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Profile: Fabrice Teroni (University of Berne)
  1. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (forthcoming). Emotions and Well-Being. Philosophical Topics.
    It is striking that for each major theory of well-being, there exists a companion theory of the emotions. Thus, to classical hedonic views of well-being, there corresponds no less classical pure feeling views of the emotions; to desire views that conceive of well-being in terms of desire satisfaction, there corresponds a variety of theories approaching the emotions in terms of the satisfaction/frustration of desires; and finally, to so called objective list theories of well-being, there corresponds a variety of theories that (...)
     
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  2. Fabrice Teroni (forthcoming). Getting a Grip on Emotional Modes. In Alix Cohen & Robert Stern (eds.), Thinking About The Emotions: A Philosophical History. Oxford.
  3. Fabrice Teroni (forthcoming). Le plaisir de manger du chocolat. In Olivier Massin & Anne Meylan (eds.), Aristote chez les Helvètes: Onze essais de métaphysique helvétique. Ithaque.
    A l’instar de bien d’autres activités, manger du chocolat suscite du plaisir. Mais comment articuler de manière satisfaisante les différents sens en jeu dans l’ingestion d’un aliment – le goût, bien sûr, mais aussi l’odorat, l’ouïe et le toucher – avec ce plaisir ? Selon une approche traditionnelle, ce dernier n’est rien de plus qu’une expérience ineffable qui, si elle s’avère accompagner certaines stimulations sensorielles ou des activités plus intellectuelles, ne porte sur rien du tout. Est-ce plausible ? Ou faudrait-il (...)
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  4. Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna, Emotions and Values. The Handbook of Value.
    What is the role of emotions in elucidating the nature of value? For example, should dangerousness be understood in term of the fear response? What is the role of emotions in our getting access to values? For example, what may be the role of fear in becoming aware that a given animal is dangerous? What value do emotions have? For example, is fear of special value because it helps behaving appropriately towards its object? We shall take up these three questions (...)
     
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  5. Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (forthcoming). In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations? In Cain Todd & Sabine Roeser (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford.
    In this chapter, we first introduce the idea that emotions are evaluations. Next, we explore two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgments. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. We explain why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue (...)
     
