Search results for 'False Belief Task' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Joseph Shieber (2009). Understanding Assertion: Lessons From the False Belief Task. Language & Communication 29 (1):47-60.score: 639.0
    This paper uses recent research in developmental psychology regarding the acquisition of the concept of belief in young children to explore the contrast between a disposition-based account of the principles underlying linguistic communication and the representative and highly influential intention-based accounts of assertional practice advanced by David Lewis and Donald Davidson. Indeed, evidence from recent work in developmental psychology would seem to suggest that disposition-based accounts are not only possible accounts of the acquisition of competence in assertional practice, but (...)
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  2. Bart Hollebrandse, Angeliek Hout & Petra Hendriks (2012). Children's First and Second-Order False-Belief Reasoning in a Verbal and a Low-Verbal Task. Synthese (3):1-13.score: 609.0
    We can understand and act upon the beliefs of other people, even when these conflict with our own beliefs. Children’s development of this ability, known as Theory of Mind, typically happens around age 4. Research using a looking-time paradigm, however, established that toddlers at the age of 15 months old pass a non-verbal false-belief task (Onishi and Baillargeon in Science 308:255–258, 2005). This is well before the age at which children pass any of the verbal false- (...) tasks. In this study we present a more complex case of false-belief reasoning with older children. We tested second-order reasoning, probing children’s ability to handle the belief of one person about the belief of another person. We find just the opposite: 7-year-olds pass a verbal false-belief reasoning task, but fail on an equally complex low-verbal task. This finding suggests that language supports explicit reasoning about beliefs, perhaps by facilitating the cognitive system to keep track of beliefs attributed by people to other people. (shrink)
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  3. Bart Hollebrandse, Angeliek van Hout & Petra Hendriks (2012). Children's First and Second-Order False-Belief Reasoning in a Verbal and a Low-Verbal Task. Synthese 191 (3):1-13.score: 609.0
    We can understand and act upon the beliefs of other people, even when these conflict with our own beliefs. Children’s development of this ability, known as Theory of Mind, typically happens around age 4. Research using a looking-time paradigm, however, established that toddlers at the age of 15 months old pass a non-verbal false-belief task (Onishi and Baillargeon in Science 308:255–258, 2005). This is well before the age at which children pass any of the verbal false- (...) tasks. In this study we present a more complex case of false-belief reasoning with older children. We tested second-order reasoning, probing children’s ability to handle the belief of one person about the belief of another person. We find just the opposite: 7-year-olds pass a verbal false-belief reasoning task, but fail on an equally complex low-verbal task. This finding suggests that language supports explicit reasoning about beliefs, perhaps by facilitating the cognitive system to keep track of beliefs attributed by people to other people. (shrink)
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  4. Joseph A. Hedger & William V. Fabricius (2011). True Belief Belies False Belief: Recent Findings of Competence in Infants and Limitations in 5-Year-Olds, and Implications for Theory of Mind Development. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):429-447.score: 480.0
    False belief tasks have enjoyed a monopoly in the research on children?s development of a theory of mind. They have been granted this status because they promise to deliver an unambiguous assessment of children?s understanding of the representational nature of mental states. Their poor cousins, true belief tasks, have been relegated to occasional service as control tasks. That this is their only role has been due to the universal assumption that correct answers on true belief tasks (...)
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  5. Michael Wilby (2012). Embodying the False-Belief Tasks. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):519-540.score: 470.0
    Embodied approaches to mindreading have tended to define themselves in contrast to cognitive approaches to social mindreading. One side effect of this has been a lack of engagement with key areas in the study of social cognition—in particular the topic of how we gain an understanding of the referential nature of others’ thoughts, and how that understanding develops from infancy. I argue that embodied accounts of mindreading are well equipped to enter into this debate, by making use of the notion (...)
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  6. Paul Bloom (2000). Two Reasons to Abandon the False Belief Task as a Test of Theory of Mind. Cognition 77 (1):25-31.score: 450.0
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  7. Robert Thompson, Believe It, or Not? Explaining Why Children Fail the Standard False Belief Task.score: 450.0
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  8. Konstantine Arkoudas & Selmer Bringsjord (2008). Toward Formalizing Common-Sense Psychology: An Analysis of the False-Belief Task. In Tu-Bao Ho & Zhi-Hua Zhou (eds.), Pricai 2008: Trends in Artificial Intelligence. Springer. 17--29.score: 450.0
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  9. Gut Arkadiusz (2009). Language and second order thinking (the analysis of false belief task)(jezyk a myslenie drugiego rzedu (analiza testów falszywego przekonania)). Filozofia Nauki 17 (3 (67)).score: 450.0
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  10. Arkadiusz Gut (2009). Language and Second Order Thinking (the Analysis of False Belief Task). Filozofia Nauki 17 (3):99.score: 450.0
     
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  11. Alicia Callejas, Gordon L. Shulman & Maurizio Corbetta (2011). False Belief Vs. False Photographs: A Test of Theory of Mind or Working Memory? Frontiers in Psychology 2.score: 432.0
    Theory of Mind, the ability to reason about other people’s thoughts and beliefs, has been traditionally studied in behavioral and neuroimaging experiments by comparing performance in ‘false belief’ and ‘false photograph’ (control) stories. However, some evidence suggests that these stories are not matched in difficulty, complicating the interpretation of results. Here, we more fully evaluated the relative difficulty of comprehending these stories and drawing inferences from them. Subjects read false belief and false photograph stories (...)
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  12. L. C. De Bruin & A. Newen (2012). The Developmental Paradox of False Belief Understanding: A Dual-System Solution. Synthese (3):1-24.score: 384.0
    We explore the developmental paradox of false belief understanding. This paradox follows from the claim that young infants already have an understanding of false belief, despite the fact that they consistently fail the elicited-response false belief task. First, we argue that recent proposals to solve this paradox are unsatisfactory because they (i) try to give a full explanation of false belief understanding in terms of a single system, (ii) fail to provide (...)
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  13. [deleted]Matthias Schurz, Markus Aichhorn, Anna Martin & Josef Perner (2013). Common Brain Areas Engaged in False Belief Reasoning and Visual Perspective Taking: A Meta-Analysis of Functional Brain Imaging Studies. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 381.0
    We performed a quantitative meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies to identify brain areas which are commonly engaged in social and visuo-spatial perspective taking. Specifically, we compared brain activation found for visual-perspective taking to activation for false belief reasoning, a task which requires awareness of perspective to understand someone’s mistaken belief about the world which contrasts with reality. In support of a previous account by Perner & Leekam (2008), a meta-analytic conjunction analysis found activation for false (...)
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  14. Anna Ciaunica (2014). Under Pressure: Processing Representational Decoupling in False-Belief Tasks. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):527-542.score: 380.0
    Several studies demonstrated that children younger than 3 years of age, who consistently fail the standard verbal false-belief task, can anticipate others’ actions based on their attributed false beliefs. This gave rise to the so-called “Developmental Paradox”. De Bruin and Kästner recently suggested that the Developmental Paradox is best addressed in terms of the relation between coupled and decoupled processes and argued that if enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be (...)
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  15. Matthew Van Cleave (2010). Linguistic Practice and False-Belief Tasks. Mind & Language 25 (3):298-328.score: 357.3
    Jill de Villiers has argued that children's mastery of sentential complements plays a crucial role in enabling them to succeed at false-belief tasks. Josef Perner has disputed that and has argued that mastery of false-belief tasks requires an understanding of the multiplicity of perspectives. This paper attempts to resolve the debate by explicating attributions of desires and beliefs as extensions of the linguistic practices of making commands and assertions, respectively. In terms of these linguistic practices one (...)
