Search results for 'Fallacy' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  89
    Tomoji Shogenji (2012). The Degree of Epistemic Justification and the Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 184 (1):29-48.
    This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, and I argue that (...)
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  2.  88
    Leone Gazziero (2015). Exempla Docent. How to Make Sense of Aristotle’s Examples of the Fallacy of Accident (Doxography Matters). Acta Philosophica 24 (2):333-354.
    Scholarly dissatisfaction with Aristotle’s fallacy of accident has traditionally focused on his examples, whose compatibility with the fallacy’s definition has been doubted time and again. Besides a unified account of the fallacy of accident itself, the paper provides a formalized analysis of its several examples in Aristotle’s Sophistici elenchi. The most problematic instances are dealt with by means of an internal reconstruction of their features as conveyed by Aristotle’s text and an extensive survey of their interpretation in (...)
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  3. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2000). The Moralistic Fallacy: On the "Appropriateness" of Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
    Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one’s rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is (...)
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  4. Sheldon Wein (2013). Intolerance and the Zero Tolerance Fallacy. In Gabrijela Kišiček (ed.), What Do We Know About the World? Centre for Research on Reasoning, Argumentation, and Rhetoric 132-144.
    When an activity is unwanted, administrators often adopt a zero tolerance policy towards that activity. The background assumption is that, by adopting a zero tolerance policy, one is doing everything that one can to reduce or eliminate the activity in question. Yet which policy best serves to reduce an unwanted behavior is always an empirical question. Thus, those who adopt a zero tolerance policy towards some behavior without first investigating and finding that they are in a set of circumstances where (...)
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  5. Adam Hochman (2013). The Phylogeny Fallacy and the Ontogeny Fallacy. Biology and Philosophy 28 (4):593-612.
    In 1990 Robert Lickliter and Thomas Berry identified the phylogeny fallacy, an empirically untenable dichotomy between proximate and evolutionary causation, which locates proximate causes in the decoding of ‘ genetic programs’, and evolutionary causes in the historical events that shaped these programs. More recently, Lickliter and Hunter Honeycutt argued that Evolutionary Psychologists commit this fallacy, and they proposed an alternative research program for evolutionary psychology. For these authors the phylogeny fallacy is the proximate/evolutionary distinction itself, which they (...)
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  6.  32
    Donovan Miyasaki, Nietzsche's Answer to the Naturalistic Fallacy: Life as Condition, Not Criterion, of Morality.
    Nietzsche’s late writings present a value opposition of health and decadence based in his conception of organic life. While this appears to be a moral ideal that risks the naturalistic fallacy of directly deriving norms from facts, it instead describes a meta-ethical ideal: the necessary conditions for any kind of moral agency. Nietzsche’s ideal of health not only evades but also dissolves the naturalistic fallacy by suggesting that the specific content of morality is irrelevant. If health is measured (...)
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  7. E. J. Lowe (2002). Material Coincidence and the Cinematographic Fallacy: A Response to Olson. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):369-372.
    Eric T. Olson has argued that those who hold that two material objects can exactly coincide at a moment of time, with one of these objects constituting the other, face an insuperable difficulty in accounting for the alleged differences between the objects, such as their being of different kinds and possessing different persistence-conditions. The differences, he suggests, are inexplicable, given that the objects in question are composed of the same particles related in precisely the same way. In response, I show (...)
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  8.  38
    Rodrigo Moro (2009). On the Nature of the Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 171 (1):1 - 24.
    In a seminal work, Tversky and Kahneman showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events (e.g., Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement) is more likely to occur than one of the conjuncts (e.g., Linda is a bank teller). This belief violates the conjunction rule in probability theory. Tversky and Kahneman called this phenomenon the “conjunction fallacy”. Since the discovery of the phenomenon in 1983, researchers in psychology and (...)
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  9.  15
    Leah Henderson (forthcoming). The No Miracles Argument and the Base Rate Fallacy. Synthese:1-8.
