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Evelyn B. Pluhar [19]Evelyn Begley Pluhar [3]
  1. Evelyn B. Pluhar (2010). Meat and Morality: Alternatives to Factory Farming. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23 (5):455-468.
    Scientists have shown that the practice of factory farming is an increasingly urgent danger to human health, the environment, and nonhuman animal welfare. For all these reasons, moral agents must consider alternatives. Vegetarian food production, humane food animal farming, and in-vitro meat production are all explored from a variety of ethical perspectives, especially utilitarian and rights-based viewpoints, all in the light of current U.S. and European initiatives in the public and private sectors. It is concluded that vegetarianism and potentially in-vitro (...)
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  2.  44
    Evelyn B. Pluhar (1995). Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals. Duke University Press.
    "This book joins the illustrious company of Peter Singer's "Animal Liberation" and Tom Regan's "The Case for Animal Rights" as one of the most important books ...
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  3. Evelyn B. Pluhar (1993). On Vegetarianism, Morality, and Science: A Counter Reply. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 6 (2):185-213.
    I recently took issue with Kathryn George's contention that vegetarianism cannot be a moral obligation for most human beings, even assuming that Tom Regan's stringent thesis about the equal inherent value of humans and many sentient nonhumans is correct. I argued that both Regan and George are incorrect in claiming that his view would permit moral agents to kill and eat innocent, non-threatening rights holders. An unequal rights view, by contrast, would permit such actions if a moral agent's health or (...)
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  4. Evelyn B. Pluhar (1995). Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals. Duke University Press Books.
    In _Beyond Prejudice_, Evelyn B. Pluhar defends the view that any sentient conative being—one capable of caring about what happens to him or herself—is morally significant, a view that supports the moral status and rights of many nonhuman animals. Confronting traditional and contemporary philosophical arguments, she offers in clear and accessible fashion a thorough examination of theories of moral significance while decisively demonstrating the flaws in the arguments of those who would avoid attributing moral rights to nonhumans. Exposing the traditional (...)
     
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  5.  60
    Evelyn B. Pluhar (1988). When is It Morally Acceptable to Kill Animals? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 1 (3):211-224.
    Professor Hugh Lehman has recently argued that the rights view, according to which nonhuman animals have a prima facie right to life, is compatible with the killing of animals in many circumstances, including killing for food, research, or product-testing purposes. His principle argument is an appeal to life-boat cases, in which certain lives should be sacrificed rather than others because the latter would allegedly be made worse-off by death than the former. I argue that this reasoning would apply to so-called (...)
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  6.  53
    Evelyn B. Pluhar (2006). Experimentation on Humans and Nonhumans. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27 (4):333-355.
    In this article, I argue that it is wrong to conduct any experiment on a nonhuman which we would regard as immoral were it to be conducted on a human, because such experimentation violates the basic moral rights of sentient beings. After distinguishing the rights approach from the utilitarian approach, I delineate basic concepts. I then raise the classic “argument from marginal cases” against those who support experimentation on nonhumans but not on humans. After next replying to six (...)
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  7.  20
    Evelyn B. Pluhar (1987). The Personhood View and the Argument From Marginal Cases. Philosophica 39 (1):23-38.
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  8.  11
    Evelyn B. Pluhar (1983). The Justification of an Environmental Ethic. Environmental Ethics 5 (1):47-61.
    Tom Regan has made a very important contribution to the debate on environmental ethics in his “On the Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic.” The debate can be brought out yet more clearly by contrasting Regan’s views with those of an eminent critic of environmental ethics in Regan’s sense, William K. Frankena. I argue that Regan’s position has much to recommend it, but has a fatal flaw whichwould render environmental ethics unjustifiable. I suggest this flaw can be remedied by (...)
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  9.  11
    Evelyn B. Pluhar (1984). Regulation, Values and the Public Interest. Environmental Ethics 6 (3):271-274.
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  10.  35
    Evelyn B. Pluhar (2000). Non-Obligatory Anthropocentrism. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 13 (3-4):329-335.
    David Sztybel has argued that defenders of the moralsignificance of animals have not made an effective case against theirenemy: anthropocentrism. He maintains that they have refuted only``straw'' versions of that view. Sztybel opposes anthropocentrism, butis convinced that it is a much more difficult view to defeat than hasbeen thought. He develops the strongest argument possible for``Obligatory Anthropocentrism'' (OA), defending it against manyobjections. He also holds that OA does not have unpalatable implicationsfor the treatment of average, below average, and mentally challengedhumans. (...)
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  11.  17
    Evelyn Begley Pluhar (1977). Physicalism and the Identity Theory. Journal of Critical Analysis 7 (1):11-20.
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  12.  1
    Evelyn B. Pluhar (1988). When is It Morally Acceptable to Kill Animals? Journal of Agricultural Ethics 1 (3):211-224.
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  13.  4
    Evelyn Begley Pluhar (1987). The Perceptual and Physical Worlds. Philosophical Studies 31:228-240.
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  14.  8
    Evelyn Begley Pluhar (1978). Emergence and Reduction. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 9 (4):279-89.
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  15.  2
    Evelyn B. Pluhar (1991). The Joy of Killing. Between the Species 7 (3):3.
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  16. Evelyn B. Pluhar (1993). Arguing Away Suffering: The Neo-Cartesian Revival. Between the Species 9 (1):12.
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  17. Evelyn B. Pluhar (1978). Emergence and Reduction. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 9 (4):279-289.
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  18. Evelyn B. Pluhar (1989). Kohlberg and Concern for Nonhumans. Between the Species 5 (2):7.
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