6 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Ferenc Huoranszki (Central European University)
  1. Ferenc Huoranszki (2011). Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis. Routledge.
    Free will and powers -- Powers and possibilities -- Agency and responsibility -- The conditional analysis of free will -- Abilities and control -- Free will and reasons -- Intelligibility -- Rationality -- Spontaneity -- The determination of the self -- Some concluding remarks on autonomy and free will.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Ferenc Huoranszki (2011). Weakness and Compulsion: The Essential Difference. Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):81-97.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Ferenc Huoranszki (2006). Reasons and Passions. Acta Analytica 21 (2):41-53.
    Jonathan Dancy has argued that agents’ reasons for their actions are facts or features of the situations rather than their psychological states. The purpose of the paper is to show that even if we grant that this is so in most of the cases, there is a class of mental states that can be reasons. Although beliefs and desires are not reasons for actions, some emotional states—like loving, liking or disliking someone—can generate reasons. The distinctive feature of these states is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Ferenc Huoranszki (2003). On the Usefulness of Arts and Sciences. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):63-74.
    The paper addresses the problem whether arts, sciences and humanities can be regarded as useful. First it examines the means-ends relation and argues that some means are not causally but rather constitutively connected to ends. Second, it specifies two dimensions along which the problem of values will be addressed. One is the issue about the relation between values and desirability, the other is the active and affective conceptions of valuation. Third the paper offers a concise reconstruction of the answers to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Ferenc Huoranszki (2002). Common Sense and the Theory of Human Behaviour. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):526-543.
    I offer an analysis of Reid's notion of the will. Naturalism in the philosophy of action is defined as the attempt to eliminate the capacity of will and to reduce volition to some class of appetite or desire. Reid's arguments show, however, that volition plays a particular role in deliberation which cannot be reduced to some form of motivation present at the time of action. Deliberation is understood as an action over which the agent has control. Will is a higher-order (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Ferenc Huoranszki (2002). Fate, Freedom and Contingency. Acta Analytica 17 (1):79-102.
    Argument for fatalism attempts to prove that free choice is a logical or conceptual impossibility. The paper argues that the first two premises of the argument are sound: propositions are either true or false and they have their truth-value eternally. But the claim that from the fatalistic premises with the introduction of some innocent further premise dire consequences follow as regards to the possibility of free choice is false. The introduced premise, which establishes the connection between the first two premises (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation