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  1. Patrick Girard & Luca Moretti (2013). Antirealism and the Conditional Fallacy: The Semantic Approach. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-23.score: 18.0
    The expression conditional fallacy identifies a family of arguments deemed to entail odd and false consequences for notions defined in terms of counterfactuals. The antirealist notion of truth is typically defined in terms of what a rational enquirer or a community of rational enquirers would believe if they were suitably informed. This notion is deemed to entail, via the conditional fallacy, odd and false propositions, for example that there necessarily exists a rational enquirer. If these consequences do indeed (...)
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  2. Julia Tanner (2006). The Naturalistic Fallacy. Richmond Journal of Philosophy 13.score: 18.0
    The naturalistic fallacy is a source of much confusion. In what follows I will explain what G. E. Moore meant by the naturalistic fallacy, give modern day examples of it then mention some of the different types of views it has spawned. Finally, I will consider a few criticisms of it.
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  3. David Sloan Wilson, Eric Dietrich & Anne B. Clark (2003). On the Inappropriate Use of the Naturalistic Fallacy in Evolutionary Psychology. Biology and Philosophy 18 (5):669-81.score: 18.0
    The naturalistic fallacy is mentionedfrequently by evolutionary psychologists as anerroneous way of thinking about the ethicalimplications of evolved behaviors. However,evolutionary psychologists are themselvesconfused about the naturalistic fallacy and useit inappropriately to forestall legitimateethical discussion. We briefly review what thenaturalistic fallacy is and why it is misusedby evolutionary psychologists. Then we attemptto show how the ethical implications of evolvedbehaviors can be discussed constructivelywithout impeding evolutionary psychologicalresearch. A key is to show how ethicalbehaviors, in addition to unethical behaviors,can evolve (...)
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  4. E. J. Lowe (2002). Material Coincidence and the Cinematographic Fallacy: A Response to Olson. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):369-372.score: 18.0
    Eric T. Olson has argued that those who hold that two material objects can exactly coincide at a moment of time, with one of these objects constituting the other, face an insuperable difficulty in accounting for the alleged differences between the objects, such as their being of different kinds and possessing different persistence-conditions. The differences, he suggests, are inexplicable, given that the objects in question are composed of the same particles related in precisely the same way. In response, I show (...)
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  5. Adam Hochman (2013). The Phylogeny Fallacy and the Ontogeny Fallacy. Biology and Philosophy 28 (4):593-612.score: 18.0
    In 1990 Robert Lickliter and Thomas Berry identified the phylogeny fallacy, an empirically untenable dichotomy between proximate and evolutionary causation, which locates proximate causes in the decoding of ‘genetic programs’, and evolutionary causes in the historical events that shaped these programs. More recently, Lickliter and Hunter Honeycutt (Psychol Bull 129:819–835, 2003a) argued that Evolutionary Psychologists commit this fallacy, and they proposed an alternative research program for evolutionary psychology. For these authors the phylogeny fallacy is the proximate/evolutionary distinction (...)
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  6. Luca Moretti (2008). Brogaard and Salerno on Antirealism and the Conditional Fallacy. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):229 - 246.score: 18.0
    Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a conditional fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno's argument relies on a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, "Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association", 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000, "Nours," 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism (...)
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  7. Tomoji Shogenji (2012). The Degree of Epistemic Justification and the Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 184 (1):29-48.score: 18.0
    This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, and I argue that (...)
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  8. Allan Bäck (2009). Mistakes of Reason: Practical Reasoning and the Fallacy of Accident. Phronesis 54 (2):101-135.score: 18.0
    For Aristotle the fallacy of accident arises from mistakes about being per accidens and not from accidental predication. Mistakes in perceiving per accidens come from our judgements about being per accidens and so commit that fallacy. Practical syllogisms have the same formal structure as being and perceiving per accidens . Moreover perceiving per accidens typically provides the minor premise for the practical syllogism as it makes it possible for us to know singular propositions, especially those about substances. Thus (...)