    The no miracles argument is one of the main arguments for scientific realism. Recently it has been alleged that the no miracles argument is fundamentally flawed because it commits the base rate fallacy. The allegation is based on the idea that the appeal of the no miracles argument arises from inappropriate neglect of the base rate of approximate truth among the relevant population of theories. However, the base rate fallacy allegation relies on an assumption of random sampling of (...)
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  10. David Sloan Wilson, Eric Dietrich & Anne B. Clark (2003). On the Inappropriate Use of the Naturalistic Fallacy in Evolutionary Psychology. Biology and Philosophy 18 (5):669-81.
    The naturalistic fallacy is mentionedfrequently by evolutionary psychologists as anerroneous way of thinking about the ethicalimplications of evolved behaviors. However,evolutionary psychologists are themselvesconfused about the naturalistic fallacy and useit inappropriately to forestall legitimateethical discussion. We briefly review what thenaturalistic fallacy is and why it is misusedby evolutionary psychologists. Then we attemptto show how the ethical implications of evolvedbehaviors can be discussed constructivelywithout impeding evolutionary psychologicalresearch. A key is to show how ethicalbehaviors, in addition to unethical behaviors,can evolve (...)
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  11. Luca Moretti (2008). Brogaard and Salerno on Antirealism and the Conditional Fallacy. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):229 - 246.
    Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a conditional fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno's argument relies on a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, "Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association", 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000, "Nous," 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism (...)
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  12.  78
    Stephan Hartmann & Wouter Meijs (2012). Walter the Banker: The Conjunction Fallacy Reconsidered. [REVIEW] Synthese 184 (1):73-87.
    In a famous experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (Psychol Rev 90:293–315, 1983), featuring Linda the bank teller, the participants assign a higher probability to a conjunction of propositions than to one of the conjuncts, thereby seemingly committing a probabilistic fallacy. In this paper, we discuss a slightly different example featuring someone named Walter, who also happens to work at a bank, and argue that, in this example, it is rational to assign a higher probability to the conjunction of suitably (...)
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  13. Patrick Girard & Luca Moretti (2014). Antirealism and the Conditional Fallacy: The Semantic Approach. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):761-783.
    The expression conditional fallacy identifies a family of arguments deemed to entail odd and false consequences for notions defined in terms of counterfactuals. The antirealist notion of truth is typically defined in terms of what a rational enquirer or a community of rational enquirers would believe if they were suitably informed. This notion is deemed to entail, via the conditional fallacy, odd and false propositions, for example that there necessarily exists a rational enquirer. If these consequences do indeed (...)
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  14.  47
    Jonah N. Schupbach (2012). Is the Conjunction Fallacy Tied to Probabilistic Confirmation? Synthese 184 (1):13-27.
    Crupi et al. (2008) offer a confirmation-theoretic, Bayesian account of the conjunction fallacy—an error in reasoning that occurs when subjects judge that Pr( h 1 & h 2 | e ) > Pr( h 1 | e ). They introduce three formal conditions that are satisfied by classical conjunction fallacy cases, and they show that these same conditions imply that h 1 & h 2 is confirmed by e to a greater extent than is h 1 alone. Consequently, (...)
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  15.  35
    Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi (2012). How the Conjunction Fallacy is Tied to Probabilistic Confirmation: Some Remarks on Schupbach (2009). Synthese 184 (1):3-12.
    Crupi et al. (Think Reason 14:182–199, 2008) have recently advocated and partially worked out an account of the conjunction fallacy phenomenon based on the Bayesian notion of confirmation. In response, Schupbach (2009) presented a critical discussion as following from some novel experimental results. After providing a brief restatement and clarification of the meaning and scope of our original proposal, we will outline Schupbach’s results and discuss his interpretation thereof arguing that they do not actually undermine our point of view (...)
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  16.  11
    Jaakko Hintikka (1987). The Fallacy of Fallacies. Argumentation 1 (3):211-238.
