You are accessing PhilPapers from Open University (UK), an institution that is not subscribed to PhilPapers. Starting on July 1, 2014, we ask institutions that grant philosophy degrees and are based in high-GDP countries to contribute to PhilPapers' maintenance and development through a subscription. See this page for details. Please show your support by contacting your librarian.
See also:
Profile: Evan Thomas Butts (University of Geneva)
  1. Evan Butts (2013). Know How. By J. Stanley. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. 201. Price £25.00.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):180-184.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Evan Butts (2012). Mentalism is Not Epistemic Ur-Internalism. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):233 - 249.
    Earl Conee and Richard Feldman claim that mentalism identifies the core of internalist epistemology. This is what I call identifying ur-internalism. Their version of ur-internalism differs from the traditional one ? viz., accessibilism ? by not imposing requirements stipulating that subjects must have reflective access to facts which justify their beliefs for these beliefs to be justified. Instead, justification simply supervenes on the mental lives of subjects. I argue that mentalism fails to establish itself as ur-internalism by demonstrating that the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Evan Butts (2008). Attributing Mental Properties to Wide Subjects. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    Rob Wilson (2001) claims that mental properties are not attributable to wide subjects, despite the claims of authors like Clark and Chalmers (1998). I examine Wilson's objection and endeavor to demonstrate that Clark and Chalmers' account does support the attribution of mental properties to wide subjects.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation