Search results for 'Facts and values' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Peter Albert Railton (2003). Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence. Cambridge University Press.score: 180.0
    In our everyday lives we struggle with the notions of why we do what we do and the need to assign values to our actions. Somehow, it seems possible through experience and life to gain knowledge and understanding of such matters. Yet once we start delving deeper into the concepts that underwrite these domains of thought and actions, we face a philosophical disappointment. In contrast to the world of facts, values and morality seem insecure, uncomfortably situated, easily (...)
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  2. M. C. Doeser & J. N. Kraay (eds.) (1986). Facts and Values: Philosophical Reflections From Western and Non-Western Perspectives. M. Nijhoff.score: 168.0
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  3. Susan M. Easton (1977). Facts, Values and Marxism. Studies in East European Thought 17 (2):117-134.score: 160.0
    From the foregoing discussion we can note that whilst Marx transcends the fact-value distinction he embraces neither a scientistic approach nor a moral theory. Rather he gives a sociological account of morality, illustrating that description and evaluation cannot be separated and that juridical conceptions need to be understood in relation to the mode of production in which they arise.30 In the absence of an absolute notion of justice it is mistaken to see Marx as offering a critique of capitalism based (...)
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  4. Putting Facts & Values In Place (2005). Fjactual Knowing. Ethics and the Environment 10 (2):137-174.score: 160.0
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  5. Malcolm Parker (2013). Overstating Values: Medical Facts, Diverse Values, Bioethics and Values-Based Medicine. Bioethics 27 (2):97-104.score: 156.0
    Fulford has argued that (1) the medical concepts illness, disease and dysfunction are inescapably evaluative terms, (2) illness is conceptually prior to disease, and (3) a model conforming to (2) has greater explanatory power and practical utility than the conventional value-free medical model. This ‘reverse’ model employs Hare's distinction between description and evaluation, and the sliding relationship between descriptive and evaluative meaning. Fulford's derivative ‘Values Based Medicine’ (VBM) readjusts the imbalance between the predominance of facts over values (...)
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  6. Fiorenza Toccafondi (2009). Facts, Values, Emotions, and Perception. In Beatrice Centi & Huemer Wolfgang (eds.), Values and Ontology. Ontos. 12--137.score: 156.0
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  7. Richard B. Brandt (1996). Facts, Values, and Morality. Cambridge University Press.score: 152.0
    Richard Brandt is one of the most influential moral philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century. He is especially important in the field of ethics for his lucid and systematic exposition of utilitarianism. This new book represents in some ways a summation of his views and includes many useful applications of his theory. The focus of the book is how value judgments and moral belief can be justified. More generally, the book assesses different moral systems and theories of (...)
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  8. Peter Railton (2005). Précis of Facts, Values, and Norms. Philosophical Studies 126 (3):429 - 432.score: 150.0
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  9. D. M. Appleby (2005). Facts, Values and Quanta. Foundations of Physics 35 (4):627-668.score: 150.0
    Quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory (at least so far as the empirical predictions are concerned). It follows that, if one wants to properly understand quantum mechanics, it is essential to clearly understand the meaning of probability statements. The interpretation of probability has excited nearly as much philosophical controversy as the interpretation of quantum mechanics. 20th century physicists have mostly adopted a frequentist conception. In this paper it is argued that we ought, instead, to adopt a logical or Bayesian (...)
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  10. John Skorupski (2008). Review of Peter Railton, Facts, Values and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence. [REVIEW] Utilitas 20 (2):217-229.score: 150.0
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  11. Stephen W. Ball (1989). Facts, Values, and Normative Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 55 (2):143 - 172.score: 150.0
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  12. Sarah Stroud (1998). Facts, Values, and Morality. Philosophical Review 107 (4):612-614.score: 150.0
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  13. Stephen Brown (2005). Book Review: Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 2 (2):243-245.score: 150.0
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  14. D. Merli (2006). Facts, Values, and Norms. Philosophical Review 115 (1):105-107.score: 150.0
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  15. S. W. Ball (1993). Facts, Values, and Interpretation in Law: Jurisprudence From Perspectives in Ethics and Philosophy of Science. American Journal of Jurisprudence 38 (1):15-61.score: 150.0
  16. Amedeo Giorgi (2006). Facts, Values and the Psychology of the Human Person. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology: Methodology: Special Edition 6:p - 1.score: 150.0
    The notion of value neutrality has been a contentious issue within the human and social sciences for some time. In this paper, some of the philosophical and scientific bases for the confusion surrounding the fact-value dichotomy are covered and the discrepancy between how psychology studies values and expresses them is noted. The sense of value neutrality is clarified historically and the clarified meaning of the term applied to some qualitative data demonstrating in what sense values may be expressed (...)
