretical Framework? A Proposal For Non-Positing Epistemic States. Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics 52 (1):23-37.
    Thought Theory seems to provide an answer to the paradox of fiction which has the ontological merits of current pretence accounts without, however, assuming mere pretence emotions. This article will question whether present formulations of TT live up to what they promise. Whenever its current versions try to include evaluative beliefs in a TT framework in order to comply with a cognitivist account of emotions, they either stop being a genuine thought theory or endorse the irrationalism of fictional emotions. (...)
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  46.  24
    D. G. Brown (1955). Evaluative Inference. Philosophy 30 (114):214 - 228.
    The phrase ‘evaluative inference’ was used by Toulmin for ‘that form of inference by which we pass from factual reasons to an ethical conclusion’; and the phrase has been attacked by Hare in his review of Toulmin and in his book . I shall try to dig out some of the questions at issue in that discussion, but to do so without the help of this technical term, or of any other that I can avoid.
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  47.  9
    Jacqui Poltera (2005). Is Personal Identity Evaluative? South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):87-96.
    Martha Nussbaum subscribes to the view that our identity is an evaluative question determined by our common, deeply held beliefs about what is worthwhile in human life. In so doing, she asserts that for an account of ethics to have “philosophical power” it needs to be grounded in an account of human nature that is both evaluative and internal. I focus on Nussbaum's claim that personal identity has to include the necessary features of practical rationality and sociability. Although (...)
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    Kenneth Reid Beesley (1982). Evaluative Adjectives as One-Place Predicates Dm Montague Grammar. Journal of Semantics 1 (3-4):195-249.
    In this paper I will argue that evaluative adjectives, such as good, bad, clever and skilful, should be analysed as one-place predicates in logical translation. This approach, which is basically the traditional logical treatment of ‘absolute’ adjectives, is to be contrasted with the approach in Montague (1974a) and Parsons (1972), wherein all adjectives are translated as two-place predicates, i.e. as semantic attributives. The move away from the Montague-Parsons analysis is not new: Bartsch (1972. 1975), McConnell-Ginet (1973), Kamp (1975), Siegel (...)
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    Xinyan Jiang (2008). Moral Perception and Its Evaluative Dimension. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:215-220.
    Moral Perception is the moral agent’s perception of the morally significant situation. In recent decades, the question about the role of moral perception in the moral life has drawn more and more attention in contemporary ethical theories. It has been widely acknowledged that the virtuous person perceives a given morally significant situation differently from others. But, current discussions of moral perception have been focused on the cognitive function of moral perception i.e., moral perception 's making a certain feature of a (...)
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    Jonathan M. Weinberg (2011). What is Evaluative Normativity, That We (Maybe) Should Avoid It? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):274-275.
    Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that we should avoid evaluative normativity in our psychological theorizing. But there are two crucial issues lacking clarity in their presentation of evaluative normativity. One of them can be resolved through disambiguation, but the other points to a deeper problem: Evaluative normativity is too tightly-woven in our theorizing to be easily disentangled and discarded.
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