Search results for 'Experience Machine' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  48
    Eden Lin (2016). How to Use the Experience Machine. Utilitas 28 (3):314-332.
    The experience machine was traditionally thought to refute hedonism about welfare. In recent years, however, the tide has turned: many philosophers have argued not merely that the experience machine doesn't rule out hedonism, but that it doesn't count against it at all. I argue for a moderate position between those two extremes: although the experience machine doesn't decisively rule out hedonism, it provides us with some reason to reject it. I also argue for a (...)
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  2. Ben Bramble (2016). The Experience Machine. Philosophy Compass 11 (3):136-145.
    In this paper, I reconstruct Robert Nozick's experience machine objection to hedonism about well-being. I then explain and briefly discuss the most important recent criticisms that have been made of it. Finally, I question the conventional wisdom that the experience machine, while it neatly disposes of hedonism, poses no problem for desire-based theories of well-being.
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  3. Jason Kawall (1999). The Experience Machine and Mental State Theories of Well-Being. Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (3):381-387.
    It is argued that Nozick's experience machine thought experiment does not pose a particular difficulty for mental state theories of well-being. While the example shows that we value many things beyond our mental states, this simply reflects the fact that we value more than our own well-being. Nor is a mental state theorist forced to make the dubious claim that we maintain these other values simply as a means to desirable mental states. Valuing more than our mental states (...)
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  4. Sharon Hewitt (2010). What Do Our Intuitions About the Experience Machine Really Tell Us About Hedonism? Philosophical Studies 151 (3):331 - 349.
    Robert Nozick's experience machine thought experiment is often considered a decisive refutation of hedonism. I argue that the conclusions we draw from Nozick's thought experiment ought to be informed by considerations concerning the operation of our intuitions about value. First, I argue that, in order to show that practical hedonistic reasons are not causing our negative reaction to the experience machine, we must not merely stipulate their irrelevance (since our intuitions are not always responsive to stipulation) (...)
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  5.  36
    H. E. Baber (2008). The Experience Machine Deconstructed. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 15 (1):133-138.
    Nozick’s Experience Machine thought experiment is generally taken to make a compelling, if not conclusive, case against philosophical hedonism. I argue that it does not and, indeed, that regardless of the results, it cannot provide any reason to accept or reject either hedonism or any other philosophical account of wellbeing since it presupposes preferentism, the desire-satisfaction account ofwellbeing. Preferentists cannot take any comfort from the results of such thought experiments because they assume preferentism and therefore cannot establish it. (...)
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  6.  56
    Basil Smith (2012). Affect, Rationality, and the Experience Machine. Ethical Perspectives 19 (2):268-276.
    Can we test philosophical thought experiments, such as whether people would enter an experience machine or would leave one once they are inside? Dan Weijers argues that since 'rational' subjects (e.g. students taking surveys in college classes) are believable, we can do so. By contrast, I argue that because such subjects will probably have the wrong affect (i.e. emotional states) when they are tested, such tests are almost worthless. Moreover, understood as a general policy, such pretend testing would (...)
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  7. Basil Smith (2011). Can We Test the Experience Machine? Ethical Perspectives 18 (1):29-51.
    Robert Nozick famously asks us whether we would plug in to an experience machine, or whether we would insist upon ‘living in contact with reality’. Felipe De Brigard, after conducting a series of empirical ‘inverted’ experience machine studies, suggests that this is a false dilemma. Rather, he says, '…the fact is that people tend to prefer the state of affairs they are in currently,' or the status quo. -/- In this paper, I argue that these studies (...)
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  8. Harriet Baber (2008). The Experience Machine Deconstructed. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 15 (1):133-138.
    Nozick’s Experience Machine thought experiment is generally taken to make a compelling, if not conclusive, case against philosophical hedonism. I argue that it does not and, indeed, that regardless of the results, it cannot provide any reason to accept or reject either hedonism or any other philosophical account of wellbeing since it presupposes preferentism, the desire-satisfaction account of wellbeing. Preferentists cannot take any comfort from the results of such thought experiments because they assume preferentism and therefore cannot establish (...)
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  9.  65
    Dan Weijers (2013). Nozick's Experience Machine is Dead, Long Live the Experience Machine! Philosophical Psychology (4):1-23.
