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  1. Fabian Dorsch (forthcoming). Knowledge by Imagination - How Imaginative Experience Can Ground Knowledge. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy.
    In this article, I defend the view that we can acquire factual knowledge – that is, contingent propositional knowledge about certain (perceivable) aspects of reality – on the basis of imaginative experience. More specifically, I argue that, under suitable circumstances, imaginative experiences can rationally determine the propositional content of knowledge-constituting beliefs – though not their attitude of belief – in roughly the same way as perceptual experiences do in the case of perceptual knowledge. I also highlight some philosophical consequences of (...)
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  2.  79
    Fabian Dorsch (forthcoming). The Phenomenology of Attitudes and the Salience of Rational Role and Determination. Philosophical Explorations.
    The recent debate on cognitive phenomenology has largely focused on phenomenal aspects connected to the content of thoughts. By contrasts, aspects pertaining to their attitude have often been neglected, despite the fact that they are distinctive of the mental kind of thought concerned and, moreover, also present in experiences and thus less contentious than purely cognitive aspects. My main goal is to identify two central and closely related aspects of attitude that are phenomenologically salient and shared by thoughts with experiences, (...)
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  3.  77
    Fabian Dorsch (forthcoming). Perceptual Acquaintance and the Seeeming Relationality of Hallucinations. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    In recent years, it has become popular again to endorse relationalism about perception.1 According to this view, perceptions are essentially relational experiences and thus di er in nature from non-relational hallucinations. In this article, I assume that relationalism is true. The issue that I am generally interested in is rather which version of relationalism we should endorse, given that perceptions are relational. The standard answer to this question is Acquaintance Relationalism, the view that perceptions are relational in so far as (...)
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  4. Fabian Dorsch (2012). Announcing the Second Estetika Essay Competition (Aesthetics in Central Europe). Estetika 49 (1):115-116.
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  5. Fabian Dorsch (2013). Cover (1-2013). Estetika 50 (L (1)):1-7.
     
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  6. Fabian Dorsch (2013). Cover (2-2013). Estetika 50 (2):138-144.
     
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  7.  28
    Fabian Dorsch (2016). Seeing-In as Aspect Perception. In Gary Kemp & Gabriele Mras (eds.), Wollheim, Wittgenstein, and Pictorial Representation: Seeing-as and Seeing-in. Routledge
  8.  20
    Fabian Dorsch (2016). Hume. In Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. Routledge 40-54.
    This chapter overviews Hume’s thoughts on the nature and role of imagining and focusses primarily on three important distinctions that Hume draws among our conscious mental episodes: (i) between impressions and ideas; (ii) between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination; and (iii), among the ideas of the imagination, between ideas of the judgement and ideas of the fancy. In addition, the chapter considers Hume’s views on the imagination as a faculty of producing ideas, as well as on (...)
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  9. Fabian Dorsch (2012). Cover (1-2012). Estetika 49 (2):129-134.
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  10.  12
    Fabian Dorsch (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons. In Fabian Dorsch & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press
    Doxasticism about our awareness of normative (i.e. justifying) reasons – the view that we can recognise reasons for forming attitudes or performing actions only by means of normative judgements or beliefs – is incompatible with the following triad of claims: -/- (1) Being motivated (i.e. forming attitudes or performing actions for a motive) requires responding to and, hence, recognising a relevant reason. -/- (2) Infants are capable of being motivated. -/- (3) Infants are incapable of normative judgement or belief. -/- (...)
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  11. Fabian Dorsch (2013). Announcing the Winner of the Estetika Essay Competition (Aesthetics in Central Europe). Estetika 50 (2):232-233.
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  12.  8
    Fabian Dorsch (2015). Focused Daydreaming and Mind-Wandering. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):791-813.
    In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we tend to classify both as instances of daydreaming. The first difference between the two, I argue, is that, while focused daydreaming is an instance of imaginative mental agency, mind-wandering is not—though this does not mean that mind-wandering cannot involve mental agency at (...)
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  13.  58
    Fabian Dorsch (2015). Hume on the Imagination. Rero Doc Digital Library:1-28.
    This is the original, longer draft for my entry on Hume in the 'The Routledge Hand- book of Philosophy of Imagination', edited by Amy Kind and published by Routledge in 2016 (see the separate entry). — Please always cite the Routledge version, unless there are passages concerned that did not make it into the Handbook for reasons of length. — -/- This chapter overviews Hume’s thoughts on the nature and the role of imagining, with an almost exclusive focus on the (...)
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  14. Fabian Dorsch (2009). Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press 38-71.
