30 found
Sort by:
  1. Fabian Dorsch, Conceptual Qualia and Communication.
    The claim that consciousness is propositional has be widely debated in the past. For instance, it has been discussed whether consciousness is always propositional, whether all propositional consciousness is linguistic, whether propositional consciousness is always articulated, or whether there can be non-articulated propositions. In contrast, the question of whether propositions are conscious has not very often been the focus of attention.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Fabian Dorsch, Colour Realism and Colour Resemblance.
    Our various theories and conceptions of colours are influenced by the two main perspectives which we have on them. On the one hand, colours are directly given to us, in our conscious perceptual experiences, as features of objects in our environment. As part of these experiences, the colours instantiated by the objects are presented as having certain qualitative and certain categorial properties. Among the sensorily presented qualitative features of colours are, first of all, their various internal similarities and differences. Thus, (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Fabian Dorsch, Experience and Introspection.
    One central fact about hallucinations is that they may be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions. Indeed, it has been argued by M. G. F. Martin and others that the hallucinatory experiences concerned cannot — and need not — be characterised in any more positive general terms. This epistemic conception of hallucinations has been advocated as the best choice for proponents of experiential (or ‘na¨ıve realist’) disjunctivism — the view that perceptions and hallucinations differ essentially in their introspectible subjective characters. In this (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Fabian Dorsch, Experiential Rationalism.
    The main aim of my research project is to investigate the conscious and normative aspects of the mind and their complex relationships to each other. More concretely, the guiding theme of my research is to develop and defend Experiential Rationalism - the claim that our mental episodes are given to us as responses to and/or providers of reasons and, therefore, involve an experience of their rational nature. I intend to provide a detailed formulation and defense of this view and, in (...)
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Fabian Dorsch, Novels and Sounds.
    One of the central questions of the ontology of art is which ontological categories the diferent types of artworks – such as paintings, novels, pieces of musics, or etchings – belong to. The best answer to this question may then reveal whether all types of artworks belong to the same ontological category; and perhaps also how this fact may be related to their signifcance in our lives.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Fabian Dorsch, Our Subjective Perspective on Objective Reasons.
    In many respects, how things subjectively seem to us is distinct — and may diverge — from how they objectively are. My goal in this research project is to illustrate that this is in particular true of reasons, and to highlight some of the main metaphysical, epistemological and normative consequences of this truth. My central claim is that objective facts constitute reasons for us by speaking for or against certain beliefs, actions, evaluations or emotions; and that we recognise such facts (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Gianfranco Soldati & Fabian Dorsch, The Rational Dimension of Perceptual Phenomenology.
    One influential focus of the recent debates about non-sensory aspects of the phenomenal character of our mental episodes has been on their intellectual elements. More specifically, it has been on what it is like to think or judge something in opposition to seeing or imagining it, as well as on the extent to which how we subjectively experience our thoughts and judgements depends on how they present the world as being.1 Other non-sensory aspects of character, by contrast, have been largely (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Gianfranco Soldati & Fabian Dorsch, The Rational Dimension of Phenomenal Character.
    One influential focus in the recent debates on the non-sensory aspects of the phenomenal character of our mental episodes has been on their intellectual elements. More specifically, it has been on what it is like to think or judge something (in opposition to seeing or imagining it), as well as on the extent to which how we subjectively experience our thoughts and judgements depends on how they present the world as being.1 Other non-sensory — and non-intellectual — aspects of character, (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Fiona Macpherson, Martine Nida-Rümelin & Fabian Dorsch (eds.) (forthcoming). Phenomenal Presence.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Fabian Dorsch (2013). Announcing the Winner of the Estetika Essay Competition (Aesthetics in Central Europe). Estetika 50 (2):232-233.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Fabian Dorsch (2013). Cover (1-2013). Estetika 50 (L (1)):1-7.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Fabian Dorsch (2013). Cover (2-2013). Estetika 50 (2):138-144.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Fabian Dorsch (2013). Hume and the recreative imagination. Rivista di Estetica 53 (2):25-54.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Fabian Dorsch (2013). Hume e l'immaginazione ricreativa. Rivista di Estetica 53 (53):25-54.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Fabian Dorsch (2013). Non‐Inferentialism About Justification – The Case of Aesthetic Judgements. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):660-682.
