Search results for 'Explanatory gap' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. David Papineau (2011). What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap? Philosophia 39 (1):5-19.
    It is widely agreed among contemporary philosophers of mind that science leaves us with an ‘explanatory gap’—that even after we know everything that science can tell us about the conscious mind and the brain, their relationship still remains mysterious. I argue that this agreed view is quite mistaken. The feeling of a ‘explanatory gap’ arises only because we cannot stop ourselves thinking about the mind–brain relation in a dualist way.
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  2. Max Seeger, The Reductive Explanation of Boiling Water in Levine's Explanatory Gap Argument.
    This paper examines a paradigm case of allegedly successful reductive explanation, viz. the explanation of the fact that water boils at 100°C based on facts about H2O. The case figures prominently in Joseph Levine’s explanatory gap argument against physicalism. The paper studies the way the argument evolved in the writings of Levine, focusing especially on the question how the reductive explanation of boiling water figures in the argument. It will turn out that there are two versions of the (...) gap argument to be found in Levine’s writings. The earlier version relies heavily on conceptual analysis and construes reductive explanation as a process of deduction. The later version makes do without conceptual analysis and understands reductive explanations as based on theoretic reductions that are justified by explanatory power. Along the way will be shown that the bridge principles — which are being neglected in the explanatory gap literature — play a crucial role in the explanatory gap argument. (shrink)
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  3. Uriah Kriegel (2011). Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap. In J. Liu & J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge University Press
    According to the self-representational theory of consciousness – self- representationalism for short – a mental state is phenomenally conscious when, and only when, it represents itself in the right way. In this paper, I consider how self- representationalism might address the alleged explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and physical properties. I open with a presentation of self- representationalism and the case for it (§1). I then present what I take to be the most promising self-representational approach to the (...) gap (§2). That approach is threatened, however, by an objection to self-representationalism, due to Levine, which I call the just more representation objection (§3). I close with a discussion of how the self-representationalist might approach the objection (§4). (shrink)
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  4.  38
    Liam P. Dempsey (2013). The Side Left Untouched: Panpsychism, Embodiment, and the Explanatory Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):3-4.
    This paper considers Galen Strawson's recent defence of panpsychism. Strawson's account has a number of attractive features: it proffers an unflappable commitment to the reality of conscious experience, adduces a relatively novel and constructive appeal to the explanatory gap, and presents a picture which is in certain respects consistent with Herbert Feigl's version of mind-brain identity theory, what I call twofold-access theory. Strawson is right that the experiential and physical are not irreconcilable, for at least some physical phenomena have (...)
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  5. Neil Campbell (2009). Why We Should Lower Our Expectations About the Explanatory Gap. Theoria 75 (1):34-51.
    I argue that the explanatory gap is generated by factors consistent with the view that qualia are physical properties. I begin by considering the most plausible current approach to this issue based on recent work by Valerie Hardcastle and Clyde Hardin. Although their account of the source of the explanatory gap and our potential to close it is attractive, I argue that it is too speculative and philosophically problematic. I then argue that the explanatory gap should not (...)
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  6. Hagit Benbaji (2008). Constitution and the Explanatory Gap. Synthese 161 (2):183-202.
    Proponents of the explanatory gap claim that consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account of how a physical thing could be identical to a phenomenal one. We fully understand the identity between water and H2O but the identity between pain and the firing of C-fibers is inconceivable. Mark Johnston [Journal of philosophy , 564–583] suggests that if water is constituted by H2O, not identical to it, then the explanatory gap becomes a pseudo-problem. This is (...)
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  7.  35
    Neil Mehta (2013). How to Explain the Explanatory Gap. Dialectica 67 (2):117-135.
    I construct a tempting anti-physicalist argument, which sharpens an explanatory gap argument suggested by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson. The argument relies crucially on the premise that there is a deep epistemic asymmetry (which may be identified with the explanatory gap) between phenomenal truths and ordinary macroscopic truths. Many physicalists reject the argument by rejecting this premise. I argue that even if this premise is true, the anti-physicalist conclusion should be rejected, and I provide a detailed, physicalist-friendly explanation (...)
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  8. Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999). Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.
    The explanatory gap . Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states. Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain, say activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6,as Crick and Koch have suggested for visual consciousness. (...)
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  9. Tom McClelland (2011). Consciousness, Ignorance and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Writings:45-57.
