Search results for 'F. O. X. M' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. A. E. Taylor (1931). Opera Hactenus Inedita Rogeri Baconi. Fasc. X. Questiones Supra Libros Prima Philosophae Aristotelis (Metaphysica I, II, VX). Nunc Primum Edidit Robert Steele, Collaborante Ferdinand M. Delorme, O.F.M. (Oxford: Clarendon Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1930. Pp. Xxxii, 360. Price 28s. Net.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 6 (21):123-.score: 960.0
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  2. Alphonse-Marie Parent (1971). E. Schillebeeckx, La Présence du Christ Dans L'Eucharistie, Traduit du Néerlandais Par M. Benzerath. Collection Avenir de la Théologie, Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1970 (13.5 X 16 Cm), 152 Pages, 14 F. Colman O'Neill, Nouvelles Approches de L'Eucharistie, Traduit de L'Américain Par Soeur Marie-Bemard Saïd, o.s.B. Collection Théologie Et Vie, Gembloux, Éditions J. Duculot, 1970 (12.5 X 18.5 Cm), 128 Pages, 120 FB. [REVIEW] Laval Théologique et Philosophique 27 (1):99.score: 960.0
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  3. Louis Arnaud Reid (1934). Beauty and Other Forms of Value. By S. Alexander O.M., Litt.D., F.B.A., Hon. LL.D., D.Litt., Litt.D., (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1933. Pp. X + 305. Price 10s. 6d. Net.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 9 (34):220-.score: 960.0
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  4. Gedeon Gál (1987). John Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Selected and Trans. Allan B. Wolter O.F.M. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1986. Pp. X, 543. $54.95. [REVIEW] Speculum 62 (3):766-767.score: 960.0
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  5. Paul-Emile Langevin (1970). L.-M. Dewailly, O.P., Jésus-Christ, Parole de Dieu, 2 Édition Refondue, Paris, Éd. du Cerf, 1969, (13.5 X 19.5 Cm), 200 Pages, 18 F. [REVIEW] Laval Théologique et Philosophique 26 (2):198.score: 960.0
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  6. Paul-Émile Langevin (1972). Lexique Saint Bonaventure, Publié Sous la Direction de Jacques-Guy Bougerol, O.F.M., Paris, Éditions Franciscaines, 1969 (19 X 24 Cm), 144 Pages, 20 Francs. [REVIEW] Laval Théologique et Philosophique 28 (1):86.score: 960.0
  7. David Schweickart, Economic Democracy: A W o R T H y S o C I a L I S M That Would Really Work.score: 432.0
    w a y s h a v e b e e n . W e a l l r e m e m b e r M a (...) r x ' s p o l e m i c a g a i n s t P r o u d h o n , t h e Manifesto's critique of "historical action [yielding] to personal inventive action, historically created conditions of emancipation to fantastic ones, and the gradual spontaneous class organizations of the proletariat to an organization of society specially contrived by these inventors" (Marx and Engels, 1986, 64), and the numerous other occasions when the fathers of "scientific socialism" went a f t e r t h e " u t o p i a n s . " I n general this Marxian aversion to drawing up blueprints has been healthy, fueled at least in part by a respect for the concrete specificity of the revolutionary situation and for the agents engaged in revolutionary activity: it is not the business of Marxist intellectuals to tell the agents of revolution how they are to construct their postrevolutionary economy. (shrink)
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  8. W. F. S. M. (1999). Brian Davies O. P. (Ed.) Philosophy of Religion: a Guide to the Subject. (London: Cassell, 1998). Pp. X+400. £19.99 Pbk. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 35 (3):385-388.score: 288.0
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  9. F. O. X. M. & BENJAMIN MASON MEIER (2009). Health as Freedom: Addressing Social Determinants of Global Health Inequities Through the Human Right to Development. Bioethics 23 (2):112-122.score: 201.0
