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Profile: Ezequiel Di Paolo (University of Sussex)
  1. Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (2014). The Worldly Constituents of Perceptual Presence. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  2. Thomas Buhrmann, Ezequiel Alejandro Di Paolo & Xabier Barandiaran (2013). A Dynamical Systems Account of Sensorimotor Contingencies. Frontiers in Psychology 4.
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  3. Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Hanne De Jaegher & Shaun Gallagher (2013). One Step Forward, Two Steps Back – Not the Tango: Comment on Gallotti and Frith. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (7):303-304.
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  4. Miriam Kyselo & Ezequiel Di Paolo (2013). Locked-in Syndrome: A Challenge for Embodied Cognitive Science. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-26.
    Embodied approaches in cognitive science hold that the body is crucial for cognition. What this claim amounts to, however, still remains unclear. This paper contributes to its clarification by confronting three ways of understanding embodiment—the sensorimotor approach, extended cognition and enactivism—with Locked-in syndrome (LIS). LIS is a case of severe global paralysis in which patients are unable to move and yet largely remain cognitively intact. We propose that LIS poses a challenge to embodied approaches to cognition requiring them to make (...)
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  5. Manuel G. Bedia & Ezequiel Di Paolo (2012). Unreliable Gut Feelings Can Lead to Correct Decisions: The Somatic Marker Hypothesis in Non-Linear Decision Chains. Frontiers in Psychology 3.
    Dual system approaches of decision making examine the interaction between affective/intuitive and deliberative processes underlying value judgment. Decisions are arise from a combination of relatively explicit capabilities for abstract reasoning and relatively implicit evolved domain-general as well as learned domain-specific affective responses. One such approach, the somatic markers hypothesis (SMH), expresses these processes as a system of evolved primary emotions supplemented by associations between affect and experience that accrue over lifetime, or somatic markers (SMs). In this view, SMs are useful (...)
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  6. Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo (2012). Enactivism is Not Interactionism. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.
  7. Ezequiel Di Paolo & Hanne De Jaegher (2012). The Interactive Brain Hypothesis. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.
    Enactive approaches foreground the role of interpersonal interaction in explanations of social understanding. This motivates, in combination with a recent interest in neuroscientific studies involving actual interactions, the question of how interactive processes relate to neural mechanisms involved in social understanding. We introduce the Interactive Brain Hypothesis (IBH) in order to help map the spectrum of possible relations between social interaction and neural processes. The hypothesis states that interactive experience and skills play enabling roles in both the development and current (...)
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  8. Tom Froese & Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (2011). The Enactive Approach: Theoretical Sketches From Cell to Society. Pragmatics and Cognition 19 (1):1-36.
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  9. Hanne de Jaegher, Ezequiel di Paolo & Shaun Gallagher (2010). Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (10):441-447.
    An important shift is taking place in social cognition research, away from a focus on the individual mind and toward embodied and participatory aspects of social understanding. Empirical results already imply that social cognition is not reducible to the workings of individual cognitive mechanisms. To galvanize this interactive turn, we provide an operational definition of social interaction and distinguish the different explanatory roles – contextual, enabling and constitutive – it can play in social cognition. We show that interactive processes are (...)
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  10. Philip Husbands, Andrew Philippides, Patricia Vargas, Christopher L. Buckley, Peter Fine, Ezequiel Di Paolo & Michael O'Shea (2010). Spatial, Temporal, and Modulatory Factors Affecting GasNet Evolvability in a Visually Guided Robotics Task. Complexity 16 (2):35-44.
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  11. John Stewart, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo & Olivier Gapenne (eds.) (2010). Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. A Bradford Book.
     
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  12. Ezequiel Di Paolo (2009). Extended Life. Topoi 28 (1):9-21.
    This paper reformulates some of the questions raised by extended mind theorists from an enactive, life/mind continuity perspective. Because of its reliance on concepts such as autopoiesis, the enactive approach has been deemed internalist and thus incompatible with the extended mind hypothesis. This paper answers this criticism by showing (1) that the relation between organism and cogniser is not one of co-extension, (2) that cognition is a relational phenomenon and thereby has no location, and (3) that the individuality of a (...)
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  13. Ezequiel Di Paolo (2009). Editorial: The Social and Enactive Mind. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):409-415.
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  14. Tom Froese & Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (2009). Sociality and the Life–Mind Continuity Thesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):439-463.
    The life–mind continuity thesis holds that mind is prefigured in life and that mind belongs to life. The biggest challenge faced by proponents of this thesis is to show how an explanatory framework that accounts for basic biological processes can be systematically extended to incorporate the highest reaches of human cognition. We suggest that this apparent ‘cognitive gap’ between minimal and human forms of life appears insurmountable largely because of the methodological individualism that is prevalent in cognitive science. Accordingly, a (...)
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  15. Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (2008). A Mind of Many. Constructivist Foundations 3 (2):89-91.
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  16. Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo (2007). Participatory Sense-Making. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):485-507.
    As yet, there is no enactive account of social cognition. This paper extends the enactive concept of sense-making into the social domain. It takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter. It is a well-established finding that individuals can and generally do coordinate their movements and utterances in such situations. We argue that the interaction process can take on a form of autonomy. This allows us to reframe the problem of social cognition as (...)
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  17. Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (2005). Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):429-452.
    A proposal for the biological grounding of intrinsic teleology and sense-making through the theory of autopoiesis is critically evaluated. Autopoiesis provides a systemic language for speaking about intrinsic teleology but its original formulation needs to be elaborated further in order to explain sense-making. This is done by introducing adaptivity, a many-layered property that allows organisms to regulate themselves with respect to their conditions of viability. Adaptivity leads to more articulated concepts of behaviour, agency, sense-construction, health, and temporality than those given (...)
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  18. Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (2005). The Phenomenon of Life” by Hans Jonas. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 36 (3).
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