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Evan Thompson [94]Evan Timothy Thompson [1]
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Profile: Evan Thompson (University of British Columbia)
  1.  83
    Evan Thompson (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Harvard University Press.
    The question has long confounded philosophers and scientists, and it is this so-called explanatory gap between biological life and consciousness that Evan ...
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  2. Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson & Eleanor Rosch (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press.
    The Embodied Mind provides a unique, sophisticated treatment of the spontaneous and reflective dimension of human experience.
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  3. Evan Thompson & Stephen Batchelor (2014). Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy. Cup.
    A renowned philosopher of the mind, also known for his groundbreaking work on Buddhism and cognitive science, Evan Thompson combines the latest neuroscience research on sleep, dreaming, and meditation with Indian and Western philosophy of the mind, casting new light on the self and its relation to the brain. Thompson shows how the self is a changing process, not a static thing. When we are awake we identify with our body, but if we let our mind wander or daydream, we (...)
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  4. Evan Thompson & Francisco J. Varela (2001). Radical Embodiment: Neural Dynamics and Consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (10):418-425.
  5. Evan Thompson & Mog Stapleton (2009). Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories. Topoi 28 (1):23-30.
    This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making . We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.
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  6. Antoine Lutz & Evan Thompson (2003). Neurophenomenology - Integrating Subjective Experience and Brain Dynamics in the Neuroscience of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):31-52.
    The paper presents a research programme for the neuroscience of consciousness called 'neurophenomenology' and illustrates it with a recent pilot study . At a theoretical level, neurophenomenology pursues an embodied and large-scale dynamical approach to the neurophysiology of consciousness . At a methodological level, the neurophenomenological strategy is to make rigorous and extensive use of first-person data about subjective experience as a heuristic to describe and quantify the large-scale neurodynamics of consciousness . The paper focuses on neurophenomenology in relation to (...)
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  7. Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson (forthcoming). The Feeling Body: Towards an Enactive Approach to Emotion. In W. F. Overton, U. Mueller & J. Newman (eds.), Body in Mind, Mind in Body: Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness. Erlbaum
    For many years emotion theory has been characterized by a dichotomy between the head and the body. In the golden years of cognitivism, during the nineteen-sixties and seventies, emotion theory focused on the cognitive antecedents of emotion, the so-called “appraisal processes.” Bodily events were seen largely as byproducts of cognition, and as too unspecific to contribute to the variety of emotion experience. Cognition was conceptualized as an abstract, intellectual, “heady” process separate from bodily events. Although current emotion theory has moved (...)
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  8.  65
    Evan Thompson (1994). Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
    Colour fascinates all of us, and scientists and philosophers have sought to understand the true nature of colour vision for many years. In recent times, investigations into colour vision have been one of the main success stories of cognitive science, for each discipline within the field - neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, computer science and artificial intelligence, and philosophy - has contributed significantly to our understanding of colour. Evan Thompson's book is a major contribution to this interdisciplinary project. Colour Vision provides an (...)
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  9. Evan Thompson (2005). Sensorimotor Subjectivity and the Enactive Approach to Experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):407-427.
  10. Evan Thompson (2001). Empathy and Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):1-32.
    This article makes five main points. Individual human consciousness is formed in the dynamic interrelation of self and other, and therefore is inherently intersubjective. The concrete encounter of self and other fundamentally involves empathy, under- stood as a unique and irreducible kind of intentionality. Empathy is the precondi- tion of the science of consciousness. Human empathy.
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  11. Alva Noë & Evan Thompson (2004). Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):3-28.
    In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness (or NCC) has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness (Metzinger, 2000a). A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we … need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness.… For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive.… No (...)
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  12. Alva Noe & Evan Thompson (2004). Sorting Out the Neural Basis of Consciousness: Authors' Reply to Commentators. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):87-98.
    Correspondence: Alva Noë, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley CA 94720-2390, USA. _Email: noe@socrates.berkeley.edu_ Evan Thompson, Philosophy Department, York University, 4700 Keele Street, North York, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada. _Email: evant@yorku.ca_.
