Search results for 'Fictional Characters' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Stacie Friend (2007). Fictional Characters. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):141–156.score: 90.0
    If there are no fictional characters, how do we explain thought and discourse apparently about them? If there are, what are they like? A growing number of philosophers claim that fictional characters are abstract objects akin to novels or plots. They argue that postulating characters provides the most straightforward explanation of our literary practices as well as a uniform account of discourse and thought about fiction. Anti-realists counter that postulation is neither necessary nor straightforward, and (...)
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  2. Paisley Livingston & Andrea Sauchelli (2011). Philosophical Perspectives on Fictional Characters. New Literary History 42 (2):337-360.score: 90.0
    This paper takes up a series of basic philosophical questions about the nature and existence of fictional characters. We begin with realist approaches that hinge on the thesis that at least some claims about fictional characters can be right or wrong because they refer to something that exists, such as abstract objects. Irrealist approaches deny such realist postulations and hold instead that fictional characters are a figment of the human imagination. A third family of (...)
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  3. Mark Sainsbury (2012). 'Of Course There Are Fictional Characters'. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4:615-40.score: 90.0
    There is no straightforward inference from there being fictional characters to any interesting form of realism. One reason is that “fictional” may be an intensional operator with wide scope, depriving the quantifier of its usual force. Another is that not all uses of “there are” are ontologically committing. A realist needs to show that neither of these phenomena are present in “There are fictional characters”. Other roads to realism run into difficulties when negotiating the role (...)
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  4. Amie L. Thomasson (2003). Speaking of Fictional Characters. Dialectica 57 (2):205–223.score: 60.0
    The challenge of handling fictional discourse is to find the best way to resolve the apparent inconsistencies in our ways of speaking about fiction. A promising approach is to take at least some such discourse to involve pretense, but does all fictional discourse involve pretense? I will argue that a better, less revisionary, solution is to take internal and fictionalizing discourse to involve pretense, while allowing that in external critical discourse, fictional names are used seriously to refer (...)
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  5. Stuart Brock (2002). Fictionalism About Fictional Characters. Noûs 36 (1):1–21.score: 60.0
    Despite protestations to the contrary, philosophers have always been renowned for espousing theories that do violence to common-sense opinion. In the last twenty years or so there has been a growing number of philosophers keen to follow in this tradition. According to these philosophers, if a story of pure fic-tion tells us that an individual exists, then there really is such an individual. According to these realists about fictional characters, ‘Scarlett O’Hara,’ ‘Char-lie Brown,’ ‘Batman,’ ‘Superman,’ ‘Tweedledum’ and ‘Tweedledee’ (...)
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  6. Stuart Brock (2010). The Creationist Fiction: The Case Against Creationism About Fictional Characters. Philosophical Review 119 (3):337-364.score: 60.0
    This essay explains why creationism about fictional characters is an abject failure. Creationism about fictional characters is the view that fictional objects are created by the authors of the novels in which they first appear. This essay shows that, when the details of creationism are filled in, the hypothesis becomes far more puzzling than the linguistic data it is used to explain. No matter how the creationist identifies where, when and how fictional objects are (...)
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  7. Amie L. Thomasson (2003). Fictional Characters and Literary Practices. British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (2):138-157.score: 60.0
    I argue that the ontological status of fictional characters is determined by the beliefs and practices of those who competently deal with works of literature, and draw out three important consequences of this. First, heavily revisionary theories cannot be considered as ‘discoveries’ about the ‘true nature’ of fictional characters; any acceptable realist theory of fiction must preserve all or most of the common conception of fictional characters. Second, once we note that the existence conditions (...)
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  8. Edward N. Zalta (2003). Referring to Fictional Characters. Dialectica 57 (2):243–254.score: 60.0
    The author engages a question raised about theories of nonexistent objects. The question concerns the way names of fictional characters, when analyzed as names which denote nonexistent objects, acquire their denotations. Since nonexistent objects cannot causally interact with existent objects, it is thought that we cannot appeal to a `dubbing' or a `baptism'. The question is, therefore, what is the starting point of the chain? The answer is that storytellings are to be thought of as extended baptisms, and (...)