    What is the scope of our conscious mental agency, and how do we acquire self-knowledge of it? Both questions are addressed through an investigation of what best explains our inability to form judgemental thoughts in direct response to practical reasons. Contrary to what Williams and others have argued, it cannot be their subjection to a truth norm, given that our failure to adhere to such a norm need not undermine their status as judgemental. Instead, it is argued that we cannot (...)
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  15.  48
    Fabian Dorsch (2015). Focused Daydreaming and Mind-Wandering. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):791-813.
    In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we tend to classify both as instances of daydreaming. The first difference between the two, I argue, is that, while focused daydreaming is an instance of imaginative mental agency, mind-wandering is not—though this does not mean that mind-wandering cannot involve mental agency at (...)
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  16. Fabian Dorsch (2018). Imagination. Routledge.
    The imagination poses fascinating philosophical questions across a range of subjects including philosophy of mind, aesthetics and epistemology. However, until now it has been a relatively neglected topic. How do acts of imagining differ from other mental episodes, such as perceptions or judgements? What kind of awareness is involved in imagining? Can imagining ground knowledge and if so, how reliable is it? Is there some unity to the various forms of imagining? In this book Fabian Dorsch considers these questions, introducing (...)
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  17. Fabian Dorsch (2013). Non‐Inferentialism About Justification – The Case of Aesthetic Judgements. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):660-682.
    In this article, I present two objections against the view that aesthetic judgements – that is, judgemental ascriptions of aesthetic qualities like elegance or harmony – are justified non‐inferentially. The first is that this view cannot make sense of our practice to support our aesthetic judgements by reference to lower‐level features of the objects concerned. The second objection maintains that non‐inferentialism about the justification of aesthetic judgements cannot explain why our aesthetic interest in artworks and other objects is limited to (...)
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  18. Fabian Dorsch (2010). Transparency and Imagining Seeing. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):173-200.
    In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well- known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of (...)
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  19.  60
    Fabian Dorsch (2010). The Unity of Hallucinations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):171-191.
    My primary aim in this article is to provide a philosophical account of the unity of hallucinations, which can capture both perceptual hallucinations (which are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions) and non-perceptual hallucinations (all others). Besides, I also mean to clarify further the division of labour and the nature of the collaboration between philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Assuming that the epistemic conception of hallucinations put forward by M. G. F. Martin and others is largely on the right track, I will (...)
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  20.  71
    Fabian Dorsch (2013). Experience and Introspection. In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. The MIT Press 175-220.
    One central fact about hallucinations is that they may be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions. Indeed, it has been argued that the hallucinatory experiences concerned cannot— and need not—be characterized in any more positive general terms. This epistemic conception of hallucinations has been advocated as the best choice for proponents of experiential (or “naive realist”) disjunctivism—the view that perceptions and hallucinations differ essentially in their introspectible subjective characters. In this chapter, I aim to formulate and defend an intentional alternative to experiential (...)
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  21.  99
    Fabian Dorsch (2005). Review: Hegel's Theory of Imagination. [REVIEW] British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (3):309-311.
  22. Fabian Dorsch & Gianfranco Soldati (2005). Conceptual Qualia and Communication. In Gilian Crampton Smith (ed.), The Foundations of Interaction Design. 1-14.
    The claim that consciousness is propositional has be widely debated in the past. For instance, it has been discussed whether consciousness is always propositional, whether all propositional consciousness is linguistic, whether propositional consciousness is always articulated, or whether there can be non-articulated propositions. In contrast, the question of whether propositions are conscious has not very often been the focus of attention.
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  23.  77
    Fabian Dorsch (2011). The Diversity of Disjunctivism. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):304-314.
    In this review article, I introduce a classification of metaphysical and epistemological forms of disjunctivism and critically discuss the essays on disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception, the philosophy of action and epistemology that are published in Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock’s collection 'Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge' (Oxford University Press, 2008).
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  24.  33
    Fabian Dorsch (2010). Colour Resemblance and Colour Realism. Rivista di Estetica 50 (43):85-108.
    One prominent ambition of theories of colour is to pay full justice to how colours are subjectively given to us; and another to reconcile this first-personal perspective on colours with the third-personal one of the natural sciences. The goal of this article is to question whether we can satisfy the second ambition on the assumption that the first should and can be met. I aim to defend a negative answer to this question by arguing that the various kinds of experienced (...)
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  25.  2
    Fabian Dorsch (2014). Editorial: 50th Anniversary Issue. Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aestetics 51 (2):167-169.
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  26.  98
    Fabian Dorsch (2007). Sentimentalism and the Intersubjectivity of Aesthetic Evaluations. Dialectica 61 (3):417-446.
