Search results for 'Fatalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Susan Haack (1974). On a Theological Argument for Fatalism. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (95):156-159.score: 24.0
    It is the aim of this paper to show that [the theological argument from Divine omniscience] is not more than a needlessly (and confusingly) elaborate version of the argument for fatalism discussed by Aristotle in de Interpretatione 9, which, since its sole premise is the Principle of Bivalence, may conveniently be called the logical argument for fatalism. If this is right, if the theological premisses of the theological argument can be shown to be strictly irrelevant to the fatalist (...)
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  2. Nicola Ciprotti (2012). Metaphysical Fatalism, in Five Steps. Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):35-54.score: 24.0
    The paper presents an argument for the conclusion that a certain conception of truth, according to which truth is timeless, truth-values are just two and the primary truth-bearers are propositions, leads to a kind of inevitabilism here labelled Metaphysical Fatalism. After the presentation of the argument for Metaphysical Fatalism, three objections to it are discussed and rebutted.
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  3. Stefaan E. Cuypers (2013). Moral Shallowness, Metaphysical Megalomania, and Compatibilist-Fatalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):173-188.score: 24.0
    In the debate on free will and moral responsibility, Saul Smilansky is a hard source-incompatibilist who objects to source-compatibilism for being morally shallow. After criticizing John Martin Fischer’s too optimistic response to this objection, this paper dissipates the charge that compatibilist accounts of ultimate origination are morally shallow by appealing to the seriousness of contingency in the framework of, what Paul Russell calls, compatibilist-fatalism. Responding to the objection from moral shallowness thus drives a wedge between optimists and fatalists within (...)
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  4. Mohammad Saleh Zarepour (2013). Sunday School Student and Theological Fatalism. Sophia 52 (3):553-555.score: 24.0
    I will briefly argue that theological fatalism is not a genuine ‘theological’ problem, for it can be reduced to another alleged incompatibility that arises independently of the existence or non-existence of God. I will conclude that the way of arguing against the existence of God or His omniscience by appealing to theological fatalism is blocked for libertarian atheists.
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  5. M. Oreste Fiocco (forthcoming). Fatalism and the Metaphysics of Contingency. In Steven M. Cahn & Maureen Eckert (eds.), Freedom and the Self: Essays in the Philosophy of David Foster Wallace. Columbia University Press.score: 24.0
    Contingency is the presence of non-actualized possibility in the world. Fatalism is a view of reality on which there is no contingency. Since it is contingency that permits agency, there has traditionally been much interest in contingency. This interest has long been embarrassed by the contention that simple and plausible assumptions about the world lead to fatalism. I begin with an Aristotelian argument as presented by Richard Taylor. Appreciation of this argument has been stultified by a question pertaining (...)
     
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  6. Michael Anthony Istvan (2014). Es la Respuesta de Aristóteles Al Argumento de Fatalismo En De Interpretatione 9 Exitosa?” / “Is Aristotle’s Response to the Argument for Fatalism in De Interpretatione 9 Successful? Ideas y Valores 154.score: 24.0
    My aim is to figure out whether Aristotle’s response to the argument for fatalism in De Interpretatione 9 is successful. By “response” here I mean not simply the reasons he offers to highlight why fatalism does not accord with how we conduct our lives, but also the solution he devises to block the argument he provides for it. Achieving my aim hence demands that I figure out what exactly is the argument for fatalism he voices, what exactly (...)
     
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  7. Penelope Mackie (2003). Fatalism, Incompatibilism, and the Power to Do Otherwise. Noûs 37 (4):672-689.score: 21.0
  8. H. Rensselaer Wilsovann (1955). Causal Discontinuity in Fatalism and Indeterminism. Journal of Philosophy 52 (February):70-71.score: 21.0
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  9. Robert B. Pippin (2011). Fatalism in American Film Noir: Some Cinematic Philosophy. University of Virginia Press.score: 21.0
    Introduction -- Trapped by oneself in Jacques Tourneur's Out of the past -- "A deliberate, intentional fool" in Orson Welles's The lady from Shanghai -- Sexual agency in Fritz Lang's Scarlet Street -- "Why didn't you shoot again, baby?": concluding remarks.
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  10. Yair Schlein (2014). Fatalism, Determinism and Free Will as the Axiomatic Foundations of Rival Moral World Views. Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism 22 (1):53-62.score: 21.0
    One of the prominent questions of moral thought throughout history is the question of moral responsibility. In other words, to what measure do human actions result from free will rather than from being subordinate to a common “predetermined” law. In ancient Greece, this question was associated with mythical figures like Moira and Ananke while in recent times it is connected with concepts such as determinism and compatibilism. The argument between these two world views crosses cultures and historical periods, giving the (...)
