This comment on Brian Langille's article agrees with Langille's claim that inter-state competition should not be viewed as the main challenge to the global efforts to regulate labor rights. The comment suggests, however, that there is another type of competition that poses a challenge, namely a transnational competition which takes place among sub-state actors. Focusing on this "transnational conflict paradigm," the ILO has the tools to engage domestic constituencies in an effort to promote labor rights within the respective member states.

This Article examines the authority of states to settle individual private property claims in post–conflict negotiations towards settlement. We analyze this question by exploring the limits of states’ authority to take or limit private property rights for the public good. We argue that this authority rests on two cumulative justifications: the inclusion of the property owners among the public that stands to benefit from the public good, and their representation by the government that decides on the taking of the property. (...) In post–conflict settlement, the negotiating states may redistribute both private property and the public good between and within their respective communities. Their authority to redistribute continues to rests on the same justifications of inclusion and representation. Hence, their authority extends only to the redistribution of property of owners who are members of the respective communities that negotiate the agreement, and who are represented by a negotiating government. (shrink)

In 1992, Israel underwent a major constitutional reform, which provided Israel, for the first time in its history, with an effective system of separation of powers between the political branches of government. This reform was not intentional but, rather, a byproduct of the voluntary adoption by the two major political parties of open primaries as the method for choosing candidates on their lists for election to parliament. The adoption of the primaries system produced two major changes in the Israeli constitutional (...) and political order. First, it transformed the Knesset into an independent body and, hence, for the first time in Israel’s history, provided for a functioning system of checks and balances between the legislature and the executive. Second, it shifted power from the Jewish religious minority to the secular majority and even contributed to the increase in the relative power of the Arab parties. On a more general level, the Article demonstrates the impact different modalities of pre-selection of party candidates can have not only on the outcome of the elections and on the relative power relations among the parties, but, more importantly, on the structure and the functioning of the political system. Once proven, this impact requires public attention: legislative regulation of the pre-selection process may be required, indeed even constitutionally mandated, to ensure political checks and balances. (shrink)

The debate whether property is a limit on or the product of sovereignty envisages a tension between “the individual owner” and “the state.” But “the state” is not more than the aggregate of individuals who define theirs and others’ property rights through the state’s political process. The underlying tension between property and sovereignty is thus the tension between the economic market and the political market. Owners and others compete simultaneously at both levels to define, protect or improve the value of (...) property. There are two ways to compete in the political marketplace: by engaging in either “high visibility politics” or “low visibility politics.” Diffuse owners rely on high visibility politics promoted by agents such as political parties or trade unions and on elections, referenda and the like, whereas smaller groups of owners prefer the low politics of capturing lawmakers and state executives. When economic markets became global at the end of the Cold War, so did the political markets: property rights increasingly became defined by international agreements, by decisions of international organizations, and by the exercise of “low politics” in foreign, weaker states. The global political markets were dominated by the executive branches of a handful of relatively strong states that, in turn, were responsive to the “low politics” of special interests. The high transaction costs of cooperation among diffuse owners inhibited the parallel rise of “high politics” at the global level. The skewed global political market for property continues to favor special interests, but there are budding attempts to reclaim the space for “high politics” by national regulators and courts. Current negotiations over the so-called “Mega Regional” agreements between the United States and its trading partners will, if successful, nip these buds as they render certain property rights almost immune to the subsequent challenges of high politics. (shrink)

In 1861 John Stuart Mill published Considerations on Representative Government to discuss the justifications for democracy. In the third chapter of this book he explores why a government run by a Good Despot is unacceptable. In this Article we revisit Mill’s critique of the Good Despot to problematize the contemporary exercise of authority and influence by multinational companies, especially in foreign countries. Inspired by Mill, we redefine the problem of privatization. The challenges of privatization are mostly defined by essentialist concerns (...) or a consequentialist critique of the problematic outcomes of privatization. In this Article we shift the attention to the democracy losses associated with the privatized decision-making process. We identify the growing influence of private, particularly foreign, actors as a democratic problem of exclusion of persons from decision-making processes on issues with constitutive influence on their lives, and explore the different aspects of what we regard as an acute problem of democratic deficit. The redefining of the problem as one of process and democratic deficit allows us toconclude with a critical assessment of the potentials and limitations of contemporary attempts to solve it. (shrink)

Lawmakers regularly delegate authority to agents. Such delegation is accompanied by mechanisms that attempt to ensure that the agents adhere to the will of the lawmakers. But these mechanisms are often ineffective or inefficient. Moreover, at times the very imposition of constraints distorts the agents’ incentives and impels them to adopt skewed policies. We suggest that it is possible to reduce such wasteful enforcement costs by delegating authority to certain types of agents who will pursue the lawmaker’s policies without constraints (...) imposed by the lawmaker. In this Article we focus on agents who are impartial — but not indifferent! — and skillful enough to identify the proper course of action. The Article encompasses two main arguments. The normative argument is that when skillful and impartial agents can be identified, it makes sense to delegate to them decision-making powers with only limited constraints. Moreover, in such instances it may be more cost-effective to provide agents with incentives to act impartially rather than develop enforcement mechanisms to impose impartiality. The positive argument is that the law — sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly — is compatible with our normative argument in various fields. Although our argument is general in scope and applies to many areas of law, in this Article we begin by focusing on tort law and on international law. We distinguish five categories of cases where the law relies on agents and detect in some of them impartial and skillful agents. This analysis demonstrates that, in some of these categories, the law in fact relies on agents with only minimal constraints and that, in other situations, the constraints imposed by the law are counterproductive. Our normative argument thus serves an explanatory role in understanding many legal doctrines and principles, but, at the same time, offers a critical view on other doctrines and principles, which are not compatible with that argument. (shrink)