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  6. Fabrice Teroni, Fictions, émotions et araignées au plafond. Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.
    Le fameux paradoxe de la fiction (Radford 1975) a suscité maintes interprétations. L’une des distinctions importantes qui affleure bien souvent au sein de cette littérature, pour se voir presque aussitôt négligée, est celle entre les deux questions suivantes : « comment les émotions peuvent-elles être suscitées par des œuvres de fiction ? » et « les émotions suscitées par de telles œuvres peuvent-elles être rationnelles ? » Dans ce qui suit, je me concentrerai exclusivement sur la seconde de ces questions (...)
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  7. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2012). From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements. Dialogue 51 (1):55-77.
    ABSTRACT: Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then investigate the (...)
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  8. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2012/2011). The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge.
    The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? (...)
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  9. Fabrice Teroni (2012). Memory, A Philosophical Study. By Sven Bernecker. (New York: Oxford UP, 2010. Pp. Viii + 276. Price $65.00.). Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):626-628.
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  10. Julien Deonna, Fabrice Teroni & Raffaele Rodogno (2011). In Defense of Shame. Oxford University Press.
    Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic emotion? Researchers in disciplines as different as psychology, philosophy, and anthropology have thought so. But what is the nature of shame and why are claims regarding its social nature and moral standing interesting and important? Do they tell us anything worthwhile about the value of shame and its potential legal and political applications? -/- In this book, Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni propose an original philosophical account of (...)
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  11. Christine Tappolet, Fabrice Teroni & Anita Konzelmann Ziv (eds.) (2011). Les Ombres de L'Âme: Penser les Émotions Négatives. Markus Haller.
    Les émotions peuvent être pénibles, voire néfastes. Pensons par exemple à la peur, la colère, la haine, la jalousie ou au mépris. De telles émotions sont souvent qualifiées de négatives. Mais que sont les émotions négatives et comment se distinguent-elles des émotions positives ? Plus généralement, qu’impliquent-elles pour notre compréhension des émotions ? Et quels sont concrètement leurs effets sur nos pensées et nos vies ? De plus, comment analyser l’ambivalence affective, comme quand on ressent à la fois de l’amour (...)
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  12. Fabrice Teroni (2011). Plus Ou Moins: Emotions Et Valence. In Christine Tappolet, Fabrice Teroni & Anita Konzelmann Ziv (eds.), Les ombres de l'âme: Penser les émotions négatives. Markus Haller.
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  13. Fabrice Teroni, The Epistemological Disunity of Memory. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan.
    A long-standing debate surrounds the question as to what justifies memory judgements. According to the Past Reason Theory, these judgements are justified by the reasons we had to make identical judgements in the past, whereas the Present Reason Theory claims that these justifying reasons are to be found at the time we pass the memory judgements. In this paper, I defend the original claim that, far from being exclusive, these two theories should be applied to different kinds of memory judgements. (...)
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  14. Fabrice Teroni & Otto Bruun (2011). Shame, Guilt and Morality. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2):223-245.
    The connection between shame, guilt and morality is the topic of many recent debates. A broad tendency consists in attributing a higher moral status and a greater moral relevance to guilt, a claim motivated by arguments that tap into various areas of morality and moral psychology. The Pro-social Argument has it that guilt is, contrary to shame, morally good since it promotes pro-social behaviour. Three other arguments claim that only guilt has the requisite connection to central moral concepts: the Responsibility (...)
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  15. Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (2011). Is Shame a Social Emotion. In Anita Konzelmann Ziv, Keith Lehrer & Hans Bernard Schmid (eds.), Self-Evaluation: Affective and Social Grounds of Intentionality. Springer.
    In this article, we present, assess and give reasons to reject the popular claim that shame is essentially social. We start by presenting several theses which the social claim has motivated in the philosophical literature. All of them, in their own way, regard shame as displaying a structure in which ‘others’ play an essential role. We argue that while all these theses are true of some important families of shame episodes, none of them generalize so as to motivate the conclusion (...)
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  16. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2009). Taking Affective Explanations to Heart. Social Science Information 48 (3):359-377.
    In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositions) is to ascribe a certain stability to the subject’s moods (episodes). The rationale for this (...)
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  17. Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (2009). The Self of Shame. In Mikko Salmela & Verena Mayer (eds.), Emotions, Ethics, and Authenticity. John Benjamins.
    The evaluations involved in shame are, intuitively at least, of many different sorts. One feels ashamed when seen by others doing something one would prefer doing alone (social shame). One is ashamed because of one’s ugly nose (shame about permanent traits). One feels ashamed of one’s dishonest behavior (moral shame), etc. The variety of evaluations in shame is striking; and it is even more so if one takes a cross-cultural perspective on this emotion. So the difficulty – the “unity problem” (...)
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  18. Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (2009). L'intentionnalité des Émotions: Du Corps aux Valeurs. Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales 47 (144):25-41.
  19. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2008). Differentiating Shame From Guilt. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1063-1400..
    How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a) shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; (b) shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; (c) shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and (d) shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting the relevant empirical evidence, we (...)
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  20. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2008). Shame's Guilt Disproved. Critical Quarterly 50 (4):65-72.
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  21. Fabrice Teroni (2007). Emotions and Formal Objects. Dialectica 61 (3):395-415.
    It is often claimed that emotions are linked to formal objects. But what are formal objects? What roles do they play? According to some philosophers, formal objects are axiological properties which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. In this paper, I evaluate these claims in order to answer the above questions. I first give reasons to doubt the thesis that formal objects individuate emotions. Second, I distinguish different ways in which emotions are intelligible and argue that (...)
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  22. Fabrice Teroni (2005). Gianni Vattimo, après la chrétienté. Pour un christianisme non religieux, Paris, calmann-lévy, 2004, 205 P. Revue de Théologie Et de Philosophie 137:79.
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  23. Fabrice Teroni (2005). Meinong on Memory. In Mark Textor (ed.), Early Analytic Philosophy: The Austrian Contribution. Routledge.
    Meinong’s early essay, Zur erkenntnistheoretischen Würdigung des Gedächtnisses, provides, despite its brevity, a very important discussion of mnesic phenomena. In this paper, I investigate some points I believe to be of particular interest: some of them are briefly broached by Meinong, whereas others form an important part of his argument. Moreover, I will connect the discussion with more recent concerns in analytical philosophy. This presentation is structured in the following way. In section (1), I present Meinong’s definition of memory, and (...)
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  24. Fabrice Teroni (2005). Philosophie de l'esprit. Textes réunis par D. Fisette et P. Poirier. Volume 1 : Psychologie du sens commun et sciences de l'esprit, Vrin, 2002, 381 pages. Volume 2 : Problèmes et perspectives, Vrin, 2003, 380 pages.Philosophie de l'esprit. Textes réunis par D. Fisette et P. Poirier. Volume 1 : Psychologie du sens commun et sciences de l'esprit, Vrin, 2002, 381 pages. Volume 2 : Problèmes et perspectives, Vrin, 2003, 380 pages. [REVIEW] Philosophiques 32 (1):274-277.
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