Search results for 'Fact' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Anna Giustina & Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Fact-Introspecton, Thing-Introspection, and Inner Awareness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7:1-22.
    Phenomenal beliefs are beliefs about the phenomenal properties of one's concurrent conscious states. It is an article of common sense that such beliefs tend to be justified. Philosophers have been less convinced. It is sometimes claimed that phenomenal beliefs are not on the whole justified, on the grounds that they are typically based on introspection and introspection is often unreliable. Here we argue that such reasoning must guard against a potential conflation between two distinct introspective phenomena, which we call (...)-introspection and thing -introspection; arguments for the unreliability of introspection typically target only the former, leaving the reliability of the latter untouched. In addition, we propose a theoretical framework for understanding thing -introspection that may have a surprising consequence: thing -introspection is not only reliable, but outright infallible. This points at a potential line of defense of phenomenal-belief justification, which here we only sketch very roughly. (shrink)
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  2. Owen Ware (2014). Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (32).
    Kant’s doctrine of the Fact of Reason is one of the most perplexing aspects of his moral philosophy. The aim of this paper is to defend Kant’s doctrine from the common charge of dogmatism. My defense turns on a previously unexplored analogy to the notion of ‘matters of fact’ popularized by members of the Royal Society in the seventeenth century. In their work, ‘facts’ were beyond doubt, often referring to experimental effects one could witness first hand. While Kant (...)
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  3.  91
    John Corcoran (2009). Sentence, Proposition, Judgment, Statement, and Fact: Speaking About the Written English Used in Logic. In W. A. Carnielli (ed.), The Many Sides of Logic. College Publications 71-103.
    The five English words—sentence, proposition, judgment, statement, and fact—are central to coherent discussion in logic. However, each is ambiguous in that logicians use each with multiple normal meanings. Several of their meanings are vague in the sense of admitting borderline cases. In the course of displaying and describing the phenomena discussed using these words, this paper juxtaposes, distinguishes, and analyzes several senses of these and related words, focusing on a constellation of recommended senses. One of the purposes of this (...)
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  4. James R. Hofmann & Bruce H. Weber (2003). The Fact of Evolution: Implications for Science Education. Science and Education 12 (8):729-760.
    Creationists who object to evolution in the science curriculum of public schools often cite Jonathan Well’s book Icons of Evolution in their support (Wells 2000). In the third chapter of his book Wells claims that neither paleontological nor molecular evidence supports the thesis that the history of life is an evolutionary process of descent from preexisting ancestors. We argue that Wells inappropriately relies upon ambiguities inherent in the term ‘Darwinian’ and the phrase ‘Darwin’s theory’. Furthermore, he does not (...)
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  5. Holmes Rolston (2004). Caring for Nature: From Fact to Value, From Respect to Reverence. Zygon 39 (2):277-302.
    . Despite the classical prohibition of moving from fact to value, encounter with the biodiversity and plenitude of being in evolutionary natural history moves us to respect life, even to reverence it. Darwinian accounts are value-laden and necessary for understanding life at the same time that Darwinian theory fails to provide sufficient cause for the historically developing diversity and increasing complexity on Earth. Earth is a providing ground; matter and energy on Earth support life, but distinctive to life is (...)
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  6.  27
    Sem de Maagt (2014). In Defence of Fact-Dependency. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):443-462.
    G.A. Cohen and David Estlund claim that, because of their fact-dependent nature, constructivist theories of justice do not qualify as moral theories about fundamental values such as justice. In this paper, I defend fact-dependent, constructivist theories of justice against this fact-independency critique. I argue that constructivists can invoke facts among the grounds for accepting fundamental principles of justice while maintaining that the foundation of morality has to be non-empirical. My claim is that constructivists ultimately account for the (...)
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  7.  8
    Victor Eugen Gelan (2014). Fact and Essence. Factual vs Eidetic in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Revista de Filosofie (Romania):273–295.
    The purpose of this paper is to show that the dichotomy between factual and eidetic represents one of the fundamental presuppositions of the Husserlian phenomenology. No authentic understanding of the phenomenological reduction and of its constitutive role for the transcendental phenomenology is possible without a proper understanding of this dichotomy and of its relevance for the transcendental problem. One of the questions I am going to discuss in this paper is the following: Could it be possible that both the dichotomy (...)
