Search results for 'False Belief Task' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  20
    Joseph Shieber (2009). Understanding Assertion: Lessons From the False Belief Task. Language & Communication 29 (1):47-60.
    This paper uses recent research in developmental psychology regarding the acquisition of the concept of belief in young children to explore the contrast between a disposition-based account of the principles underlying linguistic communication and the representative and highly influential intention-based accounts of assertional practice advanced by David Lewis and Donald Davidson. Indeed, evidence from recent work in developmental psychology would seem to suggest that disposition-based accounts are not only possible accounts of the acquisition of competence in assertional practice, but (...)
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  2.  4
    Paula Rubio‐Fernández (2015). Can We Forget What We Know in a FalseBelief Task? An Investigation of the True‐Belief Default. Cognitive Science 40 (4).
    It has been generally assumed in the Theory of Mind literature of the past 30 years that young children fail standard false-belief tasks because they attribute their own knowledge to the protagonist. Contrary to the traditional view, we have recently proposed that the children's bias is task induced. This alternative view was supported by studies showing that 3 year olds are able to pass a false-belief task that allows them to focus on the protagonist, (...)
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  3.  14
    Bart Hollebrandse, Angeliek van Hout & Petra Hendriks (2012). Children's First and Second-Order False-Belief Reasoning in a Verbal and a Low-Verbal Task. Synthese 191 (3):1-13.
    We can understand and act upon the beliefs of other people, even when these conflict with our own beliefs. Children’s development of this ability, known as Theory of Mind, typically happens around age 4. Research using a looking-time paradigm, however, established that toddlers at the age of 15 months old pass a non-verbal false-belief task (Onishi and Baillargeon in Science 308:255–258, 2005). This is well before the age at which children pass any of the verbal false- (...) tasks. In this study we present a more complex case of false-belief reasoning with older children. We tested second-order reasoning, probing children’s ability to handle the belief of one person about the belief of another person. We find just the opposite: 7-year-olds pass a verbal false-belief reasoning task, but fail on an equally complex low-verbal task. This finding suggests that language supports explicit reasoning about beliefs, perhaps by facilitating the cognitive system to keep track of beliefs attributed by people to other people. (shrink)
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  4.  5
    Bart Hollebrandse, Angeliek Hout & Petra Hendriks (2012). Children's First and Second-Order False-Belief Reasoning in a Verbal and a Low-Verbal Task. Synthese (3):1-13.
    We can understand and act upon the beliefs of other people, even when these conflict with our own beliefs. Children’s development of this ability, known as Theory of Mind, typically happens around age 4. Research using a looking-time paradigm, however, established that toddlers at the age of 15 months old pass a non-verbal false-belief task (Onishi and Baillargeon in Science 308:255–258, 2005). This is well before the age at which children pass any of the verbal false- (...) tasks. In this study we present a more complex case of false-belief reasoning with older children. We tested second-order reasoning, probing children’s ability to handle the belief of one person about the belief of another person. We find just the opposite: 7-year-olds pass a verbal false-belief reasoning task, but fail on an equally complex low-verbal task. This finding suggests that language supports explicit reasoning about beliefs, perhaps by facilitating the cognitive system to keep track of beliefs attributed by people to other people. (shrink)
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  5.  35
    Paul Bloom (2000). Two Reasons to Abandon the False Belief Task as a Test of Theory of Mind. Cognition 77 (1):25-31.
  6. Heather J. Ferguson, Ian Apperly, Jumana Ahmad, Markus Bindemann & James Cane (2015). Task Constraints Distinguish Perspective Inferences From Perspective Use During Discourse Interpretation in a False Belief Task. Cognition 139:50-70.
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  7.  9
    Konstantine Arkoudas & Selmer Bringsjord (2008). Toward Formalizing Common-Sense Psychology: An Analysis of the False-Belief Task. In Tu-Bao Ho & Zhi-Hua Zhou (eds.), Pricai 2008: Trends in Artificial Intelligence. Springer 17--29.
  8.  8
    Robert Thompson, Believe It, or Not? Explaining Why Children Fail the Standard False Belief Task.
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  9. Gut Arkadiusz (2009). Language and second order thinking (the analysis of false belief task)(jezyk a myslenie drugiego rzedu (analiza testów falszywego przekonania)). Filozofia Nauki 17 (3 (67)).
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  10. Arkadiusz Gut (2009). Language and Second Order Thinking (the Analysis of False Belief Task). Filozofia Nauki 17 (3):99.
     
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  11.  30
    L. C. De Bruin & A. Newen (2012). The Developmental Paradox of False Belief Understanding: A Dual-System Solution. Synthese (3):1-24.
    We explore the developmental paradox of false belief understanding. This paradox follows from the claim that young infants already have an understanding of false belief, despite the fact that they consistently fail the elicited-response false belief task. First, we argue that recent proposals to solve this paradox are unsatisfactory because they (i) try to give a full explanation of false belief understanding in terms of a single system, (ii) fail to provide (...)
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  12.  33
    Michael Wilby (2012). Embodying the False-Belief Tasks. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):519-540.
    Embodied approaches to mindreading have tended to define themselves in contrast to cognitive approaches to social mindreading. One side effect of this has been a lack of engagement with key areas in the study of social cognition—in particular the topic of how we gain an understanding of the referential nature of others’ thoughts, and how that understanding develops from infancy. I argue that embodied accounts of mindreading are well equipped to enter into this debate, by making use of the notion (...)
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  13.  22
    Anika Fiebich (2013). Mindreading with Ease? Fluency and Belief Reasoning in 4- to 5-Year-Olds. Synthese 191 (5):1-16.
    For decades, philosophers and psychologists have assumed that children understand other people’s behavior on the basis of Belief Reasoning (BR) at latest by age 5 when they pass the false belief task. Furthermore, children’s use of BR in the true belief task has been regarded as being ontogenetically prior. Recent findings from developmental studies challenge this view and indicate that 4- to 5-year-old children make use of a reasoning strategy, which is cognitively less demanding (...)
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  14. Masaharu Mizumoto (2011). A Theory of Knowledge and Belief Change - Formal and Experimental Perspectives. Hokkaido University Press.
    This work explores the conceptual and empirical issues of the concept of knowledge and its relation to the pattern of our belief change, from formal and experimental perspectives. Part I gives an analysis of knowledge (called Sustainability) that is formally represented and naturalistically plausible at the same time, which is claimed to be a synthesized view of knowledge, covering not only empirical knowledge, but also knowledge of future, practical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, knowledge of general facts. Part II tries to (...)
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  15.  5
    Paula Rubio-Fernández & Bart Geurts (forthcoming). Don’T Mention the Marble! The Role of Attentional Processes in False-Belief Tasks. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    In the last 30 years, the key issue in developmental Theory of Mind has been if and when children are capable of representing false beliefs. Moving away from this research question, the aim of this study was to investigate the role of attentional processes in false-belief tasks. We focused on the design of the test phase and investigated two factors that may be critical for 3-year-old children’s success: the form of the wh-question and the salience of the (...)
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  16.  34
    James Dungan & Rebecca Saxe (2012). Matched False-Belief Performance During Verbal and Nonverbal Interference. Cognitive Science 36 (6):1148-1156.
    Language has been shown to play a key role in the development of a child’s theory of mind, but its role in adult belief reasoning remains unclear. One recent study used verbal and nonverbal interference during a false-belief task to show that accurate belief reasoning in adults necessarily requires language (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). The strength of this inference depends on the cognitive processes that are matched between the verbal and nonverbal inference tasks. Here, (...)
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  17.  11
    Anna Ciaunica (2014). Under Pressure: Processing Representational Decoupling in False-Belief Tasks. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):527-542.
    Several studies demonstrated that children younger than 3 years of age, who consistently fail the standard verbal false-belief task, can anticipate others’ actions based on their attributed false beliefs. This gave rise to the so-called “Developmental Paradox”. De Bruin and Kästner recently suggested that the Developmental Paradox is best addressed in terms of the relation between coupled and decoupled processes and argued that if enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be (...)
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  18.  13
    Anika Fiebich (2016). Narratives, Culture, and Folk Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):135-149.
    In this paper, I aim to determine to what extent contemporary cross-cultural and developmental research can shed light on the role that narrative practices might play in the development of folk psychology. In particular, I focus on the role of narrative practices in the development of false belief understanding, which has been regarded as a milestone in the development of folk psychology. Second, I aim to discuss possible cognitive procedures that may underlie successful performance in false (...) tasks. Methodologically, I distinguish between two kinds of narrative practices: ‘mentalistic narrative practice’, and ‘behavioral-contextual narrative practice’ behavior of another person in a specific socio-situational context). Whereas the former is more prevalent in Western cultures than in Eastern cultures, the latter is predominantly used by members of Eastern cultures. Mentalistic narrative practices correlate with cultural divergences in the development of false belief understanding throughout ontogeny but do not seem to play the key role. The analysis shows that conceptual change and the acquisition of mental state terms is essential for passing the false belief task, and that theory is likely to be the cognitive mechanism involved here such as proposed by Theory Theory. However, Hutto’s Narrative Practice Hypothesis trumps over Theory Theory to account for the varieties and ambiguities people typically meet when understanding each other in everyday life. (shrink)
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  19.  7
    Joseph A. Hedger (2016). Perceptual Access Reasoning: Developmental Stage or System 1 Heuristic? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):207-226.