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  13. Jake H. Davis & Evan Thompson (2013). From the Five Aggregates to Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a Cross-Cultural Cognitive Science. In Steven M. Emmanuel (ed.), A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. John Wiley & Sons
    Buddhism originated and developed in an Indian cultural context that featured many first-person practices for producing and exploring states of consciousness through the systematic training of attention. In contrast, the dominant methods of investigating the mind in Western cognitive science have emphasized third-person observation of the brain and behavior. In this chapter, we explore how these two different projects might prove mutually beneficial. We lay the groundwork for a cross-cultural cognitive science by using one traditional Buddhist model of the mind (...)
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  14.  13
    Rebecca M. Todd, William A. Cunningham, Adam K. Anderson & Evan Thompson (2012). Affect-Biased Attention as Emotion Regulation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (7):365-372.
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  15.  48
    Kalina Christoff, Diego Cosmelli, Dorothée Legrand & Evan Thompson (2011). Specifying the Self for Cognitive Neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):104-112.
  16. Evan Thompson (2008). Representationalism and the Phenomenology of Mental Imagery. Synthese 160 (3):203--213.
    This paper sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery and uses it to criticize representationalism and the internalist-versus-externalist framework for understanding consciousness. Contrary to internalist views of mental imagery imagery experience is not the experience of a phenomenal mental picture inspected by the mind’s eye, but rather the mental simulation of perceptual experience. Furthermore, there are experiential differences in perceiving and imagining that are not differences in the properties represented by these experiences. Therefore, externalist representationalism, which maintains that the (...)
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  17. Evan Thompson (2007). Look Again: Phenomenology and Mental Imagery. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):137-170.
    This paper (1) sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery; (2) applies this analysis to the mental imagery debate in cognitive science; (3) briefly sketches a neurophenomenological approach to mental imagery; and (4) compares the results of this discussion with Dennett’s heterophenomenology.
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  18. Antoine Lutz & Evan Thompson (2003). Neurophenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):31-52.
    _sciousness called ‘neurophenomenology’ (Varela 1996) and illustrates it with a_ _recent pilot study (Lutz et al., 2002). At a theoretical level, neurophenomenology_ _pursues an embodied and large-scale dynamical approach to the_ _neurophysiology of consciousness (Varela 1995; Thompson and Varela 2001;_ _Varela and Thompson 2003). At a methodological level, the neurophenomeno-_ _logical strategy is to make rigorous and extensive use of first-person data about_ _subjective experience as a heuristic to describe and quantify the large-scale_ _neurodynamics of consciousness (Lutz 2002). The paper (...)
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  19. Dan Zahavi, Evan Thompson & Mark Siderits (eds.) (2011). Self, No Self? Perspectives From Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford University Press.
    Self, No Self? is the first book of its kind. It brings together leading philosophical scholars of the Indian and Tibetan traditions with leading Western philosophers of mind and phenomenologists to explore issues about consciousness and selfhood from these multiple perspectives.
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  20.  25
    Georges Dreyfus & Evan Thompson (2007). Asian Perspectives: Indian Theories of Mind. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press 89--114.
  21. Diego J. Cosmelli, Jean-Philippe Lachaux & Evan Thompson (2007). Neurodynamics of Consciousness. In P.D. Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge 731--774.
    cal basis of consciousness. We continue by discussing the relation between spatiotem- One of the outstanding problems in the cog- poral patterns of brain activity and con- nitive sciences is to understand how ongo- sciousness, with particular attention to pro- ing conscious experience is related to the cesses in the gamma frequency band. We workings of the brain and nervous system. then adopt a critical perspective and high-.
     
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  22.  29
    Evan Thompson, A. Palacios & F. J. Varela (1992). Ways of Coloring. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):1-26.
