Search results for 'Feeling' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Ben Bramble (2013). The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
    In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. (...)
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  2. Uriah Kriegel (2012). Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion. European Journal of Philosophy (3):420-442.
    According to the old feeling theory of emotion, an emotion is just a feeling: a conscious experience with a characteristic phenomenal character. This theory is widely dismissed in contemporary discussions of emotion as hopelessly naïve. In particular, it is thought to suffer from two fatal drawbacks: its inability to account for the cognitive dimension of emotion (which is thought to go beyond the phenomenal dimension), and its inability to accommodate unconscious emotions (which, of course, lack any phenomenal character). (...)
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  3.  27
    Matthew Ratcliffe (2005). The Feeling of Being. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):43-60.
    There has been much recent philosophical discussion concerning the relationship between emotion and feeling. However, everyday talk of 'feeling' is not restricted to emotional feeling and the current emphasis on emotions has led to a neglect of other kinds of feeling. These include feelings of homeliness, belonging, separation, unfamiliarity, power, control, being part of something, being at one with nature and 'being there'. Such feelings are perhaps not 'emotional'. However, I suggest here that they do form (...)
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  4. Jan Slaby (2008). Affective Intentionality and the Feeling Body. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):429-444.
    This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling. The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact is (...)
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  5.  35
    Sven Walter (2014). Willusionism, Epiphenomenalism, and the Feeling of Conscious Will. Synthese 191 (10):2215-2238.
    While epiphenomenalism—i.e., the claim that the mental is a causally otiose byproduct of physical processes that does not itself cause anything—is hardly ever mentioned in philosophical discussions of free will, it has recently come to play a crucial role in the scientific attack on free will led by neuroscientists and psychologists. This paper is concerned with the connection between epiphenomenalism and the claim that free will is an illusion, in particular with the connection between epiphenomenalism and willusionism, i.e., with the (...)
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  6.  19
    Thor Grünbaum (2015). The Feeling of Agency Hypothesis: A Critique. Synthese 192 (10):3313-3337.
    A dominant view in contemporary cognitive neuroscience is that low-level, comparator-based mechanisms of motor control produce a distinctive experience often called the feeling of agency . An opposing view is that comparator-based motor control is largely non-conscious and not associated with any particular type of distinctive phenomenology . In this paper, I critically evaluate the nature of the empirical evidence researchers commonly take to support FoA-hypothesis. The aim of this paper is not only to scrutinize the FoA-hypothesis and data (...)
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  7.  61
    E. Sonny Elizondo (2014). More Than a Feeling. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):425-442.
    According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, (...)
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  8.  18
    Owen Ware (2015). Accessing the Moral Law Through Feeling. Kantian Review 20 (2):301-311.
    In this article I offer a critical commentary on Jeanine Grenberg’s claim that, by the time of the second Critique, Kant was committed to the view that we only access the moral law’s validity through the feeling of respect. The issue turns on how we understand Kant’s assertion that our consciousness of the moral law is a ‘fact of reason’. Grenberg argues that all facts must be forced, and anything forced must be felt. I defend an alternative interpretation, according (...)
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  9. Joel M. Potter (2012). Arguments From the Priority of Feeling From Contemporary Emotion Theory and Max Scheler's Phenomenology. Quaestiones Disputatae 3 (1):215-225.
    Many so-called “cognitivist” theories of the emotions account for the meaningfulness of emotions in terms of beliefs or judgments that are associated or identified with these emotions. In recent years, a number of analytic philosophers have argued against these theories by pointing out that the objects of emotions are sometimes meaningfully experienced before one can take a reflective stance toward them. Peter Goldie defends this point of view in his book The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Goldie argues that emotions are (...)
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  10.  57
    Robert Kirk (1994). Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Robert Kirk uses the notion of "raw feeling" to bridge the intelligibility gap between our knowledge of ourselves as physical organisms and our knowledge of ..
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  11.  34
    Glenn Carruthers (forthcoming). A Metacognitive Model of the Feeling of Agency Over Bodily Actions. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research and Practice.
    I offer a new metacognitive account of the feeling of agency over bodily actions. On this model the feeling of agency is the metacognitive monitoring of two cues: i) smoothness of action: done via monitoring the output of the comparison between actual and predicted sensory consequences of action and ii) action outcome: done via monitoring the outcome of action and its success relative to a prior intention. Previous research has shown that the comparator model offers a powerful explanation (...)
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  12. Edoardo Zamuner (2004). “Treating the Sceptic with Genuine Expression of Feeling. Wittgenstein’s Later Remarks on the Psychology of Other Minds”. In A. Roser & R. Raatzsch (eds.), Jahrbuch der Deutschen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft. Peter Lang Verlag
    This paper is concerned with the issue of authenticity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology. In the manuscripts published as Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie – Das Innere und das Äußere, the German term Echtheit is mostly translated as ‘genuineness’. In these manuscripts, Wittgenstein frequently uses the term as referring to a feature of the expression of feeling and emotion: -/- […] I want to say that there is an original genuine expression of pain; that the expression of (...)
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  13.  50
    Mohan Matthen (2010). Two Visual Systems and the Feeling of Presence. In Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary & Finn Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems. Oxford University Press 107.
    Argues for a category of “cognitive feelings”, which are representationally significant, but are not part of the content of the states they accompany. The feeling of pastness in episodic memory, of familiarity (missing in Capgras syndrome), and of motivation (that accompanies desire) are examples. The feeling of presence that accompanies normal visual states is due to such a cognitive feeling; the “two visual systems” are partially responsible for this feeling.
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  14.  29
    Laura Papish (2013). Moral Feeling and Moral Conversion in Kant's Religion. Idealistic Studies 43 (1/2):11 - 26.
    Kant’s account of moral feeling is continually disputed in the secondary literature. My goal is to focus on the Religion and make sense of moral feeling as it appears in this context. I argue that we can best understand moral feeling if we note its place in Kant’s concerns about the possibility of moral conversion. As Kant notes, if the new, morally upright man is of a different character than the man he used to be, then it (...)
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  15. Bernhard Waldenfels (2008). The Role of the Lived-Body in Feeling. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):127-142.
    Feelings not only have a place, they also have a time. Today, one can speak of a multifaceted renaissance of feelings. This concerns philosophy itself, particularly, ethics. Every law-based morality comes up against its limits when morals cease to be only a question of legitimation and begin to be a question of motivation, since motives get no foothold without the feeling of self and feeling of the alien. As it is treated by various social theories and psychoanalysis, the (...)
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  16.  45
    Somogy Varga (2013). Vulnerability to Psychosis, I-Thou Intersubjectivity and the Praecox-Feeling. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):131-143.
    Psychotic and prodromal states are characterized by distortions of intersubjectivity, and a number of psychopathologists see in the concrete I-You frame of the clinical encounter the manifestation of such impairment. Rümke has coined the term of ‘praecox-feeling’, designated to describe a feeling of unease emanating in the interviewer that reflects the detachment of the patient and the failure of an ‘affective exchange.’ While the reliability of the praecox-feeling as a diagnostic tool has since been established, the explanation (...)
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  17.  4
    Barrie Falk (1996). Feeling and Cognition. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 211-222.
    There is a common view that as well as being conscious of the world in virtue of having thoughts about it, forming representations of its various states and processes, we are also conscious of it in virtue of feeling it. What I have in mind is not the fact that we have feelings about the world—indignation at this, pleasure at that—but that we sensorily feel its colours, sounds, textures and so on. And this feeling form of consciousness, it's (...)
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  18.  9
    Brent D. Slife (1994). Free Will and Time: That "Stuck" Feeling. Journal of Theoretical and Philsophical Psychology 14 (1):1-12.
    Clarifies the central elements of the "stuckness" feeling in the traditional framework for free will and determinism in psychology, based on the inherent dependence on context and the assumed need of free will to be independent of context. These central elements are examined from the relatively overlooked perspective of time. A large part of the stuckness is revealed to stem from the linear assumption of time, rather than the linear nature of causality, as (...)
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  19. Louise M. Antony (1997). Feeling Fine About the Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):381-87.
    The article presents a critique of John Searle's attack on computationalist theories of mind in his recent book, The Rediscovery of the Mind. Searle is guilty of caricaturing his opponents, and of ignoring their arguments. Moreover, his own positive theory of mind, which he claims "takes account of" subjectivity, turns out to offer no discernible advantages over the views he rejects.
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  20.  54
    Louis C. Charland (1995). Feeling and Representing: Computational Theory and the Modularity of Affect. Synthese 105 (3):273-301.
    In this paper I review some leading developments in the empirical theory of affect. I argue that (1) affect is a distinct perceptual representation governed system, and (2) that there are significant modular factors in affect. The paper concludes with the observation thatfeeler (affective perceptual system) may be a natural kind within cognitive science. The main purpose of the paper is to explore some hitherto unappreciated connections between the theory of affect and the computational theory of mind.
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  21.  42
    Matthew Ratcliffe (2011). Stance, Feeling and Phenomenology. Synthese 178 (1):121 - 130.
    This paper addresses Bas van Fraassen's claim that empiricism is a ' stance'. I begin by distinguishing two different kinds of stance: an explicit epistemic policy and an implicit way of ' finding oneself in a world'. At least some of van Fraassen's claims, I suggest, refer to the latter. In explicating his ordinarily implicit ' empirical stance', he assumes the stance of the phenomenologist, describing the structure of his commitment to empiricism without committing to it in the process. This (...)
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  22.  28
    John M. Russell (1978). Saying, Feeling, and Self-Deception. Behaviorism 6 (1):27-43.
  23. Stuart N. Hampshire (1952). The Analogy of Feeling. Mind 61 (January):1-12.
    In this article the author is concerned with the justification of the knowledge of other minds by virtue of statements of other people's feelings based upon inductive arguments of any ordinary pattern as being inferences from the observed to the unobserved of a familiar and accepted form. The author argues that they are not logically peculiar or invalid, When considered as inductive arguments. The author also proposes that solipsism is a linguistically absurd thesis, While at the same time stopping to (...)
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  24.  61
    Geoffrey C. Madell & Aaron Ridley (1997). Emotion and Feeling. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (71):147-176.
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  25.  52
    Moreland Perkins (1966). Emotion and Feeling. Philosophical Review 75 (April):139-160.
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  26.  63
    Roland Puccetti (1967). On Thinking Machines and Feeling Machines. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (May):39-51.
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  27.  19
    Philip J. Koch (1987). Bodily Feeling in Emotion. Dialogue 26 (1):59-75.
  28.  10
    Antonio R. Damasio (2001). Reflections on the Neurobiology of Emotion and Feeling. In João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press 99--108.
  29.  36
    Bruce Aune (1963). On Thought and Feeling. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (January):1-12.
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  30.  29
    William R. Carter (1972). Locke on Feeling Another's Pain. Philosophical Studies 23 (June):280-285.
  31.  15
    Joe Neisser (2006). Making the Case for Unconscious Feeling. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):129-138.
  32.  17
    Stephen R. Leighton (1988). On Feeling Angry and Elated. Journal of Philosophy 85 (May):253-264.
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  33.  1
    H. N. Peters (1938). Experimental Studies of the Judgmental Theory of Feeling: I. Learning of Positive and Negative Reactions as a Determinant of Affective Judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology 23 (1):1.
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  34.  1
    H. N. Peters (1943). Experimental Studies of the Judgmental Theory of Feeling: V. The Influence of Set Upon the Affective Values of Colors. Journal of Experimental Psychology 33 (4):285.
  35.  1
    H. N. Peters (1938). Experimental Studies of the Judgmental Theory of Feeling: II. Application of Scaling to the Measurement of Relatively Indifferent Affective Values. Journal of Experimental Psychology 23 (3):258.
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  36.  1
    H. N. Peters (1943). Experimental Studies of the Judgmental Theory of Feeling. VI. Concrete Versus Abstract Sets in the Preference Judgments of Pictures. [REVIEW] Journal of Experimental Psychology 33 (6):487.
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  37. Jennifer Wilkinson (1998). Feeling an Emotion. South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):62-74.
     
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  38. H. N. Peters (1939). Experimental Studies of the Judgmental Theory of Feeling: III. The Absolute Shift in Affective Value Conditioned by Learned Reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology 24 (1):73.
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  39. Stan Klein (2015). The Feeling of Personal Ownership of One’s Mental States: A Conceptual Argument and Empirical Evidence for an Essential, but Underappreciated, Mechanism of Mind. Psychology of Consciousness: Research, Practice, and Theory 2:355-376.
    I argue that the feeling that one is the owner of his or her mental states is not an intrinsic property of those states. Rather, it consists in a contingent relation between consciousness and its intentional objects. As such, there are (a variety of) circumstances, varying in their interpretive clarity, in which this relation can come undone. When this happens, the content of consciousness still is apprehended, but the feeling that the content “belongs to me” no longer (...)
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  40.  74
    A. Koriat (2000). The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):149-171.
    The study of the feeling of knowing may have implications for some of the metatheoretical issues concerning consciousness and control. Assuming a distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments, it is argued that the sheer phenomenological experience of knowing (''noetic feeling'') occupies a unique role in mediating between implicit-automatic processes, on the one hand, and explicit-controlled processes, on the other. Rather than reflecting direct access to memory traces, noetic feelings are based on inferential heuristics that operate implicitly and (...)
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  41. Murat Aydede (2009). Is Feeling Pain the Perception of Something? Journal of Philosophy 106 (10):531-567.