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  9. Massimiliano Vignolo (2009). Pleonastic Entities: Fictional Characters and Propositions. Philosophical Investigations 32 (1):65-78.score: 60.0
    Stephen Schiffer holds that propositions are pleonastic entities. I will argue that there is a substantial difference between propositions and fictional characters, which Schiffer presents as typical pleonastic entities. My conclusion will be that if fictional characters are typical pleonastic entities, then Schiffer fails to show that propositions are pleonastic entities.
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  10. Umberto Eco (2009). On the Ontology of Fictional Characters. Sign Systems Studies 37 (1-2):82-97.score: 60.0
    Why are we deeply moved by the misfortune of Anna Karenina if we are fully aware that she is simply a fictional character who does not exist in our world?But what does it mean that fictional characters do not exist? The present article is concerned with the ontology of fictional characters. The author concludes thatsuccessful fictional characters become paramount examples of the ‘real’ human condition because they live in an incomplete world what we (...)
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  11. Zsófia Zvolenszky, Abstract Artifact Theory About Fictional Characters Defended — Why Sainsbury’s Category-Mistake Objection is Mistaken. Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics Vol. 5/2013.score: 60.0
    In this paper, I explore a line of argument against one form of realism about fictional characters: abstract artifact theory (‘artifactualism’, for short), the view according to which fictional characters like Harry Potter are part of our reality, but (unlike concrete entities like the Big Ben and J. K. Rowling), they are abstract objects created by humans, akin to the institution of marriage and the game of soccer. I will defend artifactualism against an objection that Mark (...)
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  12. Bill Wringe (2008). Making the Lightness of Being Bearable: Arithmetical Platonism, Fictional Realism and Cognitive Command. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 453-487.score: 54.0
    In this paper I argue against Divers and Miller's 'Lightness of Being' objection to Hale and Wright's neo-Fregean Platonism. According to the 'Lightness of Being' objection, the neo-Fregean Platonist makes existence too cheap: the same principles which allow her to argue that numbers exist also allow her to claim that fictional objects exist. I claim that this is no objection at all" the neo-Fregean Platonist should think that fictional characters exist. However, the pluralist approach to truth developed (...)
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  13. Fiora Salis (2013). Fictional Names and the Problem of Intersubjective Identification. Dialectica 67 (3):283-301.score: 54.0
    The problem of intersubjective identification arises from the difficulties of explaining how our thoughts and discourse about fictional characters can be directed towards the same (or different) characters given the assumption that there are no fictional entities. In this paper I aim to offer a solution in terms of participation in a practice of thinking and talking about the same thing, which is inspired by Sainsbury's name-using practices. I will critically discuss a similar idea that was (...)
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  14. Robert Blanchet & Margrethe Bruun Vaage (2012). Don, Peggy, and Other Fictional Friends? Engaging with Characters in Television Series. Projections 6 (2):18-41.score: 53.0
    As the frequent use of metaphors like friendship or relationship in academic and colloquial discourse on serial television suggests, long-term narratives seem to add something to the spectator's engagement with fictional characters that is not fully captured by terms such as empathy and sympathy. Drawing on philosophical accounts of friendship and psychological theories on the formation of close relationships, this article clarifies in what respect the friendship metaphor is warranted. The article proposes several hypotheses that will enhance cognitive (...)
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  15. Terence Parsons (2011). Fictional Characters and Indeterminate Identity. In Franck Lihoreau (ed.), Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag. 38--27.score: 46.0
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  16. Iris Einheuser (2009). Some Remarks on “Language-Created Entities”. Acta Analytica 24 (3):185-192.score: 45.0
    Some entities, such as fictional characters, propositions, properties, events and numbers are prima facie promising candidates for owing their existence to our linguistic and conceptual practices. However, it is notoriously hard to pin down just what sets such allegedly “language-created” entities apart from ordinary entities. The present paper considers some of the features that are supposed to distinguish between entities of the two kinds and argues that, on an independently plausible account of what it takes to individuate objects, (...)