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  11. M. Benstein (1992). Fatalism. University of Nebraska Press.score: 21.0
     
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  12. M. Bernstein (2002). Fatalism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
     
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  13. Robert C. Solomon (2003). On Fate and Fatalism. Philosophy East and West 53 (4):435-454.score: 18.0
    : Fate and fatalism have been powerful notions in many societies, from Homer's Iliad, the Greek moira, the South Asian karma, and the Chinese ming in the ancient world to the modern concept of "destiny." But fate and fatalism are now treated with philosophical disdain or as a clearly inferior version of what is better considered as "determinism." The concepts of fate and fatalism are defended here, and fatalism is clearly distinguished from determinism. Reference is made (...)
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  14. David Buller (1995). On the 'Standard' Argument for Fatalism. Philosophical Papers 24 (2):111-125.score: 18.0
    What has sometimes been called the "standard" argument for fatalism never achieved the critical popularity of Richard Taylor's (1962) infamous argument. But it has enjoyed far greater longevity. In De Fato Cicero (1960) tells us it was known in ancient Greece as the "idle argument", for it purports to show the futility of attempting to control one's fate and, hence, those persuaded by it could be led to a life of inaction and idleness. Even with such antiquated credentials, however, (...)
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  15. Joseph Diekemper (2004). Temporal Necessity and Logical Fatalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):287–294.score: 18.0
    I begin by briefly mentioning two different logical fatalistic argument types: one from temporal necessity, and one from antecedent truth value. It is commonly thought that the latter of these involves a simple modal fallacy and is easily refuted, and that the former poses the real threat to an open future. I question the conventional wisdom regarding these argument types, and present an analysis of temporal necessity that suggests the anti-fatalist might be better off shifting her argumentative strategy. Specifically, two (...)
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  16. Paul Russell (2000). Compatibilist Fatalism. In A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer. 199--218.score: 18.0
    Compatibilists argue, famously, that it is a simple incompatibilist confusion to suppose that determinism implies fatalism. Incompatibilists argue, on the contrary, that determinism implies fatalism, and thus cannot be consistent with the necessary conditions of moral responsibility. Despite their differences, however, both parties are agreed on one important matter: the refutation of fatalism is essential to the success of the compatibilist strategy. In this paper I argue that compatibilism requires a richer conception of fatalistic concern; one that (...)
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  17. David Kyle Johnson (2009). God, Fatalism, and Temporal Ontology. Religious Studies 45 (4):435-454.score: 18.0
    Theological incompatibility arguments suggest God's comprehensive foreknowledge is incompatible with human free will. Logical incompatibility arguments suggest a complete set of truths about the future is logically incompatible with human free will. Of the two, most think theological incompatibility is the more severe problem; but hardly anyone thinks either kind of argument presents a real threat to free will. I will argue, however, that sound theological and logical incompatibility arguments exist and that, in fact, logical incompatibly is the more severe (...)
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  18. James Cargile (1996). Some Comments on Fatalism. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):1-11.score: 18.0
    This paper discusses fatalism, defined as the view that it is never both in one's power to do X and in one's power to not do X. It is argued that this view is made out as more plausible than it really is, because of unclarity as to its meaning. Some philosophers, such as Michael Dummett or David Lewis, who criticise fatalism, actually advocate views closely in line with fatalism as defined here.
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  19. Richard Gaskin (1998). Fatalism, Bivalence and the Past. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):83-88.score: 18.0
    In his paper ‘Some Comments on Fatalism’, The Philosophical Quartery, 46 (1996), pp. 1–11, James Cargile offers an argument against the view that the correct response to fatalism is to restrict the principle of bivalence with respect to statements about future contingencies. His argument fails because it is question‐begging. Further, he fails to give due weight to the reason behind this view, which is the desire to give an adequate account of the past/future asymmetry. He supposes that mere (...)
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  20. Gabriel A. Acevedo (2005). Turning Anomie on its Head: Fatalism as Durkheim's Concealed and Multidimensional Alienation Theory. Sociological Theory 23 (1):75-85.score: 18.0
    Durkheim's underdeveloped notion of fatalism is the keystone for a bridge between two conceptual categories central to Marxian and Durkheimian theory: alienation and anomie. Durkheim does not necessarily disagree with Marx that excessive regulation can be socially damaging but chooses to highlight the effects of under- regulation. A Durkheimian critique of overregulation becomes possible if we turn away from anomie and toward Durkheim's idea of fatalism-a concept that I will argue here is unexpectedly consistent with Marx's notion of (...)