    Different explanations of color vision favor different philosophical positions: Computational vision is more compatible with objectivism (the color is in the object), psychophysics and neurophysiology with subjectivism (the color is in the head). Comparative research suggests that an explanation of color must be both experientialist (unlike objectivism) and ecological (unlike subjectivism). Computational vision's emphasis on optimally prespecified features of the environment (i.e., distal properties, independent of the sensory-motor capacities of the animal) is unsatisfactory. Conceiving of visual perception instead as the (...)
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  23. Evan Thompson (2004). Life and Mind: From Autopoiesis to Neurophenomenology. A Tribute to Francisco Varela. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):381-398.
    This talk, delivered at De l''autopoièse à la neurophénoménologie: un hommage à Francisco Varela; from autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: a tribute to Francisco Varela, June 18–20, at the Sorbonne in Paris, explicates several links between Varela''s neurophenomenology and his biological concept of autopoiesis.
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  24.  23
    Kathleen Garrison, Scheinost A., Worhunsky Dustin, D. Patrick, Hani Elwafi, Thornhill M., A. Thomas, Evan Thompson, Clifford Saron, Gaëlle Desbordes, Hedy Kober, Michelle Hampson, Jeremy Gray, Constable R., Papademetris R. Todd & Brewer Xenophon (2013). Real-Time fMRI Links Subjective Experience with Brain Activity During Focused Attention. NeuroImage 81:110--118.
  25. Luiz Pessoa, Evan Thompson & Alva Noë (1998). Finding Out About Filling-In: A Guide to Perceptual Completion for Visual Science and the Philosophy of Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (21):723–802.
    In visual science the term filling-inis used in different ways, which often leads to confusion. This target article presents a taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena to organize and clarify theoretical and empirical discussion. Examples of boundary completion (illusory contours) and featural completion (color, brightness, motion, texture, and depth) are examined, and single-cell studies relevant to filling-in are reviewed and assessed. Filling-in issues must be understood in relation to theoretical issues about neuralignoring an absencejumping to a conclusionanalytic isomorphismCartesian materialism, a particular (...)
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  26. Evan Thompson, A. Lutz & D. Cosmelli (2005). Neurophenomenology: An Introduction for Neurophilosophers. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press 40.
    • An adequate conceptual framework is still needed to account for phenomena that (i) have a first-person, subjective-experiential or phenomenal character; (ii) are (usually) reportable and describable (in humans); and (iii) are neurobiologically realized.2 • The conscious subject plays an unavoidable epistemological role in characterizing the explanadum of consciousness through first-person descriptive reports. The experimentalist is then able to link first-person data and third-person data. Yet the generation of first-person data raises difficult epistemological issues about the relation of second-order awareness (...)
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  27.  33
    Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson (2008). Il corpo E il vissuto affettivo: Verso un approccio «enattivo» allo studio delle emozioni. Rivista di Estetica 48 (37):77-96.
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  28. Robert Hanna & Evan Thompson (2003). The Mind-Body-Body Problem. Theoria Et Historia Scientiarum 7 (T):24-44.
    ? We gratefully acknowledge the Center for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona, Tucson, which provided a grant for the support of this work. E.T. is also supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the McDonnell Project in Philosophy and the Neurosciences. 1 See David Woodruff Smith.
     
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  29. Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (2007). Philosophical Issues: Phenomenology. In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press 67--87.
    Current scientific research on consciousness aims to understand how consciousness arises from the workings of the brain and body, as well as the relations between conscious experience and cognitive processing. Clearly, to make progress in these areas, researchers cannot avoid a range of conceptual issues about the nature and structure of consciousness, such as the following: What is the relation between intentionality and consciousness? What is the relation between self-awareness and consciousness? What is the temporal structure of conscious experience? What (...)
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  30. Alva Noë, Luis Pessoa & Evan Thompson (2000). Beyond the Grand Illusion: What Change Blindness Really Teaches Us About Vision. Visual Cognition 7 (1-3):93-106.