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  9. Brian Lightbody & Berman Michael (2010). The Metaphoric Fallacy to a Deductive Inference. Informal Logic: Reasoning and Argumentation in Theory and Practice 30 (2):185-193.score: 18.0
    Our article identifies and describes the metaphoric fallacy to a deductive inference (MFDI) that is an example of incorrect reasoning along the lines of the false analogy fallacy. The MFDI proceeds from informal semantical (metaphorical) claims to a supposedly formally deductive and necessary inference. We charge that such an inference is invalid. We provide three examples of the MFDI to demonstrate the structure of this invalid form of reasoning. Our goal is to contribute to the set of known (...)
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  10. Wai-Hung Wong & Zanja Yudell (2013). How Fallacious is the Consequence Fallacy? Philosophical Studies 165 (1):221-227.score: 18.0
    Timothy Williamson argues against the tactic of criticizing confidence in a theory by identifying a logical consequence of the theory whose probability is not raised by the evidence. He dubs it “the consequence fallacy”. In this paper, we will show that Williamson’s formulation of the tactic in question is ambiguous. On one reading of Williamson’s formulation, the tactic is indeed a fallacy, but it is not a commonly used tactic; on another reading, it is a commonly used tactic (...)
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  11. Stephan Hartmann & Wouter Meijs (2012). Walter the Banker: The Conjunction Fallacy Reconsidered. [REVIEW] Synthese 184 (1):73-87.score: 18.0
    In a famous experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (Psychol Rev 90:293–315, 1983), featuring Linda the bank teller, the participants assign a higher probability to a conjunction of propositions than to one of the conjuncts, thereby seemingly committing a probabilistic fallacy. In this paper, we discuss a slightly different example featuring someone named Walter, who also happens to work at a bank, and argue that, in this example, it is rational to assign a higher probability to the conjunction of suitably (...)
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  12. Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi (2012). How the Conjunction Fallacy is Tied to Probabilistic Confirmation: Some Remarks on Schupbach (2009). Synthese 184 (1):3-12.score: 18.0
    Crupi et al. (Think Reason 14:182–199, 2008) have recently advocated and partially worked out an account of the conjunction fallacy phenomenon based on the Bayesian notion of confirmation. In response, Schupbach (2009) presented a critical discussion as following from some novel experimental results. After providing a brief restatement and clarification of the meaning and scope of our original proposal, we will outline Schupbach’s results and discuss his interpretation thereof arguing that they do not actually undermine our point of view (...)
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  13. Jonathan Barrett (1991). Really Taking Darwin and the Naturalistic Fallacy Seriously: An Objection to Rottschaefer and Martinsen. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 6 (4):433-437.score: 18.0
    Out of a concern to respect the naturalistic fallacy, Ruse (1986) argues for the possibility of causal, but not justificatory, explanations of morality in terms of evolutionary processes. In a discussion of Ruse's work, Rottschaefer and Martinsen (1990) claim that he erroneously limits the explanatory scope of evolutionary concepts, because he fails to see that one can have objective moral properties without committing either of two forms of the naturalistic fallacy, if one holds that moral properties supervene on (...)
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  14. William A. Rottschaefer & David Martinsen (1991). The Insufficience of Supervenient Explanations of Moral Actions: Really Taking Darwin and the Naturalistic Fallacy Seriously. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 6 (4):439-445.score: 18.0
    In a recent paper in this journal (Rottschaefer and Martinsen 1990) we have proposed a view of Darwinian evolutionary metaethics that we believe improves upon Michael Ruse's (e.g., Ruse 1986) proposals by claiming that there are evolutionary based objective moral values and that a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness can be given that avoids the naturalistic fallacy in both its definitional and derivational forms while providing genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive (...)
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  15. Catarina Dutilh Novaes & Stephen Read (2008). Insolubilia and the Fallacy Secundum Quid Et Simpliciter. Vivarium 46 (2):175-191.score: 18.0
    Thomas Bradwardine makes much of the fact that his solution to the insolubles is in accordance with Aristotle's diagnosis of the fallacy in the Liar paradox as that of secundum quid et simpliciter. Paul Spade, however, claims that this invocation of Aristotle by Bradwardine is purely "honorary" in order to confer specious respectability on his analysis and give it a spurious weight of authority. Our answer to Spade follows Bradwardine's response to the problem of revenge: any proposition saying of (...)
