This paper investigates a series of normative principles that are used to justify different aspects of executive compensation within business firms, as well as the remuneration of lower-ranking employees. We look at how businesses perform pay benchmarking; employees’ engagement, fidelity and loyalty ; and the acceptability of what we call both-ends-dipping, that is, receiving both ex ante and ex post benefits for the same work. We make two observations. First, either different or incoherent principles are used to justify (...) the pay of executives compared to employees, or the same principles are applied differently. Second, these differences or inconsistencies tend to be to the benefit of executives and/or to the detriment of employees. We conclude by asking whether there is any reason for thinking differently about executive pay than we do about employee pay. Our analysis leads us to question the principles justifying current executive compensation and to wonder if these principles are potentially being instrumentalized to serve other ends. (shrink)

This paper investigates a series of normative principles that are used to justify different aspects of executive compensation within business firms, as well as the remuneration of lower-ranking employees. We look at how businesses perform pay benchmarking; employees’ engagement, fidelity and loyalty ; and the acceptability of what we call both-ends-dipping, that is, receiving both ex ante and ex post benefits for the same work. We make two observations. First, either different or incoherent principles are used to justify (...) the pay of executives compared to employees, or the same principles are applied differently. Second, these differences or inconsistencies tend to be to the benefit of executives and/or to the detriment of employees. We conclude by asking whether there is any reason for thinking differently about executive pay than we do about employee pay. Our analysis leads us to question the principles justifying current executive compensation and to wonder if these principles are potentially being instrumentalized to serve other ends. (shrink)

This study investigates the relation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud in China. We document a significantly negative correlation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud using data on publicly traded firms between 2005 and 2010. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms penalize CEOs for fraud by lowering their pay. We also find that CEO compensation is lower in firms that commit more severe frauds. Panel data fixed effects and propensity score methods are used to (...) demonstrate these effects. Our results also indicate that corporate governance mechanisms influence the magnitude of punishment. We find that CEOs of privately controlled firms, firms that split the posts of CEO and chairman, and CEOs of firms located in developed regions suffer larger compensation penalties for committing financial fraud. Finally, we show that CEOs at firms that commit fraud are more likely to be replaced compared to those at non-fraud firms. (shrink)

Governing boards utilize executive compensation contracts in an attempt to align executive actions with corporate goals. The objective is to ensure that executive performance provides value to the organization in terms of successful outcomes. A key performance criteria typically specified in CEO compensation contracts is earnings targets. However, using earnings as a performance evaluation may be problematic because some firms exhibit robust and sustained earnings over time (high earnings persistence), and other firms, such as high (...) growth oriented firms, exhibit weak or sometimes negative earnings over time (low earnings persistence). Our study reveals that the effect of high earnings persistence results in firms that focus more heavily on cash compensation (salary and bonus) rather than on equity compensation (stock options, etc.) to compensate executive performance. Additionally, for firms characterized by low earnings persistence, our study indicates that cash flows from operations act as a supplementary performance measure to accounting earnings, and become increasingly important as a means to justify executive cash compensation. (shrink)

The eighties and nineties have seen much debate about CEO compensation. Critics of CEO compensation support their contention of excessive and inequitable CEO pay based on a number of factors and premises. This paper examines the validity of these arguments. We show why many of these arguments fail to persuade, in part, because they attempt to determine propriety of CEO pay without having a definitive standard for comparison. Arguments based on comparisons between CEO pay and the pay of (...) other individuals or jobs or between CEO pay and firm performance are shown to be an insufficient mechanism to determine the appropriateness of CEO compensation. (shrink)

We link the corporate governance literature in financial economics to the agency cost perspective of corporate social responsibility to derive theoretical predictions about the relationship between corporate governance and the existence of executive compensation incentives for CSR. We test our predictions using novel executive compensation contract data, and find that firms with more shareholder-friendly corporate governance are more likely to provide compensation to executives linked to firm social performance outcomes. Also, providing executives with direct incentives (...) for CSR is an effective tool to increase firm social performance. The findings provide evidence identifying corporate governance as a determinant of managerial incentives for social performance, and suggest that CSR activities are more likely to be beneficial to shareholders, as opposed to an agency cost. (shrink)

