The principle of self-determination, as commonly established, is based on a formal and individualistic view of liberty rights. This perspective, however, is inconsistent with the needs of a community and particularly with the necessity to promote integration between subjects and a relatively stable social order. I propose a different perspective, the one that not only takes into account individuals but also relationships. In particular, what I propose is: 1) that any community is aware of a specific social order, which consists (...) of a set of practices, 2) that these practices express specific values, 3) that these values are the result of historical and cultural circumstances, 4) that they are subject to a permanent public debate, and finally 5) that the individual praxis can lead to recognition of rights only if it is consistent with these values. In this perspective there is no general liberty for self-determination of the subject outside specific relationships. It only could be stated that one has a practical liberty (not a right) to do and behave as one wants, but one's rights depend on the relationships in which the person is engaged. El principio de auto- determinación, como comúnmente se pretende, se plantea sobre una visión formal e individualista de los derechos de libertad. Esta perspectiva, sin embargo, es incompatible con las necesidades de una comunidad, y en particular con la necesidad de promover un orden social estable, y una integración entre los sujetos. Yo propongo una perspectiva diferente, que tenga en cuenta las relaciones y no solo los individuos. En particular, lo que argumento es que 1) cualquier comunidad se da cuenta de un determinado orden social, que es un conjunto de prácticas; 2) que estas prácticas expresan valores específicos; 3) que están sujetos a un debate público permanente y, finalmente, 5) que solo si la praxis individual es consistente con estos valores puede llevar al reconocimiento de los derechos. En esa perspectiva, no existe una libertad general para que un sujeto pueda auto-determinarse, sin considerar una relación específica. Solo se podría afirmar que uno tiene una libertad concreta (y no un derecho) de hacer y de actuar como quiera, pero los derechos dependen de las relaciones en las que participa la persona. (shrink)

The right to health implies, among other things, that individuals and communities must be allowed to have a voice in decisions concerning the definition of their well-being. The article argues for a more active participation of ethnocultural minorities in healthcare decisions and highlights the relevance of strategies aimed at creating a bottom-up engagement of people and groups, as well as of measures aimed at a broader organizational flexibility, in order to meet migrants’ and minorities’ needs. Finally, the article clarifies that (...) these strategies are not simply the outcome of a welcoming attitude of the Western healthcare system but may be interpreted as a specific duty resulting from the notion of “particularly vulnerable groups,” as formulated by the ECtHR in its case law: when vulnerable groups are at stake, every decision about state actions and rules regarding healthcare should start from an a consideration of the specific conditions and needs of people belonging to vulnerable minority groups. (shrink)

If we want to take firm the importance of universal principles in Bioethics, but at the same time we want to take seriously the importance of cultural diversity and pluralism, it is necessary to adopt a multifaceted approach. In the article I argue that a possible way out is a sort of hermeneutic approach, in order to reduce the ambivalence that stems from the dual recognition of cultural diversity and universal value of human rights. Through this approach conflicting principles and (...) traditions can be harmonized within a common framework, at least to some extent. Such an approach, in my perspective, can be implemented as a strategy of interpretation, which can hold together different conceptions and common principles. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a cautious multicultural approach, with specific regard to its implementation as a legal strategy. Such an approach is cautious only because, as I will demonstrate, it stems from an awareness that in some cases, and for different reasons (political, social, as well as legal), other multicultural policies based on minority or group rights do not work. In other words, I will argue for a strategy of recognition that is additional to others, and that can (...) be implemented and juxtaposed with others, in order to offer a better defence of those rights and claims, which other policies do not recognise (or recognise insufficiently). (shrink)

In this essay I will try to demonstrate that the principle of self-determination is based on a formal and individualistic view of liberty rights. I also propose a different perspective that takes into account the relationships rather than the individual. I will show how this result can only be achieved through a different ascription of rights to individuals: in particular, I will try to demonstrate 1) that any social practices express specific values, 2) that these values are the result of (...) historical and cultural circumstances, 3) that they are subject to an ongoing public debate, and finally 4) that only if the individual praxis is consistent with these values can it lead to recognition of rights. (shrink)

The notion of vulnerable groups has gained relevance in international legal instruments while being criticised in philosophical literature for its disabling potential and disempowering consequences. The article argues that the category of group vulnerability should not be abandoned, being an opportunity for resistance, visibility, and a place for dissent: vulnerable groups can both function as a sounding board for claims and make demands for recognition, resetting the political agenda and the topics of public debate, and allow the level of collective (...) needs to emerge from the level of individual interests, thereby guaranteeing a fairer distribution of resources. For this purpose, the article provides two definitions of group vulnerability that avoid both the risks of essentialism and of labelling outcomes. The article also analyses the political value of vulnerable groups, highlighting that it is conceivable as an enabling condition, a source of political agency and mobilisation. (shrink)