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  1. F. John Clendinnen (2010). Note on Howard Sankey's "Induction and Natural Kinds". Principia 2 (1):125-134.
    Note on Howard Sankey's "Induction and Natural Kinds".
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  2. F. John Clendinnen (1999). Causal Dependence and Laws. In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer. 187--213.
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  3. F. John Clendinnen (1998). Note on Howard Sankey's. Principia 2 (1).
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  4. F. John Clendinnen (1996). Theorizing and Empirical Belief. In P. Riggs (ed.), Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 63--92.
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  5. F. John Clendinnen (1992). Nomic Dependence and Causation. Philosophy of Science 59 (3):341-360.
    The paper proposes an explication of causation in terms of laws and their explanatory systematization. A basic notion is "nomic dependence". The definition given by David Lewis is suitable for deterministic laws, and a general definition drawing on Wesley Salmon's statistical-relevance model of explanation is proposed. A test is offered for establishing that one chain of nomically dependent events is more direct than another that ends with the same event by considering the relationship between the two chains when an explanation (...)
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  6. F. John Clendinnen (1989). Realism and the Underdetermination of Theory. Synthese 81 (1):63 - 90.
    The main theme is that theorizing serves empirical prediction. This is used as the core of a counter to contemporary anti-realist arguments. Different versions of the thesis that data underdetermines theory are identified and it is shown that none which are acceptable differentiates between theory selection and prediction. Criteria sufficient for the former are included amongst those necessary for the latter; and obviously go beyond mere compatibility with data.Special attention is given to causal process theories. It is argued that the (...)
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  7. F. John Clendinnen (1986). Instrumental Evaluation in Scientific Knowledge. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:219 - 226.
    The normative nature of scientific rationality is sometimes accounted for by the thesis that having theories which meet the criteria we apply is valuable to us in itself rather than as a means to an end. But given the experiential input to our beliefs and their practical role, it is apparent that we must evaluate the criteria to be used as rational means of pursuing predictive success. So we must seek a practical justification, in spite of the threat of circularity. (...)
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  8. F. John Clendinnen (1986). Induction, Indifference and Guessing. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (3):340 – 344.
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  9. F. John Clendinnen (1983). The Rationality of Method Verssus Historical Relativism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 14 (1):23-38.
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  10. F. John Clendinnen (1982). Review. [REVIEW] Synthese 51 (2):283-291.
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  11. F. John Clendinnen (1977). Inference, Practice and Theory. Synthese 34 (1):89 - 132.
    Reichenbach held that all scientific inference reduces, via probability calculus, to induction, and he held that induction can be justified. He sees scientific knowledge in a practical context and insists that any rational assessment of actions requires a justification of induction. Gaps remain in his justifying argument; for we can not hope to prove that induction will succeed if success is possible. However, there are good prospects for completing a justification of essentially the kind he sought by showing that while (...)
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  12. F. John Clendinnen (1970). A Response to Jackson. Philosophy of Science 37 (3):444-448.
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  13. F. John Clendinnen (1966). Induction and Objectivity. Philosophy of Science 33 (3):215-229.
    This paper is an attempt at a vindication of induction. The point of departure is that induction requires a justification and that the only kind of justification possible is a vindication. However traditional vindications of induction have rested on unjustified assumptions about the aim of induction. This vindication takes the end pursued in induction simply to be correct prediction. It is argued that induction is the only reasonable way of pursuing this end because induction is the only objective method of (...)
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  14. F. John Clendinnen (1965). Katz on the Vindication of Induction. Philosophy of Science 32 (3/4):370-376.
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