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  16. Anika Fiebich (2013). Mindreading with Ease? Fluency and Belief Reasoning in 4- to 5-Year-Olds. Synthese:1-16.score: 315.0
    For decades, philosophers and psychologists have assumed that children understand other people’s behavior on the basis of Belief Reasoning (BR) at latest by age 5 when they pass the false belief task. Furthermore, children’s use of BR in the true belief task has been regarded as being ontogenetically prior. Recent findings from developmental studies challenge this view and indicate that 4- to 5-year-old children make use of a reasoning strategy, which is cognitively less demanding (...)
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  17. Masaharu Mizumoto (2011). A Theory of Knowledge and Belief Change - Formal and Experimental Perspectives. Hokkaido University Press.score: 315.0
    This work explores the conceptual and empirical issues of the concept of knowledge and its relation to the pattern of our belief change, from formal and experimental perspectives. Part I gives an analysis of knowledge (called Sustainability) that is formally represented and naturalistically plausible at the same time, which is claimed to be a synthesized view of knowledge, covering not only empirical knowledge, but also knowledge of future, practical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, knowledge of general facts. Part II tries to (...)
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  18. Matthew van Cleave & Christopher Gauker (2010). Linguistic Practice and False-Belief Tasks. Mind and Language 25 (3):298-328.score: 306.0
    Jill de Villiers has argued that children's mastery of sentential complements plays a crucial role in enabling them to succeed at false-belief tasks. Josef Perner has disputed that and has argued that mastery of false-belief tasks requires an understanding of the multiplicity of perspectives. This paper attempts to resolve the debate by explicating attributions of desires and beliefs as extensions of the linguistic practices of making commands and assertions, respectively. In terms of these linguistic practices one (...)
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  19. James Dungan & Rebecca Saxe (2012). Matched False-Belief Performance During Verbal and Nonverbal Interference. Cognitive Science 36 (6):1148-1156.score: 300.0
    Language has been shown to play a key role in the development of a child’s theory of mind, but its role in adult belief reasoning remains unclear. One recent study used verbal and nonverbal interference during a false-belief task to show that accurate belief reasoning in adults necessarily requires language (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). The strength of this inference depends on the cognitive processes that are matched between the verbal and nonverbal inference tasks. Here, (...)
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  20. Anika Fiebich (forthcoming). Narratives, Culture, and Folk Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.score: 270.0
    In this paper, I aim to determine to what extent contemporary cross-cultural and developmental research can shed light on the role that narrative practices might play in the development of folk psychology. In particular, I focus on the role of narrative practices in the development of false belief understanding, which has been regarded as a milestone in the development of folk psychology. Second, I aim to discuss possible cognitive procedures that may underlie successful performance in false (...) tasks. Methodologically, I distinguish between two kinds of narrative practices: ‘mentalistic narrative practice’ (which involves an explicit reference to another person’s mental states), and ‘behavioral-contextual narrative practice’ (which involves an explicit reference to the (normative) behavior of another person in a specific socio-situational context). Whereas the former is more prevalent in Western cultures than in Eastern cultures, the latter is predominantly used by members of Eastern cultures. Mentalistic narrative practices correlate with cultural divergences in the development of false belief understanding throughout ontogeny but do not seem to play the key role. The analysis shows that (i) conceptual change and the acquisition of mental state terms is essential for passing the false belief task, and that (ii) theory is likely to be the cognitive mechanism involved here such as proposed by Theory Theory. However, Hutto’s Narrative Practice Hypothesis trumps over Theory Theory to account for the varieties and ambiguities people typically meet when understanding each other in everyday life. (shrink)
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  21. Tillmann Vierkant (2012). Self Knowledge and Knowing Other Minds: The Implicit / Explicit Distinction as a Tool in Understanding Theory of Mind. British Journal of Developmental Psychology 30 (1):141-155.score: 270.0
    Holding content explicitly requires a form of self knowledge. But what does the relevant self knowledge look like? Using theory of mind as an example, this paper argues that the correct answer to this question will have to take into account the crucial role of language based deliberation, but warns against the standard assumption that explicitness is necessary for ascribing awareness. It argues in line with Bayne that intentional action is at least an equally valid criterion for awareness. This leads (...)
