60 found
Order:
Disambiguations:
Frederique de Vignemont [56]F. de Vignemont [4]
  1.  92
    Frederique De Vignemont & Tania Singer (2006). The Empathic Brain: How, When and Why? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (10):435-441.
  2. Frédérique de Vignemont & Pierre Jacob (2012). What Is It Like to Feel Another's Pain? Philosophy of Science 79 (2):295-316.
    We offer an account of empathetic pain that preserves the distinctions among standard pain, contagious pain, empathetic pain, sympathy for pain, and standard pain ascription. Vicarious experiences of both contagious and empathetic pain resemble to some extent experiences of standard pain. But there are also crucial dissimilarities. As neuroscientific results show, standard pain involves a sensorimotor and an affective component. According to our account, contagious pain consists in imagining the former, whereas empathetic pain consists in imagining the latter. We further (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  3.  71
    Frédérique De Vignemont (2010). Embodiment, Ownership and Disownership. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):1-12.
    There are two main pathways to investigate the sense of body ownership, (i) through the study of the conditions of embodiment for an object to be experienced as one's own and (ii) through the analysis of the deficits in patients who experience a body part as alien. Here, I propose that E is embodied if some properties of E are processed in the same way as the properties of one's body. However, one must distinguish among different types of embodiment, and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   21 citations  
  4. Alvin Goldman & Frederique de Vignemont (2009). Is Social Cognition Embodied? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (10):154-159.
    Theories of embodied cognition abound in the literature, but it is often unclear how to understand them. We offer several interpretations of embodiment, the most interesting being the thesis that mental representations in bodily formats (B-formats) have an important role in cognition. Potential B-formats include motoric, somatosensory, affective and interoceptive formats. The literature on mirroring and related phenomena provides support for a limited-scope version of embodied social cognition under the B-format interpretation. It is questionable, however, whether such a thesis can (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   25 citations  
  5. Frederique de Vignemont (2007). Habeas Corpus: The Sense of Ownership of One's Own Body. Mind and Language 22 (4):427-449.
    What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  6.  46
    F. de Vignemont & P. Fourneret (2004). The Sense of Agency: A Philosophical and Empirical Review of the "Who" System. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):1-19.
    How do I know that I am the person who is moving? According to Wittgenstein (1958), the sense of agency involves a primitive notion of the self used as subject, which does not rely on any prior perceptual identification and which is immune to error through misidentification. However, the neuroscience of action and the neuropsychology of schizophrenia show the existence of specific cognitive processes underlying the sense of agency—the ‘‘Who'' system (Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998) which is disrupted in delusions of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  7. F. de Vignemont (2013). The Mark of Bodily Ownership. Analysis 73 (4):643-651.
    I am aware that this hand is my own. But is the sense of ownership of my hand manifested to me in a more primitive form than judgements? On the deflationary view recently defended by Martin and Bermúdez in their works, the sense of bodily ownership has no counterpart at the experiential level. Here I present a series of cases that the deflationary account cannot easily accommodate, including belief-independent illusions of ownership and experiences of disownership despite the presence of bodily (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  8.  30
    Adrian Alsmith & Frédérique De Vignemont (2012). Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):1-13.
    Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of representation depend so closely upon the body that their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction of this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body representations, which remain too often neglected or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put weight (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  9.  11
    Frédérique De Vignemont, Autism, Morality and Empathy.
    The golden rule of most religions assumes that the cognitive abilities of perspective-taking and empathy are the basis of morality. One would therefore predict that people that display difficulties in those abilities, such as people with psychopathy and autism, are impaired in morality. But then why do autistics have a sense of morality while psychopaths do not, given that they both display a deficit of empathy? We would like here to refine some of the views on autism and morality. In (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  11
    Frédérique De Vignemont, Body Schema and Body Image - Pros and Cons.
    There seems to be no dimension of bodily awareness that cannot be disrupted. To account for such variety, there is a growing consensus that there are at least two distinct types of body representation that can be impaired, the body schema and the body image. However, the definition of these notions is often unclear. The notion of body image has attracted most controversy because of its lack of unifying positive definition. The notion of body schema, onto which there seems to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  10
    Adrian Alsmith & Frédérique De Vignemont, Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body.
    Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of representation depend so closely upon the body that their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction of this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body representations, which remain too often neglected or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put weight (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  10
    Frédérique De Vignemont, Action Observation and Execution: What is Shared?
    Performing an action and observing it activate the same internal representations of action. The representations are therefore shared between self and other. But what exactly is shared? At what level within the hierarchical structure of the motor system do SRA occur? Understanding the content of SRA is important in order to decide what theoretical work SRA can perform. In this paper, we provide some conceptual clarification by raising three main questions: are SRA semantic or pragmatic representations of action?; are SRA (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Frédérique de Vignemont (2011). A Self for the Body. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):230-247.
    Abstract: What grounds the experience of our body as our own? Can we rationally doubt that this is our own body when we feel sensations in it? This article shows how recent empirical evidence can shed light on issues on the body and the self, such as the grounds of the sense of body ownership and the immunity to error through misidentification of bodily self-ascriptions. In particular, it discusses how bodily illusions (e.g., the Rubber Hand Illusion), bodily disruptions (e.g., somatoparaphrenia), (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  14.  41
    Uta Frith & Frederique de Vignemont (2005). Egocentrism, Allocentrism, and Asperger Syndrome. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):719-738.
    In this paper, we attempt to make a distinction between egocentrism and allocentrism in social cognition, based on the distinction that is made in visuo-spatial perception. We propose that it makes a difference to mentalizing whether the other person can be understood using an egocentric (‘‘you'') or an allocentric (‘‘he/ she/they'') stance. Within an egocentric stance, the other person is represented in relation to the self. By contrast, within an allocentric stance, the existence or mental state of the other person (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  15.  32
    Frederique de Vignemont (2014). Pain and Bodily Care: Whose Body Matters? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):542-560.
    Pain is unpleasant. It is something that one avoids as much as possible. One might then claim that one wants to avoid pain because one cares about one's body. On this view, individuals who do not experience pain as unpleasant and to be avoided, like patients with pain asymbolia, do not care about their body. This conception of pain has been recently defended by Bain [2014] and Klein [forthcoming]. In their view, one needs to care about one's body for pain (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16. Frederique de Vignemont (2005). Body Mereology. In G. Knoblich, I. M. Thornton, M. Grosjean & M. Shiffrar (eds.), Human Body Perception From the Inside Out. Oxford University Press
  17.  45
    Alessia Folegatti, Alessandro Farnè, R. Salemme & Frédérique De Vignemont (2012). The Rubber Hand Illusion: Two's a Company, but Three's a Crowd. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):799-812.
    On the one hand, it is often assumed that the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) is constrained by a structural body model so that one cannot implement supernumerary limbs. On the other hand, several recent studies reported illusory duplication of the right hand in subjects exposed to two adjacent rubber hands. The present study tested whether spatial constraints may affect the possibility of inducing the sense of ownership to two rubber hands located side by side to the left of the subject's (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  18. F. de Vignemont (2004). The Co-Consciousness Hypothesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):97-114.
    Self-knowledge seems to be radically different from the knowledge of other people. However, rather than focusing on the gap between self and others, we should emphasize their commonality. Indeed, different mirror matching mechanisms have been found in monkeys as well as in humans showing that one uses the same representations for oneself and for the others. But do these shared representations allow one to report the mental states of others as if they were one''s own? I intend in this essay (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  19.  6
    Frédérique De Vignemont, Manos Tsakiris & Patrick Haggard, Body Mereology.
    The body is made up of parts. This basic assumption is central in most neuroscientific studies of bodily sensation, body representation and motor action. Yet, the assumption has rarely been considered explicitly. We may indeed ask how the body is internally segmented and how body parts can be defined. That is, how can we sketch the mereology of the body? Here we distinguish between a somatosensory mereology and a motor mereology.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  6
    Frédérique De Vignemont, Ghost Buster: The Reality of One's Own Body.