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  21. Raymond D. Bradley, Fatalism.score: 18.0
    The belief in fatalism, like many others, has its roots in the quasi-religious mythologies of ancient peoples many of whom personified the notion of fate. Thus Greek mythology supposed that three Fates, daughters of the goddess of Necessity, had control of our lives from beginning to end and that it was therefore impossible for us to do anything contrary to what they had prescribed for us. We may think we are in control of our own destinies. But we are (...)
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  22. Richard Gaskin (1998). Middle Knowledge, Fatalism and Comparative Similarity of Worlds. Religious Studies 34 (2):189-203.score: 18.0
    The doctrine of Middle Knowledge presupposes that conditionals of freedom (statements of the form 'If A were circumstances C, he would perform X') can be true. Such conditions are, where true, not true in virtue of the truth of any categorical proposition. Nor can their truth be modelled in terms of comparative similarity of possible worlds, because the structure of possible worlds is a necessary one, whereas the connection between antecedent and consequent of a conditional of freedom is a contingent (...)
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  23. Richard Purtill (1988). ``Fatalism and the Omnitemporality of Truth&Quot. Faith and Philosophy 5 (2):185-192.score: 18.0
    In this paper I will show that the omnitemporality of truth does indeed imply fatalism if the past is unchangeable. I then argue that it is very likely indeed that the past is unchangeable and thus, since it is very likely that fatalism is false, it is very likely that the doctrine of the omnitemporality of truth is false. I argue that the rejection of the omnitemporality of truth has no undesirable consequences for either logic or theology, that (...)
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  24. Richard L. Purtill (1988). Fatalism and the Omnitemporality of Truth. Faith and Philosophy 5 (2):185-192.score: 18.0
    In this paper I will show that the omnitemporality of truth does indeed imply fatalism if the past is unchangeable. I then argue that it is very likely indeed that the past is unchangeable and thus, since it is very likely that fatalism is false, it is very likely that the doctrine of the omnitemporality of truth is false. I argue that the rejection of the omnitemporality of truth has no undesirable consequences for either logic or theology, that (...)
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  25. Ted A. Warfield & Alicia Finch (1999). Fatalism: Logical and Theological. Faith and Philosophy 16 (2):233-238.score: 18.0
    The logical fatalist holds that the past truth of future tense propositions is incompatible with libertarian freedom. The theological fatalist holds that the combination of God’s past beliefs with His essential omniscience is incompatible with libertarian freedom. There is an ongoing dispute over the relation between these two kinds of fatalism: some philosophers believe that the problems are equivalent while others believe that the theological problem is more difficult. We offer a diagnosis of this dispute showing that one’s view (...)
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  26. Ricardo Salles (2004). Bivalencia, fatalismo e inacción en Crisipo (Bivalence, Fatalism and Inaction in Chrysippus). Crítica 36 (106):3 - 27.score: 18.0
    Este ensayo ofrece un análisis del argumento de Crisipo a favor de que todo tiene una causa en Cicerón, De Fato 20. Para ello, se discute en qué sentido el argumento es fatalista y si el tipo de fatalismo que implica alienta la inacción. Asimismo, se presenta una nueva interpretación de la réplica de Crisipo al Argumento Perezoso en Eusebio, Praep. ev. 6.8.28. En particular se sostiene que, para Crisipo, la relación entre sucesos codestinados es analítica: a fin de determinar (...)
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  27. Charles T. Hughes (1997). Belief, Foreknowledge, and Theological Fatalism. Faith and Philosophy 14 (3):378-387.score: 18.0
    David Hunt has recently developed a new strategy, called the “dispositional omniscience scenario,” or (OOS), which is designed to defeat theological fatalism by showing the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human (libertarian) free agency. But I argue that Hunt fails to establish his compatibility claim because (DOS) is based on a defective analysis of dispositional belief that is too weak to sustain any divine foreknowledge of future free actions.
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  28. Raymond L. M. Lee (1998). The Tao of Exchange: Ideology and Cosmology in Baudrillard's Fatalism. Thesis Eleven 52 (1):53-67.score: 18.0
    Baudrillard's fatalism could be interpreted as a unique synthesis of poststructuralism and Eastern philosophy. It may be construed as an effort to integrate the critique of the political economy of the sign with a romantic anthropology of symbolic exchange that is partly influenced by Taoist philosophy. As a whole, it comprises a type of countercultural response to a burgeoning simulacral order. This is a response that draws upon some aspects of Taoist thought because it ideally provides a non-Marxist approach (...)
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  29. David Widerker (2000). ``Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities&Quot. Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):249-254.score: 18.0
    In a recent article, David Hunt has proposed a theological counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities involving divine foreknowledge (G-scenario). Hunt claims that this example is immune to my criticism of regular Frankfurt-type counterexamples to that principle, as God’s foreknowing an agent’s act does not causally determine that act. Furthermore, he claims that the considerations which support the claim that the agent is morally responsible for his act in a Frankfurt-type scenario also hold in a G-scenario. In reply, Icontest (...)
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  30. Denis Diderot (2008). Jacques the Fatalist. OUP Oxford.score: 18.0
    'Your Jacques is a tasteless mishmash of things that happen, some of them true, others made up, written without style and served up like a dog's breakfast.' -/- Jacques the Fatalist is Diderot's answer to the problem of existence. If human beings are determined by their genes and their environment, how can they claim to be free to want or do anything? Where are Jacques and his Master going? Are they simply occupying space, living mechanically until they die, believing erroneously (...)
     
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  31. Richard Taylor (1962). Fatalism. Philosophical Review 71 (1):56-66.score: 15.0
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  32. Richard Taylor (1963). A Note on Fatalism. Philosophical Review 72 (4):497-499.score: 15.0
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  33. Michael C. Rea (2006). Presentism and Fatalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):511 – 524.score: 15.0
    It is widely believed that presentism is compatible with both a libertarian view of human freedom and an unrestricted principle of bivalence. I argue that, in fact, presentists must choose between bivalence and libertarianism: if presentism is true, then either the future is open or no one is free in the way that libertarians understand freedom.
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  34. Robert C. Solomon (2002). Nietzsche on Fatalism and "Free Will&Quot. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 23 (1):63-87.score: 15.0
  35. Joseph Diekemper (2007). B-Theory, Fixity, and Fatalism. Noûs 41 (3):429–452.score: 15.0
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  36. Joseph K. Campbell (2010). Incompatibilism and Fatalism: Reply to Loss. Analysis 70 (1):71-76.score: 15.0
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  37. John Carroll, Context, Conditionals, Fatalism, Freedom & Time Travel.score: 15.0
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  38. Andrew Beedle (1996). Modal Fatalism. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):488-495.score: 15.0
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  39. Bruce Aune (1962). Fatalism and Professor Taylor. Philosophical Review 71 (4):512-519.score: 15.0
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  40. V. Alan White, Determinism is Not Fatalism.score: 15.0
    After learning about the concept of determinism, a natural tendency is to conclude that if anyone actually believed in the determinism of human nature, then all future human actions are "set out for us" or "cut and dried" and, in some sense, utterly unavoidable. Another way of referring to such inevitability is that human action appears to be..
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  41. Mark Bernstein (1989). Fatalism, Tense, and Changing the Past. Philosophical Studies 56 (2):175 - 186.score: 15.0
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  42. Richard Taylor (1964). Tautology and Fatalism: Fatalistic Arguments: Comment. Journal of Philosophy 61 (10):305-307.score: 15.0
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  43. Katherin A. Rogers (2007). The Necessity of the Present and Anselm's Eternalist Response to the Problem of Theological Fatalism. Religious Studies 43 (1):25-47.score: 15.0
    It is often argued that the eternalist solution to the freedom/foreknowledge dilemma fails. If God's knowledge of your choices is eternally fixed, your choices are necessary and cannot be free. Anselm of Canterbury proposes an eternalist view which entails that all of time is equally real and truly present to God. God's knowledge of your choices entails only a ‘consequent’ necessity which does not conflict with libertarian freedom. I argue this by showing that if consequent necessity does conflict with libertarian (...)
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  44. Roberto Loss (2010). Fatalism and the Necessity of the Present: Reply to Campbell. Analysis 70 (1):76-78.score: 15.0
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  45. R. D. Bradley (1963). Causality, Fatalism, and Morality. Mind 72 (288):591-594.score: 15.0
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  46. William Hasker (1988). Hard Facts and Theological Fatalism. Noûs 22 (3):419-436.score: 15.0
  47. Hugh Rice, Fatalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 15.0
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  48. R. Sorensen (2006). Sharp Edges From Hedges: Fatalism, Vagueness and Epistemic Possibility. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):607 - 626.score: 15.0
    Mights plug gaps. If p lacks a truth-value, then ‘It might be that p’ should also lack truth-value. Yet epistemic hedges often turn an unassertible statement into an assertible one. The phenomenon is illustrated in detail for two kinds of statements that are frequently alleged to be counterexamples to the principle of bivalence: future contingents and statements that apply predicates to borderline cases. The paper concludes by exploring the prospects for generalizing this gap-plugging strategy.
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  49. Jordan Howard Sobel (1966). Dummett on Fatalism. Philosophical Review 75 (1):78-90.score: 15.0
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  50. Lewis Foster (1971). Fatalism and Precognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (3):341-351.score: 15.0
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