    In spite of vast global improvements in living standards, health, and well-being, the persistence of absolute poverty and its attendant maladies remains an unsettling fact of (...)life for billions around the world and constitutes the primary cause for the failure of developing states to improve the health of their peoples. While economic development in developing countries is necessary to provide for underlying determinants of healthmost prominently, poverty reduction and the building of comprehensive primary health systemsinequalities in power within the international economic order and the spread of neoliberal development policy limit the ability of developing states to develop economically and realize public goods for health. With neoliberal development policies impacting entire societies, the collective right to development, as compared with an individual rights-based approach to development, offers a framework by which to restructure this system to realize social determinants of health. The right to development, working through a vector of rights, can address social determinants of health, obligating states and the international community to support public health systems while reducing inequities in health through poverty-reducing economic growth. At an international level, where the ability of states to develop economically and to realize public goods through public health systems is constrained by international financial institutions, the implementation of the right to development enables a restructuring of international institutions and foreign-aid programs, allowing states to enter development debates with a right to cooperation from other states, not simply a cry for charity. (shrink)
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  10. Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Thephilosophyofautomatedtheoremproving.score: 201.0
    Different researchers use "the philosophy of automated theorem p r o v i n g " t o cover d i f f e r e n t (...) concepts, indeed, different levels of concepts. Some w o u l d count such issues as h o w to e f f i c i e n t l y i n d e x databases as part of the philosophy of automated theorem p r o v i n g . Others wonder about whether f o r m u l a s should be represented as strings or as trees or as lists, and call this part of the philosophy of automated theorem p r o v i n g . Yet others concern themselves w i t h what k i n d o f search should b e embodied i n a n y automated theorem prover, or to what degree any automated theorem prover should resemble Prolog. Still others debate whether natural deduction or semantic tableaux or resolution is " b e t t e r " , a n d c a l l t h i s a part of the p h i l o s o p h y of automated theorem p r o v i n g . Some people wonder whether automated theorem p r o v i n g should be " h u m a n oriented" or "machine o r i e n t e d " — sometimes arguing about whether the internal p r o o f methods should be " h u m a n - I i k e " or not, sometimes arguing about whether the generated proof should be output in a f o r m u n d e r s t a n d a b l e by p e o p l e , and sometimes a r g u i n g a b o u t the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f h u m a n intervention in the process of constructing a proof. There are also those w h o ask such questions as whether we s h o u l d even be concerned w i t h completeness or w i t h soundness of a system, or perhaps we should instead look at very efficient (but i n c o m p l e t e ) subsystems or look at methods of generating models w h i c h might nevertheless validate invalid arguments. A n d a l l of these have been v i e w e d as issues in the philosophy of automated theorem proving. Here, I w o u l d l i k e to step back from such i m p l e m e n t - ation issues and ask: " W h a t do we really think we are doing when we w r i t e an automated theorem prover?" My reflections are perhaps idiosyncratic, but I do think that they put the different researchers* efforts into a broader perspective, and give us some k i n d of handle on w h i c h directions we ourselves m i g h t w i s h to pursue when constructing (or extending) an automated theorem proving system. A logic is defined to be (i) a vocabulary and formation rules ( w h i c h tells us w h a t strings of symbols are w e l l - formed formulas in the logic), and ( i i ) a definition of ' p r o o f in that system ( w h i c h tells us the conditions under which an arrangement of formulas in the system constitutes a proof). Historically speaking, definitions of ' p r o o f have been given in various different manners: the most c o m m o n have been H i l b e r t - s t y l e ( a x i o m a t i c ) , Gentzen-style (consecution, or sequent), F i t c h - s t y l e (natural deduction), and Beth-style (tableaux).. (shrink)
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  11. Jesse B. Wright (1972). Characterization of Recursively Enumerable Sets. Journal of Symbolic Logic 37 (3):507-511.score: 198.0
    Let N, O and S denote the set of nonnegative integers, the graph of the constant 0 function and the graph of the successor function respectively. For (...)
