A viable environmental ethics must confront “the silence of nature”—the fact that in our culture only humans have status as speaking subjects. Deep ecology has attempted to do so by challenging the idiom of humanism that has silenced the natural world. This approach has been criticized by those who wish to rescue the discourse of reason in environmental ethics. I give a genealogy of nature’s silence to show how various motifs of medieval and Renaissance origins have worked together historically to (...) create the fiction of “Man,” a character portrayed as sole subject, speaker, and telos of the world. I conclude that the discourse of reason, as a guide to social practice, is implicated in this fiction and, therefore, cannot break the silence of nature. Instead, environmental ethics must learn a language that leaps away from the motifs of humanism, perhaps by drawing on the discourse of ontological humility found in primal cultures, postmodern philosophy, and medieval contemplative tradition. (shrink)
Although the particular ethical consequenees of biocentrism can be defended at a logical level, the centrality of problems with valuational frameworks in biocentric ethics leads to ontologieal ambiguities which contribute to the broader problematic of modem metaphysics. I suggest, however, that this may actually help to thematize the relationship between the metaphysieal foundations of environmentalism and its social task. Mysticism and phenomenology, including the concept of the “ecological self,” attempt to settle these ambiguities in a dialectical opposition to the technological (...) world view behind the environmental crisis. Whatever ontological stability they achieve, however, is at the expense of being assimilated by the same kind of metaphysical totalization characterizing technological thinking. Unlike anthropocentrism and the stewardship model of environmentalism, nevertheless, these difficulties for biocentrism lead to positive results: the ambiguities in the search for philosophic stability and foundational certainty can act as a cue to the nonmetaphysical task of analyzing and resisting technological power. The result may be a “negative ethics,” but one that holds out the possibility of confronting the real power relations of technological culture (and the use of ethics within them), rather than pursuing the endless projeet of discovering the hidden source of value and meaning. (shrink)
Shared agency is of central importance in our lives in many ways. We enjoy engaging in certain joint activities with others. We also engage in joint activities to achieve complex goals. Current approaches propose that we understand shared agency in terms of the more basic phenomenon of shared intention. However, they have presented two antagonistic views about the nature of this phenomenon. Some have argued that shared intention should be understood as being primarily a structure of attitudes of individual participants (...) and their interrelations (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela and Miller). Others have claimed that shared intention should be regarded as being primarily a normative transaction which gives rise to interpersonal obligations (Gilbert). In contrast to these approaches, I propose a compromise view. I argue that shared intention involves a complex socio-psychological structure which ensures, in the absence of special circumstances, the existence of relevant moral obligations. My argument involves two main steps. First, I show that shared intention includes important relations of mutual reliance between the participants. Then, I argue that the existence of these relations of mutual reliance in shared intention helps us explain why, failing special circumstances, shared intention generates those obligations. This provides, in my view, a solution to the vexed question of the relation between shared intention and interpersonal obligations. (shrink)
. This article presents and examines four different reconstructions of Ronald Duska’s argument for the thesis that employees’ loyalty to their employers is misguided. One of them is the reconstruction presented by John Corvino in this journal. The remaining three revolve around, respectively, employers’ failure to reciprocate employees’ (attempts at) loyalty, the commercial character of employment, and the instrumental character of employment. The result of the examination is that the argument does not withstand scrutiny in any of the four reconstructions. (...) The failure of Duska’s argument, however, does not mean that employee loyalty is justified, because the burden of proof is on the defenders of the loyalty. Moreover, a different argument, which is also presented in the article, shows that the loyalty of most present-day employees to their employers is bound to be significantly limited, because of the radical changeability of corporations with publicly traded stock. (shrink)
I believe that in the indeterminacy of drawing, the contingent way that images arrive in the work, lies some kind of model of how we live our lives. The activity of drawing is a way of trying to understand who we are or how we operate in the world.Hands play with torn scraps of paper.1 Somehow they come together to form a horse. As the thick fingers keep moving, shifting bits and pieces around, the horse is momentarily lost but reappears, (...) again and again. We see its mane, then a leg, a tail. "I am not me, the horse is not mine," the artist tells us. It doesn't matter. We are made to find meaning in what we see. Now almost all the bits of paper are gone, only a few shards remain. We still see a horse. We can't help .. (shrink)
Scientists need that scientific descriptions meet request methodological principles. Science knowledge is independent. Methodological principles guarantee autonomic regime of scientific investigations. Methodological principles are requirements the process of descriptive knowledge receiving as result of methodological analysis on best samples of scientific investigations, or methodological standards in history of science. There are mane principles in methodology of science: autonomic scientific investigation, competence, objectivity, expedience, systemness, verification, coherence, unity of methods, integration, differentiation, many-variation of formulizations, modernizations, diversity of chosen types of descriptions, (...) two logical meanings – truthfulness and falseness. (shrink)