    Several of the so-called “fallacies” in Aristotle are not in fact mistaken inference-types, but mistakes or breaches of rules in the questioning games which were practiced in the Academy and in the Lyceum. Hence the entire Aristotelian theory of “fallacies” ought to be studied by reference to the author's interrogative model of inquiry, based on his theory of questions and answers, rather than as a part of the theory of inference. Most of the “fallacies” mentioned by Aristotle can in fact (...)
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  17.  41
    Wai-Hung Wong & Zanja Yudell (2013). How Fallacious is the Consequence Fallacy? Philosophical Studies 165 (1):221-227.
    Timothy Williamson argues against the tactic of criticizing confidence in a theory by identifying a logical consequence of the theory whose probability is not raised by the evidence. He dubs it “the consequence fallacy”. In this paper, we will show that Williamson’s formulation of the tactic in question is ambiguous. On one reading of Williamson’s formulation, the tactic is indeed a fallacy, but it is not a commonly used tactic; on another reading, it is a commonly used tactic (...)
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  18.  17
    Martin L. Jönsson & Elias Assarsson (2013). Shogenji's Measure of Justification and the Inverse Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 190 (15):3075-3085.
    This paper takes issue with a recent proposal due to Shogenji (Synthese 184:29–48, 2012). In his paper, Shogenji introduces J, a normatively motivated formal measure of justification (and of confirmation), and then proceeds to recruit it descriptively in an explanation of the conjunction fallacy. We argue that this explanation is undermined by the fact that it cannot be extended in any natural way to the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered, closely related fallacy. We point out (...)
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  19. Julia Tanner (2006). The Naturalistic Fallacy. Richmond Journal of Philosophy 13.
    The naturalistic fallacy is a source of much confusion. In what follows I will explain what G. E. Moore meant by the naturalistic fallacy, give modern day examples of it then mention some of the different types of views it has spawned. Finally, I will consider a few criticisms of it.
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  20.  43
    Catarina Dutilh Novaes & Stephen Read (2008). Insolubilia and the Fallacy Secundum Quid Et Simpliciter. Vivarium 46 (2):175-191.
    Thomas Bradwardine makes much of the fact that his solution to the insolubles is in accordance with Aristotle's diagnosis of the fallacy in the Liar paradox as that of secundum quid et simpliciter. Paul Spade, however, claims that this invocation of Aristotle by Bradwardine is purely "honorary" in order to confer specious respectability on his analysis and give it a spurious weight of authority. Our answer to Spade follows Bradwardine's response to the problem of revenge: any proposition saying of (...)
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  21.  20
    Brian Ribeiro (2008). How Often Do We (Philosophy Professors) Commit the Straw Man Fallacy? Teaching Philosophy 31 (1):27-38.
    In a recent paper (in Argumentation, 2006) Robert Talisse and Scott Aikin suggest that we ought to recognize two distinct forms of the straw man fallacy. In addition to misrepresenting the strength of an opponent’s specific argument (= the representation form), one can also misrepresent the strength of one’s opposition in general, or the overall state of a debate, by selecting a (relatively) weak opponent for critical consideration (= the selection form). Here I consider whether we as philosophy professors (...)
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  22.  15
    Jürgen Huber, Michael Kirchler & Thomas Stöckl (2010). The Hot Hand Belief and the Gambler's Fallacy in Investment Decisions Under Risk. Theory and Decision 68 (4):445-462.
    We conduct experiments to analyze investment behavior in decisions under risk. Subjects can bet on the outcomes of a series of coin tosses themselves, rely on randomized ‘experts’, or choose a risk-free alternative. We observe that subjects who rely on the randomized experts pick those who were successful in the past, showing behavior consistent with the hot hand belief. Obviously the term ‘expert’ suffices to attract some subjects. For those who decide on their own, we find behavior consistent with the (...)
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  23.  15
    Anne Drapkin Lyerly & Mary Briody Mahowald (2001). Maternal-Fetal Surgery: The Fallacy of Abstraction and the Problem of Equipoise. [REVIEW] Health Care Analysis 9 (2):151-165.