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  16. Rodrigo Moro (2009). On the Nature of the Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 171 (1):1 - 24.score: 18.0
    In a seminal work, Tversky and Kahneman showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events (e.g., Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement) is more likely to occur than one of the conjuncts (e.g., Linda is a bank teller). This belief violates the conjunction rule in probability theory. Tversky and Kahneman called this phenomenon the “conjunction fallacy”. Since the discovery of the phenomenon in 1983, researchers in psychology and (...)
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  17. Jonah N. Schupbach (2012). Is the Conjunction Fallacy Tied to Probabilistic Confirmation? Synthese 184 (1):13-27.score: 18.0
    Crupi et al. (2008) offer a confirmation-theoretic, Bayesian account of the conjunction fallacy—an error in reasoning that occurs when subjects judge that Pr( h 1 & h 2 | e ) > Pr( h 1 | e ). They introduce three formal conditions that are satisfied by classical conjunction fallacy cases, and they show that these same conditions imply that h 1 & h 2 is confirmed by e to a greater extent than is h 1 alone. Consequently, (...)
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  18. Martin L. Jönsson & Elias Assarsson (2013). Shogenji's Measure of Justification and the Inverse Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 190 (15):3075-3085.score: 18.0
    This paper takes issue with a recent proposal due to Shogenji (Synthese 184:29–48, 2012). In his paper, Shogenji introduces J, a normatively motivated formal measure of justification (and of confirmation), and then proceeds to recruit it descriptively in an explanation of the conjunction fallacy. We argue that this explanation is undermined by the fact that it cannot be extended in any natural way to the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered, closely related fallacy. We point out (...)
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  19. Christoph Lumer (2000). Reductionism in Fallacy Theory. Argumentation 14 (4):405-423.score: 18.0
    (1) The aim of the paper is to develop a reduction of fallacy theory, i.e. to 'deduce' fallacy theory from a positive theory of argumentation which provides exact criteria for valid and adequate argumentation. Such reductionism has several advantages compared to an unsystematic action, which is quite usual in current fallacy but which at least in part is due to the poor state of positive argumentation theory itself. (2) After defining 'fallacy' (3) some principle ideas and (...)
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  20. Brian Ribeiro (2008). How Often Do We (Philosophy Professors) Commit the Straw Man Fallacy? Teaching Philosophy 31 (1):27-38.score: 18.0
    In a recent paper (in Argumentation, 2006) Robert Talisse and Scott Aikin suggest that we ought to recognize two distinct forms of the straw man fallacy. In addition to misrepresenting the strength of an opponent’s specific argument (= the representation form), one can also misrepresent the strength of one’s opposition in general, or the overall state of a debate, by selecting a (relatively) weak opponent for critical consideration (= the selection form). Here I consider whether we as philosophy professors (...)
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  21. William Goodwin (2010). The 'Passes-For' Fallacy and the Future of Critical Thinking. Argumentation 24 (3):363-374.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I characterize Susan Haack’s so called passes-for fallacy, analyze both what makes this inference compelling and why it is illegitimate, and finally explain why reflecting on the passes-for fallacy—and others like it—should become part of critical thinking pedagogy for humanities students. The analysis proceeds by examining a case of the passes-for fallacy identified by Haack in the work of Ruth Bleier. A charitable reconstruction of Bleier’s reasoning shows that it is enlightening to regard the (...)
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  22. Brian J. Gibbs (1997). Evolving Null Hypotheses and the Base Rate Fallacy: A Functional Interpretation of Scientific Myth. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):776-777.score: 18.0
    The meaning of an experimental result depends on the experiment's conceptual backdrop, particularly its null hypothesis. This observation provides the basis for a functional interpretation of belief in the base rate fallacy. On this interpretation, if the base rate fallacy is to be labelled a “myth,” then it should be recognized that this label is not necessarily a disparaging one.
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  23. Oren Harman (2012). Is the Naturalistic Fallacy Dead (and If So, Ought It Be?). Journal of the History of Biology 45 (3):557 - 572.score: 18.0
    Much of modern moral philosophy argued that there are is's in this world, and there are oughts, but that the two are entirely independent of one another. What this meant was that morality had nothing to do with man's biological nature, and could not be derived from it. Any such attempt was considered to be a categorical mistake, and plain foolish. Most philosophers still believe this, but a growing group of neonaturalist thinkers are now challenging their assumptions. Here I consider (...)