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  22. Karolina Krzyżanowska (2013). Belief Ascription and the Ramsey Test. Synthese 190 (1):21-36.score: 267.0
    In this paper, I analyse a finding by Riggs and colleagues that there is a close connection between people’s ability to reason with counterfactual conditionals and their capacity to attribute false beliefs to others. The result indicates that both processes may be governed by one cognitive mechanism, though false belief attribution seems to be slightly more cognitively demanding. Given that the common denominator for both processes is suggested to be a form of the Ramsey test, I investigate (...)
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  23. Mikolaj Hernik, Pasco Fearon & Peter Fonagy (2009). There Must Be More to Development of Mindreading and Metacognition Than Passing False Belief Tasks. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):147-148.score: 243.3
    We argue that while it is a valuable contribution, Carruthers' model may be too restrictive to elaborate our understanding of the development of mindreading and metacognition, or to enrich our knowledge of individual differences and psychopathology. To illustrate, we describe pertinent examples where there may be a critical interplay between primitive social-cognitive processes and emerging self-attributions.
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  24. Vincent G. Berthiaume, Thomas R. Shultz & Kristine H. Onishi (2013). A Constructivist Connectionist Model of Transitions on False-Belief Tasks. Cognition 126 (3):441-458.score: 243.3
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  25. [deleted]Andreas Falck, Ingar Brinck & Magnus Lindgren (2014). Interest Contagion in Violation-of-Expectation-Based False-Belief Tasks. Frontiers in Psychology 5.score: 243.3
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  26. Ian A. Apperly, Dana Samson, Claudia Chiavarino, Wai-Ling Bickerton & Glyn W. Humphreys (2007). Testing the Domain-Specificity of a Theory of Mind Deficit in Brain-Injured Patients: Evidence for Consistent Performance on Non-Verbal, “Reality-Unknown” False Belief and False Photograph Tasks. Cognition 103 (2):300-321.score: 238.3
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  27. Ian A. Apperly, Elisa Back, Dana Samson & Lisa France (2008). The Cost of Thinking About False Beliefs: Evidence From Adults' Performance on a Non-Inferential Theory of Mind Task. Cognition 106 (3):1093-1108.score: 225.0
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  28. Marco Fenici (2011). What Does the False Belief Test Test? Phenomenology and Mind 1:197-207.score: 224.0
    The age at which children acquire the concept of belief is a subject of debate. Many scholars claim that children master beliefs when they are able to pass the false belief test, around their fourth year of life. However, recent experiments show that children implicitly attribute beliefs even earlier. The dispute does not only concern the empirical issue of discovering children’s early cognitive abilities. It also depends on the kind of capacities that we associate to the very (...)
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  29. Torben Braüner (2014). Hybrid-Logical Reasoning in the Smarties and Sally-Anne Tasks. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (4):415-439.score: 219.0
    The main aim of the present paper is to use a proof system for hybrid modal logic to formalize what are called false-belief tasks in cognitive psychology, thereby investigating the interplay between cognition and logical reasoning about belief. We consider two different versions of the Smarties task, involving respectively a shift of perspective to another person and to another time. Our formalizations disclose that despite this difference, the two versions of the Smarties task have exactly (...)
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  30. Mitchell Herschbach (2008). False-Belief Understanding and the Phenomenological Critics of Folk Psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):33-56.score: 212.0
    The dominant account of human social understanding is that we possess a 'folk psychology', that we understand and can interact with other people because we appreciate their mental states. Recently, however, philosophers from the phenomenological tradition have called into question the scope of the folk psychological account and argued for the importance of 'online', non-mentalistic forms of social understanding. In this paper I critically evaluate the arguments of these phenomenological critics, arguing that folk psychology plays a larger role in human (...)