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  8.  38
    Jos Lehmann & Aldo Gangemi (2007). An Ontology of Physical Causation as a Basis for Assessing Causation in Fact and Attributing Legal Responsibility. Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (3):301-321.
    Computational machineries dedicated to the attribution of legal responsibility should be based on (or, make use of) a stack of definitions relating the notion of legal responsibility to a number of suitably chosen causal notions. This paper presents a general analysis of legal responsibility and of causation in fact based on Hart and Honoré’s work. Some physical aspects of causation in fact are then treated within the “lite” version of DOLCE foundational ontology written in OWL-DL, a standard description (...)
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  9.  38
    John H. Zammito (2012). The Last Dogma of Positivism: Historicist Naturalism and the Fact/Value Dichotomy. Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (3):305-338.
    Has the emergence of post-positivism in philosophy of science changed the terms of the “is/ought” dichotomy? If it has demonstrated convincingly that there are no “facts” apart from the theoretical frames and evaluative standards constructing them, can such a cordon sanitaire really be upheld between “facts” and values? The point I wish to stress is that philosophy of science has had a central role in constituting and imposing the fact/value dichotomy and a revolution in the philosophy of (...)
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  10.  19
    J. P. Smit (2003). The Supposed “Inseparability” of Fact and Value. South African Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):51-62.
    A wide variety of philosophers seem to agree that there is something dubious about the distinction between fact and value. This paper evaluates some of the arguments made for such a contention. It is argued that only the crudest form of pragmatism leads to a conflation of fact and value. Other arguments against the fact/value distinction, mostly drawn from Putnam's Reason, Truth and History, are examined in order to show that they are either false or trivial. S. (...)
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  11.  48
    Bryan Lueck (2009). Kant's Fact of Reason as Source of Normativity. Inquiry 52 (6):596 – 608.
    In _The Sources of Normativity_, Christine M. Korsgaard argues that unconditional obligation can be accounted for in terms of practical identity. My argument in this paper is that practical identity cannot play this foundational role. More specifically, I interpret Korsgaard's argument as beginning with something analogous to Kant's fact of reason, viz. with the fact that our minds are reflective. I then try to show that her determination of this fact is inadequate and that this causes the (...)
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  12.  9
    Wojciech Krysztofiak (2015). Hyper-Slingshot. Is Fact-Arithmetic Possible? Foundations of Science 20 (1):59-76.
    The paper presents a new argument supporting the ontological standpoint according to which there are no mathematical facts in any set theoretic model of arithmetical theories. It may be interpreted as showing that it is impossible to construct fact-arithmetic. The importance of this conclusion arises in the context of cognitive science. In the paper, a new type of slingshot argument is presented, which is called hyper-slingshot. The difference between meta-theoretical hyper-slingshots and conventional slingshots consists in the fact that (...)
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  13.  11
    Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2011). Reasons and Two Kinds of Fact. In Sliwinski Rysiek & Svensson Frans (eds.), Neither/Nor - Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday. Uppsala Philosophical Studies 95 - 113.
    Reasons are facts, i.e., they are constituted by facts. Given a popular view that conceives of facts as thin abstract rather than thick concrete entities, the dichotomy between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons is not particularly problematic. It is argued that it would be preferable if we could understand the dichotomy even if we had a thick noton of fact in mind. It would be preferable because it is better if our notion of a reason is consistent with a wider (...)
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  14.  26
    L. Morawski (1999). Law, Fact and Legal Language. Law and Philosophy 18 (5):461-473.
    This paper discusses the difference between the factual and the legal, both as to terms and as to statements, on the analogy of the methodologists' distinction of the observational and the theoretical. No absolute distinction exists, and pure `brute facts' do not exist in law because of the socialisation of physical world and juridification of the social world.; also, the effect of evidentiary constraints. Law/fact distinction depends on `applicability rules'. The problem of `mixed terms' is partly a matter of (...)
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  15.  13
    G. Marshall (1999). Provisional Concepts and Definitions of Fact. Law and Philosophy 18 (5):447-460.
    The paper explains and differentiates the concept of `fact' in the legal setting. Fact and evidence, fact/falsity distinguished; fact and law considered -- a real difference or a pragmatic device? Questions of fact and degree considered, in themselves and in the context of jury trial and of appeals. Primary fact, factual inferences from primary fact, questions of classification of fact are considered. Whether inference is supported by evidence, and whether classification is correct (...)
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  16.  4
    Zohar Livnat (2009). The Concept of Scientific Fact: Perelman and Beyond. [REVIEW] Argumentation 23 (3):375-386.
    This paper applies the argumentative perspective to the concept of scientific fact by combining the rhetorical and the sociological perspectives. The scientific fact is presented as an entity having both an epistemic and a social meaning, and the scientific paper is presented as a discourse that has both an epistemic value and role related to knowledge and to the description of the ‘world,’ and a social value, fulfilling social roles within its relevant discourse community. The discussion leads to (...)
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  17. Bryan Lueck (forthcoming). A Fact, As It Were: Obligation, Indifference, and the Question of Ethics. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy.
    According to Immanuel Kant, the objective validity of obligation is given as a fact of reason, which forces itself upon us and which requires no deduction of the kind that he had provided for the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. This fact grounds a moral philosophy that treats obligation as a good that trumps all others and that presents the moral subject as radically responsible, singled out by an imperatival address. Based on conceptions of indifference and (...)
     
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  18.  49
    Bryan Lueck (2011). The Fact of Sense: Nancy and Kant on the Withdrawn Origin of Moral Experience. MonoKL 10:216-230.
  19.  8
    Carlos Kh Wong, Cindy Lk Lam, Wai‐Lun Law, Jensen Tc Poon, Pierre Chan, Dora Lw Kwong & Janice Tsang (2012). Validity and Reliability Study on Traditional Chinese FACT‐C in Chinese Patients with Colorectal Neoplasm. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (6):1186-1195.
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  20.  27
    Toru Tani (2008). The Ego, the Other and the Primal Fact. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (4):385-399.
    Japan has absorbed many western ideas since the late nineteenth century, but Japanese philosophers have often been reluctant to accept the western idea of the “I” in its entirety. The I transgresses to the Other more easily than western philosophies think and imports what belongs to the Other as his own. How is this possible? Husserl attempted to explain the constitution of the Other by the intentionality that goes from the I to the Other, mediated by the body. However, Husserl (...)
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  21.  4
    H. Gurnee (1937). A Comparison of Collective and Individual Judgments of Fact. Journal of Experimental Psychology 21 (1):106.
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  22.  9
    Kevin McKenzie (2001). Fact and the Narratives of War: Produced Undecidability in Accounts of Armed Conflict. [REVIEW] Human Studies 24 (3):187-209.
    This paper explores how providing the inferential basis to argue for a range of equally plausible interpretations features as a way of managing issues of accountability in talk about armed confrontation. We examine conversation produced in open-ended interviews with diplomatic representatives of the United States and Great Britain in discussion about those countries'' involvement in the Persian Gulf conflict of 1990–91. By providing the inferential basis upon which to argue for a range of equally plausible interpretative scenarios, speakers attend to (...)
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  23. Nelson Goodman (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press.
    In his new foreword to this edition, Hilary Putnam forcefully rejects these nativist claims.
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  24. John S. Wilkins & Paul E. Griffiths (forthcoming). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in Three Domains: Fact, Value, and Religion. In James Maclaurin Greg Dawes (ed.), A New Science of Religion. Routledge
    Ever since Darwin people have worried about the sceptical implications of evolution. If our minds are products of evolution like those of other animals, why suppose that the beliefs they produce are true, rather than merely useful? We consider this problem for beliefs in three different domains: religion, morality, and commonsense and scientific claims about matters of empirical fact. We identify replies to evolutionary scepticism that work in some domains but not in others. One reply is that evolution can (...)
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  25. Jody Azzouni & Otávio Bueno (2008). On What It Takes for There to Be No Fact of the Matter. Noûs 42 (4):753-769.
    Philosophers are very fond of making non-factualist claims—claims to the effect that there is no fact of the matter as to whether something is the case. But can these claims be coherently stated in the context of classical logic? Some care is needed here, we argue, otherwise one ends up denying a tautology or embracing a contradiction. In the end, we think there are only two strategies available to someone who wants to be a non-factualist about something, and remain (...)
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  26. Shelley Weinberg (2012). The Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness in Locke's Theory of Personal Identity. Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (3):387-415.
    Locke’s theory of personal identity was philosophically groundbreaking for its attempt to establish a non-substantial identity condition. Locke states, “For the same consciousness being preserv’d, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv’d” (II.xxvii.13). Many have interpreted Locke to think that consciousness identifies a self both synchronically and diachronically by attributing thoughts and actions to a self. Thus, many have attributed to Locke either a memory theory or an appropriation theory of personal identity. But the former (...)