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  24. Jürgen Huber, Michael Kirchler & Thomas Stöckl (2010). The Hot Hand Belief and the Gambler's Fallacy in Investment Decisions Under Risk. Theory and Decision 68 (4):445-462.score: 18.0
    We conduct experiments to analyze investment behavior in decisions under risk. Subjects can bet on the outcomes of a series of coin tosses themselves, rely on randomized ‘experts’, or choose a risk-free alternative. We observe that subjects who rely on the randomized experts pick those who were successful in the past, showing behavior consistent with the hot hand belief. Obviously the term ‘expert’ suffices to attract some subjects. For those who decide on their own, we find behavior consistent with the (...)
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  25. David Sloan-Wilson, Eric Dietrich & Anne Clark (2003). On the Inappropriate Use of the Naturalistic Fallacy in Evolutionary Psychology. Biology and Philosophy 18 (5):669-681.score: 18.0
    The naturalistic fallacy is mentioned frequently by evolutionary psychologists as an erroneous way of thinking about the ethical implications of evolved behaviors. However, evolutionary psychologists are themselves confused about the naturalistic fallacy and use it inappropriately to forestall legitimate ethical discussion. We briefly review what the naturalistic fallacy is and why it is misused by evolutionary psychologists. Then we attempt to show how the ethical implications of evolved behaviors can be discussed constructively without impeding evolutionary psychological research. (...)
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  26. Jaakko Hintikka (1987). The Fallacy of Fallacies. Argumentation 1 (3):211-238.score: 18.0
    Several of the so-called “fallacies” in Aristotle are not in fact mistaken inference-types, but mistakes or breaches of rules in the questioning games which were practiced in the Academy and in the Lyceum. Hence the entire Aristotelian theory of “fallacies” ought to be studied by reference to the author's interrogative model of inquiry, based on his theory of questions and answers, rather than as a part of the theory of inference. Most of the “fallacies” mentioned by Aristotle can in fact (...)
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  27. John Kekes (1995). Pluralism, Scientific Knowledge, and the Fallacy of Overriding Values. Argumentation 9 (4):577-594.score: 18.0
    The paper examines one implication of pluralism, the view that all values are conditional and none are overriding. This implication is that since scientific knowledge is one of the conditional values, there are circumstances in which the pursuit of even the most basic scientific knowledge is legitimately curtailed. These circumstances occur when the pursuit of scientific knowledge conflicts with moral and political values which, in that context, are more important than it. The argument focuses on the case for and against (...)
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  28. Aaron Ben-Zeev (1995). Did Jesus Commit a Fallacy? Informal Logic 17 (2).score: 18.0
    Jesus has been accused of committing a fallacy (of denying the antecedent) at John 8:47. Careful analysis of this text (1) reveals a hitherto unrecognized valid form of argument which can superficially look like the predicate-logic analogue of denying the antecedent; (2) shows that determining whether a published text can be fairly charged with committing a fallacy may require (but often does not get) extensive and detailed analysis; (3) acquits Jesus of the charge; and thereby (4) conflnns a (...)
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  29. Michael P. Berman & Brian A. Lightbody (2010). The Metaphoric Fallacy to a Deductive Inference. Informal Logic 30 (2):185-193.score: 18.0
    Our article identifies and describes the metaphoric fallacy to a deductive inference (MFDI) that is an example of incorrect reasoning along the lines of the false analogy fallacy. The MFDI proceeds from informal semantical (metaphorical) claims to a supposedly formally deductive and necessary inference. We charge that such an inference is invalid. We provide three examples of the MFDI to demonstrate the structure of this invalid form of reasoning. Our goal is to contribute to the set of known (...)
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  30. Christopher Hughes Chatham (2013). The Consistency Fallacy and Failures of Theory Embellishment. Frontiers in Psychology 4:965.score: 18.0
    The consistency fallacy and failures of theory embellishment.
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  31. Edwin Coleman (1995). There is No Fallacy of Arguing From Authority. Informal Logic 17 (3).score: 18.0
    I argue that there is no fallacy of argument from authority. I first show the weakness of the case for there being such a fallacy: text-book presentations are confused, alleged examples are not genuinely exemplary, reasons given for its alleged fallaciousness are not convincing. Then I analyse arguing from authority as a complex speech act. Rejecting the popular but unjustified category of the "part-time fallacy", I show that bad arguments which appeal to authority are defective through breach (...)
