Search results for 'Evolutionary explanation' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  60
    Henry C. Byerly & Richard E. Michod (1991). Fitness and Evolutionary Explanation. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 6 (1):45-53.
    Recent philosophical discussions have failed to clarify the roles of the concept fitness in evolutionary theory. Neither the propensity interpretation of fitness nor the construal of fitness as a primitive theoretical term succeed in explicating the empirical content and explanatory power of the theory of natural selection. By appealing to the structure of simple mathematical models of natural selection, we separate out different contrasts which have tended to confuse discussions of fitness: the distinction between what fitness is defined as (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  2.  58
    Seungbae Park (2013). Evolutionary Explanation of Psychopaths. International Journal of Social Science Studies 1 (2):1-7.
    Psychopaths are brutal individuals, having no empathetic concern for others. Initially, the existence of psychopaths seems to be a mystery from an evolutionary point of view. On close examination, however, it can be accommodated by evolutionary theory. Brutal individuals excelled meek individuals in the desperate circumstances where they had to fight their competitors over natural resources for survival and reproduction. This evolutionary explanation of psychopaths receives support from Pinker's observation of the history of brutality. We have (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  24
    Neil Tennant (2014). The Logical Structure of Evolutionary Explanation and Prediction: Darwinism's Fundamental Schema. Biology and Philosophy 29 (5):611-655.
    We present a logically detailed case-study of Darwinian evolutionary explanation. Special features of Darwin’s explanatory schema made it an unusual theoretical breakthrough, from the point of view of the philosophy of science. The schema employs no theoretical terms, and puts forward no theoretical hypotheses. Instead, it uses three observational generalizations—Variability, Heritability and Differential Reproduction—along with an innocuous assumption of Causal Efficacy, to derive Adaptive Evolution as a necessary consequence. Adaptive Evolution in turn, with one assumption of scale (‘Deep (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  18
    Dale Jamieson (2000). :Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation. Ethics 110 (2):436-437.
    Excerpt from: Hull, D. L.. Review: Anthony O'Hear, Beyond Evolution:\nHuman Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation. Oxford:\nClarendon Press. 1997. cloth 19.99. British Journal for the Philosophy\nof Science, 49, 511-14.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Robert C. Robinson (2007). An Evolutionary Explanation of Self-Deception. Falsafeh 35 (3).
    Abstract: In Chapter 4 of his "Self-Deception Unmasked" (SDU), Al Mele considers several (attempted) empirical demonstrations of self-deception. These empirical demonstrations work under the conception of what Mele refers to as the 'dual-belief requirement', in which an agent simultaneously holds a belief p and a belief ~p. Toward the end of this chapter, Mele considers the argument of one biologist and anthropologist, Robert Trivers, who describes what he takes to be an evolutionary explanation for coming to form false (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  4
    HanGoo Lee (2008). An Evolutionary Explanation Model on the Transformation of Culture by Cultural Gene. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 38:49-55.
    This article seeks to explain the transformation of culture using the mechanism of evolutionary theory. Social biologists have been dealing with this issue for many years now. However, these scholars have not sufficiently allowed for the importance of factors independent of genes. They have primarily thought of culture as nothing more than the expansion of genes, as an increase in the rate of genetic adaptation. Namely, they have focused less on culture itself and more on its natural origins. Even (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  51
    Steven Horst (1999). Evolutionary Explanation and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1):39-48.
    Chalmers and others have argued that physicalist microexplanation is incapable of solving the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness. This article examines whether evolutionary accounts of the mind, such as those developed by Millikan, Dretske and Flanagan, can add anything to make up for the possible short falls of more reductionist accounts. I argue that they cannot, because evolutionary accounts explain by appeal to a selectional history that only comes into the picture if consciousness can first arise due to spontaneous (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  8. P. E. Griffiths & R. D. Gray (1994). Developmental Systems and Evolutionary Explanation. Journal of Philosophy 91 (6):277-304.
  9.  50
    J. Wentzel van Huyssteen (2006). Emergence and Human Uniqueness: Limiting or Delimiting Evolutionary Explanation? Zygon 41 (3):649-664.
  10.  96
    Anthony O'Hear (1997). Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation. Oxford University Press.
    In this controversial new book O'Hear takes a stand against the fashion for explaining human behavior in terms of evolution. He contends that while the theory of evolution is successful in explaining the development of the natural world in general, it is of limited value when applied to the human world. Because of our reflectiveness and our rationality we take on goals and ideals which cannot be justified in terms of survival-promotion or reproductive advantage. O'Hear examines the nature of human (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  11. Denise D. Cummins & Robert C. Cummins (1999). Biological Preparedness and Evolutionary Explanation. Cognition 73 (3):B37-B53.
    It is commonly supposed that evolutionary explanations of cognitive phenomena involve the assumption that the capacities to be explained are both innate and modular. This is understandable: independent selection of a trait requires that it be both heritable and largely decoupled from other `nearby' traits. Cognitive capacities realized as innate modules would certainly satisfy these contraints. A viable evolutionary cognitive psychology, however, requires neither extreme nativism nor modularity, though it is consistent with both. In this paper, we seek (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12. Colin Allen (1992). Mental Content and Evolutionary Explanation. Biology and Philosophy 7 (1):1-12.
