Search results for 'Fallacy' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Scott Sturgeon (2000). Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason and Nature. Routledge.score: 8.0
    The mind-body problem continues to be the focus of many of our philosophical concerns. Matters of Mind tackles how the problem has spanned and how it has changed from the earlier theories of reducing aboutness to empirical cases for physicalism. The theories of perception, property explanation, content and knowledge, reliabilism and the problem of zombies and ghosts are all carefully assessed.
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  2. Frank Jackson (2005). Consciousness. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press New York. 310--333.score: 8.0
     
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  3. Antti Revonsuo & Matti Kamppinen (eds.) (1994). Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Lawrence Erlbaum.score: 8.0
    Consciousness seems to be an enigmatic phenomenon: it is difficult to imagine how our perceptions of the world and our inner thoughts, sensations and feelings could be related to the immensely complicated biological organ we call the brain. This volume presents the thoughts of some of the leading philosophers and cognitive scientists who have recently participated in the discussion of the status of consciousness in science. The focus of inquiry is the question: "Is it possible to incorporate consciousness into science?" (...)
     
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  4. Patrick Girard & Luca Moretti (2014). Antirealism and the Conditional Fallacy: The Semantic Approach. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):761-783.score: 6.0
    The expression conditional fallacy identifies a family of arguments deemed to entail odd and false consequences for notions defined in terms of counterfactuals. The antirealist notion of truth is typically defined in terms of what a rational enquirer or a community of rational enquirers would believe if they were suitably informed. This notion is deemed to entail, via the conditional fallacy, odd and false propositions, for example that there necessarily exists a rational enquirer. If these consequences do indeed (...)
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  5. Susanne Bobzien (2006). The Stoics on Fallacies of Equivocation. In D. Frede & B. Inwood (eds.), Language and Learning, Proceedings of the 9th Symposium Hellenisticum. Cambridge University Press.score: 6.0
    ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the Stoic treatment of fallacies that are based on lexical ambiguities. It provides a detailed analysis of the relevant passages, lays bare textual and interpretative difficulties, explores what the Stoic view on the matter implies for their theory of language, and compares their view with Aristotle’s. In the paper I aim to show that, for the Stoics, fallacies of ambiguity are complexes of propositions and sentences and thus straddle the realms of meaning (which is the domain (...)
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  6. Julia Tanner (2006). The Naturalistic Fallacy. Richmond Journal of Philosophy 13.score: 6.0
    The naturalistic fallacy is a source of much confusion. In what follows I will explain what G. E. Moore meant by the naturalistic fallacy, give modern day examples of it then mention some of the different types of views it has spawned. Finally, I will consider a few criticisms of it.
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  7. David Sloan Wilson, Eric Dietrich & Anne B. Clark (2003). On the Inappropriate Use of the Naturalistic Fallacy in Evolutionary Psychology. Biology and Philosophy 18 (5):669-81.score: 6.0
    The naturalistic fallacy is mentionedfrequently by evolutionary psychologists as anerroneous way of thinking about the ethicalimplications of evolved behaviors. However,evolutionary psychologists are themselvesconfused about the naturalistic fallacy and useit inappropriately to forestall legitimateethical discussion. We briefly review what thenaturalistic fallacy is and why it is misusedby evolutionary psychologists. Then we attemptto show how the ethical implications of evolvedbehaviors can be discussed constructivelywithout impeding evolutionary psychologicalresearch. A key is to show how ethicalbehaviors, in addition to unethical behaviors,can evolve (...)
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  8. Adam Hochman (2013). The Phylogeny Fallacy and the Ontogeny Fallacy. Biology and Philosophy 28 (4):593-612.score: 6.0
    In 1990 Robert Lickliter and Thomas Berry identified the phylogeny fallacy, an empirically untenable dichotomy between proximate and evolutionary causation, which locates proximate causes in the decoding of ‘genetic programs’, and evolutionary causes in the historical events that shaped these programs. More recently, Lickliter and Hunter Honeycutt (Psychol Bull 129:819–835, 2003a) argued that Evolutionary Psychologists commit this fallacy, and they proposed an alternative research program for evolutionary psychology. For these authors the phylogeny fallacy is the proximate/evolutionary distinction (...)
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  9. E. J. Lowe (2002). Material Coincidence and the Cinematographic Fallacy: A Response to Olson. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):369-372.score: 6.0
    Eric T. Olson has argued that those who hold that two material objects can exactly coincide at a moment of time, with one of these objects constituting the other, face an insuperable difficulty in accounting for the alleged differences between the objects, such as their being of different kinds and possessing different persistence-conditions. The differences, he suggests, are inexplicable, given that the objects in question are composed of the same particles related in precisely the same way. In response, I show (...)
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  10. Hubert L. Dreyfus (2012). A History of First Step Fallacies. Minds and Machines 22 (2):87-99.score: 6.0
    In the 1960s, without realizing it, AI researchers were hard at work finding the features, rules, and representations needed for turning rationalist philosophy into a research program, and by so doing AI researchers condemned their enterprise to failure. About the same time, a logician, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, pointed out that AI optimism was based on what he called the “first step fallacy”. First step thinking has the idea of a successful last step built in. Limited early success, however, is not (...)
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  11. Luca Moretti (2008). Brogaard and Salerno on Antirealism and the Conditional Fallacy. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):229 - 246.score: 6.0
    Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a conditional fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno's argument relies on a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, "Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association", 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000, "Nous," 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism (...)
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  12. Robert K. Garcia & Nathan L. King (forthcoming). Getting Our Minds Out of the Gutter: Fallacies That Foul Our Discourse (and Virtues That Clean It Up). In Michael W. Austin (ed.), Virtues in Action: New Essays in Applied Virtue Theory.score: 6.0
    Contemporary discourse is littered with nasty and derailed disagreements. In this paper we hope to help clean things up. We diagnose two patterns of thought that often plague and exacerbate controversy. We illustrate these patterns and show that each involves both a logical mistake and a failure of intellectual charity. We also draw upon recent work in social psychology to shed light on why we tend to fall into these patterns of thought. We conclude by suggesting how the intellectual virtues (...)
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  13. Christopher W. Tindale (2007). Fallacies and Argument Appraisal. Cambridge University Press.score: 6.0
    Fallacies and Argument Appraisal presents an introduction to the nature, identification, and causes of fallacious reasoning, along with key questions for evaluation. Drawing from the latest work on fallacies as well as some of the standard ideas that have remained relevant since Aristotle, Christopher Tindale investigates central cases of major fallacies in order to understand what has gone wrong and how this has occurred. Dispensing with the approach that simply assigns labels and brief descriptions of fallacies, Tindale provides fuller treatments (...)
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  14. Tomoji Shogenji (2012). The Degree of Epistemic Justification and the Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 184 (1):29-48.score: 6.0
    This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, and I argue that (...)
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  15. Allan Bäck (2009). Mistakes of Reason: Practical Reasoning and the Fallacy of Accident. Phronesis 54 (2):101-135.score: 6.0
    For Aristotle the fallacy of accident arises from mistakes about being per accidens and not from accidental predication. Mistakes in perceiving per accidens come from our judgements about being per accidens and so commit that fallacy. Practical syllogisms have the same formal structure as being and perceiving per accidens . Moreover perceiving per accidens typically provides the minor premise for the practical syllogism as it makes it possible for us to know singular propositions, especially those about substances. Thus (...)
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  16. Rodrigo Becerra (2004). Homonymous Mistakes with Ontological Aspirations: The Persisting Problem with the Word 'Consciousness'. Sorites 15 (December):11-23.score: 6.0
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  17. F. Macagno & D. Walton (2007). The Fallaciousness of Threats: Character and Ad Baculum . [REVIEW] Argumentation 28 (3):203-228.score: 6.0
    Robert Kimball, in “What’s Wrong with Argumentum Ad Baculum?” (Argumentation, 2006) argues that dialogue-based models of rational argumentation do not satisfactorily account for what is objectionable about more malicious uses of threats encountered in some ad baculum arguments. We review the dialogue-based approach to argumentum ad baculum, and show how it can offer more than Kimball thinks for analyzing such threat arguments and ad baculum fallacies.
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  18. Brian Lightbody & Berman Michael (2010). The Metaphoric Fallacy to a Deductive Inference. Informal Logic: Reasoning and Argumentation in Theory and Practice 30 (2):185-193.score: 6.0
    Our article identifies and describes the metaphoric fallacy to a deductive inference (MFDI) that is an example of incorrect reasoning along the lines of the false analogy fallacy. The MFDI proceeds from informal semantical (metaphorical) claims to a supposedly formally deductive and necessary inference. We charge that such an inference is invalid. We provide three examples of the MFDI to demonstrate the structure of this invalid form of reasoning. Our goal is to contribute to the set of known (...)