    Experiments on scene perception and change blindness suggest that the visual system does not construct detailed internal models of a scene. These experiments therefore call into doubt the traditional view that vision is a process in which detailed representations of the environment must be constructed. The non-existence of such detailed representations, however, does not entail that we do not perceive the detailed environment. The “grand illusion hypothesis” that our visual world is an illusion rests on (1) a problematic “reconstructionist” conception (...)
     
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  31.  19
    Evan Thompson (2011). Reply to Commentaries. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (5-6):5-6.
    Let me express my deep thanks to the contributors for taking the time to read my book, Mind in Life, and for writing their thoughtful commentaries, from which I have learned a great deal. Special thanks are due to Tobias Schlicht, whose hard work and dedication made this volume possible. In what follows, I will respond singly to each con-tributor and do my best to address their main points. My replies to the commentators will be longer or shorter depending on (...)
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  32.  24
    Evan Thompson (1995). Colour Vision. Routledge.
    This book is a major contribution to the interdisciplinary project of investigating the true nature of color vision.
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  33.  8
    Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.) (2007). Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
    The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness is the first of its kind in the field, and its appearance marks a unique time in the history of intellectual inquiry on the topic. After decades during which consciousness was considered beyond the scope of legitimate scientific investigation, consciousness re-emerged as a popular focus of research towards the end of the last century, and it has remained so for nearly 20 years. There are now so many different lines of investigation on consciousness that the (...)
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  34. Diego Cosmelli & Evan Thompson (web). Embodiment or Envatment? Reflections on the Bodily Basis of Consciousness. In J. Stewart, O. Gapenne & E Di Paolo (eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press
    Suppose that a team of neurosurgeons and bioengineers were able to remove your brain from your body, suspend it in a life-sustaining vat of liquid nutrients, and connect its neurons and nerve terminals by wires to a supercomputer that would stimulate it with electrical impulses exactly like those it normally receives when embodied. According to this brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, your envatted brain and your embodied brain would have subjectively indistinguishable mental lives. For all you know—so one argument goes—you could be (...)
     
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  35.  48
    Evan Thompson (2001). Between Ourselves: Second-Person Issues in the Study of Consciousness. Imprint Academic.
    This book puts that right, and goes further by also including decriptions of animal "person-to-person" interactions.
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  36.  39
    Evan Thompson & Diego Cosmelli (2011). Brain in a Vat or Body in a World?: Brainbound Versus Enactive Views of Experience. Philosophical Topics 39 (1):163-180.
    We argue that the minimal biological requirements for consciousness include a living body, not just neuronal processes in the skull. Our argument proceeds by reconsidering the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment. Careful examination of this thought experiment indicates that the null hypothesis is that any adequately functional “vat” would be a surrogate body, that is, that the so-called vat would be no vat at all, but rather an embodied agent in the world. Thus, what the thought experiment actually shows is that the (...)
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  37. Evan Thompson, Alva Noë & Luiz Pessoa (1999). Perceptual Completion: A Case Study in Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. In Jean Petitot, Franscisco J. Varela, Barnard Pacoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford University Press 161--195.
  38.  29
    Frans de Waal, Evan Thompson & J. Proctor (2005). Primates, Monks and the Mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (7):38-54.
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  39. George Dreyfus & Evan Thompson (2007). Philosophical Theories of Consciousness: Asian Perspectives. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge
  40.  56
    Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson (2005). Enacting Emotional Interpretations with Feeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):200-201.
    This commentary makes three points: (1) There may be no clear-cut distinction between emotion and appraisal “constituents” at neural and psychological levels. (2) The microdevelopment of an emotional interpretation contains a complex microdevelopment of affect. (3) Neurophenomenology is a promising research program for testing Lewis's hypotheses about the neurodynamics of emotion-appraisal amalgams.
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  41.  51
    Evan Thompson (1992). Novel Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):321-49.
    Could there be genuinely novel colours — that is, visual qualities having a hue that bears a resemblance relation to red, green, yellow, and blue, yet is neither reddish, nor greenish, nor yellowish, nor blueish?1 And if there could be such colours, what would it be like to see them? How would the colours look? In his article,"Epiphenomenal Qualia,"2 Frank Jackson presents a philosophical thought experiment that raises these questions . Jackson asks us to imagine a perceiver named Fred who (...)