    In contrast with the two dominant views in Theory of Mind development, the Perceptual Access Reasoning hypothesis of Fabricius and colleagues is that children don’t understand the mental state of belief until around 6 years of age. Evidence for this includes data that many children ages 4 and 5, who pass the standard 2-location false belief task, nonetheless fail the true belief task, and often fail a 3-location false belief task by (...)
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  20.  2
    Tillmann Vierkant (2012). Self Knowledge and Knowing Other Minds: The Implicit / Explicit Distinction as a Tool in Understanding Theory of Mind. British Journal of Developmental Psychology 30 (1):141-155.
    Holding content explicitly requires a form of self knowledge. But what does the relevant self knowledge look like? Using theory of mind as an example, this paper argues that the correct answer to this question will have to take into account the crucial role of language based deliberation, but warns against the standard assumption that explicitness is necessary for ascribing awareness. It argues in line with Bayne that intentional action is at least an equally valid criterion for awareness. This leads (...)
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  21.  28
    Karolina Krzyżanowska (2013). Belief Ascription and the Ramsey Test. Synthese 190 (1):21-36.
    In this paper, I analyse a finding by Riggs and colleagues that there is a close connection between people’s ability to reason with counterfactual conditionals and their capacity to attribute false beliefs to others. The result indicates that both processes may be governed by one cognitive mechanism, though false belief attribution seems to be slightly more cognitively demanding. Given that the common denominator for both processes is suggested to be a form of the Ramsey test, I investigate (...)
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  22.  2
    Lu Wang, Preschoolers' and Adults' Belief Reasoning and Task Demand.
    Thirty-years research seemed to reveal that there is a U-shape development in children’s theory-of-mind abilities: infants have the competence to attribute false beliefs properly when measured by looking time and anticipatory eye gaze, while children younger than four systematically fail the standard false belief tasks measuring their voluntary responses. Why is it, and why does the infants’ implicit belief reasoning seem to be free from the inhibition and selection requirements? Are there really two systems, one explicit (...)
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  23.  55
    Maria Brincker (2014). Navigating Beyond “Here & Now” Affordances—on Sensorimotor Maturation and “False Belief” Performance. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    How and when do we learn to understand other people’s perspectives and possibly divergent beliefs? This question has elicited much theoretical and empirical research. A puzzling finding has been that toddlers perform well on so-called implicit false belief (FB) tasks but do not show such capacities on traditional explicit FB tasks. I propose a navigational approach, which offers a hitherto ignored way of making sense of the seemingly contradictory results. The proposal involves a distinction between how we navigate (...)
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  24.  10
    Max Rosenkrantz (2016). The Problem of False Belief and the Failure of the Theory of Descriptions. Theoria 82 (1):56-80.
    In this article I argue that Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgment is a continuation of the campaign against Frege and Meinong begun in “On Denoting” with the theory of descriptions. More precisely, I hold that the problem of false belief, to which the multiple-relation theory is presented as a solution, emerges quite naturally out of the problem context of “On Denoting” and threatens to give new life to the theories Russell purports to have laid to rest there, and (...)
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  25.  47
    Marco Fenici (2011). What Does the False Belief Test Test? Phenomenology and Mind 1:197-207.
    The age at which children acquire the concept of belief is a subject of debate. Many scholars claim that children master beliefs when they are able to pass the false belief test, around their fourth year of life. However, recent experiments show that children implicitly attribute beliefs even earlier. The dispute does not only concern the empirical issue of discovering children’s early cognitive abilities. It also depends on the kind of capacities that we associate to the very (...)
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  26.  18
    Matthew Van Cleave (2010). Linguistic Practice and False-Belief Tasks. Mind & Language 25 (3):298-328.
    Jill de Villiers has argued that children's mastery of sentential complements plays a crucial role in enabling them to succeed at false-belief tasks. Josef Perner has disputed that and has argued that mastery of false-belief tasks requires an understanding of the multiplicity of perspectives. This paper attempts to resolve the debate by explicating attributions of desires and beliefs as extensions of the linguistic practices of making commands and assertions, respectively. In terms of these linguistic practices one (...)
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  27.  23
    Christopher Steinsvold (2010). Being Wrong: Logics for False Belief. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 52 (3):245-253.