    Robert Nozick's experience machine thought experiment (Nozick's scenario) is widely used as the basis for a ?knockdown? argument against all internalist mental state theories of well-being. Recently, however, it has been convincingly argued that Nozick's scenario should not be used in this way because it elicits judgments marred by status quo bias and other irrelevant factors. These arguments all include alternate experience machine thought experiments, but these scenarios also elicit judgments marred by status quo bias and (...)
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  10. John Lemos (2004). Psychological Hedonism, Evolutionary Biology, and the Experience Machine. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (4):506-526.
    In the second half of their recent, critically acclaimed book Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior , Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson discuss psychological hedonism. This is the view that avoiding our own pain and increasing our own pleasure are the only ultimate motives people have. They argue that none of the traditional philosophical arguments against this view are good, and they go on to present theirownevolutionary biological argument against it. Interestingly, the first half of their (...)
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  11.  79
    Alex Barber (2011). Hedonism and the Experience Machine. Philosophical Papers 40 (2):257 - 278.
    Money isn’t everything, so what is? Many government leaders, social policy theorists, and members of the general public have a ready answer: happiness. This paper examines an opposing view due to Robert Nozick, which centres on his experience-machine thought experiment. Despite the example's influence among philosophers, the argument behind it is riddled with difficulties. Dropping the example allows us to re-version Nozick's argument in a way that makes it far more forceful - and less dependent on people's often (...)
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  12.  52
    Steven M. Cahn & Christine Vitrano (2013). Choosing the Experience Machine. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 20 (1):52-58.
    In the decades since Robert Nozick posed his now famous thought experiment involving the experience machine, philosophers have taken his treatment as conclusive. A review of the literature finds almost no one who has argued that people would choose the experience machine. To find such unanunity among philosophers is unexpected. But the situation is especially surprising because Nozick's conclusion appears mistaken. In support of this view, we offer three different sorts of reasons why persons would be (...)
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  13. John Lemos (2002). Sober and Wilson and Nozick and the Experience Machine. Philosophia 29 (1-4):401-409.
    Years ago Robert Nozick provided the experience machine argument, which states that since many people would forgo a life of artificially stimulated tremendous pleasure provided by an "experience machine," it must be that sometimes people are motivated by things other than the pursuit of their own pleasure. This is to say that he rejected psychological hedonism. In a recent book Elliot Sober and David Wilson defend the view that Nozick's argument does not provide adequate refutation of (...)
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  14.  34
    Alex Barber (2011). Hedonism and the Experience Machine: Re-Reading of Robert Nozick,'The Experience Machine', in His Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, Pages 42–5. [REVIEW] Philosophical Papers 40 (2):257-278.
    Money isn’t everything, so what is? Many government leaders, social policy theorists, and members of the general public have a ready answer: happiness. This paper examines an opposing view due to Robert Nozick, which centres on his experience-machine thought experiment. Despite the example's influence among philosophers, the argument behind it is riddled with difficulties. Dropping the example allows us to re-version Nozick's argument in a way that makes it far more forceful - and less dependent on people's often (...)
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  15.  10
    Y. Michael Barilan (2009). Nozick's Experience Machine and Palliative Care: Revisiting Hedonism. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 12 (4):399-407.
    In refutation of hedonism, Nozick offered a hypothetical thought experiment, known as the Experience Machine. This paper maintains that end-of-life-suffering of the kind that is resistant to state-of-the-art palliation provides a conceptually equal experiment which validates Nozick’s observations and conclusions. The observation that very many terminal patients who suffer terribly do no wish for euthanasia or terminal sedation is incompatible with motivational hedonism. Although irreversible vegetative state and death are equivalently pain-free, very many people loath the former even (...)
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  16.  2
    Basil Smith (2011). Can We Test the Experience Machine? Ethical Perspectives 18 (1):29-51.
    Robert Nozick famously asks us whether we would plug in to an experience machine, or whether we would insist upon ‘living in contact with reality’. Felipe De Brigard, after conducting a series of empirical ‘inverted’ experience machine studies, suggests that this is a false dilemma. Rather, he says, ’…the fact is that people tend to prefer the state of affairs they are in currently,’ or the status quo. In this paper, I argue that these studies are (...)
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  17. Christopher Belshaw (2014). What's Wrong with the Experience Machine? European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):573-592.
    Nozick's thought experiment is less effective than is often believed. Certainly, there could be reasons to enter the machine. Possibly, life there might be among the best of all those available. Yet we need to distinguish between two versions. On the first, I retain my beliefs, memories, dispositions, some knowledge. On the second, all these too are determined by the scientists. Nozick alludes to both versions. But only on the first will machine life have appeal.
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  18. Christopher Grau (2005). Bad Dreams, Evil Demons, and the Experience Machine: Philosophy and The Matrix. In Philosophers Explore The Matrix. Oxford University Press
  19.  35
    Dan Weijers & Vanessa Schouten (2013). An Assessment of Recent Responses to the Experience Machine Objection to Hedonism. Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (4):461-482.
  20.  19
    Brian Jortner (2015). A Critical Analysis of Robert Nozick's Experience Machine. Philosophical Inquiry 39 (2):72-78.
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  21. Dan Weijers (2012). We Can Test the Experience Machine: Reply to Smith. Ethical Perspectives 19 (1).
     
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  22.  30
    Bart Engelen (2010). Open Your Eyes? Why Nozick's Experience Machine Does Not Refute Hedonism. Film and Philosophy 14:33-46.
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  23.  21
    Valerie Tiberius (2013). Beyond the Experience Machine: How to Build a Theory of Well-Being. In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge 398.
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  24. John-Stewart Gordon (2008). Hedonistic Utilitarianism and the Argument of the Experience Machine. Conjectura: Filosofia E Educação 13 (1):25-36.
     
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  25. Nathan Ballantyne (unknown). A Defense Of Nozick's "Experience Machine". Eidos: The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 18.
     
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  26.  16
    Michael Hauskeller (2004). The Experience Machine. Think 3 (8):35.
    Michael Hauskeller discusses a famous thought-experiment that appears to show that we actually want far more then merely to feel happy.
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  27.  8
    Dan Weijers (2011). The Experience Machine Objection to Hedonism. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell 229--231.
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  28. I. Dream Skepticism (2007). Bad Dreams, Evil Demons, and the Experience Machine: Philosophy and The Matrix. In John Perry, Michael Bratman & John Martin Fischer (eds.), Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press 195.
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  29.  8
    Jae-Joon Lee (2008). An Experience of Machine-Based Images by the Autonomy of Computing System. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 12:47-54.
    Contemporary production of machine-based images relay gradually on the autonomy of computing machines. Autonomous computing machines require the interaction with users like Human-Computer-Interaction technology and other interface technologies, especially computing machine-based images must also ask for viewer as an inter-actor, viewer’s participations. Whether this interaction of viewer-user is with machines or with images, if it is an interaction with each individual that have autonomy or self-organization, its interaction will be the interaction of each ecosystem. And the forms of (...)
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  30. Don Ihde (1975). The Experience of Technology: Human-Machine Relations. Philosophy and Social Criticism 2 (3):267-279.
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  31.  1
    Christopher Roberts (2010). Sound Ideas: Music, Machine and Experience (Review). Substance 39 (3):132-136.
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  32.  1
    Christopher Roberts (2010). Evens, Aden. Sound Ideas: Music, Machine and Experience. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003. Pp. 202. Substance 39 (3):1-5.
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  33. Ben Bramble (2016). A New Defense of Hedonism About Well-Being. Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    According to hedonism about well-being, lives can go well or poorly for us just in virtue of our ability to feel pleasure and pain. Hedonism has had many advocates historically, but has relatively few nowadays. This is mainly due to three highly influential objections to it: The Philosophy of Swine, The Experience Machine, and The Resonance Constraint. In this paper, I attempt to revive hedonism. I begin by giving a precise new definition of it. I then argue that (...)
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  34. Matthew Silverstein (2000). In Defense of Happiness. Social Theory and Practice 26 (2):279-300.
    Many philosophers believe that Robert Nozick's experience machine argument poses an insurmountable obstacle to hedonism as a theory of well-being. After an initial attempt to demonstrate that the persuasiveness of this argument rests on a key ambiguity, I argue that the intuitions to which the thought experiment appeals are not nearly as clear as many philosophers suppose they are. I believe that a careful consideration of the origin of those intuitions -- especially in light of the so-called "paradox (...)