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  17. Francis W. Dauer (1995). The Nature of Fictional Characters and the Referential Fallacy. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53 (1):31-38.score: 45.0
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  18. Hanoch Ben-Yami (2010). Could Sherlock Holmes Have Existed? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):175-181.score: 45.0
    In Naming and Necessity Kripke argued against the possible existence of fictional characters. I show that his argument is invalid, analyze the confusion it involves, and explain why the view that fictional characters could not have existed is implausible.
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  19. Laurent Stern (1965). Fictional Characters, Places, and Events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (2):202-215.score: 45.0
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  20. Alec Hyslop (1986). Emotions and Fictional Characters. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (3):289 – 297.score: 45.0
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  21. Ira Newman (2009). Virtual People: Fictional Characters Through the Frames of Reality. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67 (1):73-82.score: 45.0
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  22. Zsófia Zvolenszky (2012). Against Sainsbury’s Irrealism About Fictional Characters: Harry Potter as an Abstract Artifact. Hungarian Philosophical Review (Magyar Filozófiai Szemle) (4):83-109.score: 45.0
  23. Carl Plantinga (2010). “I Followed the Rules, and They All Loved You More”: Moral Judgment and Attitudes Toward Fictional Characters in Film. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 34 (1):34-51.score: 45.0
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  24. Reina Hayaki (2011). Yagisawa on Trans-Indexical Individuals and Fictional Characters. Analytic Philosophy 52 (4):283-292.score: 45.0
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  25. David B. Suits (1994). Fictional Characters Are Just Like Us. Philosophy and Literature 18 (1):105-108.score: 45.0
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  26. Reina Hayaki (2009). Fictional Characters as Abstract Objects: Some Questions. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):141 - 149.score: 45.0
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  27. William Flesch (2010). What We Think About When We Think About Fictional Characters. Symploke 18 (1):327-332.score: 45.0
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  28. Peter Keating & Alberto Cambrosio (1997). Helpers and Suppressors: On Fictional Characters in Immunology. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Biology 30 (3):381 - 396.score: 45.0
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  29. Catherine Osborne (2009). Selves and Other Selves in Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics Vii 12. Ancient Philosophy 29 (2):349-371.score: 45.0
    Osborne argues against the idea that Aristotle thinks that friends are useful for assisting us towards self-knowledge, and defends instead the idea that friends provide an extension of the self which enables one to obtain a richer view of the shared world that we view together. She then examines similar questions about why the good person would gain from encountering fictional characters in literature, and what kinds of literature would be beneficial to the good life.
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  30. Edward Sankowski (forthcoming). Blame, Fictional Characters, and Morality. Journal of Aesthetic Education.score: 45.0
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  31. R. M. Sainsbury (2012). Of Course there are Fictional Characters. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4:615-630.score: 45.0
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  32. Ioan-Radu Motoarca (forthcoming). Fictional Surrogates. Philosophia:1-21.score: 42.0
    It is usually taken for granted, in discussions about fiction, that real things or events can occur as referents of fictional names (e.g. ‘Napoleon’ in War and Peace). In this paper, I take issue with this view, and provide several arguments to the effect that it is better to take the names in fiction to refer to fictional surrogates of real objects. Doing so allows us to solve a series of problems that arise on the reference-continuity view. I (...)