     
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  10. M. Scheele (2002). Never Mind the Gap: The Explanatory Gap as an Artifact of Naive Philosophical Argument. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):333-342.
    It is argued that the explanatory gap argument, according to which it is fundamentally impossible to explain qualitative mental states in a physicalist theory of mind, is unsound. The main argument in favour of the explanatory gap is presented, which argues that an identity statement of mind and brain has no explanatory force, in contrast to "normal" scientific identity statements. Then it is shown that "normal" scientific identity statements also do not conform to the demands set by (...)
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  11.  37
    Brian Loar (1999). Should the Explanatory Gap Perplex Us? In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy Documentation Center 99-104.
    In what follows, I argue that the disturbing effect of the explanatory gap arises from an illusion, an implicit expectation that all “direct grasps of the essence” of a property are achieved by a homogeneous concept-forming faculty. But there is no such faculty. The truth is that our concepts form a mixed bag, drawing on experiential states, verbal conceptions, theoretical conceptual roles, and other concept-making factors. It should not be too surprising then if some pairs of concepts, even when (...)
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  12. David J. Chalmers (2007). Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press
    Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, there are many possible reactions. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an explanatory gap for now, but that it will eventually be closed. Some hold that the explanatory gap corresponds to an ontological gap in nature.
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  13. Michael Tye (1999). Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion. Mind 108 (432):705-25.
    The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts.
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  14.  41
    Elanor Taylor (2016). Explanation and the Explanatory Gap. Acta Analytica 31 (1):77-88.
    “The Explanatory Gap” is a label for the idea that we cannot explain consciousness in terms of brain activity. There are many different formulations of the explanatory gap, but all discussion about it assumes that there is only one gap, which consists of the absence of a deductive explanation. This assumption is mistaken. In this paper, I show that the position that deductive explanation is privileged in this case is unmotivated. I argue that whether or not there is (...)
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  15. Brie Gertler (2001). The Explanatory Gap is Not an Illusion: A Reply to Michael Tye. Mind 110 (439):689-694.
    The claim that there is an explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal properties is perhaps the leading current challenge to materialist views about the mind. Tye tries to block this challenge, not by providing an explanation to bridge the gap but by denying that phenomenalphysical identities introduce an explanatory gap. Since an explanatory gap exists only if there is something unexplained that needs explaining, and something needs explaining only if it can be explained , there is no (...)
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  16. Brian Fiala, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols (2011). On the Psychological Origins of Dualism: Dual-Process Cognition and the Explanatory Gap. In Edward Slingerland & Mark Collard (eds.), Creating Consilience: Issues and Case Studies in teh Integration of the Sciences and Humanities. OUP
    Consciousness often presents itself as a problem for materialists because no matter which physical explanation we consider, there seems to remain something about conscious experience that hasn't been fully explained. This gives rise to an apparent explanatory gap. The explanatory gulf between the physical and the conscious is reflected in the broader population, in which dualistic intuitions abound. Drawing on recent empirical evidence, this essay presents a dual-process cognitive model of consciousness attribution. This dual-process model, we suggest, (...)
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  17. Tim Crane (2010). Cosmic Hermeneutics Vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. OUP Oxford
    This paper is a defence of Terence Horgan’s claim that any genuinely physicalist position must distinguish itself from emergentism. I argue that physicalism is necessarily reductive in character -- it must either give a reductive account of apparently non-physical entities, or a reductive explanation of why there are non-physical entities. I argue that many recent ‘nonreductive’ physicalists do not do this, and that because of this they cannot adequately distinguish their view from emergentism. The conclusion is that this is the (...)
     
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  18. Julie Yoo, The Other Explanatory Gap.
    One of the driving questions in philosophy of mind is whether a person can be understood in purely physical terms. In this presentation, I wish to continue the project initiated by Donald Davidson, whose subtle position on this question has left many more perplexed than enlightened. The main reason for this perplexity is Davidson’s rather obscure pronouncements about the normativity of intentionality and its role in supporting psychophysical anomalism – the claim that there are no laws bridging our intentional states (...)
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  19.  99
    J. M. Musacchio (2002). Dissolving the Explanatory Gap: Neurobiological Differences Between Phenomenal and Propositional Knowledge. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 3 (3):331-365.
    The explanatory gap and theknowledge argument are rooted in the conflationof propositional and phenomenal knowledge. Thebasic knowledge argument is based on theconsideration that ``physical information'' aboutthe nervous system is unable to provide theknowledge of a ``color experience'' . The implication is that physicalism isincomplete or false because it leaves somethingunexplained. The problem with Jackson'sargument is that physical information has theform of highly symbolic propositional knowledgewhereas phenomenal knowledge consists in innateneurophysiological processes. In addition totheir fundamental epistemological differences,clinical, anatomical, pathological and (...)
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  20.  39
    Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (1998). Three Paradoxes of Phenomenal Consciousness: Bridging the Explanatory Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (4):419-42.
    Any physical explanation of consciousness seems to leave unresolved the ‘explanatory gap': Isn't it conceivable that all the elements in that explanation could occur, with the same information processing outcomes as in a conscious process, but in the absence of consciousness? E.g. any digital computational process could occur in the absence of consciousness. To resolve this dilemma, we propose a biological-process-oriented physiological- phenomenological characterization of consciousness that addresses three ‘paradoxical’ qualities seemingly incompatible with the empirical realm: The dual location (...)
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  21.  51
    W. R. Webster (2002). A Case of Mind/Brain Identity: One Small Bridge for the Explanatory Gap. Synthese 131 (2):275-287.
    Based on the technique of pressure blinding of the eye, two types of after-image were identified. A physicalist or mind/brain identity explanation was established for a negative a AI produced by moderately intense stimuli. These AI's were shown to be located in the neurons of the retina. An illusory AI of double a grating's spatial frequency was also produced in the same structure and was both prevented from being established and abolished after establishment by pressure blinding, thus showing that the (...)
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  22.  35
    John G. Taylor (1998). Cortical Activity and the Explanatory Gap. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):109-48.
    An exploration is given of neural network features now being uncovered in cortical processing which begins to go a little way to help bridge the ''Explanatory Gap'' between phenomenal consciousness and correlated brain activity. A survey of properties suggested as being possessed by phenomenal consciousness leads to a set of criteria to be required of the correlated neural activity. Various neural styles of processing are reviewed and those fitting the criteria are selected for further analysis. One particular processing style, (...)
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  23.  84
    Donald F. Gustafson (1998). Pain, Qualia, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.
    This paper investigates the status of the purported explanatory gap between pain phenomena and natural science, when the “gap” is thought to exist due to the special properties of experience designated by “ qualia ” or “the pain quale” in the case of pain experiences. The paper questions the existence of such a property in the case of pain by: looking at the history of the conception of pain; raising questions from empirical research and theory in the psychology of (...)
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  24.  72
    Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (2000). Words as Deeds: Wittgenstein's ''Spontaneous Utterances'' and the Dissolution of the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):355 – 372.
    Wittgenstein demystified the notion of 'observational self-knowledge'. He dislodged the long-standing conception that we have privileged access to our impressions, sensations and feelings through introspection, and more precisely eliminated knowing as the kind of awareness that normally characterizes our first-person present-tense psychological statements. He was not thereby questioning our awareness of our emotions or sensations, but debunking the notion that we come to that awareness via any epistemic route. This makes the spontaneous linguistic articulation of our sensations and impressions nondescriptive. (...)
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  25.  20
    Thomas W. Clark (1995). Function and Phenomenology: Closing the Explanatory Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):241-54.
    This paper critiques the view that consciousness is likely something extra which accompanies or is produced by neural states, something beyond the functional cognitive processes realized in the brain. Such a view creates the `explanatory gap'between function and nomenology which many suppose cannot be filled by functionalist theories of mind. Given methodological considerations of simplicity, ontological parsimony, and theoretical conservatism, an alternative hypothesis is recommended, that subjective qualitative experience is identical to certain information-bearing, behaviour-controlling functions, not something which (...)
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  26.  56
    Leon de Bruin & Albert Newen (2011). Consciousness, Reductionism and the Explanatory Gap: Investigations in Honor of Rudolf Carnap. Philosophia 39 (1):1-3.
    Consciousness, Reductionism and the Explanatory Gap: Investigations in Honor of Rudolf Carnap Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s11406-010-9272-7 Authors Leon de Bruin, Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany Albert Newen, Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany Journal Philosophia Online ISSN 1574-9274 Print ISSN 0048-3893 Journal Volume Volume 39 Journal Issue Volume 39, Number 1.
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  27.  10
    Nathaniel F. Barrett (2010). The Perspectivity of Feeling: Process Panpsychism and the Explanatory Gap. Chromatikon: Annales de la Philosophie En Procès / Yearbook of Philosophy in Process 6 (2):63-77.
    For mainstream analytic philosophy of mind, the explanatory gap between first- and third-person accounts of consciousness derives from the inaccessibilityof special, “experiential” properties of conscious minds. Within this framework, panpsychism is simply the claim that these special properties are everywhere. In contrast, process panpsychism understands the explanatory gap in terms of the particularity of feeling. While the particularity of feeling cannot be captured by third-person accounts, for this very reason it is amenable to understanding consciousness as an evolutionary (...)
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  28.  16
    Itay Shani & Sungho Choi (2013). Type‐Identity Statements and the Explanatory Gap: An Argument for Compatibility. Dialectica 67 (4):485-502.
    This paper challenges a popular thesis which we call the explanatory primitiveness thesis (for short, EPT), namely, the thesis that identities leave no logical space wherein explanatory questions may be formulated and explanatory gaps may reside. We argue that while EPT is, in all likelihood, flawless when the relevant domain consists of identity statements flanked by proper names of individuals it is a mistake to hold that the thesis generalizes to cover all identity statements. In particular, we (...)
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  29.  27
    Brian Loar (1999). Should the Explanatory Gap Perplex Us? The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:99-104.
    In what follows, I argue that the disturbing effect of the explanatory gap arises from an illusion, an implicit expectation that all “direct grasps of the essence” of a property are achieved by a homogeneous concept-forming faculty. But there is no such faculty. The truth is that our concepts form a mixed bag, drawing on experiential states, verbal conceptions, theoretical conceptual roles, and other concept-making factors. It should not be too surprising then if some pairs of concepts, even when (...)
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  30.  48
    Neil Campbell Manson (2002). Consciousness-Dependence and the Explanatory Gap. Inquiry 45 (4):521-540.
    Contrary to certain rumours, the mind-body problem is alive and well. So argues Joseph Levine in Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness . The main argument is simple enough. Considerations of causal efficacy require us to accept that subjective experiential, or 'phenomenal', properties are realized in basic non-mental, probably physical properties. But no amount of knowledge of those physical properties will allow us conclusively to deduce facts about the existence and nature of phenomenal properties. This failure of deducibility constitutes an (...)
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  31.  37
    W. R. Webster (2003). Revelation and Transparency in Colour Vision Refuted: A Case of Mind/Brain Identity and Another Bridge Over the Explanatory Gap. Synthese 133 (3):419-39.
    Russell and others have argued that the real nature of colour is transparentto us in colour vision. It's nature is fully revealed to us and no further knowledgeis theoretically possible. This is the doctrine of revelation. Two-dimensionalFourier analyses of coloured checkerboards have shown that apparently simple,monadic, colours can be based on quite different physical mechanisms. Experimentswith the McCollough effect on different types of checkerboards have shown thatidentical colours can have energy at the quite different orientations of Fourierharmonic components but no (...)
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  32.  16
    Massimiliano Vignolo (2012). Referential/Attributive: The Explanatory Gap of the Contextualist Theory. Dialectica 66 (4):621-633.
    I argue that the contextualist account of the referential/attributive interpretation of definite descriptions, presented by Recanati and Bezuidehnout and based on the idea that definite descriptions are semantically underdetermined and in need of completion through optional top-down pragmatic processes, suffers from an explanatory gap. I defend the contextualist view but hold that the determination of the content of definite descriptions is a mandatory, linguistically driven process based on saturation rather than on optional pragmatic processes.
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  33.  20
    Klaus Oberauer (2001). The Explanatory Gap is Still There. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):996-997.
    I argue that O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) theory is in a no better position than any other theory to solve the “hard problem” of consciousness. Getting rid of the explanatory gap by exchanging sensorimotor contingencies for neural representations is an illusion.
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  34.  10
    A. H. C. van der Heijden, P. T. W. Hudson & A. G. Kurvink (1997). On Widening the Explanatory Gap. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):157-158.
    The explanatory gap refers to the lack of concepts for understanding “how it is that . . . a state of consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue.” By assuming that there are colours in the outside world, Block needlessly widens this gap and Lycan and Kitcher simply fail to see the gap. When such assumptions are abandoned, an unnecessary and incomprehensible constraint disappears. It then becomes clear that the brain can use its own neural language (...)
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  35.  1
    Sean Green (2013). Bridges Over Sand The Bridge Metaphor and Conceptualizing the Explanatory Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2):1-2.
    Attempts to explain consciousness often challenge our intuitions by metaphorically bridging an 'explanatory gap' between objective reality and subjective experience. The intuitive appeal of these arguments -- such as Jackson's knowledge argument and Dennett's zimbo argument -- may depend partly on elements that do not necessarily relate to the explanatory gap. Like a bridge across sand in a dry garden, an argument may carry symbolic weight even if it does not connect one shore to another. To ensure that (...)
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  36. Joseph Levine (1983). Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
  37.  7
    M. Beaton (2016). Crossing the Explanatory Gap by Legwork, Not by Fiat. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):364-366.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: I strongly agree with Kirchhoff and Hutto that consciousness and embodied action are one and the same, but I disagree when they say this identity cannot be fully explained and must simply be posited. Here I attempt to sketch the outlines of just such an explanation.
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  38.  86
    Drozdstoj Stoyanov, Peter Machamer & Kenneth F. Schaffner (2013). In Quest for Scientific Psychiatry: Toward Bridging the Explanatory Gap. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (3):261-273.
    The contemporary epistemic status of mental health disciplines does not allow the cross validation of mental disorders among various genetic markers, biochemical pathway or mechanisms, and clinical assessments in neuroscience explanations. We attempt to provide a meta-empirical analysis of the contemporary status of the cross-disciplinary issues existing between neuro-biology and psychopathology. Our case studies take as an established medical mode an example cross validation between biological sciences and clinical cardiology in the case of myocardial infarction. This is then contrasted with (...)
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  39. Peter Carruthers (2004). Reductive Explanation and the "Explanatory Gap". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):153-174.
    Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Exponents of an.
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  40. Cynthia Macdonald (2004). Mary Meets Molyneux: The Explanatory Gap and the Individuation of Phenomenal Concepts. Noûs 38 (3):503-24.
    It is widely accepted that physicalism faces its most serious challenge when it comes to making room for the phenomenal character of psychological experience, its so-called what-it-is-like aspect. The challenge has surfaced repeatedly over the past two decades in a variety of forms. In a particularly striking one, Frank Jackson considers a situation in which Mary, a brilliant scientist who knows all the physical facts there are to know about psychological experience, has spent the whole of her life in (...)
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  41. Peter Carruthers & Elizabeth Schechter (2006). Can Panpsychism Bridge the Explanatory Gap? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):32-39.
  42. François-Igor PRIS, The Explanatory Gap Problem and Wittgenstein's Normative Naturalism (in French).
  43. C. L. Hardin (1987). Qualia and Materialism: Closing the Explanatory Gap. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):281-98.
  44. Gilbert Harman, Explaining an Explanatory Gap.
    Discussions of the mind-body problem often refer to an.
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  45.  52
    François-Igor Pris (2015). About the Explanatory Gap Problem in the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy and Culture (Russian Journal) (3):421-429.
  46. Ansgar Beckermann (2000). The Perennial Problem of the Reductive Explainability of Phenomenal Consciousness: C. D. Broad on the Explanatory Gap. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press
    At the start of the 20th century the question of whether life could be explained in purely me- chanical terms was as hotly debated as the mind-body problem is today. Two factions opposed each other: Biological mechanists claimed that the properties characteristic of living organisms could be ex- plained mechanistically, in the way the behavior of a clock can be explained by the properties and the arrangement of its cogs, springs, and weights. Substantial vitalists, on the other hand, maintained that (...)
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  47.  60
    Ram Neta (2004). Skepticism, Abductivism, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Perspectives 14 (1):296-325.
  48.  56
    Antoine Lutz (2004). Introduction—the Explanatory Gap: To Close or to Bridge? [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):325-330.
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  49.  90
    Michael Silberstein (2002). Reductive Physicalism and the Explanatory Gap: A Dilemma. In Peter K. Machamer & Michael Silberstein (eds.), Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Blackwell
  50.  84
    Alex Byrne, Tye on Color and the Explanatory Gap.
    It will not have escaped notice that the defendant in this afternoon.
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