What, if anything, is wrong with high executive compensation? Is the common “lay reaction” of indignation and moral outrage justified? In this paper, my main goal is to articulate in a more systematic and philosophical manner the egalitarian responses to these questions. In order to do so, I suggest that we take some insights from recent debates on two versions of egalitarianism: a distributive one, according to which no one should be worse off than others because of unfair (...) distributions of goods and resources, especially ones based on matters of luck or arbitrary factors, and a relational one, which maintains that egalitarian justice requires members of a society to relate to one another as equals. Drawing on recent attempts to highlight the tricky nature of managerial authority, I argue that high inequalities in pay are not simply a distributional matter but should also be analyzed through a relational lens. I also attempt to show that relational egalitarians are well-equipped to question the now dominant “incentives” view of CEO compensation. (shrink)

The debate over compensation packages for top executives is discussed. Particular emphasis is placed on the decoupling of CEO pay and organizational performance. A contrast is drawn between firms that are owner-controlled and those that are manager-controlled. Owner-controlled firms tend to be more market-driven. In manager-controlled firms, however, ownership can become diluted to the point where decisions may not always be in the best interest of shareholders. The process of determining CEO compensation packages is examined, and special attention (...) is given to the handling of stock options. In order to stem the threat of increased government intervention, suggestions are made for increasing the leverage of compensation committees and of shareholders in general. (shrink)

I broadly explore the question by examining several common criticisms of CEO pay through both philosophical and empirical lenses. While some criticisms appear to be unfounded, the analysis shows not only that current compensation practices are problematic both from the standpoint of distributive justice and fairness, but also that incentive pay ultimately exacerbates the very agency problem it is purported to solve.

In this article, we examine how firms design executive compensation in light of their risk environment. Prior literature shows that corporate environmental responsibility (CER) of a firm inversely affects firm risk. We argue that firms with better CER performance benefit from the reduced firm risk, and therefore are more likely to provide greater managerial risk‐taking incentives to encourage the risk‐averse managers to undertake risk‐increasing but positive net present value (NPV) investments. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that a (...) firm’s CER rating is positively associated with its CEO risk‐taking incentives (vega) in the following year. We also document cross‐sectional variations in the CER‐vega relationship, that is, a weaker association in the controversial industries. This study contributes to the literature by investigating the role of CER on executive compensation design from the perspective of risk management. (shrink)

Executive compensation has long been a prominent topic in the management literature. A main question that is also given substantial attention in the business ethics literature—even more so in the wake of the recent financial crisis—is whether increasing levels of executive compensation can be justified from an ethical point of view. Also, the relationship of executive compensation to instances of unethical behavior or outcomes has received considerable attention. The purpose of this paper is to (...) explore the social, ecological, and existential costs of economic incentives, by discussing how relying on increasing levels of executive compensation may have an adverse effect on managerial performance in a broad sense. Specifically, we argue that one-dimensional economic incentives may destroy existential, social, and systemic values that influence the manager’s commitment to ensure responsible business conduct, and have negative spillover effects that may reduce the manager’s performance. There are well-documented findings that demonstrate that reliance on sources of extrinsic motivation (such as economic incentives) may displace intrinsic motivation. Our perspective is a holistic one, in the sense that we will explore the influence of sources of extrinsic motivation on the manager’s intrinsic commitment to different types of values. We will in particular investigate how it may influence the manager’s ethical reflection and behavior or lack thereof. (shrink)

We explore the extent to which Boards use executive compensation to incite firms to act in accordance with social and environmental objectives (e.g., Johnson, R. and D. Greening: 1999, Academy of Management Journal 42(5), 564-578; Kane, E. J.: 2002, Journal of Banking and Finance 26, 1919-1933.). We examine the association between executive compensation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) for 77 Canadian firms using three key components of executives' compensation structure: salary, bonus, and stock options. Similar (...) to prior research (McGuire, J., S. Dow and K. Argheyd: 2003, Journal of Business Ethics 45(4), 341-359), we measure three different aspects of CSR, which include Total CSR as well as CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses. CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses capture the positive and negative aspects of CSR, respectively. We find significant positive relationships between: (1) Salary and CSR Weaknesses, (2) Bonus and CSR Strengths, (3) Stock Options and Total CSR; and (4) Stock Options and CSR Strengths. Our findings suggest the importance of the structure of executive compensation in encouraging socially responsible actions, particularly for larger Canadian firms. This in turn suggests that executive compensation can be an effective tool in aligning executives' welfare with that of the "common good", which results in more socially responsible firms (Bebchuk, L., J. Fried and D. Walker: 2002, The University of Chicago Law Review 69, 751-846; Zalewski, D.: 2003, Journal of Economic Issues 37(2), 503-509). In addition, our findings suggest the importance of institutional context in influencing the association between executive compensation and CSR. Further implications for practice and research are discussed. (shrink)