    In this article, I present two objections against the view that aesthetic judgements – that is, judgemental ascriptions of aesthetic qualities like elegance or harmony – are justified non-inferentially. The first is that this view cannot make sense of our practice to support our aesthetic judgements by reference to lower-level features of the objects concerned. The second objection maintains that non-inferentialism about the justification of aesthetic judgements cannot explain why our aesthetic interest in artworks and other objects is limited to (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Fabian Dorsch (2012). Announcing the Second Estetika Essay Competition (Aesthetics in Central Europe). Estetika 49 (1):115-116.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Fabian Dorsch (2012). Cover (1-2012). Estetika 49 (2):129-134.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Fabian Dorsch (2012). Die Grenzen des asthetisch en Empirismus. Zeitschrift für Ästhetik Und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft 57 (2):269-281.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Fabian Dorsch (2012). The Unity of Imagining. Ontos.
    In this highly ambitious, wide ranging, immensely impressive and ground-breaking work Fabian Dorsch surveys just about every account of the imagination that has ever been proposed. He identifies five central types of imagining that any unifying theory must accommodate and sets himself the task of determining whether any theory of what imagining consists in covers these five paradigms. Focussing on what he takes to be the three main theories, and giving them each equal consideration, he faults the first two and (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Fabian Dorsch (2011). Emotional Imagining and Our Responses to Fiction. Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 46:153-176.
  21. Fabian Dorsch (2011). Transparency and Imagining Seeing. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):173-200.
    One of the most powerful arguments against intentionalism and in favour of disjunctivism about perceptual experiences has been formulated by M. G. F. Martin in his paper The Transparency of Experience. The overall structure of this argument may be stated in the form of a triad of claims which are jointly inconsistent.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Fabian Dorsch (2011). The Diversity of Disjunctivism. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):304-314.
  23. Fabian Dorsch (2010). Colour Resemblance and Colour Realism. Rivista di Estetica 50 (43):85-108.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Fabian Dorsch (2010). The Self-Presentational Error in Hallucinating. In Fiona MacPherson (ed.), Hallucination. Mit Press.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Fabian Dorsch (2010). The Unity of Hallucinations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):171-191.
    My primary aim in this article is to provide a philosophical account of the unity of hallucinations, which can capture both perceptual hallucinations (which are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions) and non-perceptual hallucinations (all others). Besides, I also mean to clarify further the division of labour and the nature of the collaboration between philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Assuming that the epistemic conception of hallucinations put forward by M. G. F. Martin and others is largely on the right track, I will (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Fabian Dorsch (2009). Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press. 38--71.
    What is the scope of our conscious mental agency, and how do we acquire self-knowledge of it? Both questions are addressed through an investigation of what best explains our inability to form judgemental thoughts in direct response to practical reasons. Contrary to what Williams and others have argued, it cannot be their subjection to a truth norm, given that our failure to adhere to such a norm need not undermine their status as judgemental. Instead, it is argued that we cannot (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Fabian Dorsch (2009). The Nature of Colours / Die Natur der Farben (in German). Ontos.
    Farben sind für uns sowohl objektive, als auch phänomenale Eigenschaften. In seinem Buch argumentiert Fabian Dorsch, daß keine ontologische Theorie der Farben diesen beiden Seiten unseres Farbbegriffes gerecht werden k ann. Statt dessen sollten wir akzeptieren, daß letzterer sich auf zwei verschiedene Arten von Eigenschaften bezieht: die repräsentierten Reflektanzeigenschaften von Gegenständen und die qualitativen Eigenschaften unserer Farbwahrnehmungen, die als sinnliche Gegebenheitsweisen ersterer fungieren. Die Natur der Farben gibt einen detaillierten Überblick über die zeitgenössischen philosophischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Theorien der Farben und (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Fabian Dorsch (2007). Sentimentalism and the Intersubjectivity of Aesthetic Evaluations. Dialectica 61 (3):417-446.
  29. Fabian Dorsch & Gianfranco Soldati, Intentionalism, Experiential and Phenomenal Error.
    In this paper we shall address some issues concerning the relation between the content and the nature of perceptual experiences. More precisely, we shall ask whether the claim that perceptual experiences are by nature relational implies that they cannot be intentional. As we shall see, much depends in this respect on the way one understands the possibility for one to be wrong about the phenomenal nature of one’s own experience. We shall describe and distinguish a series of errors that can (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Gianfranco Soldati & Fabian Dorsch, Conceptual Qualia and Communication.
    The claim that consciousness is propositional has be widely debated in the past. For instance, it has been discussed whether consciousness is always propositional, whether all propositional consciousness is linguistic, whether propositional consciousness is always articulated, or whether there can be non-articulated propositions. In contrast, the question of whether propositions are conscious has not very often been the focus of attention.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation