Search results for 'Falsity' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Heinrich Wansing (2012). A Non-Inferentialist, Anti-Realistic Conception of Logical Truth and Falsity. Topoi 31 (1):93-100.score: 18.0
    Anti-realistic conceptions of truth and falsity are usually epistemic or inferentialist. Truth is regarded as knowability, or provability, or warranted assertability, and the falsity of a statement or formula is identified with the truth of its negation. In this paper, a non-inferentialist but nevertheless anti-realistic conception of logical truth and falsity is developed. According to this conception, a formula (or a declarative sentence) A is logically true if and only if no matter what is told about what (...)
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  2. Cecilia Wee (2006). Material Falsity and Error in Descartes' Meditations. Routledge.score: 18.0
    Material Falsity and Error in Descartes' Meditations approaches Descartes' Meditations as an intellectual journey, wherein Descartes' views develop and change as he makes new discoveries about self, God and matter. The first book to focus closely on Descartes' notion of material falsity, it shows how Descartes' account of material falsity and correspondingly his account of crucial notions such as truth, falsehood and error evolves according to the epistemic advances in the Meditations. It also offers important new insights (...)
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  3. Yaroslav Shramko (2012). What is a Genuine Intuitionistic Notion of Falsity? Logic and Logical Philosophy 21 (1):3-23.score: 18.0
    I highlight the importance of the notion of falsity for a semantical consideration of intuitionistic logic. One can find two principal (and non-equivalent) versions of such a notion in the literature, namely, falsity as non-truth and falsity as truth of a negative proposition. I argue in favor of the first version as the genuine intuitionistic notion of falsity.
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  4. Gemma Robles (2008). Extensions of the Basic Constructive Logic for Weak Consistency BKc1 Defined with a Falsity Constant. Logic and Logical Philosophy 16 (4):311-322.score: 18.0
    The logic BKc1 is the basic constructive logic for weak consistency (i.e., absence of the negation of a theorem) in the ternary relational semantics without a set of designated points. In this paper, a number of extensions of B Kc1 defined with a propositional falsity constant are defined. It is also proved that weak consistency is not equivalent to negation-consistency or absolute consistency (i.e., non-triviality) in any logic included in positive contractionless intermediate logic LC plus the constructive negation of (...)
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  5. Robert A. Fleming, David A. Grant & Jane A. North (1968). Truth and Falsity of Verbal Statements as Conditioned Stimuli in Classical and Differential Eyelid Conditioning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 78 (1):178.score: 15.0
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  6. Nat Hansen (2012). On an Alleged Truth/Falsity Asymmetry in Context Shifting Experiments. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):530-545.score: 12.0
    Keith DeRose has argued that context shifting experiments should be designed in a specific way in order to accommodate what he calls a ‘truth/falsity asymmetry’. I explain and critique DeRose's reasons for proposing this modification to contextualist methodology, drawing on recent experimental studies of DeRose's bank cases as well as experimental findings about the verification of affirmative and negative statements. While DeRose's arguments for his particular modification to contextualist methodology fail, the lesson of his proposal is that there is (...)
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  7. Timothy Williamson (2000). Truth, Falsity, and Borderline Cases. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):211-244.score: 12.0
    According to the principle of bivalence, truth and falsity are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive options for a statement. It is either true or false, and not both, even in a borderline case. That highly controversial claim is central to the epistemic theory of vagueness, which holds that borderline cases are distinguished by a special kind of obstacle to knowing the truth-value of the statement. But this paper is not a defence of the epistemic theory. If bivalence holds, it (...)
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  8. Dan López de Sa (2009). Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):273-282.score: 12.0
    Timothy Williamson famously offered an argument from these Tarskian principles in favor of bivalence. I show, dwelling on (Andjelkovic & Williamson, 2000), that the argument depends on a contentious formulation of the Tarskian principles about truth (and falsity), which the supervaluationist can reject without jeopardizing the Tarskian insight. In the mentioned paper, Adjelkovic and Williamson argue that, even if the appropriate formulation seems to make room for failure of bivalence in borderline cases, this appearance is illusory, once one grants (...)
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  9. Claudia Lorena Garcia (1999). Transparency and Falsity in Descartes's Theory of Ideas. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (3):349 – 372.score: 12.0
    Here I develop an interpretation of Descartes' theory of ideas which differs from the standard reading in that it incorporates a distinction between what an idea appears to represent and what it represents. I argue that this interpretation not only finds support in the texts but also is required to explain a large number of assertions in Descartes which would otherwise appear irremediably obscure or problematic. For example, in my interpretation it is not puzzling that Descartes responds to Arnauld's difficulty (...)
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  10. Norman J. Wells (1984). Material Falsity in Descartes, Arnauld, and Suarez. Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1):25-50.score: 12.0
    Arnauld's criticisms as "a model of confusion confounded.” In a review of Wilson's book, R. McRae refers to "the difficult and not too coherent subject of material falsity. '' J. Cottingham describes the Descartes-Arnauld debate on the material falsity of adventitious ideas as "an involved and rather inconclusive exchange " and claims that the example of the material falsity of such ideas espoused by Descartes in Meditation III is "needlessly complicated. " A. Kenny, in turn, notes that (...)
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  11. Kevin Scharp (2010). Falsity. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 12.0
    Although there is a massive amount of work on truth, there is very little work on falsity. Most philosophers probably think this is appropriate; after all, once we have a solid understanding of truth, falsity should not prove to be much of a challenge. However, there are several interesting and difficult issues associated with understanding falsity. After considering two prominent definitions of falsity and presenting objections to each one, I propose a definition that avoids their problems.
     
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  12. Richard W. Field (1993). Descartes on the Material Falsity of Ideas. Philosophical Review 102 (3):309-333.score: 12.0
    Descartes claims in the Third Meditation that ideas of sense might be materially false. While an accurate interpretation of this claim has the potential of providing some valuable insights into Descartes's theory of ideas in general and his understanding of the epistemic status of sensations in particular, the explanation Descartes provides of the material falsity of ideas is itself obscure and misleading, making accurate interpretation difficult. In this paper an interpretation of material falsity is offered which identifies the (...)
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  13. Steffen Lewitzka (2009). $\in_I$ : An Intuitionistic Logic Without Fregean Axiom and with Predicates for Truth and Falsity. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50 (3):275-301.score: 12.0
    We present $\in_I$-Logic (Epsilon-I-Logic), a non-Fregean intuitionistic logic with a truth predicate and a falsity predicate as intuitionistic negation. $\in_I$ is an extension and intuitionistic generalization of the classical logic $\in_T$ (without quantifiers) designed by Sträter as a theory of truth with propositional self-reference. The intensional semantics of $\in_T$ offers a new solution to semantic paradoxes. In the present paper we introduce an intuitionistic semantics and study some semantic notions in this broader context. Also we enrich the quantifier-free language (...)
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  14. Peter Heckman (1991). Nietzsche's Clever Animal: Metaphor in "Truth and Falsity". Philosophy and Rhetoric 24 (4):301 - 321.score: 12.0
    In this essay I show how Nietzsche's use of metaphor in "Truth and Falsity in an Ultra-Moral Sense" helps make the general point of the essay itself. I argue that the essay both distinguishes between the human and the natural order and yet works to erase that distinction, just as it both posits and denies a difference between truth and lie, dream and reality. Given that Nietzsche's text is directed against the possibility of literal truth, I argue that by (...)
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  15. Henry S. Leonard (1959). Interrogatives, Imperatives, Truth, Falsity and Lies. Philosophy of Science 26 (3):172-186.score: 12.0
    This paper aims to establish three major theses: (1) Not only declarative sentences, but also interrogatives and imperatives, may be classified as true or as false. (2) Declarative, imperative, and interrogative utterances may also be classified as honest or as dishonest. (3) Whether an utterance is honest or dishonest is logically independent of whether it is true or is false. The establishment of the above theses follows upon the adoption of a principle for identifying what is meant by any sentence, (...)