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  12. Lev Gordeev & Andreas Weiermann (2012). Phase Transitions of Iterated Higman-Style Well-Partial-Orderings. Archive for Mathematical Logic 51 (1-2):127-161.score: 198.0
    We elaborate Weiermann-style phase transitions for well-partial-orderings (wpo) determined by iterated finite sequences under Higman-Friedman style embedding with Gordeevs symmetric gap condition. For every (...) d-times iterated wpo ${\left({\rm S}\text{\textsc{eq}}^{d}, \trianglelefteq _{d}\right)}$ in question, d > 1, we fix a natural extension of Peano Arithmetic, ${T \supseteq \sf{PA}}$ , that proves the corresponding second-order sentence ${\sf{WPO}\left({\rm S}{\textsc{eq}}^{d}, \trianglelefteq _{d}\right) }$ . Having this we consider the following parametrized first-order slow well-partial-ordering sentence ${\sf{SWP}\left({\rm S}\text{\textsc{eq}}^{d}, \trianglelefteq _{d}, r\right):}$ $$\left( \forall K > 0 \right) \left( \exists M > 0\right) \left( \forall x_{0},\ldots ,x_{M}\in {\rm S}\text{\textsc{eq}}^{d}\right)$$ $$\left( \left( \forall i\leq M\right) \left( \left| x_{i}\right| < K + r \left\lceil \log _{d} \left( i+1\right) \right\rceil \right)\rightarrow \left( \exists i < j \leq M \right) \left(x_{i} \trianglelefteq _{d} x_{j}\right) \right)$$ for a natural additive Seq d -norm |·| and r ranging over EFA-provably computable positive reals, where EFA is an abbreviation for 0 + exp. We show that the following basic phase transition clauses hold with respect to ${T = \Pi_{1}^{0}\sf{CA}_{ < \varphi ^{_{\left( d-1\right) }} \left(0\right) }}$ and the threshold point1. If r < 1 then ${\sf{SWP}\left({\rm S}\text{\textsc{eq}}^{d}, \trianglelefteq _{d},r \right) }$ is provable in T. If ${r > 1}$ then ${\sf{SWP}\left({\rm S}\text{\textsc{eq}}^{d}, \trianglelefteq _{d},r \right) }$ is not provable in T.Moreover, by the well-known proof theoretic equivalences we can just as well replace T by PA or ACA 0 and ${\Delta _{1}^{1}\sf{CA}}$ , if d = 2 and d = 3, respectively.In the limit case d → ∞ we replaceEFA-provably computable reals r by EFA-provably computable functions ${f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{+}}$ and prove analogous theorems. (In the sequel we denote by ${\mathbb{R}_{+}}$ the set of EFA-provably computable positive reals). In the basic case T = PA we strengthen the basic phase transition result by adding the following static threshold clause ${\sf{SWP}\left({\rm S}\text{\textsc{eq}}^{2}, \trianglelefteq _{2}, 1\right)}$ is still provable in T = PA (actually in EFA). Furthermore we prove the following dynamic threshold clauses which, loosely speaking are obtained by replacing the static threshold t by slowly growing functions 1 α given by ${1_{\alpha }\left( i\right)\,{:=}\,1+\frac{1}{H_{\alpha }^{-1}\left(i\right) }, H_{\alpha}}$ being the familiar fast growing Hardy function and ${H_{\alpha }^{-1}\left( i\right)\,{:=}\,\rm min \left\{ j \mid H_{\alpha } \left ( j\right) \geq i \right\}}$ the corresponding slowly growing inversion. If ${\alpha < \varepsilon _{0}}$ , then ${\sf{SWP}\left({\rm S}\text{\textsc{eq}}^{2}, \trianglelefteq _{2}, 1_{\alpha}\right)}$ is provable in T = PA. ${\sf{SWP}\left( {\rm S}\text{\textsc{eq}}^{2}, \trianglelefteq _{2},1_{\varepsilon _{0}}\right)}$ is not provable in T = PA. We conjecture that this pattern is characteristic for all ${T\supseteq \sf{PA}}$ under consideration and their proof-theoretical ordinals o (T ), instead of ${\varepsilon _{0}}$. (shrink)
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  13. David Keyt (1985). Distributive Justice in Aristotle's Ethics and Politics. Topoi 4 (1):23-45.score: 192.0
    The symbolism introduced earlier provides a convenient vehicle for examining the status and consistency of Aristotle's three diverse justifications and for explaining how he means to (...)avoid Protagorean relativism without embracing Platonic absolutism. When the variablesxandyare allowed to range over the groups of free men in a given polis as well as over individual free men, the formula for the Aristotelian conception of justice expresses the major premiss of Aristotle's three justifications: (1) (∀ x )(∀ y ) (P(xW(x)/P(yW(y)=V(T(x))/V(T(y)))Democracy is justified by adding a minor premiss to the effect that as a group the many ( m ) are superior (>) in virtue and wealth to the few best men ( f ): 85 (2 d ) (P(m) · W(m)) > (P(f) · W(f)) (3 d ) V(T(m))>V(T(f))Absolute kingship is justified when a godlike man ( g ) appears in a polis who is incommensurably superior (≫) in virtue and wealth to all the remaining free men ( r ): (2 k ) (P(g) · W(g)) ≫ (P(r) · W(r)) (3 k ) V(T(g)) ≫ V(T(r))True aristocracy requires a more complex justification, which was symbolized in Section 4. These justifications are compatible with each other since they apply to different situations. The polises where democracy and true aristocracy are justified contain no godlike men, and the polis in which democracy is justified differs from that in which true aristocracy is justified in containing a large group of free men who individually have little virtue ( Pol. III.11.1281b23-25, 1282a25-26). Each of the justifications is a valid deductive argument. Aristotle affirms the major premiss they share on the basis of a twofold appeal to nature. The principle of distributive justice, the concept as distinguished from the various conceptions of distributive justice, is itself