    Within the debate on the epistemology of aesthetic appreciation, it has a long tradition, and is still very common, to endorse the sentimentalist view that our aesthetic evaluations are rationally grounded on, or even constituted by, certain of our emotional responses to the objects concerned. Such a view faces, however, the serious challenge to satisfactorily deal with the seeming possibility of faultless disagreement among emotionally based and epistemically appropriate verdicts. I will argue that the sentimentalist approach to aesthetic epistemology cannot (...)
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  27.  74
    Fabian Dorsch (2011). Emotional Imagining and Our Responses to Fiction. Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 46:153-176.
    The aim of this article is to present the disagreement between Moran and Walton on the nature of our affective responses to fiction and to defend a view on the issue which is opposed to Moran’s account and improves on Walton’s. Moran takes imagination-based affective responses to be instances of genuine emotion and treats them as episodes with an emotional attitude towards their contents. I argue against the existence of such attitudes, and that the affective element of such responses should (...)
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  28.  2
    Fabian Dorsch (2013). Hume and the Recreative Imagination. Rivista di Estetica 53 (2):25-54.
    Two particular approaches to the imagination as a recreative capacity have recently gained prominence: neo-Humeanism and simulationatism. According to neo-Humeanism, imaginings have cognitions as a constitutive part of their representational contents; while simulationalists maintain that, in imagining, we essentially simulate the occurrence of certain cognitive states. Two other kinds of constitutive dependence, that figure regularly in the debate, concern the necessity of cogni­tions for, respectively, the causation and the semantic power of imaginings. In what follows, I dis­cuss each of these (...)
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  29.  2
    Fabian Dorsch (2013). Transparency and Imagining Seeing. In Marcus Willaschek (ed.), Disjunctivism – Disjunctive Accounts in Epistemology and in the Philosophy of Perception. Routledge 5-32.
    In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well- known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of (...)
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  30.  2
    Fabian Dorsch (2011). Visualising as Imagining Seeing. Kongress-Akten der Deutschen Gesellschaft Für Philosophie 22:1-16.
    In this paper, I would like to put forward the claim that, at least in some central cases, visualising consists literally in imagining seeing. The first section of my paper is concerned with a defence of the specific argument for this claim that M. G. F. Martin presents in his paper 'The Transparency of Experience' (Martin 2002). This argument has been often misunderstood (or ignored), and it is worthwhile to discuss it in detail and to illus­trate what its precise nature (...)
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  31.  1
    Fabian Dorsch (2014). The Limits of Aesthetic Empiricism. In Gregory Currie, Matthew Kieran, Aaron Meskin & Jon Robson (eds.), Aesthetics and the Sciences of Mind. Oxford University Press 75-100.
    Empirical findings may be relevant for aesthetic evaluation in at least two ways. First ‒‒ within criticism ‒ they may help us to identify the aesthetic value of objects. Second ‒ whithin philosophy ‒ they may help us to decide which theory of aesthetic value and evaluation to prefer. In this paper, I address both kinds of relevance. My focus is thereby on empirical evidence gathered, not by means of first-personal experiences, but by means of third-personal scientific investigations of individual (...)
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  32.  39
    Fabian Dorsch (2012). The Unity of Imagining. Ontos.
    Please send me an email (fabian.dorsch@unifr.ch) if you wish to receive a copy of the book. — 'In this highly ambitious, wide ranging, immensely impressive and ground-breaking work Fabian Dorsch surveys just about every account of the imagination that has ever been proposed. He identifies five central types of imagining that any unifying theory must accommodate and sets himself the task of determining whether any theory of what imagining consists in covers these five paradigms. Focussing on what he takes to (...)
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  33.  1
    Fabian Dorsch (2011). The Aesthetic Relevance of Empirical Findings. Kongress-Akten der Deutschen Gesellschaft Für Ästhetik 2:1-21.
    Empirical findings may be relevant for aesthetic evaluation in at least two ways. First — within criticism — they may help us to identify the aesthetic value of objects. Second— whithin philosophy — they may help us to decide which theory of aesthetic value and evaluation to prefer. In this paper, I address both kinds of relevance. My focus is thereby on empirical evidence gathered, not by means of first-personal experiences, but by means of third-personal scientific investigations of individual artworks (...)
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  34. Gianfranco Soldati & Fabian Dorsch, The Rational Dimension of Phenomenal Character.
    One influential focus in the recent debates on the non-sensory aspects of the phenomenal character of our mental episodes has been on their intellectual elements. More specifically, it has been on what it is like to think or judge something (in opposition to seeing or imagining it), as well as on the extent to which how we subjectively experience our thoughts and judgements depends on how they present the world as being.1 Other non-sensory — and non-intellectual — aspects of character, (...)