This case study highlights some of the latest research on setting executive compensation at ethical levels. The board of directors of Spade’s, a mid-size U.S. hardware chain, considers altering the pay package of its incoming CEO to best align his interests with those of shareholders and stakeholders. Students are invited to consider various options on current trends, which seem attractive and convincing on the surface, but might present certain risks over the longer term. Five compensation components are (...) analyzed, namely, salary capping, pay for performance, bonus scales, stock option parameters, and severance package. (shrink)

Payment for performance is widely embraced as a key component of any well-designed executive compensation package. There is a price to be paid, however, for the heavy reliance on incentives as a way of controlling agent behavior. In particular, evidence exists demonstrating that incentives can crowd out an agent’s social preferences towards her principal. Social preferences are pro-social tendencies of people to do things for others for reasons such as fairness, reciprocity, altruism, and ethical or moral beliefs. The (...) use of incentives in compensation can result in self-interested agents. When crowding out occurs, in order to elicit the desired level of performance, principals may need to increase the level of incentive employed. Crowding out therefore provides an additional account for rising levels of executive compensation. In addition, crowding theory can provide a helpful explanation for the tension around the U.S. government’s reaction to preexisting banker incentive contracts during the 2008 financial crisis. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:The link between firm corporate social performance (CSP) and executive compensation could be driven by a sorting effect (a firm’s CSP is related to the initial levels of compensation of newly hired executives), or by an incentive effect (incumbent executives are rewarded for past firm CSP). Existing empirical work focuses exclusively on the incentive effect. In contrast, in this paper we explore the sorting effect of firm CSP on the initial compensation of newly hired executives. In (...) doing so, we develop a novel theoretical approach based on an integration of stakeholder theory and human capital theory, suggesting a positive association between the initial compensation of executives and firm CSP strengths and concerns. It also suggests that the strength of this relationship varies between different executive roles (as a function of stakeholder-management responsibilities). We find support for this theoretical framework in a large sample of newly-hired executives employed by Standard & Poor 1500 firms. (shrink)

The Chinese government capped executive compensation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to address income inequality and promote a more equitable distribution of wealth. This study investigates whether regulating top executives' pay alters their motivation for corporate green innovation (GI) initiatives. Using data from 2006 to 2018 for Chinese-listed SOEs, the regression analysis and difference-in-difference methods revealed that government restrictions on executive compensation negatively affect GI. Furthermore, the types of SOE results show that the negative effect of pay (...) restrictions on GI exists only in local SOEs, as opposed to central SOEs. Moreover, high managerial shareholding positively moderates this negative effect, demonstrating that the adverse effects of compensation restrictions are mitigated by the convergence of interests between managers and stakeholders. These findings are robust to instrumental variables and other robustness tests. This study provides policy recommendations for the government to boost its assistance in GI and establish new environment-related incentives that motivate managers to promote GI and inspire enterprises to deploy sustainable environmental initiatives. (shrink)

We empirically examine the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on CEO compensation using a large sample of the US firms from 1996 to 2010. We develop and test two hypotheses, the overinvestment hypothesis based on agency theory and the conflict–resolution hypothesis based on stakeholder theory. We find that the lag of CSR adversely affects both total compensation and cash compensation, after controlling for various firm and board characteristics. Our estimates show that an interquartile increase in CSR (...) is followed by a 4.35% (2.78%) decrease in total (cash) compensation. We also find an inverse association between lagged employee relations and CEO compensation. Our results are robust to the correction for endogeneity using instrumental variable approach. Taken together, our results support the conflict–resolution hypothesis, but not the CSR overinvestment argument. (shrink)