according to nature ( Pol. VII.3.1325b7-10) and so too is one particular standard of worth, the standard of the best polis. Consequently, the question of the status of these three justifications, whether they are purely hypothetical or not, is a question about the minor premiss or premisses of each. In the case of the democratic premiss Aristotle's answer is straightforward: it is sometimes but not always true ( Pol. III.11.1281bl5-21). Hence the justification of democracy is not purely hypothetical. Nor is the justification of absolute kingship. The man who islike a god among men” ( Pol. III.13.1284a10-11) would be a man of heroic virtue (see VII.14.1332bl6-27); and such a man, Aristotle says, israre” ( σπávιoη ) (not nonexistent) ( E.N. VII.1.1145a27-28). The minor premisses of the aristocratic argument describe a situation where all of the free men in a given polis have sufficient wealth for the exercise of the moral and intellectual virtues and where all of the older free men of the polis are men of practical wisdom. In the Politics Aristotle makes only the modest claim that such a situation is possible: It is not possible for the best constitution to come into being without appropriate equipment [that is, the appropriate quality and quantity of territory and of citizens and noncitizens]. Hence one must presuppose many things as one would wish them to be, though none of them must be impossible ( Pol. VII.4.1325b37-38; see also II.6.1265al7-18). But Aristotle appears to subscribe to the principle that every possibility is realized at some moment of time ( Top. 11.11.115bl7-18, Met. Θ.4.1047b3-6, N.2.1088b23-25). This principle together with the claim that the situation described is possible entails that the situation sometimes occurs. Thus even Aristotle's justification of true aristocracy is not purely hypothetical. The final question is Aristotle's way of avoiding Protagorean relativism without embracing Platonic absolutism. The relativist, along with everyone else ( E.N. V.3.1131a13-14, Pol. III.12.1282bl8), can accept the principle of distributive justice: Q(x)/Q(y) = V(T(x))/V(T(y)) And he can concede that particular instances of this principle, particular conceptions of justice, accurately describe the modes of distributing political authority that appear just to particular polises and to particular philosophers. What he denies is that there is any basis for ranking these various conceptions of justice or for singling one out as the best (Plato, Theaet. 172A-B). Aristotle, following in Plato's track ( Laws X.888D7-890D8), maintains against the relativist that nature provides such a basis. But he departs from Plato in his conception of nature. For Platothe just by nature” ( τó ρυσει δίκ }) ( Rep. VI.501B2) is the Form of justice, an incorporeal entity ( Phdo. 65D4-5, Soph. 246B8) that exists beyond time and space ( Tim. 37C6-38C3, 51E6-52B2), whereas for Aristotle the sensible world is the realm of nature ( Met. A.1.1069a30-b2). Thus in appealing to nature Aristotle does not appeal to a transcendent standard. Nor does he appeal to his main criterion of the natural, namely, happening always or for the most part. Aristotle's theory of justice is anchored to nature by means of the polis described in Politics VII and VIII, and he regards this polis as natural because it fosters the true end of human life and because its social and political structure reflects the natural hierarchy of human beings and the natural stages of life. Thus the nature that Aristotle's theory of justice is ultimately founded on is human nature. (shrink)
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  14. Sheldon Goldstein, Absence of Chaos in Bohmian Dynamics.score: 192.0
    In a recent paper [1], O. F. de Alcantara Bonfim, J. Florencio, and F. C. S´ a Barreto claim to have found numerical evidence of chaos in (...)
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  15. Martin Cohen (2005). Wittgenstein's Beetle and Other Classic Thought Experiments. Blackwell Pub..score: 192.0
    A is for Alice and astronomers arguing about acceleration -- B is for Bernard's body-exchange machine -- C is for the Catholic cannibal -- D is for Maxwell (...)'s demon -- E is for evolution (and an embarrassing problem with it) -- F is for the forms lost forever to the prisoners of the cave -- G is for Galileo's gravitational balls -- H is for Hume's shades -- I is for the identity of indiscernibles -- J is for Henri Poincaré and alternative geometries -- K is for the Kritik and Kant's kind of thought experiments -- L is for Lucretius' spear -- M is for Mach's motionless chain -- N is for Newton's bucket -- O is for Olbers' paradox -- P is for Parfit's person -- Q is for the questions raised by thought experiments quotidiennes -- R is for the rule-ruled room -- S is for Salvatius' ship, sailing along its own space-time line -- T is for the time-travelling twins -- U is for the universe, and Einstein's attempts to understand it -- V is for the vexed case of the violinist -- W is for Wittgenstein's beetle -- X is for xenophanes and thinking by examples -- Y is for counterfactuals and a backwards approach to history -- Z is for Zeno and the mysteries of infinity. (shrink)
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  16. Andrew Kuper, D E B at E.score: 192.0
    The main thrust of my argument was that ad hoc su gge s ti ons of ch a ri ty cannot replace a systematic and theoreti c (...)