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  16. Charles Kahn (2007). Why Is the Sophist a Sequel to the Theaetetus? Phronesis 52 (1):33-57.score: 9.0
    The "Theaetetus" and the "Sophist" both stand in the shadow of the "Parmenides," to which they refer. I propose to interpret these two dialogues as Plato's first move in the project of reshaping his metaphysics with the double aim of avoiding problems raised in the "Parmenides" and applying his general theory to the philosophy of nature. The classical doctrine of Forms is subject to revision, but Plato's fundamental metaphysics is preserved in the "Philebus" as well as in the "Timaeus." The (...)
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  17. Raffaella De Rosa (2008). Material Falsity and Error in Descartes's Meditations (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (4):pp. 641-642.score: 9.0
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  18. Heinrich Wansing (2010). The Power of Belnap: Sequent Systems for SIXTEEN ₃. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (4):369 - 393.score: 9.0
    The trilattice SIXTEEN₃ is a natural generalization of the wellknown bilattice FOUR₂. Cut-free, sound and complete sequent calculi for truth entailment and falsity entailment in SIXTEEN₃, are presented.
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  19. Monroe C. Beardsley (1976). Metaphor and Falsity. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 35 (2):218-222.score: 9.0
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  20. Lennart Åqvist (2008). Some Logico-Semantical Themes in Karl Olivecrona's Philosophy of Law: A Non-Exegetical Approach. Theoria 74 (4):271-294.score: 9.0
    The paper deals with certain issues with which Olivecrona was mainly concerned in his Philosophy of Law, notably (i) his views about the logical or syntactical form of imperatives as used in the law, and (ii) his views on the semantics of imperatives in the law and on the question whether and to what extent the notions of truth and falsity are applicable to those imperatives at all. In the light of an important critical notice of Olivecrona's work by (...)
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  21. Joseph M. Boyle Jr (1972). Self-Referential Inconsistency, Inevitable Falsity and Metaphysical Argumentation. Metaphilosophy 3 (1):25–42.score: 9.0
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  22. David Nelson (1949). Constructible Falsity. Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (1):16-26.score: 9.0
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  23. Dan López de Sa (2009). Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 273-282.score: 9.0
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  24. T. Foster Lindley (1971). Lying and Falsity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):152 – 157.score: 9.0
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  25. Ioannis Votsis, Simplicity as a Guide to Falsity?score: 9.0
    Participants in the debate about whether simplicity is a guide to truth or merely pragmatically useful typically wrangle over two problems: (1) how to weigh simplicity against other virtues like strength and fitness and (2) whether there is a unique measure for simplicity that straps it to truth. I would like to put forth a third problem: (3) Even if problems (1) and (2) could be solved, it is far from clear whether the simplest theory out of an available class (...)
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  26. Ahmad Almukdad & David Nelson (1984). Constructible Falsity and Inexact Predicates. Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (1):231-233.score: 9.0
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  27. Peter John Harvey (1978). Aristotle on Truth and Falsity In. Journal of the History of Philosophy 16 (2).score: 9.0
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  28. Melbourne G. Evans (1969). On the Falsity of the Fitzgerald-Lorentz Contraction Hypothesis. Philosophy of Science 36 (4):354-362.score: 9.0
    The Fitzgerald-Lorentz contraction hypothesis, proposed as an explanation of the Michelson-Morley result, fails to account for the Kennedy-Thorndike result. Hence, Grünbaum argues, the hypothesis has been falsified. However, the contraction hypothesis as formulated by Lorentz is false for the very fundamental reason that it entails a contradiction, namely, the consequence that light waves must have a variable velocity along what by definition is taken to be a rest length. Furthermore, the attempt to resolve this contradiction by coupling the Fitzgerald-Lorentz contraction (...)
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  29. Job van Eck (1995). Falsity Without Negative Predication: On Sophistes255e‐263d. Phronesis 40 (1):20-47.score: 9.0
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  30. Aaron Ben-Zeev (1984). Aristotle on Perceptual Truth and Falsity. Apeiron 18 (2):118 - 125.score: 9.0
  31. G. F. Stout (1932). Truth and Falsity. Mind 41 (163):297-310.score: 9.0
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  32. Rem B. Edwards (1966). The Truth and Falsity of Definitions. Philosophy of Science 33 (1/2):76-79.score: 9.0
  33. Dorothy Mitchell (1972). The Truth or Falsity of Value Judgements. Mind 81 (321):67-74.score: 9.0
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  34. Gianni Pellegrini (2011). Analysis of the Second and Fourth Definitions of Mithyātva in the Advaitasiddhi of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (4-5):441-459.score: 9.0
    This paper is a preliminary analysis of two among the five definitions of falsity ( mithyātva ) presented by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (MS) in his magnum opus , the Advaitasiddhi . It is mainly focused on the second and fourth definitions, which at first sight appear to be mere repetitions of one another. The first definition of falsity examined is Prakāśātman’s: “falsity is the property of being the counter-positive of the absolute absence of an entity in the [same] (...)
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  35. Robert K. Shope (1979). Knowledge and Falsity. Philosophical Studies 36 (4):389 - 405.score: 9.0
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  36. Peter John Harvey (1978). Aristotle on Truth and Falsity in De Anima 3.6. Journal of the History of Philosophy 16 (2):219-220.score: 9.0
  37. Mary R. Newsome & P. N. Johnson-Laird (2006). How Falsity Dispels Fallacies. Thinking and Reasoning 12 (2):214 – 234.score: 9.0
    From certain sorts of premise, individuals reliably infer invalid conclusions. Two Experiments investigated a possible cause for these illusory inference: Reasoners fail to think about what is false. In Experiment 1, 24 undergraduates drew illusory and control inferences from premises based on exclusive disjunctions (“or else”). In one block, participants were instructed to falsify the premises of each illusory and control inference before making the inference. In the other block, participants did not receive these instructions. There were more correct answers (...)
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  38. G. F. Stout (1925). Bradley on Truth and Falsity. Mind 34 (133):39-54.score: 9.0
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  39. Joseph M. Boyle Jr (1972). Self-Referential Inconsistency, Inevitable Falsity and Metaphysical Argumentation. Metaphilosophy 3 (1):25-42.score: 9.0
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  40. Jason Xenakis (1963). Subjects, Falsity, Commitment. Inquiry 6 (1-4):234 – 241.score: 9.0
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  41. Arnold Isenberg (1964). Comments on "Pleasure and Falsity". American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (2):96 - 100.score: 9.0
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  42. David Nelson (1970). Review: A. Bialynicki-Birula, H. Rasiowa, On Constructible Falsity in the Constructive Logic with Strong Negation. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):138-138.score: 9.0
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  43. Terence Penelhum (1964). Pleasure and Falsity. American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (2):81 - 91.score: 9.0
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  44. Mark Roberts (1994). The Bearer of Truth and Falsity. Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (2):59-67.score: 9.0
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  45. Albert Visser (2005). Faith & Falsity. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 131 (1):103-131.score: 9.0
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  46. Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (1996). The Falsity of Folk Theories: Implications for Psychology and Philosophy. In W. O'Donahue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications. 244--256.score: 9.0
  47. Claudia Lorena García (2000). The Falsity of Non-Judgmental Cognitions in Descartes and Suárez. The Modern Schoolman 77 (3):199-216.score: 9.0
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  48. Rainer W. Trapp (1985). Sinking Into the Sand: The Falsity of All Sorites-Arguments. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 23 (2):123 - 125.score: 9.0
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  49. David Behan (2008). Descartes and Conceptual Falsity (Falsitas Materialis). The Modern Schoolman 85 (2):89-115.score: 9.0
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  50. Desmond Paul Henry & Gabriel Nuchelmans (1974). Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (96):274.score: 9.0
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