     
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  35.  6
    Fabian Dorsch (2012). Die Grenzen des ästhetischen Empirismus. Zeitschrift für Ästhetik Und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft 57 (2):269-281.
    In den letzten Jahren ist es recht populär geworden, traditionelle Fragen der philosophischen Ästhetik – wie zum Beispiel die nach der Natur und Rechtfertigung ästhetischer Beurteilungen – mithilfe empirischer Forschungsergebnisse zu beantworten zu versuchen. Diesem empiristisch geprägten Ansatz möchte ich gerne eine rationalistisch orientierte Auffassung der ästhetischen Erfahrung und Bewertung von Kunstwerken entgegensetzen. Insbesondere werde ich die ästhetische Relevanz dreier verschiedener Arten empirischer Studien kritisch diskutieren: (i) solcher, die einzelne Kunstwerke unter Einsatz der Natur- oder Geschichtswissenschaften erforschen; (ii) solcher, die (...)
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  36.  4
    Fabian Dorsch (2013). Hume e l'immaginazione ricreativa. Rivista di Estetica 53 (53):25-54.
  37.  1
    Fabian Dorsch (2009). 5. Subjektivistische Theorien der Farben. In Die Natur der Farben. De Gruyter 311-372.
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  38. Fabian Dorsch, Novels and Sounds.
    One of the central questions of the ontology of art is which ontological categories the diferent types of artworks – such as paintings, novels, pieces of musics, or etchings – belong to. The best answer to this question may then reveal whether all types of artworks belong to the same ontological category; and perhaps also how this fact may be related to their signifcance in our lives.
     
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  39. Fabian Dorsch (2009). Appendix A: Dispositionen. In Die Natur der Farben. De Gruyter 389-410.
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  40. Fabian Dorsch (2009). Appendix B: Die Wissenschaft der Farben. In Die Natur der Farben. De Gruyter 411-474.
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  41. Fabian Dorsch (2009). Bibliographie. In Die Natur der Farben. De Gruyter 477-484.
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  42.  20
    Fabian Dorsch (2009). Die Natur der Farben. De Gruyter.
    Farben sind für uns sowohl objektive, als auch phänomenale Eigenschaften. In seinem Buch argumentiert Fabian Dorsch, daß keine ontologische Theorie der Farben diesen beiden Seiten unseres Farbbegriffes gerecht werden k ann. Statt dessen sollten wir akzeptieren, daß letzterer sich auf zwei verschiedene Arten von Eigenschaften bezieht: die repräsentierten Reflektanzeigenschaften von Gegenständen und die qualitativen Eigenschaften unserer Farbwahrnehmungen, die als sinnliche Gegebenheitsweisen ersterer fungieren. Die Natur der Farben gibt einen detaillierten Überblick über die zeitgenössischen philosophischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Theorien der Farben und (...)
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  43. Fabian Dorsch (2009). 6. Das resultierende Bild der Farben. In Die Natur der Farben. De Gruyter 373-388.
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  44. Fabian Dorsch (2009). 2. Die Zwei Seiten der Farben. In Die Natur der Farben. De Gruyter 37-122.
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  45. Fabian Dorsch (2009). 1. Einleitung. In Die Natur der Farben. De Gruyter 7-36.
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  46. Fabian Dorsch (2012). Editorial. Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aestetics 49 (1):3-4.
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  47. Fabian Dorsch (2011). Experience and Reason. Rero Doc.
    This collection brings together a selection of my recently published or forthcoming articles. What unites them is their common concern with one of the central ambitions of philosophy, namely to get clearer about our first-personal perspective onto the world and our minds. Three aspects of that perspective are of particular importance: consciousness, intentionality, and rationality. The collected essays address metaphysical and epistemological questions both concerning the nature of each of these aspects and concerning the various connections among them. More generally, (...)
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  48. Fabian Dorsch (2009). 3. Eine Systematik der Farbtheorien. In Die Natur der Farben. De Gruyter 123-190.
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  49. Fabian Dorsch (2009). Inhaltsverzeichnis. In Die Natur der Farben. De Gruyter 3-6.
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  50.  10
    Fabian Dorsch (2005). Imagination and the Will. Dissertation, University College London
    The principal aim of my thesis is to provide a unified theory of imagining, that is, a theory which aspires to capture the common nature of all central forms of imagining and to distinguish them from all paradigm instances of non-imaginative phenomena. The theory which I intend to put forward is a version of what I call the Agency Account of imagining and, accordingly, treats imaginings as mental actions of a certain kind. More precisely, it maintains that imaginings are mental (...)
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