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  17. Richard Beigel, Harry Buhrman, Peter Fejer, Lance Fortnow, Piotr Grabowski, Luc Longpré, Andrej Muchnik, Frank Stephan & Leen Torenvliet (2006). Enumerations of the Kolmogorov Function. Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (2):501 - 528.score: 192.0
    A recursive enumerator for a function h is an algorithm f which enumerates for an input x finitely many elements including h(x), f is a k(n (...))-enumerator if for every input x of length n, h(x) is among the first k(n) elements enumerated by f. If there is a k(n)-enumerator for h then h is called k(n)-enumerable. We also consider enumerators which are only A-recursive for some oracle A. We determine exactly how hard it is to enumerate the Kolmogorov function, which assigns to each string x its Kolmogorov complexity: • For every underlying universal machine U, there is a constant a such that C is k(n)-enumerable only if k(n) ≥ n/a for almost all n. • For any given constant k, the Kolmogorov function is k-enumerable relative to an oracle A if and only if A is at least as hard as the halting problem. • There exists an r.e., Turing-incomplete set A such for every non-decreasing and unbounded recursive function k, the Kolmogorov function is k(n)-enumerable relative to A. The last result is obtained by using a relativizable construction for a nonrecursive set A relative to which the prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity differs only by a constant from the unrelativized prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity. Although every 2-enumerator for C is Turing hard for K, we show that reductions must depend on the specific choice of the 2-enumerator and there is no bound on the quantity of their queries. We show our negative results even for strong 2-enumerators as an oracle where the querying machine for any x gets directly an explicit list of all hypotheses of the enumerator for this input. The limitations are very general and we show them for any recursively bounded function g: • For every Turing reduction M and every non-recursive set B, there is a strong 2-enumerator f for g such that M does not Turing reduce B to f. • For every non-recursive set B, there is a strong 2-enumerator f for g such that B is not wtt-reducible to f. Furthermore, we deal with the resource-bounded case and give characterizations for the class ${\rm S}_{2}^{{\rm P}}$ introduced by Canetti and independently Russell and Sundaram and the classes PSPACE, EXP. • ${\rm S}_{2}^{{\rm P}}$ is the class of all sets A for which there is a polynomially bounded function g such that there is a polynomial time tt-reduction which reduces A to every strong 2-enumerator for g. • PSPACE is the class of all sets A for which there is a polynomially bounded function g such that there is a polynomial time Turing reduction which reduces A to every strong 2-enumerator for g. Interestingly, g can be taken to be the Kolmogorov function for the conditional space bounded Kolmogorov complexity. • EXP is the class of all sets A for which there is a polynomially bounded function g and a machine M which witnesses APSPACEf for all strong 2-enumerators f for g. Finally, we show that any strong O(log n)-enumerator for the conditional space bounded Kolmogorov function must be PSPACE-hard if P = NP. (shrink)
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  18. José Eduardo Faria (2010). Policentrismo versus soberanía. Los nuevos órdenes normativos. Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez 44:295-309.score: 192.0
    Th e a r ticl e e xplore s h o w globalizatio n i s assumin g a pr o g ress i v e emptyin (...)
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  19. Dolores Morondo Taramundi (2011). Subordiscriminación y discriminación interseccional: elementos para una teoría del derecho antidiscriminatorio. Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez 45:15 - 42.score: 192.0
    Thi s w or k i s pa r t o f a r e visio n i n p r o g r es s r (...)
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  20. S. Bartalucci, S. Bertolucci, M. Bragadireanu, M. Cargnelli, C. Curceanu, S. Di Matteo, J.-P. Egger, C. Guaraldo, M. Iliescu, T. Ishiwatari, M. Laubenstein, J. Marton, E. Milotti, D. Pietreanu, T. Ponta, A. Romero Vidal, D. L. Sirghi, F. Sirghi, L. Sperandio, O. Vazquez Doce, E. Widmann & J. Zmeskal (2010). The VIP Experimental Limit on the Pauli Exclusion Principle Violation by Electrons. Foundations of Physics 40 (7):765-775.score: 144.0
    In this paper we describe an experimental test of the validity of the Pauli Exclusion Principle (for electrons) which is based on a straightforward idea put forward (...)
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