    What are the epistemic bases of the knowledge of the reality of our own body? Proprioception plays a primordial role in body representation and more particularly at the level of body schema. Without proprioception people can feel amputated and the mislocalization of proprioceptive information through the remapping of the Penfield Homonculus induces illusions of phantom limbs, illusions that contradictory visual feedback cannot erase. However, it turns out that it is not as simple as that and that vision also intervenes in (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  45
    Frédérique De Vignemont (2014). A Multimodal Conception of Bodily Awareness. Mind 123 (492):00-00.
    One way to characterize the special relation that one has to one's own body is to say that only one's body appears to one from the inside. Although widely accepted, the nature of this specific experiential mode of presentation of the body is rarely spelled out. Most definitions amount to little more than lists of the various body senses (including senses of posture, movement, heat, pressure, and balance). It is true that body senses provide a kind of informational access to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22.  5
    Frédérique De Vignemont, Frames of Reference in Social Cognition.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  5
    Frédérique De Vignemont & Olivier Massin, Touch.
    Since Aristotle, touch has been found especially hard to define. One of the few unchallenged intuition about touch, however, is that tactile awareness entertains some especially close relationship with bodily awareness. This article considers the relation between touch and bodily awareness from two different perspectives: the body template theory and the body map theory. According to the former, touch is defined by the fact that tactile content matches proprioceptive content. We raise some objections against such a bodily definition of touch (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  71
    Frédérique de Vignemont (2011). A Mosquito Bite Against the Enactive Approach to Bodily Experiences. Journal of Philosophy 108 (4):188-204.
    The enactive approach aims at providing a unified account of perceptual experiences in terms of bodily activities. Most enactive arguments come from the analysis of visual experiences (Noë, 2004), but there is one domain of consciousness where the enactive theses seem to be less controversial, namely, bodily experiences. After drawing the agenda for an enactive view of tactile experiences, I shall highlight the difficulties that it has to face, both conceptual and empirical.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25.  4
    Frédérique De Vignemont, Hysteria: The Reverse of Anosognosia.
    Hysteria has been the subject of controversy for many years, with theorists arguing about whether it is best explained by a hidden organic cause or by malingering and deception. However, it has been shown that hysterical paralysis cannot be explained in any of these terms. With the recent development of cognitive psychiatry, one may understand psychiatric and organic delusions within the same conceptual framework. Here I contrast hysterical conversion with anosognosia. They are indeed remarkably similar, though the content of their (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  15
    Pierre Jacob & Frédérique de Vignemont (2010). Spatial Coordinates and Phenomenology in the Two-Visual Systems Model. In N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary & F. Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  27.  71
    Frédérique De Vignemont & Olivier Massin (forthcoming). Touch. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press
    Since Aristotle, touch has been found especially hard to define. One of the few unchallenged intuition about touch, however, is that tactile awareness entertains some especially close relationship with bodily awareness. This article considers the relation between touch and bodily awareness from two different perspectives: the body template theory and the body map theory. According to the former, touch is defined by the fact that tactile content matches proprioceptive content. We raise some objections against such a bodily definition of touch (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  69
    Frédérique de Vignemont (2009). Drawing the Boundary Between Low-Level and High-Level Mindreading. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):457 - 466.
    The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds , Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman’s (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  22
    Frederique de Vignemont (2012). Habeas Corpus: poczucie własności swojego ciała. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (T).
    What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  25
    Frédérique De Vignemont & Hugo Mercier, Under Influence.
    In many circumstances we tend to assume that other people believe or desire what we ourselves believe or desire. This has been labeled 'egocentric bias.' This is not to say that we systematically fail to understand other people and forget that they can have a different perspective. If it were the case, then it would be highly difficult, if not impossible, to communicate, cooperate or compete with them. In those situations, we need to take the other person's perspective and to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  1
    Frédérique De Vignemont, The Mark of Bodily Ownership.
    Do bodily sensations include a distinctive experience of the body as of one's own? I am aware that this hand is mine. But is the sense of ownership of my hand manifested to me in a more primitive form than beliefs or judgements? Bermudez and Martin have recently argued in favour of a deflationary account of the sense of ownership, according to which there is nothing it feels like to experience one's body as of one's own, no felt 'myness' that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  1
    Pierre Jacob & Frédérique De Vignemont, What Is It Like to Feel Another's Pain?
    We offer an account of empathetic pain that preserves the distinctions among standard pain, contagious pain, empathetic pain, sympathy for pain, and standard pain ascription. Vicarious experiences of both contagious and empathetic pain resemble to some extent experiences of standard pain. But there are also crucial dissimilarities. As neuroscientific results show, standard pain involves a sensorimotor and an affective component. According to our account, contagious pain consists in imagining the former, whereas empathetic pain consists in imagining the latter. We further (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Philippe Fossati Allilaire, Frédérique de Vignemont, Tiziana Zalla, Andrés Posada, Anne Louvegnez, Olivier Koenig, Nicolas Georgieff, Nicolas Franck, Arnaud DÕArgembeau & Martial Van der Linden (2006). Cédric Lemogne, Pascale Piolino, Stéphanie Friszer, Astrid Claret, Nathalie Girault, Roland Jouvent, Jean-François. Consciousness and Cognition 15:232-233.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34.  37
    Frédérique de Vignemont (2007). How Many Representations of the Body? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2):204-205.
    Based on functional differences, Dijkerman and de Haan emphasize the duality of somatosensory processing and therefore of body representations. But how many body representations do we really have? And what kind of criterion can we use to distinguish them? I review here the empirical and conceptual difficulties in drawing such distinctions and the way to progress.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  8
    Frédérique De Vignemont (2006). A Review of Shaun Gallagher: How the Body Shapes the Mind. [REVIEW] Psyche 12 (1):1-7.
    With 'How the body shapes the mind', Shaun Gallagher provides a general panoptic of the importance of the body in cognition, based on significant experimental results. His main goals here are (1) to describe body awareness in detail and (2) to investigate the influence of the body on self-consciousness, perception, language and social cognition. Here, I focus on two points: the distinction between the body schema and the body image and the structuring role of the body.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. F. De Vignemont (2000). When I Think Doesn't Accompany My Thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):S43 - S43.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37.  5
    Frédérique de Vignemont (2008). Empathie miroir et empathie reconstructive. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 3 (3):337-345.
    Étant donné la confusion conceptuelle quant à la définition même de l’empathie, il me paraît utile d’en distinguer deux formes spécifiques, l’empathie miroir et l’empathie reconstructive. Dans les deux cas, je partage l’émotion de l’autre, mais de manières différentes. Brièvement, l’empathie miroir est provoquée par la perception d’indices émotionnels, tandis que l’empathie reconstructive est induite par la simulation de la situation émotionnelle de l’autre. J’analyse ici plus en détail leur spécificité respective, ainsi que leurs limites.Given the general confusion surrounding the (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  1
    Frédérique De Vignemont (2006). L'hystérie : ne plus vouloir pouvoir, ne plus pouvoir vouloir. Philosophiques 33 (1):197-215.
    L’hystérie se définit comme un déficit fonctionnel sans cause organique. Par exemple, certains patients sont incapables de se mouvoir volontairement, comme s’ils étaient véritablement paralysés, sans que l’on puisse fournir une explication physiologique. À l’inverse, les patients souffrant d’anosognosie sont véritablement paralysés, mais affirment pouvoir bouger. Ces pathologies résultent toutes deux d’un trouble de la conscience de la capacité à agir : les uns croient qu’ils ne peuvent pas agir alors qu’ils le pourraient et les autres croient pouvoir agir alors (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Frédérique De Vignemont (2011). A Mosquito Bite Against the Enactive Approach to Bodily Experiences. Journal of Philosophy 108 (4):188-204.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Frédérique De Vignemont, A Mosquito Bite Against the Enactive Approach to Bodily Experiences.
    The enactive approach aims at providing a unified account of perceptual experiences in terms of bodily activities. Most enactive arguments come from the analysis of visual experiences, but there is one domain of consciousness where the enactive theses seem to be less controversial, namely, bodily experiences. After drawing the agenda for an enactive view of tactile experiences, I shall highlight the difficulties that it has to face, both conceptual and empirical.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Frédérique De Vignemont, A Multimodal Conception of Bodily Awareness.