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  19. Michael Veber (2012). “People Who Argue Ad Hominem Are Jerks” and Other Self-Fulfilling Fallacies. Argumentation 26 (2):201-212.score: 6.0
    A self-fulfilling fallacy (SFF) is a fallacious argument whose conclusion is that the very fallacy employed is an invalid or otherwise illegitimate inferential procedure. This paper discusses three different ways in which SFF’s might serve to justify their conclusions. SFF’s might have probative value as honest and straightforward arguments, they might serve to justify the premise of a meta-argument or, following a point made by Roy Sorensen, they might provide a non-inferential basis for accepting their conclusion. The paper (...)
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  20. Audrey Yap (2013). Ad Hominem Fallacies, Bias, and Testimony. Argumentation 27 (2):97-109.score: 6.0
    An ad hominem fallacy is committed when an individual employs an irrelevant personal attack against an opponent instead of addressing that opponent’s argument. Many discussions of such fallacies discuss judgments of relevance about such personal attacks, and consider how we might distinguish those that are relevant from those that are not. This paper will argue that the literature on bias and testimony can helpfully contribute to that analysis. This will highlight ways in which biases, particularly unconscious biases, can make (...)
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  21. Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2007). Theory of Supposition Vs. Theory of Fallacies in Ockham. Vivarium 45 (s 2-3):343-359.score: 6.0
    I propose to examine the issue of whether the ancient tradition in logic continued to be developed in the later medieval period from the vantage point of the relations between two specific groups of theories, namely the medieval theories of supposition and the (originally) ancient theories of fallacies. More specifically, I examine whether supposition theories absorbed and replaced theories of fallacies, or whether the latter continued to exist, with respect to one particular author, William of Ockham. I compare different parts (...)
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  22. Stephan Hartmann & Wouter Meijs (2012). Walter the Banker: The Conjunction Fallacy Reconsidered. [REVIEW] Synthese 184 (1):73-87.score: 6.0
    In a famous experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (Psychol Rev 90:293–315, 1983), featuring Linda the bank teller, the participants assign a higher probability to a conjunction of propositions than to one of the conjuncts, thereby seemingly committing a probabilistic fallacy. In this paper, we discuss a slightly different example featuring someone named Walter, who also happens to work at a bank, and argue that, in this example, it is rational to assign a higher probability to the conjunction of suitably (...)
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  23. Douglas Walton (2011). Defeasible Reasoning and Informal Fallacies. Synthese 179 (3):377 - 407.score: 6.0
    This paper argues that some traditional fallacies should be considered as reasonable arguments when used as part of a properly conducted dialog. It is shown that argumentation schemes, formal dialog models, and profiles of dialog are useful tools for studying properties of defeasible reasoning and fallacies. It is explained how defeasible reasoning of the most common sort can deteriorate into fallacious argumentation in some instances. Conditions are formulated that can be used as normative tools to judge whether a given defeasible (...)
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  24. Rodrigo Moro (2009). On the Nature of the Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 171 (1):1 - 24.score: 6.0
    In a seminal work, Tversky and Kahneman showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events (e.g., Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement) is more likely to occur than one of the conjuncts (e.g., Linda is a bank teller). This belief violates the conjunction rule in probability theory. Tversky and Kahneman called this phenomenon the “conjunction fallacy”. Since the discovery of the phenomenon in 1983, researchers in psychology and (...)
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  25. Wai-Hung Wong & Zanja Yudell (2013). How Fallacious is the Consequence Fallacy? Philosophical Studies 165 (1):221-227.score: 6.0
    Timothy Williamson argues against the tactic of criticizing confidence in a theory by identifying a logical consequence of the theory whose probability is not raised by the evidence. He dubs it “the consequence fallacy”. In this paper, we will show that Williamson’s formulation of the tactic in question is ambiguous. On one reading of Williamson’s formulation, the tactic is indeed a fallacy, but it is not a commonly used tactic; on another reading, it is a commonly used tactic (...)
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  26. Jonathan Barrett (1991). Really Taking Darwin and the Naturalistic Fallacy Seriously: An Objection to Rottschaefer and Martinsen. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 6 (4):433-437.score: 6.0
    Out of a concern to respect the naturalistic fallacy, Ruse (1986) argues for the possibility of causal, but not justificatory, explanations of morality in terms of evolutionary processes. In a discussion of Ruse's work, Rottschaefer and Martinsen (1990) claim that he erroneously limits the explanatory scope of evolutionary concepts, because he fails to see that one can have objective moral properties without committing either of two forms of the naturalistic fallacy, if one holds that moral properties supervene on (...)