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  35.  59
    Sandy Berkovski (2012). The Possibility of Modified Hedonism. Theoria 78 (3):186-212.
    A popular objection to hedonist accounts of personal welfare has been the experience machine argument. Several modifications of traditional hedonism have been proposed in response. In this article I examine two such responses, recently expounded by Feldman and Sumner respectively. I argue that both modifications make hedonism indistinguishable from anti-hedonism. Sumner's account, I claim, also fails to satisfy the demands of theoretical unity.
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  36. William G. Lycan (1998). Qualitative Experience in Machines. In Terrell Ward Bynum & James H. Moor (eds.), How Computers Are Changing Philosophy. Blackwell 171.
  37. Susan A. J. Stuart (2011). Enkinaesthesia: The Fundamental Challenge for Machine Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (01):145-162.
    In this short paper I will introduce an idea which, I will argue, presents a fundamental additional challenge to the machine consciousness community. The idea takes the questions surrounding phenomenology, qualia and phenomenality one step further into the realm of intersubjectivity but with a twist, and the twist is this: that an agent’s intersubjective experience is deeply felt and necessarily co-affective; it is enkinaesthetic, and only through enkinaesthetic awareness can we establish the affective enfolding which enables first the (...)
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  38.  15
    Jaron Lanier (1995). Agents of Alienation. Interactions 2 (3):76-81.
    In the conclusion to his article, `Consciousness as an engineering issue' , pp. 52-66), Donald Michie argues that the inclusion of intelligent computer systems in workgroups will lead to a blurring of the distinction between human and machine consciousness. He also refers to the increasing use of intelligent agent software in commercial applications. Given the exponential growth in the availability of on-line information through networked computer systems, AI routines are being developed to filter information, based on the user's own (...)
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  39.  75
    S. G. Sterrett, Turing on the Integration of Human and Machine Intelligence.
    Abstract Philosophical discussion of Alan Turing’s writings on intelligence has mostly revolved around a single point made in a paper published in the journal Mind in 1950. This is unfortunate, for Turing’s reflections on machine (artificial) intelligence, human intelligence, and the relation between them were more extensive and sophisticated. They are seen to be extremely well-considered and sound in retrospect. Recently, IBM developed a question-answering computer (Watson) that could compete against humans on the game show Jeopardy! There are hopes (...)
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  40.  80
    Jesse J. Prinz (2003). Level-Headed Mysterianism and Artificial Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5):111-132.
    Many materialists believe that we should, in principle, be able to build a conscious computing machine. Others disagree. I favour a sceptical position, but of another variety. The problem isn't that it would be impossible to create a conscious computer. The problem is that we cannot know whether it is possible. There are principled reasons for thinking that we wouldn't ever be able to confirm that allegedly conscious computers were conscious. The proper stance on computational consciousness is agnosticism. Despite (...)
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  41.  6
    Linda Passarge & Thomas Binder (1996). Supporting Reflection and Dialogue in a Community of Machine Setters: Lessons Learned From Design and Use of a Hypermedia Type Training Material. [REVIEW] AI and Society 10 (1):79-88.
    The debate about experience-based or tacit knowledge has focused much attention on the limits to formalisation of work process knowledge. A main line of argument has been that, for example, industrial work even with highly advanced technical equipment can only be performed adequately when the worker through experience on the job has gained a feel for the functioning of the machinery and the properties and behaviour of the materials. In this debate links tend to be created between on (...)
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  42.  62
    Eden Lin (2014). Pluralism About Well‐Being. Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):127-154.
    Theories of well-being purport to identify the basic goods and bads whose presence in a person's life determines how well she is faring. Monism is the view that there is only one basic good and one basic bad. Pluralism is the view that there is either more than one basic good or more than one basic bad. In this paper, I give an argument for pluralism that is general in the sense that it does not purport to identify any basic (...)
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  43.  39
    David Rhys Birks (2013). Wellbeing, Schizophrenia and Experience Machines. Bioethics 27 (2):81-88.
    In the USA and England and Wales, involuntary treatment for mental illness is subject to the constraint that it must be necessary for the health or safety of the patient, if he poses no danger to others. I will argue against this necessary condition of administering treatment and propose that the category of individuals eligible for involuntary treatment should be extended. I begin by focusing on the common disorder of schizophrenia and proceed to demonstrate that it can be a considerable (...)