    When surgery is performed on pregnant women forthe sake of the fetus (MFS or maternal fetalsurgery), it is often discussed in terms of thefetus alone. This usage exemplifies whatphilosophers call the fallacy of abstraction: considering a concept as if it were separablefrom another concept whose meaning isessentially related to it. In light of theirpotential separability, research on pregnantwomen raises the possibility of conflictsbetween the interests of the woman and those ofthe fetus. Such research should meet therequirement of equipoise, i.e., (...)
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  24.  9
    Ralph H. Johnson (1987). The Blaze of Her Splendors: Suggestions About Revitalizing Fallacy Theory. [REVIEW] Argumentation 1 (3):239-253.
    Criticisms of fallacy theory have been lodged from many different directions. In this paper, I consider the classic criticism of incompleteness by DeMorgan, Finocchiaro's claim that fallacies probably exist only in the mind of the interpreter, McPeck's claim that fallacies are at best context-dependent and Paul's complaints about the teaching of fallacies. I seek not merely to defend fallacy theory against unfair criticisms but also to learn from the criticisms what can be done in order to make (...) theory a viable theory of criticism. I argue that this will involve several changes: rethinking of the nature of fallacy; addressing some theoretical issues; and presenting fallacy theory in a more rigorous fashion. The paper concludes with reflections on how Quine's ontological advice about the resolution of ontological disputes might be applied to the issue of whether or not there are fallacies. (shrink)
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  25.  6
    Allan Bäck (2015). How the Fallacy of Accident Got Its Name. Vivarium 53 (2-4):142-169.
    _ Source: _Volume 53, Issue 2-4, pp 142 - 169 I offer an explanation of why the fallacy of “accident” is so called. By ‘accident’ here, Aristotle does not mean accidental predication but being _per accidens_. Understood in this way, the fallacy of accident can be analyzed in terms of the rules that Aristotle gives for being _per accidens_. The fallacy of accident lost the original justification for its name in the late Greek period. It became associated (...)
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  26.  37
    Jonathan Barrett (1991). Really Taking Darwin and the Naturalistic Fallacy Seriously: An Objection to Rottschaefer and Martinsen. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 6 (4):433-437.
    Out of a concern to respect the naturalistic fallacy, Ruse (1986) argues for the possibility of causal, but not justificatory, explanations of morality in terms of evolutionary processes. In a discussion of Ruse's work, Rottschaefer and Martinsen (1990) claim that he erroneously limits the explanatory scope of evolutionary concepts, because he fails to see that one can have objective moral properties without committing either of two forms of the naturalistic fallacy, if one holds that moral properties supervene on (...)
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  27.  8
    Don S. Levi (1999). The Fallacy of Treating the Ad Baculum as a Fallacy. Informal Logic 19 (2).
    The ad baculum is not a fallacy in an argument, but is offered instead of an argument to put an end to further argument. This claim is the basis for criticizing Michael Wreen's "neo-traditionalism," which yields misreadings of supposed cases of the ad baculum because of its rejection of any consideration of what the person using the ad baculum, or someone who refers to that use as an "argument," is doing. The paper concludes with reflections on the values that (...)
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  28.  8
    Lawrence H. Powers (1995). The One Fallacy Theory. Informal Logic 17 (2).
    My One Fallacy theory says there is only one fallacy: equivocation, or playing on an ambiguity. In this paper I explain how this theory arose from rnetaphilosophical concerns. And I contrast this theory with purely logical, dialectical, and psychological notions of fallacy.
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  29.  14
    Carolyn Cusick & Mark Peter (2015). The Last Straw Fallacy: Another Causal Fallacy and Its Harmful Effects. Argumentation 29 (4):457-474.
    We have noticed a pattern of arguments that exhibit a type of irrationality or a particular informal logical fallacy that is not fully captured by any existing fallacy. This fallacy can be explored through three examples where one misattributes a cause by focusing on a smaller portion of a larger set—specifically, the last or least known—and claiming that that cause holds a unique priority over other contributing factors for the occurrence of an event. We propose to call (...)