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  42.  67
    Diego J. Cosmelli & Evan Thompson (2007). Mountains and Valleys: Binocular Rivalry and the Flow of Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):623-641.
    Binocular rivalry provides a useful situation for studying the relation between the temporal flow of conscious experience and the temporal dynamics of neural activity. After proposing a phenomenological framework for understanding temporal aspects of consciousness, we review experimental research on multistable perception and binocular rivalry, singling out various methodological, theoretical, and empirical aspects of this research relevant to studying the flow of experience. We then review an experimental study from our group explicitly concerned with relating the temporal dynamics of rivalrous (...)
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  43.  84
    Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (eds.) (2010). Self, No Self?: Perspectives From Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford University Press.
    It is time to bring the rich resources of these traditions into the contemporary debate about the nature of self. This volume is the first of its kind.
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  44. Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (eds.) (2013). Self, No Self?: Perspectives From Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford University Press Uk.
    The nature and reality of self is a subject of increasing prominence among Western philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists. It has also been central to Indian and Tibetan philosophical traditions for over two thousand years. Leading philosophical scholars of the Indian and Tibetan traditions join with leading Western philosophers of mind and phenomenologists to explore issues about consciousness and selfhood from these multiple perspectives. The essays mobilize the argumentative resources of diverse philosophical traditions to address issues about the self (...)
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  45.  79
    Evan Thompson & Giovanna Colombetti (2005). Enacting Emotional Interpretations with Feeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):200-201.
    One way to think about Lewis’s portrayal of appraisal-emotion interactions is by comparison with dynamic sensorimotor approaches to perception and action (Varela et al. 1991; O’Regan & Noë 2001; Hurley & Noë 2003). According to these approaches, perception is as much a motor process as a sensory one. At the neural level, there is “common coding” of sensory and motor processes (e.g., Prinz 1997; Rizzolatti et al. 1997). At the psychological level, action and perception are not simply instrumentally related, as (...)
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  46.  27
    Evan Thompson, Adrian Palacios & Francisco J. Varela (1992). On the Ways to Color. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):56-74.
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  47.  19
    Evan Thompson (2011). Living Ways of Sense Making. Philosophy Today 55 (Supplement):114-123.
    Evan Thompson’s paper has four parts. First, he says more about what he means when he asks, “what is living?” Second, he presents his way of answering this question, which is that living is sense-making in precarious conditions. Third, he responds to Welton’s considerations about what he calls the “affective entrainment” of the living being by the environment. Finally, he addresses Protevi’s remarks about panpsychism.
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  48.  65
    Evan Thompson (1995). Colour Vision, Evolution, and Perceptual Content. Synthese 104 (1):1-32.
    b>. Computational models of colour vision assume that the biological function of colour vision is to detect surface reflectance. Some philosophers invoke these models as a basis for 'externalism' about perceptual content (content is distal) and 'objectivism' about colour (colour is surface reflectance). In an earlier article (Thompson et al. 1992), I criticized the 'computational objectivist' position on the basis of comparative colour vision: There are fundmental differences among the colour vision of animals and these differences do not converge on (...)
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  49.  35
    Robert Hanna & Evan Thompson (2012). Problem umysł-ciało-ciało. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (T).
    Robert Hanna and Evan Thompson offer a solution to the Mind-Body-Body Problem. The solution, in a nutshell, is that the living and lived body (Leib) is metaphysically and conceptually basic, in the sense that one’s consciousness, on the one hand, and one’s corporeal being (Körper), on the other, are nothing but dual aspects of one’s lived body. One’s living and lived body can be equated with one’s being as an animal; therefore, this solution to the Mind-Body-Body Problem amounts to an (...)
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  50.  6
    Rebecca Todd & Evan Thompson (2015). Strengthening Emotion-Cognition Integration. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38.
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