    Cognitive ethology is the comparative study of animal cognition from an evolutionary perspective. As a sub-discipline of biology it shares interest in questions concerning the immediate causes and development of behavior. As a part of ethology it is also concerned with questions about the function and evolution of behavior. I examine some recent work in cognitive ethology, and I argue that the notions of mental content and representation are important to enable researchers to answer questions and state generalizations about (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13.  13
    Harmon R. Holcomb Iii (1996). Just so Stories and Inference to the Best Explanation in Evolutionary Psychology. Minds and Machines 6 (4):525-540.
    Evolutionary psychology is a science in the making, working toward the goal of showing how psychological adaptation underlies much human behavior. The knee-jerk reaction that sociobiology is unscientific because it tells “just-so stories” has become a common charge against evolutionary psychology as well. My main positive thesis is that inference to the best explanation is a proper method for evolutionary analyses, and it supplies a new perspective on the issues raised in Schlinger's (1996) just-so story critique. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  58
    Ingo Brigandt (2015). Evolutionary Developmental Biology and the Limits of Philosophical Accounts of Mechanistic Explanation. In P.-A. Braillard & C. Malaterre (eds.), Explanation in Biology: An Enquiry into the Diversity of Explanatory Patterns in the Life Sciences. Springer 135–173.
    Evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) is considered a ‘mechanistic science,’ in that it causally explains morphological evolution in terms of changes in developmental mechanisms. Evo-devo is also an interdisciplinary and integrative approach, as its explanations use contributions from many fields and pertain to different levels of organismal organization. Philosophical accounts of mechanistic explanation are currently highly prominent, and have been particularly able to capture the integrative nature of multifield and multilevel explanations. However, I argue that evo-devo demonstrates the need (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  15.  6
    Herbert Gintis (2013). An Implausible Model and Evolutionary Explanation of the Revenge Motive. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):21-22.
    McCullough et al.'s target article is a psychological version of the reputation models pioneered by biologist Robert Trivers (1971) and economist Robert Frank (1988). The authors, like Trivers and Frank, offer an implausible explanation of the fact that revenge is common even when there are no possible reputational effects. I sketch a more plausible model based on recent research.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  14
    David Thompson, Causal, Teleological and Evolutionary Explanation.
    Darren, attributing this argument to Hume, tells us that Hume rejected step #4. So do I. I am a compatibilist: I accept the scientific worldview that everything can be explained by natural, causal laws, but I believe that human actions (and biological functions) can still be explained teleologically, by their ends – a precondition for freedom. This paper is one of a series of attempts to show how such campatibilism is possible, this time by focusing on the nature of (...). (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  1
    Anthony O'Hear & David L. Hull (1998). Reviews-Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):511-514.
    Anthony O'Hear takes a stand against the fashion for explaining human behaviour in terms of evolution, arguing that, although evolutionary theory accounts for the development of life, it cannot satisfactorily explain the distinctive facets of human existence - self-consciousness, the quest for knowledge, moral sense, and the appreciation of beauty - where we transcend our biological origins.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  28
    Mahdi Muhammad Moosa & S. M. Minhaz Ud-Dean (2010). Danger Avoidance: An Evolutionary Explanation of Uncanny Valley. Biological Theory 5 (1):12-14.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  19. P. E. Griffiths & R. D. Gray (1994). Developmental Systems and Evolutionary Explanation. Journal of Philosophy 91 (6):277-304.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  20.  9
    Denise Dellarosa Cummins & Robert Cummins (1999). Biological Preparedness and Evolutionary Explanation. Cognition 73 (3):B37-B53.
  21.  54
    Steven Horst (2002). Evolutionary Explanation and Consciousness. Journal of Psychology and Theology 30 (1):41-50.
  22.  9
    Stephen Stich (forthcoming). Why There Might Not Be an Evolutionary Explanation for Psychological Altruism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  80
    Nicholas Agar (2001). Book Review. Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation Anthony O'Hear. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):534-537.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  15
    Larry R. Vandervert (2009). The Appearance of the Child Prodigy 10,000 Years Ago: An Evolutionary and Developmental Explanation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 30 (1):15.
    Feldman and Goldsmith sought an evolutionary explanation of the child prodigy phenomenon. Following in this vein, a theory involving the evolution and development of the collaboration of working memory and the cognitive functions of the cerebellum is presented with commentary on Edmunds and Noel’s report on a child’s literary precocity. It is argued that the evolution of working memory and the cerebellum within the increasing rule-governed complexity of culture may have produced the child prodigy within agricultural villages as (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  14
    A. Brito Da Cunha (1991). Commentary on the Paper by HC Byerly and RE Michod,“Fitness and Evolutionary Explanation”. Biology and Philosophy 6 (1):23-27.
