Search results for 'Feeling' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Uriah Kriegel (2012). Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion. European Journal of Philosophy (3):420-442.score: 24.0
    According to the old feeling theory of emotion, an emotion is just a feeling: a conscious experience with a characteristic phenomenal character. This theory is widely dismissed in contemporary discussions of emotion as hopelessly naïve. In particular, it is thought to suffer from two fatal drawbacks: its inability to account for the cognitive dimension of emotion (which is thought to go beyond the phenomenal dimension), and its inability to accommodate unconscious emotions (which, of course, lack any phenomenal character). (...)
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  2. Ben Bramble (2013). The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.score: 24.0
    In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. (...)
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  3. Edoardo Zamuner (2004). “Treating the Sceptic with Genuine Expression of Feeling. Wittgenstein’s Later Remarks on the Psychology of Other Minds”. In A. Roser & R. Raatzsch (eds.), Jahrbuch der Deutschen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft. Peter Lang Verlag.score: 24.0
    This paper is concerned with the issue of authenticity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology. In the manuscripts published as Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie – Das Innere und das Äußere, the German term Echtheit is mostly translated as ‘genuineness’. In these manuscripts, Wittgenstein frequently uses the term as referring to a feature of the expression of feeling and emotion: -/- […] I want to say that there is an original genuine expression of pain; that the expression of (...)
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  4. Bernhard Waldenfels (2008). The Role of the Lived-Body in Feeling. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):127-142.score: 24.0
    Feelings not only have a place, they also have a time. Today, one can speak of a multifaceted renaissance of feelings. This concerns philosophy itself, particularly, ethics. Every law-based morality comes up against its limits when morals cease to be only a question of legitimation and begin to be a question of motivation, since motives get no foothold without the feeling of self and feeling of the alien. As it is treated by various social theories and psychoanalysis, the (...)
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  5. Jan Slaby (2008). Affective Intentionality and the Feeling Body. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):429-444.score: 24.0
    This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling. The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact is (...)
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  6. Joel M. Potter (2012). Arguments From the Priority of Feeling From Contemporary Emotion Theory and Max Scheler's Phenomenology. Quaestiones Disputatae 3 (1):215-225.score: 24.0
    Many so-called “cognitivist” theories of the emotions account for the meaningfulness of emotions in terms of beliefs or judgments that are associated or identified with these emotions. In recent years, a number of analytic philosophers have argued against these theories by pointing out that the objects of emotions are sometimes meaningfully experienced before one can take a reflective stance toward them. Peter Goldie defends this point of view in his book The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Goldie argues that emotions are (...)
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  7. Robert Kirk (1994). Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Robert Kirk uses the notion of "raw feeling" to bridge the intelligibility gap between our knowledge of ourselves as physical organisms and our knowledge of ...
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  8. Mohan Matthen (2010). Two Visual Systems and the Feeling of Presence. In Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary & Finn Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems. Oxford University Press. 107.score: 24.0
    Argues for a category of “cognitive feelings”, which are representationally significant, but are not part of the content of the states they accompany. The feeling of pastness in episodic memory, of familiarity (missing in Capgras syndrome), and of motivation (that accompanies desire) are examples. The feeling of presence that accompanies normal visual states is due to such a cognitive feeling; the “two visual systems” are partially responsible for this feeling.
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  9. Somogy Varga (2013). Vulnerability to Psychosis, I-Thou Intersubjectivity and the Praecox-Feeling. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):131-143.score: 24.0
    Psychotic and prodromal states are characterized by distortions of intersubjectivity, and a number of psychopathologists see in the concrete I-You frame of the clinical encounter the manifestation of such impairment. Rümke has coined the term of ‘praecox-feeling’, designated to describe a feeling of unease emanating in the interviewer that reflects the detachment of the patient and the failure of an ‘affective exchange.’ While the reliability of the praecox-feeling as a diagnostic tool has since been established, the explanation (...)
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  10. Sven Walter (2014). Willusionism, Epiphenomenalism, and the Feeling of Conscious Will. Synthese 191 (10):2215-2238.score: 24.0
    While epiphenomenalism—i.e., the claim that the mental is a causally otiose byproduct of physical processes that does not itself cause anything—is hardly ever mentioned in philosophical discussions of free will, it has recently come to play a crucial role in the scientific attack on free will led by neuroscientists and psychologists. This paper is concerned with the connection between epiphenomenalism and the claim that free will is an illusion, in particular with the connection between epiphenomenalism and willusionism, i.e., with the (...)