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  31. Christopher Steinsvold (2010). Being Wrong: Logics for False Belief. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 52 (3):245-253.score: 202.0
    We introduce an operator to represent the simple notion of being wrong. Read Wp to mean: the agent is wrong about p . Being wrong about p means believing p though p is false. We add this operator to the language of propositional logic and study it. We introduce a canonical model for logics of being wrong, show completeness for the minimal logic of being wrong and various other systems. En route we examine the expressiveness of the language. In (...)
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  32. Josef Perner, Susan R. Leekam, Deborah Myers, Shalini Davis & Nicola Odgers, Misrepresentation and Referential Confusion: Children's Difficulty with False Beliefs and Outdated Photographs.score: 190.0
    Three and 4-year-old children were tested on matched versions of Zaitchik's (1990) photo task and Wimmer and Perner's (1983) false belief task. Although replicating Zaitchik's finding that false belief and photo task are of equal difficulty, this applied only to mean performance across subjects and no substantial correlation between the two tasks was found. This suggests that the two tasks tap different intellectual abilities. It was further discovered that children's performance can be improved (...)
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  33. Avram Hiller (2013). Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief. Logos and Episteme 4 (1):7-19.score: 177.3
    Richard Feldman and William Lycan have defended a view according to which a necessary condition for a doxastic agent to have knowledge is that the agent’s belief is not essentially based on any false assumptions. I call this the no-essential-false-assumption account, or NEFA. Peter Klein considers examples of what he calls “useful false beliefs” and alters his own account of knowledge in a way which can be seen as a refinement of NEFA. This paper shows that (...)
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  34. Liesbeth Flobbe, Rineke Verbrugge, Petra Hendriks & Irene Krämer (2008). Children's Application of Theory of Mind in Reasoning and Language. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (4):417-442.score: 174.0
    Many social situations require a mental model of the knowledge, beliefs, goals, and intentions of others: a Theory of Mind (ToM). If a person can reason about other people’s beliefs about his own beliefs or intentions, he is demonstrating second-order ToM reasoning. A standard task to test second-order ToM reasoning is the second-order false belief task. A different approach to investigating ToM reasoning is through its application in a strategic game. Another task that is believed (...)
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  35. Leon de Bruin & Lena Kästner (2012). Dynamic Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):541-563.score: 171.0
    Abstract In this article, we investigate the merits of an enactive view of cognition for the contemporary debate about social cognition. If enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the “cognitive gap”, i.e. provide us with a convincing account of those higher forms of cognition that have traditionally been the focus of its cognitivist opponents. We show that, when it comes to social cognition, current articulations of enactivism are—despite their celebrated successes (...)
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  36. Jason Low & Bo Wang (2011). On the Long Road to Mentalism in Children's Spontaneous False-Belief Understanding: Are We There Yet? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):411-428.score: 168.0
    We review recent anticipatory looking and violation-of-expectancy studies suggesting that infants and young preschoolers have spontaneous (implicit) understanding of mind despite their known problems until later in life on elicited (explicit) tests of false-belief reasoning. Straightforwardly differentiating spontaneous and elicited expressions of complex mental state understanding in relation to an implicit-explicit knowledge framework may be challenging; early action predictions may be based on behavior rules that are complementary to the mentalistic attributions under consideration. We discuss that the way (...)
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  37. Martin Capstick (2013). On-Line False Belief Understanding Qua Folk Psychology? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):27-40.score: 168.0
    In this paper, I address Mitchell Herschbach’s arguments against the phenomenological critics of folk psychology. Central to Herschbach’s arguments is the introduction of Michael Wheeler’s distinction between ‘on-line’ and ‘off-line’ intelligence to the debate on social understanding. Herschbach uses this distinction to describe two arguments made by the phenomenological critics. The first is that folk psychology is exclusively off-line and mentalistic. The second is that social understanding is on-line and non-mentalistic. To counter the phenomenological critics, Herschbach argues for the existence (...)
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  38. Jill G. de Villiers & Peter A. de Villiers (2002). Why Not LF for False Belief Reasoning? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):682-683.score: 168.0
    We argue that natural language has the right degree of representational richness for false belief reasoning, especially the complements under verbs of communication and belief. Language may indeed be necessary synchronically for cross-modular reasoning, but certain achievements in language seem necessary at least diachronically for explicit reasoning about false beliefs.