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  27.  10
    Murali Ramachandran (forthcoming). Knowledge-to-Fact Arguments (Bootstrapping, Closure, Paradox and KK). Analysis:anw018.
    The leading idea of this article is that one cannot acquire knowledge of any non-epistemic fact by virtue of knowing that one that knows something. The lines of reasoning involved in the surprise exam paradox and in Williamson’s reductio of the KK-principle, which demand that one can, are thereby undermined, and new type of counter-example to epistemic closure emerges.
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  28. Hartry Field (2003). No Fact of the Matter. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):457 – 480.
    Are there questions for which 'there is no determinate fact of the matter' as to which answer is correct? Most of us think so, but there are serious difficulties in maintaining the view, and in explaining the idea of determinateness in a satisfactory manner. The paper argues that to overcome the difficulties, we need to reject the law of excluded middle; and it investigates the sense of 'rejection' that is involved. The paper also explores the logic that is required (...)
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  29.  25
    Edward Hall (2013). Political Realism and Fact-Sensitivity. Res Publica 19 (2):173-181.
    Political realists complain that much contemporary political philosophy is insufficiently attentive to various facts about politics yet some political philosophers insist that any critique of normative claims on grounds of unrealism is misplaced. In this paper I focus on the methodological position G.A. Cohen champions in order assess the extent to which this retort succeeds in nullifying the realist critique of contemporary political philosophy. I argue that Cohen’s work does not succeed in doing so because the political principles that we (...)
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  30.  23
    Lauren S. Purnell & R. Edward Freeman (2012). Stakeholder Theory, Fact/Value Dichotomy, and the Normative Core: How Wall Street Stops the Ethics Conversation. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 109 (1):109-116.
    A review of the stakeholder literature reveals that the concept of "normative core" can be applied in three main ways: philosophical justification of stakeholder theory, theoretical governing principles of a firm, and managerial beliefs/values influencing the underlying narrative of business. When considering the case of Wall Street, we argue that the managerial application of normative core reveals the imbedded nature of the fact/value dichotomy. Problems arise when the work of the fact/value dichotomy contributes to a closed-core (...)
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  31. Alex Broadbent (2009). Fact and Law in the Causal Inquiry. Legal Theory 15 (3):173-191.
    This paper takes it as a premise that a distinction between matters of fact and of law is important in the causal inquiry. But it argues that separating factual and legal causation as different elements of liability is not the best way to implement the fact/law distinction. What counts as a cause-in-fact is partly a legal question; and certain liability-limiting doctrines under the umbrella of “legal causation” depend on the application of factual-causal concepts. The contrastive account of (...)
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  32.  4
    Murali Ramachandran (2016). Knowledge-to-Fact Arguments (Bootstrapping, Closure, Paradox and KK). Analysis 76 (2):142-149.
    The leading idea of this article is that one cannot acquire knowledge of any non-epistemic fact by virtue of knowing that one that knows something. The lines of reasoning involved in the surprise exam paradox and in Williamson’s reductio of the KK-principle, which demand that one can, are thereby undermined, and new type of counter-example to epistemic closure emerges.
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  33.  4
    Joseph E. Uscinski & Ryden W. Butler (2013). The Epistemology of Fact Checking. Critical Review 25 (2):162-180.
    ABSTRACT Fact checking has become a prominent facet of political news coverage, but it employs a variety of objectionable methodological practices, such as treating a statement containing multiple facts as if it were a single fact and categorizing as accurate or inaccurate predictions of events yet to occur. These practices share the tacit presupposition that there cannot be genuine political debate about facts, because facts are unambiguous and not subject to interpretation. Therefore, when the black-and-white facts?as they appear (...)
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  34. Hilary Putnam (2002). The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Harvard University Press.
    In this book, one of the world's preeminent philosophers takes issue with an idea that has found an all-too-prominent place in popular culture and philosophical ...
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  35. Mark Balaguer (2011). Is There a Fact of the Matter Between Direct Reference Theory and (Neo-)Fregeanism? Philosophical Studies 154 (1):53-78.
    It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism can be developed in numerous ways, they can be developed in essentially parallel ways; that is, for any (plausible) way of developing direct reference theory, there is an essentially parallel way of developing neo-Fregeanism, and vice (...)
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  36.  36
    William Ramsey (2010). How Not to Build a Hybrid: Simulation Vs. Fact-Finding. Philosophical Psychology 23 (6):775-795.
    In accounting for the way we explain and predict behavior, two major positions are the theory-theory and the simulation theory. Recently, several authors have advocated a hybrid position, where elements of both theory and simulation are part of the account. One popular strategy for incorporating simulation is to note that we sometimes assign mental states to others by performing cognitive operations in ourselves that mirror what has occurred in the target. In this article, I argue that this way of thinking (...)
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  37. Amalia Amaya (2008). Justification, Coherence, and Epistemic Responsibility in Legal Fact-Finding. Episteme 5 (3):pp. 306-319.
    This paper argues for a coherentist theory of the justification of evidentiary judgments in law, according to which a hypothesis about the events being litigated is justified if and only if it is such that an epistemically responsible fact-finder might have accepted it as justified by virtue of its coherence in like circumstances. It claims that this version of coherentism has the resources to address a main problem facing coherence theories of evidence and legal proof, namely, the problem of (...)
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  38. Benj Hellie (2007). That Which Makes the Sensation of Blue a Mental Fact: Moore on Phenomenal Relationism. European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):334-66.
    I interpret the anti-idealist manoeuverings of the second half of Moore's 'The refutation of idealism', material as widely cited for its discussion of 'transparency' and 'diaphanousness' as it is deeply obscure. The centerpiece of these manoeuverings is a phenomenological argument for a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, 'that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact' is a non-intentional relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view (...)
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  39. Baber Johansen (2003). Apostasy as Objective and Depersonalized Fact: Two Recent Egyptian Court Judgments. Social Research: An International Quarterly 70 (3):687-710.
    The jurists of classical Islamic Law defined the interior forum as a limit to the religious validity of the sentences of Muslim judges , because these have neither access to God's knowledge nor to the individual believer’s conscience and motivations. They can base their decisions solely on exterior appearances and can, therefore, neither be sure that their judgments correspond to the facts nor to the intentions and memories of the individuals concerned. This holds especially true for questions of belief and (...)
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  40.  33
    Sami Pihlström (2010). Toward a Pragmatically Naturalist Metaphysics of the Fact-Value Entanglement. Journal of Philosophical Research 35:323-352.
    This paper examines the metaphysical status of the fact-value entanglement. According to Hilary Putnam, among others, this is a major theme in both classical and recent pragmatism, but its relevance obviously extends beyond pragmatism scholarship. The pragmatic naturalist must make sense of the entanglement thesis within a broadly non-reductively naturalist account of reality. Two rival options for such metaphysics are discussed: values may be claimed to emerge from facts (or normativity from factuality), or fact and value may be (...)
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  41.  37
    Colin Johnston (2007). The Unity of a Tractarian Fact. Synthese 156 (2):231-251.
    It is not immediately clear from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus how to connect his idea there of an object with the logical ontologies of Frege and Russell. Toward clarification on this matter, this paper compares Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s versions of the thesis of an atomic fact that it is a complex composition. The claim arrived at is that whilst Russell (at times at least) has one particular of the elements of a fact – the relation – responsible for the unity (...)
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  42.  61
    Stephen Read (2005). The Unity of the Fact. Philosophy 80 (3):317-342.
    What binds the constituents of a state of affairs together and provides unity to the fact they constitute? I argue that the fact that they are related is basic and fundamental. This is the thesis of Factualism: the world is a world of facts. I draw three corollaries: first, that the Identity of truth is mistaken, in conflating what represents (the proposition) with what is represented (the fact). Secondly, a popular interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, due to Steinus, (...)
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  43.  80
    Stephen W. Ball (1988). Evolution, Explanation, and the Fact/Value Distinction. Biology and Philosophy 3 (3):317-348.
    Though modern non-cognitivists in ethics characteristically believe that values are irreducible to facts, they nevertheless believe that values are determined by facts, viz., those specified in functionalist, explanatory theories of the evolutionary origin of morality. The present paper probes the consistency of this position. The conventionalist theories of Hume and Harman are examined, and are seen not to establish a tight determinative reduction of values to facts. This result is illustrated by reference to recent theories of the sociobiological mechanisms involved (...)
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  44. Lars Bergström (2002). Putnam on the Fact-Value Dichotomy. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):117-129.