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  17. James H. Olthuis (1968). Facts, Values and Ethics. Assen, Van Gorcum.score: 150.0
  18. M. B. M. (1971). Facts, Values and Ethics. Review of Metaphysics 24 (4):752-753.score: 150.0
  19. John Beloff (1956). Facts, Values, and Moral Solipsism. Journal of Philosophy 53 (18):541-549.score: 150.0
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  20. Alexander Morgan Capron (forthcoming). At Law: Facts, Values, and Expert Testimony. Hastings Center Report.score: 150.0
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  21. Alexander Morgan Capron (1993). Facts, Values, and Expert Testimony. Hastings Center Report 23 (5):26-28.score: 150.0
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  22. Kwm Bill Fulford (2004). Facts/Values. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press.score: 150.0
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  23. Hanna Buczyńska-Garewicz (1970). Wartości a Fakty (James H. Olthius, Facts, Values, and Ethics). Etyka 7.score: 150.0
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  24. Robert S. Fudge (1998). Richard B. Brandt, Facts, Values, and Morality Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 18 (1):8-9.score: 150.0
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  25. Bill Fulford (2007). Facts / Values: Ten Principles of Values-Based Medicine. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oup Usa.score: 150.0
     
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  26. M. Mandzela (2004). Facts, Values and Ethics. Filozofia 59 (9):654-664.score: 150.0
    There are important consequences for ethics following from conclusions of metaethical theories. Although these theories are based upon the investigation of the language of morals and ethics, their starting points are different. There are many conceptions of meaning of moral and value judgements and many ways how to understand relation between facts and values. Are these conceptions really investiga_ting the language of ethics, or are they only alternative theories of ethics?
     
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  27. Sophia Mihic, Stephen G. Engelmann & Elizabeth Rose Wingrove (2005). Facts, Values, and 'Real'numbers. In George Steinmetz (ed.), The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences: Positivism and its Epistemological Others. Duke University Press.score: 150.0
     
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  28. J. Shand (1998). Brandt, RB-Facts, Values and Morality. Philosophical Books 39:262-263.score: 150.0
     
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  29. Eric O. Springsted (1999). Richard Brandt, Facts, Values and Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, Pp. Viii+ 319,£ 14.95 Paperback,£ 40 Hard-Back. [REVIEW] Philosophical Investigations 22 (2).score: 150.0
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  30. Svend Brinkmann (2005). Psychology's Facts and Values: A Perennial Entanglement. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):749 – 765.score: 146.0
    The idea of a logical and metaphysical gap between facts and values is taken for granted in much psychology. Howard Kendler has recently defended the standard view that human values cannot be discovered by psychology. In contrast, various postmodern approaches have sought to attack the fact-value dichotomy with the argument that psychological facts are inevitably morally and politically laden, and therefore relative. In this article, a third line of thought is pursued, significantly inspired by philosopher of (...)
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  31. Partha Dasgupta (2005). What Do Economists Analyze and Why: Values or Facts? Economics and Philosophy 21 (2):221-278.score: 144.0
    Social thinkers frequently remind us that people differ in their views on what constitutes personal well-being, but that even when they don't differ, they disagree over the extent to which one person's well-being can be permitted to be traded off against another's. In this paper I show, by offering an account of the development of development economics, that in professional debates on social policy, economists speak or write as though they agree on values but differ on their reading of (...)
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  32. Mariam Fraser (2006). The Ethics of Reality and Virtual Reality: Latour, Facts and Values. History of the Human Sciences 19 (2):45-72.score: 144.0
    In the context of the question of the extent to which science studies is able to mount an adequate critique of contemporary developments in science and technology, and in view of the proliferating interest in ethics across the social sciences, this article has two aims. Firstly to address some of the implications for ethics of Bruno Latour's, and to a lesser extent Alfred North Whitehead’s, conceptions of reality, both of which have a bearing on the long-standing dichotomy between facts (...)
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  33. Robert Elliot (1996). Facts About Natural Values. Environmental Values 5 (3):221 - 234.score: 132.0
    Some environmental philosophers believe that the rejection of anthropocentric ethics requires the development and defence of an objectivist meta-ethical theory according to which values are, in the most literal sense. discovered not conferred. It is argued that nothing of normative or motivational import, however, turns on the meta-ethical issue. It is also argued that a rejection of normative anthropocentrism is completely consistent with meta-ethical subjectivism. Moreover the dynamics and outcomes of rational debate about normative environmental ethics are not determined (...)
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  34. Chris Megone (2007). Mental Illness, Metaphysics, Facts and Values. Philosophical Papers 36 (3):399-426.score: 130.0
    A number of prominent writers on the concept of mental illness/disease are committed to accounts which involve rejecting certain plausible widely held beliefs, namely: that it is part of the meaning of illness that it is bad for its possessor, so the concept of illness is essentially evaluative; that if a person has a mental illness, that is a fact about him; and that the same concept of illness is applicable in the case of mental illness as in that of (...)