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  32. Ralph H. Johnson (1987). The Blaze of Her Splendors: Suggestions About Revitalizing Fallacy Theory. [REVIEW] Argumentation 1 (3):239-253.score: 18.0
    Criticisms of fallacy theory have been lodged from many different directions. In this paper, I consider the classic criticism of incompleteness by DeMorgan, Finocchiaro's claim that fallacies probably exist only in the mind of the interpreter, McPeck's claim that fallacies are at best context-dependent and Paul's complaints about the teaching of fallacies. I seek not merely to defend fallacy theory against unfair criticisms but also to learn from the criticisms what can be done in order to make (...) theory a viable theory of criticism. I argue that this will involve several changes: rethinking of the nature of fallacy; addressing some theoretical issues; and presenting fallacy theory in a more rigorous fashion. The paper concludes with reflections on how Quine's ontological advice about the resolution of ontological disputes might be applied to the issue of whether or not there are fallacies. (shrink)
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  33. Don S. Levi (1999). The Fallacy of Treating the Ad Baculum as a Fallacy. Informal Logic 19 (2).score: 18.0
    The ad baculum is not a fallacy in an argument, but is offered instead of an argument to put an end to further argument. This claim is the basis for criticizing Michael Wreen's "neo-traditionalism," which yields misreadings of supposed cases of the ad baculum because of its rejection of any consideration of what the person using the ad baculum, or someone who refers to that use as an "argument," is doing. The paper concludes with reflections on the values that (...)
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  34. Anne Drapkin Lyerly & Mary Briody Mahowald (2001). Maternal-Fetal Surgery: The Fallacy of Abstraction and the Problem of Equipoise. [REVIEW] Health Care Analysis 9 (2):151-165.score: 18.0
    When surgery is performed on pregnant women forthe sake of the fetus (MFS or maternal fetalsurgery), it is often discussed in terms of thefetus alone. This usage exemplifies whatphilosophers call the fallacy of abstraction: considering a concept as if it were separablefrom another concept whose meaning isessentially related to it. In light of theirpotential separability, research on pregnantwomen raises the possibility of conflictsbetween the interests of the woman and those ofthe fetus. Such research should meet therequirement of equipoise, i.e., (...)
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  35. Katarzyna Paprzycka (2014). On a Neg‐Raising Fallacy in Determining Enthymematicity: If She Did Not Believe or Want …. Metaphilosophy 45 (1):96-119.score: 18.0
    Many arguments that show p to be enthymematic (in an argument for q) rely on claims like “if one did not believe that p, one would not have a reason for believing that q.” Such arguments are susceptible to the neg-raising fallacy. We tend to interpret claims like “X does not believe that p” as statements of disbelief (X's belief that not-p) rather than as statements of withholding the belief that p. This article argues that there is a tendency (...)
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  36. Burton frederick Porter (1968). Deity and Morality, with Regard to the Naturalistic Fallacy. London, Allen & Unwin.score: 18.0
    ChapterI THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY AZ THE NATURE OF THE FALLACY The criticism which has since been labelled the naturalistic fallacy was first described by the eighteenth-century empircist David Hume, in a small but celebrated ...
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  37. Lawrence H. Powers (1995). The One Fallacy Theory. Informal Logic 17 (2).score: 18.0
    My One Fallacy theory says there is only one fallacy: equivocation, or playing on an ambiguity. In this paper I explain how this theory arose from rnetaphilosophical concerns. And I contrast this theory with purely logical, dialectical, and psychological notions of fallacy.
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  38. Marie J. Secor (2003). Reconsidering Contentious Argument: Augustus DeMorgan on Fallacy. [REVIEW] Argumentation 17 (2):131-143.score: 18.0
    This essay examines Augustus DeMorgan's chapter on fallacy in his Formal Logic (1847) in order to show how DeMorgan's treatment represents an expansion and advance upon Aristotle. It is important that Aristotle clearly distinguishes among dialectical, didactic, demonstrative, and contentious types of argument, based upon the acceptability of premises and the aims of participants. Appropriating Aristotle's list of fallacies, DeMorgan discusses examples that reveal how the charge and countercharge of fallacy function in contentious argument, which is more widespread (...)