    In Reason, Truth and History and certain related writings, Hilary Putnam attacked the fact-value distinction. This paper criticizes his arguments and defends the distinction. Putnam claims that factual statements presuppose values, that “the empirical world depends upon our criteria of rational acceptability,” and that “we must have criteria of rational acceptability to even have an empirical world.” The present paper argues that these claims are mistaken.
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  45.  1
    John A. Schuster & Judit Brody (2013). Descartes and Sunspots: Matters of Fact and Systematizing Strategies in the Principia Philosophiae. Annals of Science 70 (1):1-45.
    Summary Descartes' two treatises of corpuscular-mechanical natural philosophy?Le Monde (1633) and the Principia philosophiae (1644/1647)?differ in many respects. Some historians of science have studied their significantly different theories of matter and elements. Others have routinely noted that the Principia cites much evidence regarding magnetism, sunspots, novae and variable stars which is absent from Le Monde. We argue that far from being unrelated or even opposed intellectual practices inside the Principles, Descartes' moves in matter and element theory and his adoption of (...)
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  46.  56
    Pauline Kleingeld (2010). Moral Consciousness and the 'Fact of Reason'. In Andrews Reath & Jens Timmermann (eds.), Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press
    At the heart of the argument of the Critique of Practical Reason, one finds Kant’s puzzling and much-criticized claim that the consciousness of the moral law can be called a ‘fact of reason’. In this essay, I clarify the meaning and the importance of this claim. I correct misunderstandings of the term ‘Factum’, situate the relevant passages within their argumentative context, and argue that Kant’s argument can be given a consistent reading on the basis of which the main questions (...)
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  47.  4
    Bruce H. Weber (2007). Fact, Phenomenon, and Theory in the Darwinian Research Tradition. Biological Theory 2 (2):168-178.
    From its inception Darwinian evolutionary biology has been seen as having a problematic relationship of fact and theory. While the forging of the modern evolutionary synthesis resolved most of these issues for biologists, critics continue to argue that natural selection and common descent are “only theories.” Much of the confusion engendered by the “evolution wars” can be clarified by applying the concept of phenomena, inferred from fact, and explained by theories, thus locating where legitimate dissent may still exist. (...)
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  48. Daniel Kading (1965). Moral Action, Ignorance of Fact, and Inability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (3):333-355.
    I TRY TO SHOW THAT CONTRARY TO PRICHARD IN "DUTY AND\nIGNORANCE OF FACT" THERE ARE GOOD REASONS FOR MAINTAINING\nTHAT IN CERTAIN RESPECTS AT LEAST WE MAY BE UNAVOIDABLY\nIGNORANT OF OUR DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS, AND OF WHAT IS\nRIGHT AND WRONG GENERALLY. WHY DID PRICHARD STAND SO FIRMLY\nAGAINST UNAVOIDABLE IGNORANCE OF OUR DUTY? I SUGGEST THAT\nHE IS REALLY THINKING ABOUT ONE OF THE CONDITIONS FOR BEING\nBLAMEWORTHY, FOR CERTAINLY IT WOULD BE CONTRADICTORY TO\nSPEAK OF SOMEONE'S BEING BLAMEWORTHY BY VIRTUE OF\nUNAVOIDABLE IGNORANCE. I (...)
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  49. J. Budziszewski (2011). The Line Through the Heart: Natural Law as Fact, Theory, and Sign of Contradiction. Intercollegiate Studies Institute.
    Natural law as fact, theory, and sign of contradiction -- The second tablet project -- The mystery of what? -- The natural, the connatural, and the unnatural -- Accept no imitations: natural law vs. naturalism -- Thou shalt not kill . . . whom? the meaning of the person -- Capital punishment: the case for justice -- Constitution vs. constitutionalism -- Constitutional metaphysics -- The liberal, illiberal religion.
     
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    Neil Thomason (1992). Could Lakatos, Even with Zahar's Criterion for Novel Fact, Evaluate the Copernican Research Programme? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (2):161-200.
    Why did Copernicus's research programme supersede Ptolemy's?’, Lakatos and Zahar argued that, on Zahar's criterion for ‘novel fact’, Copernican theory was objectively scientifically superior to Ptolemaic theory. They are mistaken, Lakatos and Zahar applied Zahar's criterion to ‘a historical thought-experiment’—fictional rather than real history. Further, in their fictional history, they compared Copernicus to Eudoxus rather than Ptolemy, ignored Tycho Brahe, and did not consider facts that would be novel for geostatic theories. When Zahar's criterion is applied to real history, (...)
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