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  11. Laura Papish (2013). Moral Feeling and Moral Conversion in Kant's Religion. Idealistic Studies 43 (1/2):11 - 26.score: 24.0
    Kant’s account of moral feeling is continually disputed in the secondary literature. My goal is to focus on the Religion and make sense of moral feeling as it appears in this context. I argue that we can best understand moral feeling if we note its place in Kant’s concerns about the possibility of moral conversion. As Kant notes, if the new, morally upright man is of a different character than the man he used to be, then it (...)
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  12. E. Sonny Elizondo (2014). More Than a Feeling. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):425-442.score: 24.0
    According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. (...)
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  13. Glenn Carruthers (forthcoming). A Metacognitive Model of the Feeling of Agency Over Bodily Actions. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research and Practice.score: 24.0
    I offer a new metacognitive account of the feeling of agency over bodily actions. On this model the feeling of agency is the metacognitive monitoring of two cues: i) smoothness of action: done via monitoring the output of the comparison between actual and predicted sensory consequences of action and ii) action outcome: done via monitoring the outcome of action and its success relative to a prior intention. Previous research has shown that the comparator model offers a powerful explanation (...)
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  14. Tom Ziemke Robert Lowe (2011). The Feeling of Action Tendencies: On the Emotional Regulation of Goal-Directed Behavior. Frontiers in Psychology 2.score: 24.0
    In this article, we review the nature of the functional and causal relationship between neurophysiologically/psychologically generated states of emotional feeling and action tendencies and extrapolate a novel perspective. Emotion research, over the past century and beyond, has tended to view feeling and action tendency as independent phenomena: Attempts to outline the functional and causal relationship that exists between them have been framed therein. Classically, such relationships have been viewed as unidirectional, but an argument for bidirectionality rooted in a (...)
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  15. Stuart N. Hampshire (1952). The Analogy of Feeling. Mind 61 (January):1-12.score: 22.0
    In this article the author is concerned with the justification of the knowledge of other minds by virtue of statements of other people's feelings based upon inductive arguments of any ordinary pattern as being inferences from the observed to the unobserved of a familiar and accepted form. The author argues that they are not logically peculiar or invalid, When considered as inductive arguments. The author also proposes that solipsism is a linguistically absurd thesis, While at the same time stopping to (...)
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  16. Matthew Ratcliffe (2011). Stance, Feeling and Phenomenology. Synthese 178 (1):121 - 130.score: 22.0
    This paper addresses Bas van Fraassen's claim that empiricism is a ' stance'. I begin by distinguishing two different kinds of stance: an explicit epistemic policy and an implicit way of ' finding oneself in a world'. At least some of van Fraassen's claims, I suggest, refer to the latter. In explicating his ordinarily implicit ' empirical stance', he assumes the stance of the phenomenologist, describing the structure of his commitment to empiricism without committing to it in the process. This (...)
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  17. Geoffrey C. Madell & Aaron Ridley (1997). Emotion and Feeling. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (71):147-176.score: 21.0
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  18. Louise M. Antony (1997). Feeling Fine About the Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):381-87.score: 21.0
    The article presents a critique of John Searle's attack on computationalist theories of mind in his recent book, The Rediscovery of the Mind. Searle is guilty of caricaturing his opponents, and of ignoring their arguments. Moreover, his own positive theory of mind, which he claims "takes account of" subjectivity, turns out to offer no discernible advantages over the views he rejects.
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  19. Louis C. Charland (1995). Feeling and Representing: Computational Theory and the Modularity of Affect. Synthese 105 (3):273-301.score: 21.0
    In this paper I review some leading developments in the empirical theory of affect. I argue that (1) affect is a distinct perceptual representation governed system, and (2) that there are significant modular factors in affect. The paper concludes with the observation thatfeeler (affective perceptual system) may be a natural kind within cognitive science. The main purpose of the paper is to explore some hitherto unappreciated connections between the theory of affect and the computational theory of mind.
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  20. Moreland Perkins (1966). Emotion and Feeling. Philosophical Review 75 (April):139-160.score: 21.0
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  21. Bruce Aune (1963). On Thought and Feeling. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (January):1-12.score: 21.0
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  22. William R. Carter (1972). Locke on Feeling Another's Pain. Philosophical Studies 23 (June):280-285.score: 21.0
  23. Roland Puccetti (1967). On Thinking Machines and Feeling Machines. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (May):39-51.score: 21.0
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  24. Philip J. Koch (1987). Bodily Feeling in Emotion. Dialogue 26 (01):59-75.score: 21.0
  25. Stephen R. Leighton (1988). On Feeling Angry and Elated. Journal of Philosophy 85 (May):253-264.score: 21.0
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  26. Joe Neisser (2006). Making the Case for Unconscious Feeling. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):129-138.score: 21.0
  27. Brent D. Slife (1994). Free Will and Time: That "Stuck" Feeling. Journal of Theoretical and Philsophical Psychology 14 (1):1-12.score: 21.0
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  28. Matthew Ratcliffe (2005). The Feeling of Being. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):43-60.score: 21.0
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  29. Antonio R. Damasio (2001). Reflections on the Neurobiology of Emotion and Feeling. In João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 99--108.score: 21.0
  30. Fiorella Battaglia (2012). The Embodied Self and the Feeling of Being Alive. In Joerg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive / Gefühle des Lebendigseins. De Gruyter. 201-222.score: 21.0
    This paper aims to render some aspects of the feeling of being alive more clearly comprehensible. My emphasis on the phenomenal quality of consciousness stems from the “embodied” approach to consciousness, according to which consciousness, since it is considered a phenomenon of life, includes both intentional and motivational aspects. In this view, its phenomenal quality is an inherent property of the embodied self, which relates both to the external world and to itself. The feeling of being alive is (...)
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  31. H. N. Peters (1938). Experimental Studies of the Judgmental Theory of Feeling: I. Learning of Positive and Negative Reactions as a Determinant of Affective Judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology 23 (1):1.score: 21.0
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  32. H. N. Peters (1938). Experimental Studies of the Judgmental Theory of Feeling: II. Application of Scaling to the Measurement of Relatively Indifferent Affective Values. Journal of Experimental Psychology 23 (3):258.score: 21.0
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  33. H. N. Peters (1943). Experimental Studies of the Judgmental Theory of Feeling. VI. Concrete Versus Abstract Sets in the Preference Judgments of Pictures. [REVIEW] Journal of Experimental Psychology 33 (6):487.score: 21.0
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  34. H. N. Peters (1943). Experimental Studies of the Judgmental Theory of Feeling: V. The Influence of Set Upon the Affective Values of Colors. Journal of Experimental Psychology 33 (4):285.score: 21.0
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  35. John M. Russell (1978). Saying, Feeling, and Self-Deception. Behaviorism 6 (1):27-43.score: 21.0
  36. Jennifer Wilkinson (1998). Feeling an Emotion. South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):62-74.score: 21.0
     
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  37. Barrie Falk (1996). Feeling and Cognition. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Verstehen and Humane Understanding. Cambridge University Press. 211-222.score: 21.0
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  38. H. N. Peters (1939). Experimental Studies of the Judgmental Theory of Feeling: III. The Absolute Shift in Affective Value Conditioned by Learned Reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology 24 (1):73.score: 21.0
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  39. Demian Whiting (2011). The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed Emotions. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):281-303.score: 18.0
    Abstract: The ‘feeling theory of emotion’ holds that emotions are to be identified with feelings. An objection commonly made to that theory of emotion has it that emotions cannot be feelings only, as emotions have intentional objects. Jack does not just feel fear, but he feels fear-of-something. To explain this property of emotion we will have to ascribe to emotion a representational structure, and feelings do not have the sought after representational structure. In this paper I seek to defend (...)
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  40. Peter Goldie (2004). Emotion, Feeling, and Knowledge of the World. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    There is a view of the emotions (I might tendentiously call it ‘cognitivism’) that has at present a certain currency. This view is of the emotions as playing an essential role in our gaining evaluative knowledge of the world. When we are angry at an insult, or afraid of the burglar, our emotions involve evaluative perceptions and thoughts, which are directed towards the way something is in the world that impinges on our well-being, or on the well-being of those that (...)
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  41. Murat Aydede (2009). Is Feeling Pain the Perception of Something? Journal of Philosophy 106 (10):531-567.score: 18.0
    According to the increasingly popular perceptual/representational accounts of pain (and other bodily sensations such as itches, tickles, orgasms, etc.), feeling pain in a body region is perceiving a non-mental property or some objective condition of that region, typically equated with some sort of (actual or potential) tissue damage. In what follows I argue that given a natural understanding of what sensory perception requires and how it is integrated with (dedicated) conceptual systems, these accounts are mistaken. I will also examine (...)
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  42. Daniel Jacobson (2005). Seeing by Feeling: Virtues, Skills, and Moral Perception. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):387 - 409.score: 18.0
    Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt a perceptual moral epistemology, such as (...)
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  43. Robert Sugden (2002). Beyond Sympathy and Empathy: Adam Smith's Concept of Fellow-Feeling. Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):63-87.score: 18.0
    When modern economists use the notions of sympathy or empathy, they often claim that their ideas have their roots in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759/1976), while sometimes complaining that Smith fails to distinguish clearly enough between the two concepts. Recently, Philippe Fontaine (1997) has described various forms of sympathy and empathy, and has explored their respective roles in Smith's work. My objective in this paper is to argue that Smith's analysis of how people's sentiments impinge on one another (...)
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  44. Immanuel Kant (1960). Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. Berkeley, University of California Press.score: 18.0
    Kant's only aesthetic work apart from the Critique of Judgment , Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime gives the reader a sense of the personality and character of its author as he sifts through the range of human responses to the concept of beauty and human manifestations of the beautiful and sublime. Kant was fifty-eight when the first of his great Critical trilogy, the Critique of Pure Reason , was published. Observations offers a view into the (...)
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  45. Rachel Cohon (2008). A Very Brief Summary of Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication. Hume Studies 34 (2):253-256.score: 18.0
    Earlier versions of the four articles which follow were presented at a book panel session, on Rachel Cohon's Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication, at the Hume Society meetings in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in August 2009.I am deeply grateful to Lívia Guimarães and Donald L. M. Baxter for planning this session, and to Elizabeth S. Radcliffe and Don Garrett for serving as my critics. I have been asked to begin by summarizing my book in a few minutes.Hume's Morality: Feeling (...)
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  46. A. Koriat (2000). The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):149-171.score: 18.0
    The study of the feeling of knowing may have implications for some of the metatheoretical issues concerning consciousness and control. Assuming a distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments, it is argued that the sheer phenomenological experience of knowing (''noetic feeling'') occupies a unique role in mediating between implicit-automatic processes, on the one hand, and explicit-controlled processes, on the other. Rather than reflecting direct access to memory traces, noetic feelings are based on inferential heuristics that operate implicitly and (...)
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  47. Jeanine M. Grenberg (2001). Feeling, Desire and Interest in Kant's Theory of Action. Kant-Studien 92 (2):153-179.score: 18.0
    Henry Allison's “Incorporation Thesis” has played an important role in recent discussions of Kantian ethics. By focussing on Kant's claim that “a drive [Triebfeder] can determine the will to an action only so far as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim,” (Rel 19, translation slightly modified) Allison has successfully argued against Kant's critics that desire-based non-moral action can be free action. His work has thus opened the door for a wide range of discussions which integrate feeling (...)
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  48. Donovan Miyasaki, (2014) Feeling, Not Freedom: Nietzsche Against Agency.score: 18.0
    Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysical freedom of the will does not leave room for a morally substantial conception of freedom, particularly that of agency free will. His normative ideal of a higher, more valuable human type consists of the only kind of agency he believes to be possible: the mere feeling of freedom—the qualitative feeling alone, without deeper substance. Not only does the feeling of agency not imply any strong, morally significant freedom of agency, in practice it requires (...)
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  49. Monique David-Ménard (2000). Kant's "An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind" and Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime. Hypatia 15 (4):82 - 98.score: 18.0
    David-Ménard examines the problem of the genesis of Kant's moral philosophy. The separation between Kantian practical reason and the inclinations of sense which it regulates is shown by the author to originate in Kant's attempt to regulate his own tendency to hypochondria. Her argument links the themes from two of Kant's precritical works which attest to this tendency-"An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind" and Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime-to the final form of (...)
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  50. Stevan Harnad, Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on Consciousness: The Mind/Body Problem is the Feeling/Function Problem.score: 18.0
    Why, oh why do we keep conflating this question, which is about the uncertainty of sensory information, with the much more profound and pertinent one, which is about the functional explicability and causal role of feeling?
    _Kant: How is it possible for something even to be a thought (of mine)? What are the conditions for the_
    _possibility of experience (veridical or illusory) at all?_
    That's not the right question either. The right question is not even an epistemic (...)
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