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  44.  12
    Charles T. Wolfe & Philippe Huneman (forthcoming). “Man-Machines and Embodiment: From Cartesian Physiology to Claude Bernard’s ‘Living Machine’”. In Justin E. H. Smith (ed.), Embodiment, Oxford Philosophical Concepts. Oxford
    A common and enduring early modern intuition is that materialists reduce organisms in general and human beings in particular to automata. Wasn’t a famous book of the time entitled L’Homme-Machine? In fact, the machine is employed as an analogy, and there was a specifically materialist form of embodiment, in which the body is not reduced to an inanimate machine, but is conceived as an affective, flesh-and-blood entity. We discuss how mechanist and vitalist models of organism exist in (...)
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  45.  22
    Trevor Mowchun (2015). A Machine’s First Glimpse in Time and Space. Evental Aesthetics 4 (2):77-102.
    The primary objective of this two-part essay is to theorize the relationships between religious disenchantment, the autonomy of art, and the phenomenon of contingency. These connections are held to be vital for an understanding of modern aesthetics in general, and the possibility is put forth that they come to a head in the most modern of all the arts: cinema. In the first part, an account of the contemporary rift between the immanence of art and the transcendence of the divine (...)
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  46.  61
    Ron Chrisley & J. Parthemore (2007). Synthetic Phenomenology:Exploiting Embodiment to Specify the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):44-58.
    Not all research in machine consciousness aims to instantiate phenomenal states in artefacts. For example, one can use artefacts that do not themselves have phenomenal states, merely to simulate or model organisms that do. Nevertheless, one might refer to all of these pursuits -- instantiating, simulating or modelling phenomenal states in an artefact -- as 'synthetic phenomenality'. But there is another way in which artificial agents (be they simulated or real) may play a crucial role in understanding or creating (...)
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  47.  10
    Ross Buck (2010). Emotion is an Entity at Both Biological and Ecological Levels: The Ghost in the Machine is Language. Emotion Review 2 (3):286-287.
    In “Emergent Ghosts of the Emotion Machine,” James Coan neglects emotion displays involved in social communication and activity in central neurochemical systems associated with drug-induced changes in feelings and desires. Also, he fails to recognize that emotions are not rigidly bound to action tendencies, but rather have evolved internal signals to afford flexibility of response. Emotion indices naturally lack close coordination because different aspects—physiological arousal, expressive display, subjective experience—are differentially accessible to the responder and interaction partner, and therefore (...)
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  48.  21
    Tom Froese (2014). Bio-Machine Hybrid Technology: A Theoretical Assessment and Some Suggestions for Improved Future Design. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Technology 27 (4):539-560.
    In sociology, there has been a controversy about whether there is any essential difference between a human being and a tool, or if the tool–user relationship can be defined by co-actor symmetry. This issue becomes more complex when we consider examples of AI and robots, and even more so following progress in the development of various bio-machine hybrid technologies, such as robots that include organic parts, human brain implants, and adaptive prosthetics. It is argued that a concept of autonomous (...)
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  49.  7
    Michael Barnes Norton (2015). Matter and Machine in Derrida’s Account of Religion. Sophia 54 (3):265-279.
    Jacques Derrida’s ‘Faith and Knowledge’ presents an account of the complex relationship between religion and technoscience that disrupts their traditional boundaries by uncovering both an irreducible faith at the heart of science and an irreducible mechanicity at the heart of religion. In this paper, I focus on the latter, arguing that emphases in Derrida’s text on both the ‘sources’ of religion and its interaction with modern technologies underemphasize the ways in which a general ‘mechanicity’ is present throughout religion. There is (...)
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  50.  29
    Stephen E. Palmer (1999). On Qualia, Relations, and Structure in Color Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):976-985.
    In this Response, I defend the notion of intrinsic qualities of experience, discuss the distinction between relational experience and relational structure, clarify the difference between narrow and broad interpretations of color experience, argue against externalist approaches to color experience, defend the concept of isomorphism as a limitation in understanding color experiences, examine critiques of the color machine and color room arguments, and counter objections to within-subject experiments based on memory limitations.
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