  26.  4
    Richard E. Michod (1986). On Fitness and Adaptedness and Their Role in Evolutionary Explanation. Journal of the History of Biology 19 (2):289-302.
  27. Philippe van Parijs (1981). Evolutionary Explanation in the Social Sciences an Emerging Paradigm.
  28.  5
    Michael Bradie (2001). Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):235-238.
  29. Les Burwood (2011). It's Just Not Natural: Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation, Anthony O'Hear (Oxford University Press)£ 11.99/$18.95. [REVIEW] The Philosophers' Magazine 12:56.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  6
    A. Brito Cunhdaa (1991). Commentary on the Paper by H.C. Byerly and R.E. Michod, “Fitness and Evolutionary Explanation”. Biology and Philosophy 6 (1).
  31.  14
    Scott A. Kleiner (1991). Comments on “Fitness and Evolutionary Explanation”. Biology and Philosophy 6 (1):29-32.
  32.  3
    William H. Brenner (1999). Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation. [REVIEW] International Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):103-104.
  33.  15
    Mikael Stenmark (1999). Anthony O'Hear Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limitation of Evolutionary Explanation. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.) Pp. VIII+220. £35.00 Hbk. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 35 (4):493-504.
  34.  2
    C. M. Berman (1982). Functions of Play: First Steps Toward Evolutionary Explanation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (1):157.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  2
    Justin Broackes (1992). Nonreductionism, Content and Evolutionary Explanation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):31-32.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  2
    Mikael Stenmark (1999). Rec Av Anthony O'Hear, Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limitation of Evolutionary Explanation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Religious Studies 35:501-502.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  10
    Author unknown, Causal, Teleological and Evolutionary Explanation.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  5
    D. Hull (1998). Review. Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation. Anthony O'Hear. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):511-514.
  39.  6
    Reviewed by Dale Jamieson (2000). Anthony O'Hear, Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation. Ethics 110 (2).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  3
    A. Brito Da Cunha (1991). Commentary on the Paper by H.C. Byerly and R.E. Michod, “Fitness and Evolutionary Explanation”. Biology and Philosophy 6 (1):23-27.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Leo Apostel (1982). Philippe Van parys, "evolutionary explanation in the social sciences". [REVIEW] Revue Internationale de Philosophie 36 (4):672.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Sarah Ashelford (2012). Does Depression Require an Evolutionary Explanation? In Martin H. Brinkworth & Friedel Weinert (eds.), Evolution 2.0: Implications of Darwinism in Philosophy and the Social and Natural Sciences. Springer
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. K. Benson (2002). Anthony O'Hear, Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 23 (2):320-321.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Sa Kleiner (1991). Fitness and Evolutionary Explanation-Comment. Biology and Philosophy 6 (1):29-32.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Kimberly D. Kornbacher (2001). Building Components of Evolutionary Explanation: A Study of Wedge Tbols From Northern South. In Terry L. Hunt, Carl P. Lipo & Sarah L. Sterling (eds.), Posing Questions for a Scientific Archaeology. Bergin & Garvey 23.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Jg Lennox (1991). Fitness and Evolutionary Explanation-Comment. Biology and Philosophy 6 (1):33-37.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Mikael Stenmark (1999). Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limitation of Evolutionary Explanation. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 35 (4):493-504.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  78
    Harmon R. Holcomb (1996). Just so Stories and Inference to the Best Explanation in Evolutionary Psychology. Minds and Machines 6 (4):525-540.
    Evolutionary psychology is a science in the making, working toward the goal of showing how psychological adaptation underlies much human behavior. The knee-jerk reaction that sociobiology is unscientific because it tells just-so stories has become a common charge against evolutionary psychology as well. My main positive thesis is that inference to the best explanation is a proper method for evolutionary analyses, and it supplies a new perspective on the issues raised in Schlinger's (1996) just-so story critique. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  49.  63
    Jean Gayon (2005). Chance, Explanation, and Causation in Evolutionary Theory. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 27 (3/4):395 - 405.
    Chance comes into plays at many levels of the explanation of the evolutionary process; but the unity of sense of this category is problematic. The purpose of this talk is to clarify the meaning of chance at various levels in evolutionary theory: mutations, genetic drift, genetic revolutions, ecosystems, macroevolution. Three main concepts of chance are found at these various levels: luck (popular concept), randomness (probabilistic concept), and contingency relative to a given theoretical system (epistemological concept). After identifying (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  79
    Wybo Houkes (2012). Tales of Tools and Trees: Phylogenetic Analysis and Explanation in Evolutionary Archaeology. In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer 89--100.
    In this paper, I study the application of phylogenetic analysis in evolutionary archaeology. I show how transfer of this apparently general analytic tool is affected by salient differences in disciplinary context. One is that archaeologists, unlike many biologists, do not regard cladistics as a tool for classification, but are primarily interested in explanation. The other is that explanation is traditionally sought in terms of individual-level rather than population-level mechanisms. The latter disciplinary difference creates an ambiguity in the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000