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  39. R. Faden & A. Faden (1977). False Belief and the Refusal of Medical Treatment. Journal of Medical Ethics 3 (3):133-136.score: 168.0
    May a doctor treat a patient, despite that patient's refusal, when in his professional opinion treatment is necessary? This is the dilemma which must from time to time confront most physicians. An examination of the validity of such a refusal is provided by the present authors who use the case history of a patient refusing treatment, for cancer as well as for a fractured hip, to evaluate the grounds for intervention in such circumstances. In such a situation the patient is (...)
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  40. Maddalena Marini, Sara Agosta, Giuliana Mazzoni, Gianfranco Dalla Barba & Giuseppe Sartori (2012). True and False DRM Memories: Differences Detected with an Implicit Task. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 156.0
    Memory is prone to illusions. When people are presented with lists of words associated with a non-presented critical lure, they produce a high level of false recognitions (false memories) for non-presented related stimuli indistinguishable, at the explicit level, from presented words (DRM paradigm). We assessed whether true and false DRM memories can be distinguished at the implicit level by using the autobiographical IAT (aIAT), a novel method based on indirect measures that permits to detect true autobiographical events (...)
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  41. Brenda R. J. Jansen, Maartje E. J. Raijmakers & Ingmar Visser (2007). Rule Transition on the Balance Scale Task: A Case Study in Belief Change. Synthese 155 (2):211 - 236.score: 156.0
    For various domains in proportional reasoning cognitive development is characterized as a progression through a series of increasingly complex rules. A multiplicative relationship between two task features, such as weight and distance information of blocks placed at both sides of the fulcrum of a balance scale, appears difficult to discover. During development, children change their beliefs about the balance scale several times: from a focus on the weight dimension (Rule I) to occasionally considering the distance dimension (Rule II), guessing (...)
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  42. Scott Berman (1996). Plato's Explanation of False Belief in the "Sophist&Quot;. Apeiron 29 (1):19 - 46.score: 152.0
  43. Timothy Lane (2010). The Ethics of False Belief. EurAmerica 40 (3):591-633.score: 146.0
    According to Allen Wood’s “procedural principle” we should believe only that which can be justified by evidence, and nothing more. He argues that holding beliefs which are not justified by evidence diminishes our self-respect and corrupts us, both individually and collectively. Wood’s normative and descriptive views as regards belief are of a piece with the received view which holds that beliefs aim at the truth. This view I refer to as the Truth-Tracking View (TTV). I first present a modest (...)
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  44. Douglas Odegard (1976). Can a Justified Belief Be False? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):561 - 568.score: 144.0
    Robert richman tries to defend a justified-True-Belief analysis of knowledge by attacking the assumption that a justified belief can be false. But, Although 'p is justified but false' is incoherent if asserted about the way things actually are, It is not incoherent if asserted about a supposed situation. And critics of a justified-True-Belief analysis need only do the latter.
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  45. Kevin Lynch (2010). Self-Deception, Religious Belief, and the False Belief Condition. Heythrop Journal 51 (6):1073-1074.score: 140.0
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  46. John Ackrill (1966). Plato on False Belief. The Monist 50 (3):383-402.score: 140.0
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  47. Gail Fine (1979). False Belief in the Theaetetus. Phronesis 24 (1):70-80.score: 140.0
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  48. Katharina A. Helming, Brent Strickland & Pierre Jacob (forthcoming). Making Sense of Early False-Belief Understanding. Trends in Cognitive Sciences.score: 140.0
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  49. Gail Fine (1979). False Belief in the "Theaetetus". Phronesis 24 (1):70 - 80.score: 140.0
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  50. C. J. F. Williams (1972). Referential Opacity and False Belief in the Theaetetus. Philosophical Quarterly 22 (89):289-302.score: 140.0
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