This paper divides firms in the Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) into two groups based on inclusion in or exclusion from the Domini Social Index (DSI). Inclusion in the DSI is interpreted as a positive indicator of ethical status. Using data for the 1992–2003 period, I provide evidence that chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, other executive compensation, and director compensation tend to be lower in DSI firms than in other firms in the S&P 500. (...) This applies to the unconditional group averages (and medians) and is particularly striking given that DSI firms as a group had better financial performance than the other firms. This finding is also true in a regression framework that controls for other influences on compensation, including firm size and financial performance. In a regression context, the estimated discount for CEOs of DSI firms is approximately 12% for both current compensation (salary and bonuses) and total compensation (including the value of options). These results are consistent with the expectation that some senior executives require a “compensating differential” to accept positions in firms with less attractive ethical status. It is also consistent with the expectation that some firms with positive ethical status might use more restraint in setting executive compensation. (shrink)

This article develops and applies a knowledge-based framework for understanding and interpreting executive compensation under the rubric of ethical consideration. This framework classifies six major ethical considerations that reflect issues in compensation design. We emphasize that these six ethical considerations are influenced by liberty and equality concepts. This framework helps to highlight areas where executive compensation has not been well spelled out.

While the effect of top executives' social networks on their compensations has received substantial scholarly attention, little effort has been made to integrate segmented views to offer more complete understanding of this effect. In this paper, we propose an integrative two-stage model by taking both economic and socio-political views into account. We theorise that some characteristics of top executive's outside social ties are positively related to firm performance, and those relationships are conditioned by external and internal strategic contexts, such (...) as environmental uncertainty, strategic relevance, and tie strength. We also theorise that firm performance leads to executives' compensations, but this linkage is moderated by the socio-political dynamics among executives (within-group dynamics) as well as between executives and a board of directors (between-group dynamics) inside the firm. Based on our integrative framework, this paper provides the comprehensive understanding of how executives' compensations are determined and highlights the importance of executive's social ties and their implications. (shrink)

To deal with potential conflicts between the triple-bottom-line expectations of investors and the performance of executives, firms can use incentives by integrating corporate social performance targets into executive compensation. No evidence yet exists that CSP targets in executive compensation actually lead to an improvement of CSP results. Using a panel data set of 400 firms for the years 2008–2012 leading to 1846 firm-year observations, the relationships between CSP targets and CSP results and CSP improvements are analyzed. (...) The results show that the level of CSP has no effect on the use of CSP targets, the use of CSP targets in general does not automatically lead to better CSP results, and the use of quantitative, hard CSP targets is an effective way to improve CSP results, especially to lower CSP weaknesses. (shrink)

When politicians feel popular pressure to act, but are unwilling or unable to address the root cause of the problem, they resort to symbolic policymaking. In this paper, I examine excessive executive compensation as an issue that rose to the top of the political agenda during both the Great Depression and the Great Recession. Presidential candidates, members of Congress, the media, and the public alike blamed corporate greed for the economic downturn. In both instances, however, enacted legislation stopped (...) short of changing the way in which executive pay was determined or placing effective, enforceable limits on it. I analyze the nature of the democratic process and contend that public policy scholars need to pay more attention to the occurrence of symbolic policies. The category of symbolic policies offers a more accurate approach to understanding the politics of executive compensation in the United States during the two crises and helps explain why, in spite of the recent legislative efforts, it continues to rise. (shrink)

Previous research has investigated the links between Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) and the monetary magnitude of executive compensation, but failed to inquire how the adoption of specific attributes of compensation contacts relates to M&A activities. We address this gap in the literature by examining the impacts of some M&A characteristics and acquirers' features on the adoption of executive compensation protection provisions and new Long-Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs). The study adopts a longitudinal design before after M&A (...) deals for 80 Canadian acquiring companies that engaged in M&A activities between 1995 and 2001. Our findings suggest that both transactional and organisational characteristics significantly explain the executive compensation arrangements' adoption around M&A transactions, but that the adoption of new LTIPs is subjected to a different set of determinants than the adoption of compensation protection provisions. We interpret these results in the light of the agency, political and institutional perspectives. (shrink)