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  27. Catarina Dutilh Novaes & Stephen Read (2008). Insolubilia and the Fallacy Secundum Quid Et Simpliciter. Vivarium 46 (2):175-191.score: 6.0
    Thomas Bradwardine makes much of the fact that his solution to the insolubles is in accordance with Aristotle's diagnosis of the fallacy in the Liar paradox as that of secundum quid et simpliciter. Paul Spade, however, claims that this invocation of Aristotle by Bradwardine is purely "honorary" in order to confer specious respectability on his analysis and give it a spurious weight of authority. Our answer to Spade follows Bradwardine's response to the problem of revenge: any proposition saying of (...)
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  28. Lawrence B. Lombard (2006). Scope Fallacies and the “Decisive Objection” Against Endurance. Philosophia 34 (4):441-452.score: 6.0
    From time to time, the idea that enduring things can change has been challenged. The latest challenge has come in the form of what David Lewis has called a “decisive objection”, which claims to deduce a contradiction from the idea that enduring things change with respect to their temporary intrinsics, when that idea is combined with eternalism. It is my aim in this paper to explain why I think that no argument has yet appeared that deduces a contradiction from a (...)
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  29. Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi (2012). How the Conjunction Fallacy is Tied to Probabilistic Confirmation: Some Remarks on Schupbach (2009). Synthese 184 (1):3-12.score: 6.0
    Crupi et al. (Think Reason 14:182–199, 2008) have recently advocated and partially worked out an account of the conjunction fallacy phenomenon based on the Bayesian notion of confirmation. In response, Schupbach (2009) presented a critical discussion as following from some novel experimental results. After providing a brief restatement and clarification of the meaning and scope of our original proposal, we will outline Schupbach’s results and discuss his interpretation thereof arguing that they do not actually undermine our point of view (...)
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  30. William A. Rottschaefer & David Martinsen (1991). The Insufficience of Supervenient Explanations of Moral Actions: Really Taking Darwin and the Naturalistic Fallacy Seriously. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 6 (4):439-445.score: 6.0
    In a recent paper in this journal (Rottschaefer and Martinsen 1990) we have proposed a view of Darwinian evolutionary metaethics that we believe improves upon Michael Ruse's (e.g., Ruse 1986) proposals by claiming that there are evolutionary based objective moral values and that a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness can be given that avoids the naturalistic fallacy in both its definitional and derivational forms while providing genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive (...)
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  31. Jonah N. Schupbach (2012). Is the Conjunction Fallacy Tied to Probabilistic Confirmation? Synthese 184 (1):13-27.score: 6.0
    Crupi et al. (2008) offer a confirmation-theoretic, Bayesian account of the conjunction fallacy—an error in reasoning that occurs when subjects judge that Pr( h 1 & h 2 | e ) > Pr( h 1 | e ). They introduce three formal conditions that are satisfied by classical conjunction fallacy cases, and they show that these same conditions imply that h 1 & h 2 is confirmed by e to a greater extent than is h 1 alone. Consequently, (...)
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  32. Joel Marks (1988). When is a Fallacy Not a Fallacy? Metaphilosophy 19 (3‐4):307-312.score: 6.0
    The informal fallacies can be conceived as enthymemes that are formally valid. But, then, what accounts for our sense of their fallaciousness? I explain this in terms of the notion of a warrant.
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  33. Maurice Hamington (2009). Business is Not a Game: The Metaphoric Fallacy. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 86 (4):473 - 484.score: 6.0
    Sport and game metaphors are ubiquitous in the culture and language of business. As evocative linguistic devices, such metaphors are morally neutral; however, if they are indicative of a deep structure of understanding that filters experience, then they have the potential to be ethically problematic. This article argues that there exists a danger for those who forget or confuse metaphor with definition: the metaphoric fallacy. Accordingly, business is like a game, but it is not the equivalent of a game. (...)