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  30.  19
    Michael P. Berman & Brian A. Lightbody (2010). The Metaphoric Fallacy to a Deductive Inference. Informal Logic 30 (2):185-193.
    Our article identifies and describes the metaphoric fallacy to a deductive inference (MFDI) that is an example of incorrect reasoning along the lines of the false analogy fallacy. The MFDI proceeds from informal semantical (metaphorical) claims to a supposedly formally deductive and necessary inference. We charge that such an inference is invalid. We provide three examples of the MFDI to demonstrate the structure of this invalid form of reasoning. Our goal is to contribute to the set of known (...)
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  31.  6
    Christopher W. Tindale (1997). Fallacies, Blunders, and Dialogue Shifts: Walton's Contributions to the Fallacy Debate. Argumentation 11 (3):341-354.
    The paper examines Walton‘s concept of fallacy as it develops throughthree stages of his work: from the early series of papers co-authored withJohn Woods; through a second phase of involvement with thepragma-dialectical perspective; and on to the final phase in which heoffers a distinct pragmatic theory that reaches beyond the perceived limitsof the pragma-dialectical account while still exhibiting a debt to thatperspective and the early investigations with Woods. It is observed how Walton‘s model of fallacy is established in (...)
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  32.  39
    William A. Rottschaefer & David Martinsen (1991). The Insufficience of Supervenient Explanations of Moral Actions: Really Taking Darwin and the Naturalistic Fallacy Seriously. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 6 (4):439-445.
    In a recent paper in this journal (Rottschaefer and Martinsen 1990) we have proposed a view of Darwinian evolutionary metaethics that we believe improves upon Michael Ruse's (e.g., Ruse 1986) proposals by claiming that there are evolutionary based objective moral values and that a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness can be given that avoids the naturalistic fallacy in both its definitional and derivational forms while providing genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive (...)
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  33.  59
    Allan Bäck (2009). Mistakes of Reason: Practical Reasoning and the Fallacy of Accident. Phronesis 54 (2):101-135.
    For Aristotle the fallacy of accident arises from mistakes about being per accidens and not from accidental predication. Mistakes in perceiving per accidens come from our judgements about being per accidens and so commit that fallacy. Practical syllogisms have the same formal structure as being and perceiving per accidens . Moreover perceiving per accidens typically provides the minor premise for the practical syllogism as it makes it possible for us to know singular propositions, especially those about substances. Thus (...)
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  34.  5
    Jussi Suikkanen (2014). Contractualism and the Conditional Fallacy. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 4:113-137.
    Most contractualist ethical theories have a subjunctivist structure. This means that they attempt to make sense of right and wrong in terms of a set of principles which would be accepted in some idealized, non-actual circumstances. This makes these views vulnerable to the so-called conditional fallacy objection. The moral principles that are appropriate for the idealized circumstances fail to give a correct account of what is right and wrong in the ordinary situations. This chapter uses two versions of contractualism (...)
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  35.  39
    Brian Lightbody & Berman Michael (2010). The Metaphoric Fallacy to a Deductive Inference. Informal Logic: Reasoning and Argumentation in Theory and Practice 30 (2):185-193.
    Our article identifies and describes the metaphoric fallacy to a deductive inference (MFDI) that is an example of incorrect reasoning along the lines of the false analogy fallacy. The MFDI proceeds from informal semantical (metaphorical) claims to a supposedly formally deductive and necessary inference. We charge that such an inference is invalid. We provide three examples of the MFDI to demonstrate the structure of this invalid form of reasoning. Our goal is to contribute to the set of known (...)
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  36.  5
    Martin L. Jönsson & Elias Assarsson (2016). A Problem for Confirmation Theoretic Accounts of the Conjunction Fallacy. Philosophical Studies 173 (2):437-449.
    This paper raises a principled objection against the idea that Bayesian confirmation theory can be used to explain the conjunction fallacy. The paper demonstrates that confirmation-based explanations are limited in scope and can only be applied to cases of the fallacy of a certain restricted kind. In particular; confirmation-based explanations cannot account for the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered form of the conjunction fallacy. Once the problem has been set out, the paper explores four (...)
