Search results for 'Experiences (Events)' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Michael Jacovides (2010). Experiences as Complex Events. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):141-159.score: 144.0
    It is argued that experiences are complex events that befall their subjects. Each experience has a single subject and depends on the state or the event that it is of. The constituents of an experience are (or underlie) its subject, its grounding event or state, and everything that the subject is aware of during that time that's relevant to the telling of the story of how it was to participate in that event or be put in that state. The (...)
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  2. J. N. Findlay (1956). Report on Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse? Analysis 16 (June):121.score: 124.0
     
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  3. John R. Searle (1956). Report on Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse? Analysis 16 (June):124.score: 124.0
     
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  4. R. Taylor (1956). Report on Analysis 'Problem' No. 9 "Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse?". Analysis 16 (6):125-126.score: 120.0
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  5. J. N. Findlay (1956). Report on Analysis 'Problem' No. 9 "Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse?". Analysis 16 (6):121-122.score: 120.0
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  6. Vanessa Charland-Verville, Jean-Pierre Jourdan, Marie Thonnard, Didier Ledoux, Anne-Francoise Donneau, Etienne Quertemont & Steven Laureys (2014). Near-Death Experiences in Non-Life-Threatening Events and Coma of Different Etiologies. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.score: 120.0
  7. Vanhaudenhuyse Audrey (2012). Memories of Near-Death Experiences Are They Memories of Imagined Events? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.score: 120.0
  8. J. E. McGechie (1956). Report on Analysis 'Problem' No. 9 "Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse?". Analysis 16 (6):122-123.score: 120.0
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  9. J. R. Searle (1956). Report on Analysis 'Problem' No. 9 "Does It Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse?". Analysis 16 (6):124-125.score: 120.0
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  10. William Tov (2012). Daily Experiences and Well-Being: Do Memories of Events Matter? Cognition and Emotion 26 (8):1371-1389.score: 120.0
  11. Cathy L. McEvoy & Douglas L. Nelson (2006). Measuring, Manipulating, and Modeling the Unconscious Influences of Prior Experience on Memory for Recent Experiences. In Reinout W. Wiers & Alan W. Stacy (eds.), Handbook of Implicit Cognition and Addiction. Sage Publications Ltd. 59-71.score: 90.0
  12. George Silberschatz (2005). How Previously Inaccessible Experiences Become Conscious. In , Transformative Relationships: The Control-Mastery Theory of Psychotherapy. Routledge. 25-30.score: 90.0
  13. Thomas Metzinger (2000). The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective. In , Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. 285--306.score: 70.0
    This is a brief and accessible English summary of the "Self-model Theory of Subjectivity" (SMT), which is only available as German book in this archive. It introduces two new theoretical entities, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation" PMIR. A representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person persepctive is offered. This is a revised version, including two pictures.
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  14. Bernard J. Baars (2005). Subjective Experience is Probably Not Limited to Humans: The Evidence From Neurobiology and Behavior. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):7-21.score: 70.0
  15. M. Guy Thompson (2001). Is the Unconscious Really All That Unconscious? The Role of Being and Experience in the Psychoanalytic Encounter. Contemporary Psychoanalysis 37 (4):571-612.score: 70.0
    This paper explores the psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious and critiques it from a phenomenlogical perspective, especially Sartre and Heidegger, with a view to conceptualizing the unconscious from an ontological rather than psychological mindset.
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  16. Jonathan W. Schooler (2002). Re-Representing Consciousness: Dissociations Between Experience and Meta-Consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (8):339-344.score: 70.0
  17. Rolf Reber, P. Wurtz & Thomas E. Zimmermann (2004). Exploring "Fringe" Consciousness: The Subjective Experience of Perceptual Fluency and its Objective Bases. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):47-60.score: 70.0
  18. Richard E. Aquila (1979). Mental Particulars, Mental Events, and the Bundle Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (March):109-120.score: 70.0
    I argue, First, That the bundle theory is compatible with certain views of mental states as alterations in an underlying substance. Then I distinguish between momentary and enduring experiencers and argue that the bundle theory does not imply the possibility of experiences apart from experiencers, But at most apart from enduring experiencers. Finally, I reject strawson's claim that the bundle theory implies that some particular person's experience might instead have belonged to some other person. Regarding experiences as events (...)
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  19. J. Smallwood, J. B. Davies, D. Heim, F. Finnigan, M. Sudberry & Obonsawin M. O'Connor R. (2004). Subjective Experience and the Attentional Lapse: Task Engagement and Disengagement During Sustained Attention. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):657-90.score: 70.0
  20. Vincent A. Punzo & Emily Miller (2002). Investigating Conscious Experience Through the Beeper Project. Teaching of Psychology 29 (4):295-297.score: 70.0
  21. Lisa Feldman Barrett (2005). Feeling is Perceiving: Core Affect and Conceptualization in the Experience of Emotion. In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press. 255-284.score: 70.0
  22. Elvin Aydin, Bahadir M. Gulluoglu & M. Kemal Kuscu (2012). A Psychoanalytic Qualitative Study of Subjective Life Experiences of Women With Breast Cancer. Journal of Research Practice 8 (2):Article - M13.score: 70.0
    This article exemplifies research on the subjective life experiences of women with breast cancer, designed from a psychoanalytic perspective. Such research aims to reveal the subjective intrapsychic processes of women suffering from breast cancer, which can provide researchers and health care professionals with useful insight. Using Biographic narrative interpretative method, the study reveals some common denominators in the subjective life experiences of women with breast cancer. The study revealed that the subjects consider the diagnosis of breast cancer as (...)
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  23. Holley S. Hodgins & C. Raymond Knee (2002). The Integrating Self and Conscious Experience. In Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan (eds.), Handbook of Self-Determination Research. University of Rochester Press. 87-100.score: 70.0
  24. C. Richard Chapman (2004). Pain Perception, Affective Mechanisms, and Conscious Experience. In Thomas Hadjistavropoulos & Kenneth D. Craig (eds.), Pain: Psychological Perspectives. 59-85.score: 70.0
  25. Catherine Tallon-Baudry (2003). Oscillatory Synchrony as a Signature for the Unity of Visual Experience in Humans. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.score: 70.0
     
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  26. Carlo Umilta (2000). Consciousness and Conscious Experience. In Kurt Pawlik & Mark R. Rosenzweig (eds.), International Handbook of Psychology. Sage Publications Ltd. 223-232.score: 70.0
  27. Timothy J. Bayne & David J. Chalmers (2003). What is the Unity of Consciousness? In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.score: 66.0
    At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red (...)
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  28. Jordan Dodd (2014). Realism and Anti-Realism About Experiences of Understanding. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):745-767.score: 66.0
    Strawson (1994) and Peacocke (1992) introduced thought experiments that show that it seems intuitive that there is, in some way, an experiential character to mental events of understanding. Some (e.g., Siewert 1998, 2011; Pitt 2004) try to explain these intuitions by saying that just as we have, say, headache experiences and visual experiences of blueness, so too we have experiences of understanding. Others (e.g., Prinz 2006, 2011; Tye 1996) propose that these intuitions can be explained without positing (...)
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  29. Elisabeth Pacherie, Melissa Green & Timothy J. Bayne (2006). Phenomenology and Delusions: Who Put the 'Alien' in Alien Control? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.score: 66.0
    Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective experience in response to seeing a known person; loss of the affective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, (...)
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  30. Wolfgang Baer (2007). The Physical Condition for Consciousness: A Comment on R. Shaw and J. Kinsella-Shaw. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (8):93-104.score: 66.0
    If the universe is a machine, consciousness is not possible. If the universe is more than a machine, then physics is incomplete. Since we are both part of the universe and conscious, physics must be incomplete and the understanding required to construct conscious mechanisms must be sought through the advancement of physics not the continued application of inadequate concepts. In this paper I will show that an impediment to this advancement is the confusion arising through the use of terms such (...)
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  31. Timo Järvilehto (2001). Feeling as Knowing--Part II: Emotion, Consciousness and Brain Activity. Consciousness and Emotion. Special Issue 2 (1):75-102.score: 62.0
    In the latter part of this two-article sequence, the concept of emotion as reorganization of the organism-environment system is developed further in relation to consciousness, subjective experience and brain activity. It is argued that conscious emotions have their origin in reorganizational changes in primitive co-operative organizations, in which they get a more local character with the advent of personal consciousness and individuality, being expressed in conscious emotions. However, the conscious emotion is not confined to the individual only, but it gets (...)
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  32. Brian Massumi (2011). Semblance and Event: Arts of Experience, Politics of Expression. Mit Press.score: 62.0
    Introduction. Activist philosophy and the occurrent arts -- The ether and your anger toward a speculative pragmatism -- The thinking-feeling of what happens putting the radical back in empiricism -- The diagram as technique of existence ovum of the universe segmented -- Arts of experience, politics of expression In four movements. First movement. To dance a storm -- Second movement. Life unlimited -- Third movement. The paradox of content -- Fourth movement. Composing the political.
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  33. Susan J. Blackmore (2002). There is No Stream of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):17-28.score: 60.0
    Throughout history there have been people who say it is all illusion. I think they may be right. But if they are right what could this mean? If you just say "It's all an illusion" this gets you nowhere - except that a whole lot of other questions appear. Why should we all be victims of an illusion, instead of seeing things the way they really are? What sort of illusion is it anyway? Why is it like that and not (...)
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  34. Susan L. Hurley (2003). Action, the Unity of Consciousness, and Vehicle Externalism. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 78--91.score: 60.0
  35. Axel Cleeremans (ed.) (2003). The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
  36. M. Guy Thompson (2004). Is the Unconscious Really All That Unconscious? In Paul Gordon & Rosalind Mayo (eds.), Between Psychotherapy and Philosophy: Essays From the Philadelphia Association. 141-178.score: 60.0
    This paper explores the psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious and critiques it from a phenomenlogical perspective, especially Sartre and Heidegger, with a view to conceptualizing the unconscious from an ontological rather than psychological mindset.
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  37. Monica Meijsing (2006). Being Ourselves and Knowing Ourselves: An Adverbial Account of Mental Representations. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):605-619.score: 60.0
    This paper takes an evolutionary approach to what we are, namely autopoietic systems with a first person perspective on our surroundings and ourselves. This in contrast with Thomas Metzinger.
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  38. Robert D. Stolorow (2006). Autobiographical and Theoretical Reflections on the "Ontological Unconscious". Contemporary Psychoanalysis 42 (2):233-241.score: 60.0
  39. Jason Ford & David Woodruff Smith (2006). Consciousness, Self, and Attention. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. 353-377.score: 60.0
  40. Renée Baillargeon (2004). Can 12 Large Clowns Fit in a Mini Cooper? Or When Are Beliefs and Reasoning Explicit and Conscious? Developmental Science 7 (4):422-424.score: 60.0
  41. Mirja Johanson, Antii Revonsuo, John Chaplin & Jan-Eric Wedlund (2003). Level and Contents of Consciousness in Connection with Partial Epileptic Seizures. Epilepsy and Behavior 4 (3):279-285.score: 60.0
  42. Nicholas P. Holmes & Charles Spence (2006). Beyond the Body Schema: Visual, Prosthetic, and Technological Contributions to Bodily Perception and Awareness. In Günther Knoblich, Ian M. Thornton, Marc Grosjean & Maggie Shiffrar (eds.), Human Body Perception From the Inside Out. Oxford University Press. 15-64.score: 60.0
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  43. Jean-Marie Danion, Caroline Huron, Lydia Rizzo & Pierre Vidailhet (2004). Emotion, Memory, and Conscious Awareness in Schizophrenia. In Daniel Reisberg & Paula Hertel (eds.), Memory and Emotion. Oxford University Press. 217-241.score: 60.0
  44. Guy Drori, A Journey Towards Higher Consciousness: On Retreat in Pacha Mama, a Spiritual Village in Costa Rica.score: 60.0
     
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  45. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2006). Internal-World Skepticism and Mental Self-Presentation. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. 41-61.score: 60.0
  46. Thomas Natsoulas (2003). The Stream of Consciousness: XXVIII. Does Consciousness Exist? (First Part). Imagination, Cognition and Personality 23 (2):121-141.score: 60.0
     
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  47. K. Ramakrishna Rao (2002). Bridging Eastern and Western Perspectives on Consciousness: Comment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):63-68.score: 60.0
     
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  48. Israel Rosenfield (2000). Consciousness and Subjectivity: Memory, Language and the "Body Image". Intellectica 31:111-123.score: 60.0
  49. Gudmund J. W. Smith (2004). The Role of Unconscious Processes in the Evolvement of Creativity. In Larisa V. Shavinina & Michel Ferrari (eds.), Beyond Knowledge: Extracognitive Aspects of Developing High Ability. The Educational Psychology Series. 27-37.score: 60.0
  50. Anne Treisman (2003). Consciousness and Perceptual Binding. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 95--113.score: 60.0
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