A great deal has been written in recent years about the justification, if any, for the current levels of executive compensation. The folk consensus is that the current levels of executive compensation are unjustifiably high from both a moral and an economic perspective. In the case of the former, the compensation level is unfair and unjust. And in the case of the latter, the compensation level is not in the broader interests of other stakeholders (...) or of firm-value maximization.In this paper I counter this folk wisdom. I argue that executive compensation is a facet of the Stockholder Model, in which the primary objective of the firm is taken to be the maximization of shareholder wealth, and as such any moral critique of executive compensation is by default a critique of the Stockholder Model. Thus a necessary and sufficient condition for a moral defense of executive compensation is a moral defense of the Stockholder Model. I provide such a defense. Once the Stockholder Model is accepted then any moral or economic defense of executive compensation rests on its compatibility with shareholder wealthmaximization. I argue that the current levels of executive compensation are consistent with the overarching corporate goal of shareholder wealth maximization. Thus the current levels of executive compensation are both morally and economically justified. (shrink)

We draw on the behavioral agency model to explore the ethical consequences of CEO equity incentives. We argue that CEOs are more concerned with funding pension plans when they have more to gain from their stock options yet will increasingly underfund employee pension funds as their current option wealth increases. Our findings reveal that both effects hold when the CEO has greater power (also occupying board chair) over firm decision making. Our study suggests that there is an ethical dimension to (...) equity incentives, given they are intended to align CEO interests with shareholders, yet potentially incentivize CEO behaviors with adverse consequences for employees. Insights from our findings provide boards and regulators with behavioral levers to protect employee well-being in the context of pension funding. (shrink)

This study examines how the CSR committee and CSR-linked executive compensation jointly affect CSR performance as governance mechanisms. Prior studies provided mixed results on the CSR committee’s effect on CSR performance. We posit that a CSR committee has both a direct and an indirect positive effect on CSR performance, with CSR-linked compensation playing the role of mediator in the relationship. We base our analysis on a sample of 164 Canadian firms covering the period 2012–2018, for a total (...) of 952 firm-year observations. We propose a regression-based approach for our mediation research design. Our findings reveal that CSR-linked compensation mediates the CSR committee’s positive effect on performance, but the type of mediation depends on whether the performance is social or environmental. We provide evidence of both direct and indirect effects on environmental performance but only a positive indirect effect on social performance. These results suggest that demands from the firm’s internal and external stakeholders are treated differently, with the former receiving priority. (shrink)

The topic of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation has been a focus of interest for many years. The purpose of this article is to explore the ethical dimensions of various generally accepted theories of CEO renumeration. We argue that a contractarian approach, based on the Kantian ethical framework, can be used to augment the existing contingent pay models.While the neoclassical economic model of the firm views the maximization of the shareholders'' wealth as the sole responsibility of top management, (...) a contractarian approach regards the balancing of various stakeholders'' interests as the primary task of top management. Ethical problems emerge when there are divergent, yet equally justifiable interests which compete in order to channel organizational resources to meet their own needs. In this situation, given the inherent ambiguities and ever present possibilities of multiple perspectives, it may not always be feasible to provide a categorical answer to the question of whether the CEO''s decisions are ethical. We suggest that a broad interpretation of the neoclassical theory of the firm, one that is grounded in Kantian and contractarian ethics, can serve as a basis for a reconciliation of different theories of executive compensation. (shrink)

How is the (il)legitimacy of manager compensation constructed in social interaction? This study investigated discursive processes through which heavily contested executive pay schemes of the Finnish energy giant Fortum were constructed as (il)legitimate in public during 2005–2009. The critical discursive analysis of media texts identified five legitimation strategies through which politicians, journalists, and other social actors contested these schemes and, at the same time, constructed subject positions for managers, politicians, and citizens. The comparison of two debate periods surrounding (...) the 2007–2008 financial crisis revealed significant differences in the discursive strategies and the corresponding moral struggles linked to legitimation of executive compensation. The analysis highlights a change in moral reasoning by social actors as they adapt their justifications to a changing social context. This study has important implications for our understanding of the ethical aspects and socio-political embeddedness of manager compensation. In particular, it adds to our knowledge of organizational legitimacy by showing how discursive strategies and the corresponding morality constructions used to (de)legitimate business activities can shift quickly as a result of a change in the social and political climate surrounding the legitimation struggle. (shrink)