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  33. Peter van Inwagen (2000). Quantification and Fictional Discourse. In Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence.score: 40.0
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  34. Alberto Voltolini (2012). Crossworks ‘Identity’ and Intrawork* Identity of a Fictional Character. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 66:561-576.score: 36.0
    In this paper I want to show that the idea supporters of traditional creationism (TC) defend, that success of a fictional character across different works has to be accounted for in terms of the persistence of (numerically) one and the same fictional entity, is incorrect. For the supposedly commonsensical data on which those supporters claim their ideas rely are rather controversial. Once they are properly interpreted, they can rather be accommodated by moderate creationism (MC), according to which (...) characters arise out of a reflexive stance on a certain make-believe process. For MC, success of a fictional character across different works amounts to the fact that, first, different work-bound ficta are related with each other by means of a relation weaker than numerical identity, transfictional sameness, and second, that all those ficta are related by transfictional inclusion to a fictum that in some sense gather them all, the so-called general character. Since a general character is an abstract constructed entity, moreover, the more those particular ficta are generated, the more general fictional characters including all of them arise. (shrink)
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  35. Reina Hayaki (2009). Fictions Within Fictions. Philosophical Studies 146 (3):379 - 398.score: 36.0
    This paper examines the logic of fictions within fictions. I argue that consistently nested consistent fictions must have certain formal characteristics. The most important is that they form a tree structure. Depending on one’s theory of fictional objects, additional constraints may apply regarding the appearance of a fictional object in two or more fictional universes. The background motivation for the paper is to use iterated fiction operators as a tool for making sense of iterated modal operators; I (...)
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  36. David Conter (1991). Fictional Names and Narrating Characters. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (3):319 – 328.score: 36.0
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  37. Stavroula Glezakos (forthcoming). Truth and Reference in Fiction. In Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Routledge.score: 34.0
    Fiction is often characterized by way of a contrast with truth, as, for example, in the familiar couplet “Truth is always strange/ Stranger than fiction" (Byron 1824). And yet, those who would maintain that “we will always learn more about human life and human personality from novels than from scientific psychology” (Chomsky 1988: 159) hold that some truth is best encountered via fiction. The scrupulous novelist points out that her work depicts no actual person, either living or dead; nonetheless, we (...)
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  38. Gabriele Contessa (2012). Sweet Nothings. Analysis 72 (2):354-366.score: 31.0
    This paper is part of a book symposium on Jody Azzouni's Talking about Nothing: Numbers, Hallucinations, and Fictions.
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  39. Andrea Sauchelli (2012). Fictional Objects, Non-Existence, and the Principle of Characterization. Philosophical Studies 159 (1):139-146.score: 30.0
    I advance an objection to Graham Priest’s account of fictional entities as nonexistent objects. According to Priest, fictional characters do not have, in our world, the properties they are represented as having; for example, the property of being a bank clerk is possessed by Joseph K. not in our world but in other worlds. Priest claims that, in this way, his theory can include an unrestricted principle of characterization for objects. Now, some representational properties attributed to (...) characters, a kind of fictional entities, involve a crucial reference to the world in which they are supposed to be instantiated. I argue that these representational properties are problematic for Priest’s theory and that he cannot accept an unrestricted version of the principle of characterization. Thus, while not refuting Priest’s theory, I show that it is no better off than other Meinongian theories. (shrink)
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  40. Catherine Osborne (2006). Socrates in the Platonic Dialogues. Philosophical Investigations 29 (1):1–21.score: 30.0
    If Socrates is portrayed holding one view in one of Plato's dialogues and a different view in another, should we be puzzled? If (as I suggest) Plato's Socrates is neither the historical Socrates, nor a device for delivering Platonic doctrine, but a tool for the dialectical investigation of a philosophical problem, then we should expect a new Socrates, with relevant commitments, to be devised for each setting. Such a dialectical device – the tailor-made Socrates – fits with what we know (...)
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  41. Daniel Z. Korman (2014). The Vagueness Argument Against Abstract Artifacts. Philosophical Studies 167 (1):57-71.score: 30.0
  42. Nina Penner (2013). Opera Singing and Fictional Truth. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 71 (1):81-90.score: 27.0
    In this paper, I make two claims: an opera’s music, both vocal and instrumental, is part of the ontology of its fictional world, and song constitutes the normative mode of communication and expression in the fictional world. I refute Carolyn Abbate’s influential arguments that both of these claims are untrue. Abbate’s contention that opera characters do not have epistemic access to the music is based on false premises and gives rise to serious interpretive problems. My account of (...)
