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Profile: Evan Thomas Butts (University of Geneva)
  1.  34 DLs
    Evan Butts (2012). Mentalism is Not Epistemic Ur-Internalism. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):233 - 249.
    Earl Conee and Richard Feldman claim that mentalism identifies the core of internalist epistemology. This is what I call identifying ur-internalism. Their version of ur-internalism differs from the traditional one ? viz., accessibilism ? by not imposing requirements stipulating that subjects must have reflective access to facts which justify their beliefs for these beliefs to be justified. Instead, justification simply supervenes on the mental lives of subjects. I argue that mentalism fails to establish itself as ur-internalism by demonstrating that the (...)
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  2.  14 DLs
    Evan Butts (2013). Know How. By J. Stanley. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. 201. Price £25.00.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):180-184.
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  3.  14 DLs
    Evan Butts (forthcoming). Slim Is In: In Advance. Journal of Philosophical Research.
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  4.  12 DLs
    Evan Butts (2008). Attributing Mental Properties to Wide Subjects. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    Rob Wilson (2001) claims that mental properties are not attributable to wide subjects, despite the claims of authors like Clark and Chalmers (1998). I examine Wilson's objection and endeavor to demonstrate that Clark and Chalmers' account does support the attribution of mental properties to wide subjects.
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  5.  1 DLs
    Evan Butts (2014). Slim Is In: An Argument for a Narrow Conception of Abilities in Epistemology. Journal of Philosophical Research 39:51-66.
    Ability is a key notion in much contemporary externalist epistemology. Various authors have argued that there is an ability condition on knowledge . Moreover, epistemic justification is also arguably tied to ability. Yet there is not total agreement amongst the interested parties about the conditions under which subjects possess abilities, nor the conditions under which a subject who possesses an ability exercises or manifests it. Here, I will address what conditions must obtain for a subject to possess an ability.
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