    According to the increasingly popular perceptual/representational accounts of pain (and other bodily sensations such as itches, tickles, orgasms, etc.), feeling pain in a body region is perceiving a non-mental property or some objective condition of that region, typically equated with some sort of (actual or potential) tissue damage. In what follows I argue that given a natural understanding of what sensory perception requires and how it is integrated with (dedicated) conceptual systems, these accounts are mistaken. I will also examine (...)
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  42. Demian Whiting (2011). The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed Emotions. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):281-303.
    Abstract: The ‘feeling theory of emotion’ holds that emotions are to be identified with feelings. An objection commonly made to that theory of emotion has it that emotions cannot be feelings only, as emotions have intentional objects. Jack does not just feel fear, but he feels fear-of-something. To explain this property of emotion we will have to ascribe to emotion a representational structure, and feelings do not have the sought after representational structure. In this paper I seek (...)
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  43.  10
    Galen Barry (forthcoming). Spinoza and the Feeling of Freedom. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
    ABSTRACTWe seem to have a direct experience of our freedom when we act. Many philosophers take this feeling of freedom as evidence that we possess libertarian free will. Spinoza denies that we have free will of any sort, although he admits that we nonetheless feel free. Commentators often attribute to him what I call the ‘Negative Account’ of the feeling: it results from the fact that we are conscious of our actions but ignorant of their causes. I argue (...)
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  44. Daniel Jacobson (2005). Seeing by Feeling: Virtues, Skills, and Moral Perception. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):387-409.
    Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt a perceptual moral epistemology, such as (...)
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  45.  22
    David Carr (2005). On the Contribution of Literature and the Arts to the Educational Cultivation of Moral Virtue, Feeling and Emotion. Journal of Moral Education 34 (2):137-151.
    This paper sets out to explore connections between a number of plausible claims concerning education in general and moral education in particular: (i) that education is a matter of broad cultural initiation rather than narrow academic or vocational training; (ii) that any education so conceived would have a key concern with the moral dimensions of personal formation; (iii) that emotional growth is an important part of such moral formation; and (iv) that literature and other arts have an important part to (...)
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  46.  16
    Mark Wynn (2005). Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception and Feeling. Cambridge University Press.
    In this book Mark Wynn argues that the landscape of philosophical theology looks rather different from the perspective of a re-conceived theory of emotion. In matters of religion, we do not need to opt for objective content over emotional form or vice versa. On the contrary, these strategies are mistaken at root, since form and content are not properly separable here - because 'inwardness' may contribute to 'thought-content', or because (to use the vocabulary of the book) emotional feelings can themselves (...)
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  47.  65
    Yinghua Lu (2014). Thea PrioriValue and Feeling in Max Scheler and Wang Yangming. Asian Philosophy 24 (3):197-211.
    Following Mou Zongsan’s interpretation of Wang Yangming, this paper investigates the phenomenology of values and moral emotions in Max Scheler and the Confucian learning of heart, especially Wang Yangming. Part I illustrates the meaning of moral emotions in Confucianism and introduces Wang Yangming’s idea of pure knowing . Part II introduces Max Scheler’s idea of a priori value and feeling in order to explain how pure knowing could be both immanent and transcendental, both subjective and objective. Part III explores (...)
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  48. Immanuel Kant (1960). Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. Berkeley, University of California Press.
    Kant's only aesthetic work apart from the Critique of Judgment , Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime gives the reader a sense of the personality and character of its author as he sifts through the range of human responses to the concept of beauty and human manifestations of the beautiful and sublime. Kant was fifty-eight when the first of his great Critical trilogy, the Critique of Pure Reason , was published. Observations offers a view into the (...)
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  49. Peter Goldie (2004). Emotion, Feeling, and Knowledge of the World. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press
    There is a view of the emotions (I might tendentiously call it ‘cognitivism’) that has at present a certain currency. This view is of the emotions as playing an essential role in our gaining evaluative knowledge of the world. When we are angry at an insult, or afraid of the burglar, our emotions involve evaluative perceptions and thoughts, which are directed towards the way something is in the world that impinges on our well-being, or on the well-being of those that (...)
     
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  50.  8
    C. SouChay, C. Moulin, D. Clarys, L. Taconnat & M. Isingrini (2007). Diminished Episodic Memory Awareness in Older Adults: Evidence From Feeling-of-Knowing and Recollection. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):769-784.
    The ability to reflect on and monitor memory processes is one of the most investigated metamemory functions, and one of the important ways consciousnesses interacts with memory. The feeling-of-knowing is one task used to evaluate individual’s capacity to monitor their memory. We examined this reflective function of metacognition in older adults. We explored the contribution of metacognition to episodic memory impairment, in relation to the idea that older adults show a reduction in memory awareness characteristic of episodic memory. A (...)
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