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  34. Pieter Sjoerd Hasper (2013). The Ingredients of Aristotle's Theory of Fallacy. Argumentation 27 (1):31-47.score: 6.0
    In chapter 8 of the Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle claims that his theory of fallacy is complete in the sense that there cannot be more fallacies than the ones he lists. In this article I try to explain how Aristotle could have justified this completeness claim by analysing how he conceptualizes fallacies (dialectical mistakes which do not appear so) and what conceptual ingredients play a role in his discussion of fallacies. If we take the format of dialectical discussions into account, (...)
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  35. Frederick J. E. Woodbridge (1936). The Problem of Consciousness Again. Journal of Philosophy 33 (21):561-568.score: 6.0
  36. Luciano Floridi (2009). Logical Fallacies as Informational Shortcuts. Synthese 167 (2):317 - 325.score: 6.0
    The paper argues that the two best known formal logical fallacies, namely denying the antecedent (DA) and affirming the consequent (AC) are not just basic and simple errors, which prove human irrationality, but rather informational shortcuts, which may provide a quick and dirty way of extracting useful information from the environment. DA and AC are shown to be degraded versions of Bayes’ theorem, once this is stripped of some of its probabilities. The less the probabilities count, the closer these fallacies (...)
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  37. Martin L. Jönsson & Elias Assarsson (2013). Shogenji's Measure of Justification and the Inverse Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 190 (15):3075-3085.score: 6.0
    This paper takes issue with a recent proposal due to Shogenji (Synthese 184:29–48, 2012). In his paper, Shogenji introduces J, a normatively motivated formal measure of justification (and of confirmation), and then proceeds to recruit it descriptively in an explanation of the conjunction fallacy. We argue that this explanation is undermined by the fact that it cannot be extended in any natural way to the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered, closely related fallacy. We point out (...)
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  38. David Botting (2012). Fallacies of Accident. Argumentation 26 (2):267-289.score: 6.0
    In this paper I will attempt a unified analysis of the various examples of the fallacy of accident given by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations. In many cases the examples underdetermine the fallacy and it is not trivial to identify the fallacy committed. To make this identification we have to find some error common to all the examples and to show that this error would still be committed even if those other fallacies that the examples exemplify were (...)
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  39. Harvey S. Smallman & Maia B. Cook (2011). Naïve Realism: Folk Fallacies in the Design and Use of Visual Displays. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (3):579-608.score: 6.0
    Often implicit in visual display design and development is a gold standard of photorealism. By approximating direct perception, photorealism appeals to users and designers by being both attractive and apparently effortless. The vexing result from numerous performance evaluations, though, is that increasing realism often impairs performance. Smallman and St. John (2005) labeled misplaced faith in realistic information display Naïve Realism and theorized it resulted from a triplet of folk fallacies about perception. Here, we illustrate issues associated with the wider trend (...)
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  40. Geoffrey Bagwell (2011). Does Plato Argue Fallaciously at Cratylus 385b–C? Apeiron 44 (1):13-21.score: 6.0
    At Cratylus 385b–c, Plato appears to argue that names have truth-value. Critics have almost universally condemned the argument as fallacious. Their case has proven so compelling that it has driven editors to recommend moving or removing the argument from its received position in the manuscripts. I argue that a close reading of the argument reveals it commits no fallacy, and its purpose in the dialogue justifies its original position. I wish to vindicate the manuscript tradition, showing that the argument (...)
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  41. Christoph Lumer (2000). Reductionism in Fallacy Theory. Argumentation 14 (4):405-423.score: 6.0
    (1) The aim of the paper is to develop a reduction of fallacy theory, i.e. to 'deduce' fallacy theory from a positive theory of argumentation which provides exact criteria for valid and adequate argumentation. Such reductionism has several advantages compared to an unsystematic action, which is quite usual in current fallacy but which at least in part is due to the poor state of positive argumentation theory itself. (2) After defining 'fallacy' (3) some principle ideas and (...)
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  42. Frans H. Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst (1987). Fallacies in Pragma-Dialectical Perspective. Argumentation 1 (3):283-301.score: 6.0
    In the pragma-dialectical approach, fallacies are considered incorrect moves in a discussion for which the goal is successful resolution of a dispute. Ten rules are given for effective conduct at the various stages of such a critical discussion (confrontation, opening, argumentation, concluding). Fallacies are discussed as violations of these rules, taking into account all speech acts which are traditionally recognized as fallacies. Special attention is paid to the role played by implicitness in fallacies in everyday language use. It is stressed (...)