    One way to characterize the special relation that one has to one's own body is to say that only one's body appears to one from the inside. Although widely accepted, the nature of this specific experiential mode of presentation of the body is rarely spelled out. Most definitions amount to little more than lists of the various body senses. It is true that body senses provide a kind of informational access to one's own body, which one has to no other (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Frédérique De Vignemont, A Review of Shaun Gallagher: How the Body Shapes the Mind. [REVIEW]
    With 'How the body shapes the mind', Shaun Gallagher provides a general panoptic of the importance of the body in cognition, based on significant experimental results. His main goals here are to describe body awareness in detail and to investigate the influence of the body on self-consciousness, perception, language and social cognition. Here, I focus on two points: the distinction between the body schema and the body image and the structuring role of the body.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Frédérique De Vignemont, A Self for the Body.
    What grounds the experience of our body as our own? Can we rationally doubt that this is our own body when we feel sensations in it? Here, I show how recent empirical evidence can shed light on issues on the body and the self, such as the grounds of the sense of body ownership and the immunity to error through misidentification of bodily self-ascriptions. In particular, I discuss how bodily illusions, bodily disruptions and the multimodal nature of bodily self-knowledge challenge (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Frédérique De Vignemont, Bodily Immunity to Error.
    Are bodily self-ascriptions immune to error through misidentification? According to the Inside mode view, one cannot be mistaken about whose body part it is when experiencing them from the inside. Here I shall consider two possible objections to bodily immunity. On the one hand, I shall briefly envisage two cases of misidentification: somatoparaphrenia and the Rubber Hand illusion. I shall show that none of them challenges the immunity principle. On the other hand, I shall highlight a more serious issue for (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Frédérique de Vignemont (2006). Brainreading of Perceptual Experiences: A Challenge for First-Person Authority? Anthropology and Philosophy 7 (1/2):151-162.
    According to a traditional Cartesian view of the mind, you have a privileged access to your own conscious experiences that nobody else can have. Therefore, you have more authority than anybody else on your own experiences. Perceptual experiences are selfintimating: you are aware of what you are consciously perceiving. If you report seeing a pink elephant, nobody is entitled to deny it. There may be no pink elephant, but you do have the conscious experience of such elephant. However, the progress (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Frederique de Vignemont (2009). Bodily Spatial Content. Psyche 15 (1).
    The classic notion of an egocentric frame of reference cannot be easily applied to bodily space, given the difficulties in providing a centre of such frame as well as axes on which one could compute distances and directions . Yet, Smith tries to rehabilitate the egocentric account of bodily frame by switching from an anatomical definition of egocentricity to a more functional definition . Here I will review some empirical evidence that shows that one cannot ground bodily experiences in action. (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Frédérique De Vignemont, Drawing the Boundary Between Low-Level and High-Level Mindreading.
    In order to bring together the cognitive neuroscientific discovery of mirror system and the philosophical account of pretense within a unique theoretical framework of mental simulation, Goldman distinguishes two types of mindreading, respectively, based on low-level and high-level simulation. Yet, in what sense are they really two distinct processes? Here, I will confine myself largely to spelling out a series of points that take issue with the distinction between low-level and high-level mindreading.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Frédérique De Vignemont & Uta Frith, Egocentrism, Allocentrism, and Asperger Syndrome.
    In this paper, we attempt to make a distinction between egocentrism and allocentrism in social cognition, based on the distinction that is made in visuo-spatial perception. We propose that it makes a difference to mentalizing whether the other person can be understood using an egocentric or an allocentric stance. Within an egocentric stance, the other person is represented in relation to the self. By contrast, within an allocentric stance, the existence or mental state of the other person needs to be (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Frédérique De Vignemont, Embodiment, Ownership and Disownership.
    There are two main pathways to investigate the sense of body ownership, through the study of the conditions of embodiment for an object to be experienced as one's own and through the analysis of the deficits in patients who experience a body part as alien. Here, I propose that E is embodied if some properties of E are processed in the same way as the properties of one's body. However, one must distinguish among different types of embodiment, and only self-specific (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Frédérique De Vignemont, Habeas Corpus: The Sense of Ownership of One's Own Body.
    What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one's own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one's own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 60