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Evan Tiffany [12]Evan C. Tiffany [1]
  1. Evan Tiffany (2013). Choosing Freedom: Basic Desert and the Standpoint of Blame. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):1-17.
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  2. Evan Tiffany (2012). Why Be an Agent? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):223 - 233.
    Constitutivism is the view that it is possible to derive contentful, normatively binding demands of practical reason and morality from the constitutive features of agency. Whereas much of the debate has focused on the constitutivist's ability to derive content, David Enoch has challenged her ability to generate normativity. Even if one can derive content from the constitutive aims of agency, one could simply demur: ?Bah! Agency, shmagency?. The ?Why be moral?? question would be replaced by the ?Why be an agent?? (...)
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  3. Sam Black & Evan Tiffany (2010). Moral Philosophy Does Not Rest on a Mistake: Reasons to Be Moral Revisited. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (5).
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  4. Sam Black & Evan Tiffany (2007). Introduction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (Supplement):7-40.
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  5. Evan Tiffany (2007). Deflationary Normative Pluralism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 231-262.
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  6. Evan Tiffany (2006). Can Humeans Ask "Why Be Rational?". American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):133 - 145.
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  7. Evan Tiffany (2006). How Kantian Must Kantian Constructivists Be? Inquiry 49 (6):524 – 546.
    Kantian constructivists locate the source of normativity in the rational nature of valuing agents. Some further argue that accepting this premise thereby commits one to accepting the intrinsic or unconditioned value of rational nature itself. Whereas much of the critical literature on this “regress on conditions” argument has focused either on the cogency of the inference from the value-conferring capacity of the will to the unconditional value of that capacity itself or on the plausibility of the initial constructivist premise, my (...)
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  8. Cynthia Townley, Evan Tiffany & Hugh Upton (2005). Ethics. Philosophical Books 46 (2):174-178.
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  9. Evan Tiffany (2003). Alienation and Internal Reasons for Action. Social Theory and Practice 29 (3):387-418.
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  10. Evan Tiffany (2003). A Functional Account of Moral Motivation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):601-625.
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  11. Evan C. Tiffany (2000). What is Essential About Indexicals? Philosophical Studies 100 (1):35-50.
  12. Evan Tiffany (1999). Semantics San Diego Style. Journal of Philosophy 96 (8):416-429.