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  43. Aaron Smuts, Pleasurably Regarding the Pain of Fictional Others.score: 26.0
    Is it ever bad to take pleasure in the suffering of fictional characters? I think so. I attempt to show when and why. I begin with two powerful objections to my view: (1) engaging with fiction is akin to morally unproblematic autonomous fantasy, and (2) since no one is harmed, it is morally unproblematic. I reply to the objections and defend a Moorean view on the issue: It is intrinsically bad to enjoy evil, actual (past, present, or future) (...)
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  44. Shen-yi Liao & Sara Protasi (2013). The Fictional Character of Pornography. In Hans Maes (ed.), Pornographic Art and the Aesthetics of Pornography. Palgrave Macmillan. 100-118.score: 24.0
    We refine a line of feminist criticism of pornography that focuses on pornographic works' pernicious effects. A.W. Eaton argues that inegalitarian pornography should be criticized because it is responsible for its consumers’ adoption of inegalitarian attitudes toward sex in the same way that other fictions are responsible for changes in their consumers’ attitudes. We argue that her argument can be improved with the recognition that different fictions can have different modes of persuasion. This is true of film and television: a (...)
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  45. Tamar Szabó Gendler, Genuine Rational Fictional Emotions.score: 24.0
    Regarding certain fictional characters (and situations) F, it is simultaneously true that: (1) We have genuine and rational emotional responses towards F (2) We believe that F is purely fictional At the same time, it is also true that: (3) In order for us to have genuine and rational emotional responses towards a character (or situation), we must not believe that the character (or situation) is purely fictional.
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  46. Benjamin Schnieder & Tatjana von Solodkoff (2009). In Defence of Fictional Realism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):138-149.score: 24.0
    Fictional realism, i.e., the view that because fictions exist, fictional characters exist as well, has recently been accused of leading to inconsistency generated by phenomena of indeterminacy and inconsistency in fiction. We examine in detail four arguments against fictional realism, and present a version of fictional realism which can withstand those arguments.
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  47. Anthony Everett (2007). Pretense, Existence, and Fictional Objects. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):56–80.score: 24.0
    There has recently been considerable interest in accounts of fiction which treat fictional characters as abstract objects. In this paper I argue against this view. More precisely I argue that such accounts are unable to accommodate our intuitions that fictional negative existentials such as “Raskolnikov doesn’t exist” are true. I offer a general argument to this effect and then consider, but reject, some of the accounts of fictional negative existentials offered by abstract object theorists. I then (...)
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  48. Amie Thomasson, Fictional Entities.score: 24.0
    The first question to be addressed about fictional entities is: are there any? The usual grounds given for accepting or rejecting the view that there are fictional entities come from linguistic considerations. We make many different sorts of claims about fictional characters in our literary discussions. How can we account for their apparent truth? Does doing so require that we allow that there are fictional characters we can refer to, or can we offer equally (...)
     
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  49. Dan Haybron (1999). Evil Characters. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (2):131 - 148.score: 24.0
    In this paper I examine the psychological traits that can play a constitutive role in having an evil character, using a recent affect-based account by Colin McGinn as my starting point. I distinguish several such traits and defend the importance of both affect and action-based approaches. I then argue that someone who possesses these characteristics to the greatest possible extent—the purely evil individual—can actually be less depraved than one whose character is not so thoroughly penetrated by such traits. To illustrate (...)
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  50. Gerald Vision (1980). Fictional Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:45-59.score: 24.0
    Problems concerning identity in possible worlds and the view that proper names are rigid designators pose no threat to the doctrine that names of fictional characters (fictional names) are referential. Some philosophers, notably Saul Kripke and David Kaplan, have held otherwise; but a close examination of their arguments discovers fatal flaws in them. Furthermore, the most readily available proposals for the alternative functions of fictional names — that is, proposals in which fictional names are not (...)
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