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  35. Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (2008). Facts and Values in Emotional Plasticity. In Louis Charland & Peter Zachar (eds.), Fact and Value in Emotion; Consciousness and Emotion Book Series. John Benjamins Publishing Company. 101--137.score: 128.0
    How much can we shape the emotions we experience? Or to put it another way, how plastic are our emotions? It is clear that the exercise of identifying the degree of plasticity of emotion is futile without a prior specification of what can be plastic, so we first propose an analysis of the components of emotions. We will then turn to empirical data that might be used to assess the degree of plasticity of emotions.
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  36. Lloyd Reinhardt (2007). Truths, Facts and Values. Philosophy 82 (4):625-641.score: 126.0
    The paper suggests a revival of the 17th century distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. Some points are made which seem to me show it obviously false that a fact is merely a true proposition. Truths of fact, contingent truths, are rightly seen as corresponding to facts. Other truths, including ethical truths of right and wrong are, if true, necessarily true. In general, necessarily ture statements, including those of mathematics are wrongly construed as factual. Ethics and (...)
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  37. Mark T. Nelson (1995). Is It Always Fallacious to Derive Values From Facts? Argumentation 9 (4):553-562.score: 126.0
    Charles Pigden has argued for a logical Is/Ought gap on the grounds of the conservativeness of logic. I offer a counter-example which shows that Pigden’s argument is unsound and that there need be no logical gap between Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion. My counter-example is an argument which is logically valid, has only Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion, does not purport to violate the conservativeness of logic, and does not rely on controversial assumptions about Aristotelian biology or 'institutional facts.'.
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  38. Wolfgang Spohn (2004). On the Objectivity of Facts, Beliefs, and Values. In Peter K. Machamer & Gereon Wolters (eds.), Science, Values, and Objectivity. University of Pittsburgh Press. 172.score: 126.0
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  39. David Archard (1992). Rights, Moral Values and Natural Facts: A Reply to Mary Midgley on the Problem of Child-Abuse. Journal of Applied Philosophy 9 (1):99-104.score: 126.0
    Mary Midgley asserts that my argument concerning the problem of child-abuse was inappropriately framed in the language of rights, and neglected certain pertinent natural facts. I defend the view that the use of rights-talk was both apposite and did not misrepresent the moral problem in question. I assess the status and character of the natural facts Midgley adduces in criticism of my case, concluding that they do not obviously establish the conclusions she believes they do. Finally I briefly (...)
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  40. Peter Railton (1986). Facts and Values. Philosophical Topics 14 (2):5-31.score: 120.0
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  41. Ruth Anna Putnam (1998). Perceiving Facts and Values. Philosophy 73 (1):5-19.score: 120.0
    In a memorable passage near the beginning of William James asks us to imagine a world in which all our dearest social utopias are realized, and then to imagine that this world is offered to us at the price of one lost soul at the farthest edge of the universe suffering eternal, intense, lonely pain. Then he asks.
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  42. A. C. Genova (1970). Institutional Facts and Brute Values. Ethics 81 (1):36-54.score: 120.0
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  43. Christopher Hookway (2008). Dichotomies: Facts and Epistemic Values. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 95 (1):55-69.score: 120.0
    The paper explores Putnam's denial of the "fact/value dichotomy." After attempting to identify the main themes in this aspect of Putnam's thought, I explore its implications for our understanding of epistemic evaluation and also consider its relations to some similar moves by other philosophers in the pragmatist tradition. The final section examines an argument of Putnam's which is sued to suggest that such a dichotomy can be self defeating when applied to epistemic evaluation.
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  44. Nicholas Rescher (1990). How Wide is the Gap Between Facts and Values? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:297-319.score: 120.0
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  45. Kevin Mulligan (2009). Tractarian Beginnings and Endings. Worlds, Values, Facts and Subjects. In Giuseppe Primiero (ed.), Acts of Knowledge: History, Philosophy and Logic. College Publications. 151--168.score: 120.0
  46. Felix E. Oppenheim (1973). "Facts" and "Values" in Politics: Are They Separable? Political Theory 1 (1):54-68.score: 120.0
  47. Arto Siitonen (1998). The Ontology of Facts and Values. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 64:191-202.score: 120.0
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  48. Ruth Anna Putnam (1985). Creating Facts and Values. Philosophy 60 (232):187-204.score: 120.0
    Moral sceptics maintain that there are no objective moral values, or that there is no moral knowledge, or no moral facts, or that what looks like a statement which makes a moral judgment is not really a statement and does not have a truth-value. All of this is rather, unclear because all of it is negative. It will be necessary to remove some of this unclarity because my aim in this paper is to establish a proposition which may (...)
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