This paper examines the ethics of contemporary managerial compensation in the context of executive stock options. Economic considerations would dictate that executive stock options should be adjusted to eliminate the effect of overall stock market movements which are beyond the control of the executive. However, in practice, most executive stock options are not adjusted to control for these outside factors. Agency considerations are the most likely culprit. Adjusting for the influence of outside factors, such as (...) a generally rising stock market, from executive stock options sets a higher bar for managers to reach. Furthermore, traditional accounting standards permitted firms that did not adjust options to avoid reporting options as expenses. This presents CEOs and boards of directors with a major ethical dilemma. On the one hand, their duty to their shareholders and stakeholders dictates that executive stock options should be adjusted to eliminate outside noise from unrelated movements in the overall stock market. However, financial statements are presented in the language of accounting. If the overwhelming majority of the users of a language define a particular item in one way, then to deviate from the norm implies that the recipient of such a deviant statement may not properly interpret the statement. Likewise, if the standard practice is for firms to use unadjusted options and thus under-report expenses, to deviate from this industry norm risks that users of financial statements would not properly interpret the financial statements, with perhaps negative consequences for the shareholders. In short, if "everyone else does it," then it could be wrong for an individual firm to deviate from the norm as that would harm the shareholders. (shrink)

This study investigates the impact of fraud/lawsuit revelation on U.S. top executive turnover and compensation. It also examines potential explanatory variables affecting the executive turnover and compensation among U.S. fraud/lawsuit firms. Four important findings are documented. First, there was significantly higher executive turnover among U.S. firms with fraud/lawsuit revelation in the Wall Street Journal than matched firms without such revelation. Second, although on average, U.S. top executives received an increase in cash compensation after fraud/lawsuit (...) revelation, this increase is smaller than that of matched non-fraud/lawsuit firms. Third, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to change top executive when chief executive officer (CEO) was not the board chairman and CEO had been on the board for a short time. Fourth, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation when profitability was low, firms were involved in fraud, the compensation committee size was small, and the board met more often. These findings indicate that although, in general, U.S. fraud/lawsuits firms did not reduce their executive cash compensation, those involved in fraud were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation than to change their top executives. The finding, that ethical standards is not a significant factor for U.S. executive turnover nor compensation reduction, suggests that ethics appears to play no part in the board’s decisions, and that U.S. firms may have ethical standards in writing but they do not implement nor enforce the standards. (shrink)

Cognitive neuroscience research has found that individuals from different cultures have different neural responses and emotional perceptions. Differences in executives’ perception of external pay gaps in different cultures can affect their work attitudes and behavior. In this study, we explore the direct relationship between executive compensation fairness and executive innovation motivation. We also investigate the moderating effects of Confucian culture and western culture between executive compensation fairness and executive innovation motivation. Data were collected from (...) the Chinese listed firms from 2011 to 2019 and test the relationship using the fixed-effect panel regression models. The results demonstrate that executive compensation fairness positively influences the executive innovation motivation. This effect is more pronounced in Confucian culture regions, while Western culture weakens this effect. The findings of this study confirmed that executive compensation fairness, provide a cross-cultural comparison for compensation research, validate the findings of cultural neuroscience, and provide useful insights into the research of common prosperity. To improve the corporate compensation structure, it is necessary to consider the relative pay equity with firms in the same region and the influence of corporate culture. (shrink)

We applied a technique borrowed from the field of bioethics to test whether justice-related factors influence laypersons’ decisions concerning business ethics. In the first experiment, participants judged the acceptability of remuneration policies and in the second that of executive bonuses. In each study, participants judged a set of 36 situations. To create the scenarios, we varied retributive justice—the amount of remuneration; procedural justice—the clarity of the procedure that determined the remuneration; distributive justice—the extent of the distribution of bonus payments (...) amongst employees; and restorative justice—a special compensation for hazardous working conditions or accidents at work. K-means clustering of all 36 judgments revealed four different personal positions in both experiments. One group of people readily accepted all situations. The other three groups’ judgments were mainly a function of distributive justice modulated in different ways by the context determined by the other variables. Furthermore, people conceive of distributive justice as categorical: Acceptability judgments only increase if companies give bonuses to all employees. Granting bonuses to a subset does not increase acceptability. Our results are useful for policy makers and provide business ethics researchers with a novel technique. (shrink)