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  37.  14
    Oren Harman (2012). Is the Naturalistic Fallacy Dead (and If So, Ought It Be?). Journal of the History of Biology 45 (3):557 - 572.
    Much of modern moral philosophy argued that there are is's in this world, and there are oughts, but that the two are entirely independent of one another. What this meant was that morality had nothing to do with man's biological nature, and could not be derived from it. Any such attempt was considered to be a categorical mistake, and plain foolish. Most philosophers still believe this, but a growing group of neonaturalist thinkers are now challenging their assumptions. Here I consider (...)
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  38.  29
    Brian J. Gibbs (1997). Evolving Null Hypotheses and the Base Rate Fallacy: A Functional Interpretation of Scientific Myth. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):776-777.
    The meaning of an experimental result depends on the experiment's conceptual backdrop, particularly its null hypothesis. This observation provides the basis for a functional interpretation of belief in the base rate fallacy. On this interpretation, if the base rate fallacy is to be labelled a “myth,” then it should be recognized that this label is not necessarily a disparaging one.
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  39.  7
    Aaron Ben-Zeev (1995). Did Jesus Commit a Fallacy? Informal Logic 17 (2).
    Jesus has been accused of committing a fallacy (of denying the antecedent) at John 8:47. Careful analysis of this text (1) reveals a hitherto unrecognized valid form of argument which can superficially look like the predicate-logic analogue of denying the antecedent; (2) shows that determining whether a published text can be fairly charged with committing a fallacy may require (but often does not get) extensive and detailed analysis; (3) acquits Jesus of the charge; and thereby (4) conflnns a (...)
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  40.  10
    Edwin Coleman (1995). There is No Fallacy of Arguing From Authority. Informal Logic 17 (3).
    I argue that there is no fallacy of argument from authority. I first show the weakness of the case for there being such a fallacy: text-book presentations are confused, alleged examples are not genuinely exemplary, reasons given for its alleged fallaciousness are not convincing. Then I analyse arguing from authority as a complex speech act. Rejecting the popular but unjustified category of the "part-time fallacy", I show that bad arguments which appeal to authority are defective through breach (...)
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  41.  9
    Marie J. Secor (2003). Reconsidering Contentious Argument: Augustus DeMorgan on Fallacy. [REVIEW] Argumentation 17 (2):131-143.
    This essay examines Augustus DeMorgan's chapter on fallacy in his Formal Logic (1847) in order to show how DeMorgan's treatment represents an expansion and advance upon Aristotle. It is important that Aristotle clearly distinguishes among dialectical, didactic, demonstrative, and contentious types of argument, based upon the acceptability of premises and the aims of participants. Appropriating Aristotle's list of fallacies, DeMorgan discusses examples that reveal how the charge and countercharge of fallacy function in contentious argument, which is more widespread (...)
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  42.  10
    John Kekes (1995). Pluralism, Scientific Knowledge, and the Fallacy of Overriding Values. Argumentation 9 (4):577-594.
    The paper examines one implication of pluralism, the view that all values are conditional and none are overriding. This implication is that since scientific knowledge is one of the conditional values, there are circumstances in which the pursuit of even the most basic scientific knowledge is legitimately curtailed. These circumstances occur when the pursuit of scientific knowledge conflicts with moral and political values which, in that context, are more important than it. The argument focuses on the case for and against (...)
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  43.  25
    Christoph Lumer (2000). Reductionism in Fallacy Theory. Argumentation 14 (4):405-423.
    (1) The aim of the paper is to develop a reduction of fallacy theory, i.e. to 'deduce' fallacy theory from a positive theory of argumentation which provides exact criteria for valid and adequate argumentation. Such reductionism has several advantages compared to an unsystematic action, which is quite usual in current fallacy but which at least in part is due to the poor state of positive argumentation theory itself. (2) After defining 'fallacy' (3) some principle ideas and (...)