    We introduce an operator to represent the simple notion of being wrong. Read Wp to mean: the agent is wrong about p . Being wrong about p means believing p though p is false. We add this operator to the language of propositional logic and study it. We introduce a canonical model for logics of being wrong, show completeness for the minimal logic of being wrong and various other systems. En route we examine the expressiveness of the language. In (...)
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  28.  75
    Matthew van Cleave & Christopher Gauker (2010). Linguistic Practice and False-Belief Tasks. Mind and Language 25 (3):298-328.
    Jill de Villiers has argued that children's mastery of sentential complements plays a crucial role in enabling them to succeed at false-belief tasks. Josef Perner has disputed that and has argued that mastery of false-belief tasks requires an understanding of the multiplicity of perspectives. This paper attempts to resolve the debate by explicating attributions of desires and beliefs as extensions of the linguistic practices of making commands and assertions, respectively. In terms of these linguistic practices one (...)
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  29.  39
    Liesbeth Flobbe, Rineke Verbrugge, Petra Hendriks & Irene Krämer (2008). Children's Application of Theory of Mind in Reasoning and Language. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (4):417-442.
    Many social situations require a mental model of the knowledge, beliefs, goals, and intentions of others: a Theory of Mind (ToM). If a person can reason about other people’s beliefs about his own beliefs or intentions, he is demonstrating second-order ToM reasoning. A standard task to test second-order ToM reasoning is the second-order false belief task. A different approach to investigating ToM reasoning is through its application in a strategic game. Another task that is believed (...)
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  30.  70
    Avram Hiller (2013). Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief. Logos and Episteme 4 (1):7-19.
    Richard Feldman and William Lycan have defended a view according to which a necessary condition for a doxastic agent to have knowledge is that the agent’s belief is not essentially based on any false assumptions. I call this the no-essential-false-assumption account, or NEFA. Peter Klein considers examples of what he calls “useful false beliefs” and alters his own account of knowledge in a way which can be seen as a refinement of NEFA. This paper shows that (...)
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  31.  79
    Leon de Bruin & Lena Kästner (2012). Dynamic Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):541-563.
    Abstract In this article, we investigate the merits of an enactive view of cognition for the contemporary debate about social cognition. If enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the “cognitive gap”, i.e. provide us with a convincing account of those higher forms of cognition that have traditionally been the focus of its cognitivist opponents. We show that, when it comes to social cognition, current articulations of enactivism are—despite their celebrated successes (...)
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  32. Mitchell Herschbach (2008). False-Belief Understanding and the Phenomenological Critics of Folk Psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):33-56.
    The dominant account of human social understanding is that we possess a 'folk psychology', that we understand and can interact with other people because we appreciate their mental states. Recently, however, philosophers from the phenomenological tradition have called into question the scope of the folk psychological account and argued for the importance of 'online', non-mentalistic forms of social understanding. In this paper I critically evaluate the arguments of these phenomenological critics, arguing that folk psychology plays a larger role in human (...)
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  33.  18
    Renée Baillargeon, Rose M. Scott & Zijing He (2010). False-Belief Understanding in Infants. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):110-118.
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  34.  34
    Jason Low & Bo Wang (2011). On the Long Road to Mentalism in Children's Spontaneous False-Belief Understanding: Are We There Yet? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):411-428.
    We review recent anticipatory looking and violation-of-expectancy studies suggesting that infants and young preschoolers have spontaneous (implicit) understanding of mind despite their known problems until later in life on elicited (explicit) tests of false-belief reasoning. Straightforwardly differentiating spontaneous and elicited expressions of complex mental state understanding in relation to an implicit-explicit knowledge framework may be challenging; early action predictions may be based on behavior rules that are complementary to the mentalistic attributions under consideration. We discuss that the way (...)
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  35.  3
    Torben Braüner (2014). Hybrid-Logical Reasoning in the Smarties and Sally-Anne Tasks. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (4):415-439.
    The main aim of the present paper is to use a proof system for hybrid modal logic to formalize what are called false-belief tasks in cognitive psychology, thereby investigating the interplay between cognition and logical reasoning about belief. We consider two different versions of the Smarties task, involving respectively a shift of perspective to another person and to another time. Our formalizations disclose that despite this difference, the two versions of the Smarties task have exactly (...)
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  36.  34
    Martin Capstick (2013). On-Line False Belief Understanding ≪em Class="a-Plus-Plus"≫Qua≪/Em≫ Folk Psychology? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):27-40.
    In this paper, I address Mitchell Herschbach’s arguments against the phenomenological critics of folk psychology. Central to Herschbach’s arguments is the introduction of Michael Wheeler’s distinction between ‘on-line’ and ‘off-line’ intelligence to the debate on social understanding. Herschbach uses this distinction to describe two arguments made by the phenomenological critics. The first is that folk psychology is exclusively off-line and mentalistic. The second is that social understanding is on-line and non-mentalistic. To counter the phenomenological critics, Herschbach argues for the existence (...)
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  37.  5
    Mark Jary (2010). Assertion and False-Belief Atribution. Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (1):17-39.
    The ability to attribute false-beliefs to others — the hallmark of a representational theory of mind — has been shown to be reliant on linguistic ability, specifically on competence in sentential complementation after verbs of communication and cognition such as `say that' and `think that'. The reason commonly put forward for this is that these structures provide a representational format which enables the child to think about another's thoughts. The paper offers an alternative explanation. Drawing on the work of (...)
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  38.  20
    Jill G. de Villiers & Peter A. de Villiers (2002). Why Not LF for False Belief Reasoning? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):682-683.
    We argue that natural language has the right degree of representational richness for false belief reasoning, especially the complements under verbs of communication and belief. Language may indeed be necessary synchronically for cross-modular reasoning, but certain achievements in language seem necessary at least diachronically for explicit reasoning about false beliefs.
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  39.  14
    R. Faden & A. Faden (1977). False Belief and the Refusal of Medical Treatment. Journal of Medical Ethics 3 (3):133-136.
    May a doctor treat a patient, despite that patient's refusal, when in his professional opinion treatment is necessary? This is the dilemma which must from time to time confront most physicians. An examination of the validity of such a refusal is provided by the present authors who use the case history of a patient refusing treatment, for cancer as well as for a fractured hip, to evaluate the grounds for intervention in such circumstances. In such a situation the patient is (...)
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  40.  15
    Josef Perner & Brian Leahy (forthcoming). Mental Files in Development: Dual Naming, False Belief, Identity and Intensionality. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    We use mental files to present an analysis of children's developing understanding of identity in alternative naming tasks and belief. The core assumption is that younger children below the age of about 4 years create different files for an object depending on how the object is individuated . They can anchor them to the same object, hence think of the same object whether they think of it as a rabbit or as an animal. However, the claim is, they cannot (...)
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  41.  15
    David Buttelmann, Malinda Carpenter & Michael Tomasello (2009). Eighteen-Month-Old Infants Show False Belief Understanding in an Active Helping Paradigm. Cognition 112 (2):337-342.
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  42.  62
    Elmar Unnsteinsson (2016). Confusion is Corruptive Belief in False Identity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):204-227.
    Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.
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  43.  9
    Brenda R. J. Jansen, Maartje E. J. Raijmakers & Ingmar Visser (2007). Rule Transition on the Balance Scale Task: A Case Study in Belief Change. Synthese 155 (2):211 - 236.
    For various domains in proportional reasoning cognitive development is characterized as a progression through a series of increasingly complex rules. A multiplicative relationship between two task features, such as weight and distance information of blocks placed at both sides of the fulcrum of a balance scale, appears difficult to discover. During development, children change their beliefs about the balance scale several times: from a focus on the weight dimension (Rule I) to occasionally considering the distance dimension (Rule II), guessing (...)
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  44.  2
    Peter Mitchell & Hazel Lacohée (1991). Children's Early Understanding of False Belief. Cognition 39 (2):107-127.
  45. Scott Berman (1996). Plato's Explanation of False Belief in the "Sophist". Apeiron 29 (1):19-46.
  46. Ted Ruffman (1990). Young Children's Understanding of the Implications of Ambiguous Perceptual Information Relation to False Belief and a Developing Theory of Mind.
     
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  47.  3
    Hyun-joo Song, Kristine H. Onishi, Renée Baillargeon & Cynthia Fisher (2008). Can an Agent's False Belief Be Corrected by an Appropriate Communication? Psychological Reasoning in 18-Month-Old Infants. Cognition 109 (3):295-315.
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  48. Timothy Lane (2010). The Ethics of False Belief. EurAmerica 40 (3):591-633.
    According to Allen Wood’s “procedural principle” we should believe only that which can be justified by evidence, and nothing more. He argues that holding beliefs which are not justified by evidence diminishes our self-respect and corrupts us, both individually and collectively. Wood’s normative and descriptive views as regards belief are of a piece with the received view which holds that beliefs aim at the truth. This view I refer to as the Truth-Tracking View (TTV). I first present a modest (...)
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  49.  8
    Ted Ruffman & Josef Perner (2005). Do Infants Really Understand False Belief? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (10):462-463.
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  50.  4
    Elisa Back & Ian A. Apperly (2010). Two Sources of Evidence on the Non-Automaticity of True and False Belief Ascription. Cognition 115 (1):54-70.
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