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  39. Herman E. Stark (2000). The Lord Scroop Fallacy. Informal Logic 20 (3).score: 18.0
    In this paper I identify a fallacy. The fallacy is worth noting for practical and theoretical reasons. First, the rampant occurrences ofthis fallacy-especially at moments calling for careful thought-indicate that it is more pernicious to clear thinking than many of those found in standard logic texts. Second, the fallacy stands apart from most others in that it contains multiple kinds oflogical error (i.e., fallacious and non-fallacious logical errors) that are themselves committed in abnormal ways, and thus (...)
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  40. Matthew Zuckero (2003). Three Potential Problems for Powers' One-Fallacy Theory. Informal Logic 23 (3).score: 18.0
    Lawrence Powers advocates a one-fallacy theory in which the only real fallacies are fallacies of ambiguity. He defines a fallacy, in general, as a bad argument that appears good. He claims that the only legitimate way that an argument can appear valid, while being invalid, is when the invalid inference is covered by an ambiguity. Several different kinds of counterexamples have been offered from begging the question, to various forms of ad hominem fallacies. In this paper, I outline (...)
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  41. Joel Marks (1988). When is a Fallacy Not a Fallacy? Metaphilosophy 19 (3‐4):307-312.score: 16.0
    The informal fallacies can be conceived as enthymemes that are formally valid. But, then, what accounts for our sense of their fallaciousness? I explain this in terms of the notion of a warrant.
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  42. Marcin Lewiński (2011). Towards a Critique-Friendly Approach to the Straw Man Fallacy Evaluation. Argumentation 25 (4):469-497.score: 16.0
    In this article I address the following question: When are reformulations in argumentative criticisms reasonable and when do they become fallacious straw men? Following ideas developed in the integrated version of pragma-dialectics, I approach argumentation as an element of agonistic exchanges permeated by arguers’ strategic manoeuvring aimed at effectively defeating the opponent with reasonable means. I propose two basic context-sensitive criteria for deciding on the reasonableness of reformulations: precision of the rules for interpretation (precise vs. loose) and general expectation of (...)
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  43. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2000). The Moralistic Fallacy: On the "Appropriateness" of Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.score: 15.0
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  44. Dickinson S. Miller (1951). "Descartes' Myth" and Professor Ryle's Fallacy. Journal of Philosophy 48 (April):270-279.score: 15.0
  45. F. Recanati (2002). The Fodorian Fallacy. Analysis 62 (4):285-89.score: 15.0
  46. L. Jonathan Cohen (1980). Whose is the Fallacy? A Rejoinder to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Cognition 8 (March):89-92.score: 15.0
  47. Frank A. Lewis (2009). Parmenides' Modal Fallacy. Phronesis 54 (1):1-8.score: 15.0
    In his great poem, Parmenides uses an argument by elimination to select the correct "way of inquiry" from a pool of two, the ways of is and of is not , joined later by a third, "mixed" way of is and is not . Parmenides' first two ways are soon given modal upgrades - is becomes cannot not be , and is not becomes necessarily is not (B2, 3-6) - and these are no longer contradictories of one another. And is (...)
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  48. L. Jonathan Cohen (1979). On the Psychology of Prediction: Whose is the Fallacy? Cognition 7 (December):385-407.score: 15.0
  49. Samir Okasha (2004). The “Averaging Fallacy” and the Levels of Selection. Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):167-184.score: 15.0
    This paper compares two well-known arguments in the units of selection literature, one due to , the other due to . Both arguments concern the legitimacy of averaging fitness values across contexts and making inferences about the level of selection on that basis. The first three sections of the paper shows that the two arguments are incompatible if taken at face value, their apparent similarity notwithstanding. If we accept Sober and Lewontin's criterion for when averaging genic fitnesses across diploid genotypes (...)
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  50. Ingrid Whiteman (2013). The Fallacy of Choice in the Common Law and NHS Policy. Health Care Analysis 21 (2):146-170.score: 15.0
    Neither the English courts nor the National Health Service (NHS) have been immune to the modern mantra of patient choice. This article examines whether beneath the rhetoric any form of real choice is endorsed either in law or in NHS policy. I explore the case law on ‘consent’, look at choice within the NHS and highlight the dilemmas that a mismatch of language and practice poses for clinicians. Given the variance in interpretation and lack of consistency for the individual patient (...)
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