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  43. Brian J. Gibbs (1997). Evolving Null Hypotheses and the Base Rate Fallacy: A Functional Interpretation of Scientific Myth. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):776-777.score: 6.0
    The meaning of an experimental result depends on the experiment's conceptual backdrop, particularly its null hypothesis. This observation provides the basis for a functional interpretation of belief in the base rate fallacy. On this interpretation, if the base rate fallacy is to be labelled a “myth,” then it should be recognized that this label is not necessarily a disparaging one.
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  44. William Goodwin (2010). The 'Passes-For' Fallacy and the Future of Critical Thinking. Argumentation 24 (3):363-374.score: 6.0
    In this paper, I characterize Susan Haack’s so called passes-for fallacy, analyze both what makes this inference compelling and why it is illegitimate, and finally explain why reflecting on the passes-for fallacy—and others like it—should become part of critical thinking pedagogy for humanities students. The analysis proceeds by examining a case of the passes-for fallacy identified by Haack in the work of Ruth Bleier. A charitable reconstruction of Bleier’s reasoning shows that it is enlightening to regard the (...)
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  45. Brian Ribeiro (2008). How Often Do We (Philosophy Professors) Commit the Straw Man Fallacy? Teaching Philosophy 31 (1):27-38.score: 6.0
    In a recent paper (in Argumentation, 2006) Robert Talisse and Scott Aikin suggest that we ought to recognize two distinct forms of the straw man fallacy. In addition to misrepresenting the strength of an opponent’s specific argument (= the representation form), one can also misrepresent the strength of one’s opposition in general, or the overall state of a debate, by selecting a (relatively) weak opponent for critical consideration (= the selection form). Here I consider whether we as philosophy professors (...)
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  46. Douglas Walton (2002). The Sunk Costs Fallacy or Argument From Waste. Argumentation 16 (4):473-503.score: 6.0
    This project tackles the problem of analyzing a specific form of reasoning called ‘sunk costs’ in economics and ‘argument from waste’ in argumentation theory. The project is to build a normative structure representing the form of the argument, and then to apply this normative structure to actual cases in which the sunk costs argument has been used. The method is partly structural and partly empirical. The empirical part is carried out through the analysis of case studies of the sunk costs (...)
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  47. Kevin Korb (2004). Bayesian Informal Logic and Fallacy. Informal Logic 24 (1).score: 6.0
    Bayesian reasoning has been applied formally to statistical inference, machine learning and analysing scientific method. Here I apply it informally to more common forms of inference, namely natural language arguments. I analyse a variety of traditional fallacies, deductive, inductive and causal, and find more merit in them than is generally acknowledged. Bayesian principles provide a framework for understanding ordinary arguments which is well worth developing.
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  48. Douglas Walton (1999). The Fallacy of Many Questions: On the Notions of Complexity, Loadedness and Unfair Entrapment in Interrogative Theory. [REVIEW] Argumentation 13 (4):379-383.score: 6.0
    The traditional fallacy of many questions, also known as the fallacy of complex question, illustrated by the question, "Have you stopped sexually harassing your students?", has been known since ancient times, but is still alive and well. What is of practical importance about this fallacy is that it represents a tactic of entrapment that is very common in everyday argumentation, as well as in special kinds of argumentation like that in a legal trial or a parliamentary debate. (...)
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  49. Jürgen Huber, Michael Kirchler & Thomas Stöckl (2010). The Hot Hand Belief and the Gambler's Fallacy in Investment Decisions Under Risk. Theory and Decision 68 (4):445-462.score: 6.0
    We conduct experiments to analyze investment behavior in decisions under risk. Subjects can bet on the outcomes of a series of coin tosses themselves, rely on randomized ‘experts’, or choose a risk-free alternative. We observe that subjects who rely on the randomized experts pick those who were successful in the past, showing behavior consistent with the hot hand belief. Obviously the term ‘expert’ suffices to attract some subjects. For those who decide on their own, we find behavior consistent with the (...)
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  50. Don S. Levi (1999). The Fallacy of Treating the Ad Baculum as a Fallacy. Informal Logic 19 (2).score: 6.0
    The ad baculum is not a fallacy in an argument, but is offered instead of an argument to put an end to further argument. This claim is the basis for criticizing Michael Wreen's "neo-traditionalism," which yields misreadings of supposed cases of the ad baculum because of its rejection of any consideration of what the person using the ad baculum, or someone who refers to that use as an "argument," is doing. The paper concludes with reflections on the values that (...)
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