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  44.  7
    Herman E. Stark (2000). The Lord Scroop Fallacy. Informal Logic 20 (3).
    In this paper I identify a fallacy. The fallacy is worth noting for practical and theoretical reasons. First, the rampant occurrences ofthis fallacy-especially at moments calling for careful thought-indicate that it is more pernicious to clear thinking than many of those found in standard logic texts. Second, the fallacy stands apart from most others in that it contains multiple kinds oflogical error (i.e., fallacious and non-fallacious logical errors) that are themselves committed in abnormal ways, and thus (...)
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  45.  5
    Matthew Zuckero (2003). Three Potential Problems for Powers' One-Fallacy Theory. Informal Logic 23 (3):285-292.
    Lawrence Powers advocates a one-fallacy theory in which the only real fallacies are fallacies of ambiguity. He defines a fallacy, in general, as a bad argument that appears good. He claims that the only legitimate way that an argument can appear valid, while being invalid, is when the invalid inference is covered by an ambiguity. Several different kinds of counterexamples have been offered from begging the question, to various forms of ad hominem fallacies. In this paper, I outline (...)
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  46.  5
    Maria K. Sheppard (forthcoming). Fallacy or Functionality: Law and Policy of Patient Treatment Choice in the NHS. Health Care Analysis:1-22.
    It has been claimed that beneath the government rhetoric of patient choice, no real choice exists either in law or in National Health Service (NHS) policy (Whiteman in Health Care Anal 21:146–170, 2013). Thus, choice is considered to be a fallacy in that patients are not able to demand specific treatment, but are only able to express preferences amongst the available options. This article argues that, rather than considering choice only in terms of patient autonomy or consumer rights, choice (...)
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  47.  9
    Burton frederick Porter (1968). Deity and Morality, with Regard to the Naturalistic Fallacy. London, Allen & Unwin.
    ChapterI THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY AZ THE NATURE OF THE FALLACY The criticism which has since been labelled the naturalistic fallacy was first described by the eighteenth-century empircist David Hume, in a small but celebrated ...
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  48.  10
    David Sloan-Wilson, Eric Dietrich & Anne Clark (2003). On the Inappropriate Use of the Naturalistic Fallacy in Evolutionary Psychology. Biology and Philosophy 18 (5):669-681.
    The naturalistic fallacy is mentioned frequently by evolutionary psychologists as an erroneous way of thinking about the ethical implications of evolved behaviors. However, evolutionary psychologists are themselves confused about the naturalistic fallacy and use it inappropriately to forestall legitimate ethical discussion. We briefly review what the naturalistic fallacy is and why it is misused by evolutionary psychologists. Then we attempt to show how the ethical implications of evolved behaviors can be discussed constructively without impeding evolutionary psychological research. (...)
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  49.  11
    William Goodwin (2010). The 'Passes-For' Fallacy and the Future of Critical Thinking. Argumentation 24 (3):363-374.
    In this paper, I characterize Susan Haack’s so called passes-for fallacy, analyze both what makes this inference compelling and why it is illegitimate, and finally explain why reflecting on the passes-for fallacy—and others like it—should become part of critical thinking pedagogy for humanities students. The analysis proceeds by examining a case of the passes-for fallacy identified by Haack in the work of Ruth Bleier. A charitable reconstruction of Bleier’s reasoning shows that it is enlightening to regard the (...)
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  50.  1
    Katarzyna Paprzycka (2014). On a Neg‐Raising Fallacy in Determining Enthymematicity: If She Did Not Believe or Want …. Metaphilosophy 45 (1):96-119.
    Many arguments that show p to be enthymematic (in an argument for q) rely on claims like “if one did not believe that p, one would not have a reason for believing that q.” Such arguments are susceptible to the neg-raising fallacy. We tend to interpret claims like “X does not believe that p” as statements of disbelief (X's belief that not-p) rather than as statements of withholding the belief that p. This article argues that there is a tendency (...)
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