Search results for 'Fictional Characters' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  43
    Zsófia Zvolenszky (2015). Inadvertent Creation and Fictional Characters. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (Supp. 1):169-184.
    In several papers, Petr Koťátko defends an “ontologically modest account of fictional characters”. Consider a position (which I have been defending) that is anything but ontologically restrained: positing fictional characters like Andrei Bolkonsky in War and Peace as abstract artifacts. I will argue, first, that such a position turns out to offer a nice fit with Petr Koťátko’s proposal about narrative fiction, one that fares better than an alternative pretense-based theory that doesn’t posit Bolkonsky as existing (...)
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  2. Stacie Friend (2007). Fictional Characters. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):141–156.
    If there are no fictional characters, how do we explain thought and discourse apparently about them? If there are, what are they like? A growing number of philosophers claim that fictional characters are abstract objects akin to novels or plots. They argue that postulating characters provides the most straightforward explanation of our literary practices as well as a uniform account of discourse and thought about fiction. Anti-realists counter that postulation is neither necessary nor straightforward, and (...)
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  3. Mark Sainsbury (2012). 'Of Course There Are Fictional Characters'. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4:615-40.
    There is no straightforward inference from there being fictional characters to any interesting form of realism. One reason is that “fictional” may be an intensional operator with wide scope, depriving the quantifier of its usual force. Another is that not all uses of “there are” are ontologically committing. A realist needs to show that neither of these phenomena are present in “There are fictional characters”. Other roads to realism run into difficulties when negotiating the role (...)
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  4.  7
    Zsófia Zvolenszky (2016). Fictional Characters, Mythical Objects, and the Phenomenon of Inadvertent Creation. Res Philosophica 93 (2):1-23.
    My goal is to reflect on the phenomenon of inadvertent creation and argue that—various objections to the contrary—it doesn’t undermine the view that fictional characters are abstract artifacts. My starting point is a recent challenge by Jeffrey Goodman that is originally posed for those who hold that fictional characters and mythical objects alike are abstract artifacts. The challenge: if we think that astronomers like Le Verrier, in mistakenly hypothesizing the planet Vulcan, inadvertently created an abstract artifact, (...)
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  5. Paisley Livingston & Andrea Sauchelli (2011). Philosophical Perspectives on Fictional Characters. New Literary History 42 (2):337-360.
    This paper takes up a series of basic philosophical questions about the nature and existence of fictional characters. We begin with realist approaches that hinge on the thesis that at least some claims about fictional characters can be right or wrong because they refer to something that exists, such as abstract objects. Irrealist approaches deny such realist postulations and hold instead that fictional characters are a figment of the human imagination. A third family of (...)
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  6. Amie L. Thomasson (2003). Speaking of Fictional Characters. Dialectica 57 (2):205–223.
    The challenge of handling fictional discourse is to find the best way to resolve the apparent inconsistencies in our ways of speaking about fiction. A promising approach is to take at least some such discourse to involve pretense, but does all fictional discourse involve pretense? I will argue that a better, less revisionary, solution is to take internal and fictionalizing discourse to involve pretense, while allowing that in external critical discourse, fictional names are used seriously to refer (...)
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  7. Amie L. Thomasson (2003). Fictional Characters and Literary Practices. British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (2):138-157.
    I argue that the ontological status of fictional characters is determined by the beliefs and practices of those who competently deal with works of literature, and draw out three important consequences of this. First, heavily revisionary theories cannot be considered as ‘discoveries’ about the ‘true nature’ of fictional characters; any acceptable realist theory of fiction must preserve all or most of the common conception of fictional characters. Second, once we note that the existence conditions (...)
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  8. Stuart Brock (2002). Fictionalism About Fictional Characters. Noûs 36 (1):1–21.
    Despite protestations to the contrary, philosophers have always been renowned for espousing theories that do violence to common-sense opinion. In the last twenty years or so there has been a growing number of philosophers keen to follow in this tradition. According to these philosophers, if a story of pure fic-tion tells us that an individual exists, then there really is such an individual. According to these realists about fictional characters, ‘Scarlett O’Hara,’ ‘Char-lie Brown,’ ‘Batman,’ ‘Superman,’ ‘Tweedledum’ and ‘Tweedledee’ (...)
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  9. Stuart Brock (2010). The Creationist Fiction: The Case Against Creationism About Fictional Characters. Philosophical Review 119 (3):337-364.
    This essay explains why creationism about fictional characters is an abject failure. Creationism about fictional characters is the view that fictional objects are created by the authors of the novels in which they first appear. This essay shows that, when the details of creationism are filled in, the hypothesis becomes far more puzzling than the linguistic data it is used to explain. No matter how the creationist identifies where, when and how fictional objects are (...)
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  10.  78
    Zsófia Zvolenszky, Abstract Artifact Theory About Fictional Characters Defended — Why Sainsbury’s Category-Mistake Objection is Mistaken. Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics Vol. 5/2013.
    In this paper, I explore a line of argument against one form of realism about fictional characters : abstract artifact theory, the view according to which fictional characters like Harry Potter are part of our reality, but, they are abstract objects created by humans, akin to the institution of marriage and the game of soccer. I will defend artifactualism against an objection that Mark Sainsbury considers decisive against it: the category-mistake objection. The objection has it that (...)
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  11.  77
    Umberto Eco (2009). On the Ontology of Fictional Characters. Sign Systems Studies 37 (1-2):82-97.
    Why are we deeply moved by the misfortune of Anna Karenina if we are fully aware that she is simply a fictional character who does not exist in our world?But what does it mean that fictional characters do not exist? The present article is concerned with the ontology of fictional characters. The author concludes thatsuccessful fictional characters become paramount examples of the ‘real’ human condition because they live in an incomplete world what we (...)
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  12. Edward N. Zalta (2003). Referring to Fictional Characters. Dialectica 57 (2):243–254.
    The author engages a question raised about theories of nonexistent objects. The question concerns the way names of fictional characters, when analyzed as names which denote nonexistent objects, acquire their denotations. Since nonexistent objects cannot causally interact with existent objects, it is thought that we cannot appeal to a `dubbing' or a `baptism'. The question is, therefore, what is the starting point of the chain? The answer is that storytellings are to be thought of as extended baptisms, and (...)
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  13.  28
    Reina Hayaki (2009). Fictional Characters as Abstract Objects: Some Questions. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):141 - 149.
    Sir Arthur Conan doyle wrote fifty-six short stories and four novels about Sherlock Holmes, collectively known as the Canon. The following are all true facts about the Canon: It is true according to the Canon that Sherlock Holmes is a detective. It is true according to the Canon that Queen Victoria hired a private consulting detective, gave him an emerald tiepin, and offered him a knighthood which he refused. The Canon is about Sherlock Holmes. The Canon is about a brilliant (...)
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  14.  47
    Massimiliano Vignolo (2009). Pleonastic Entities: Fictional Characters and Propositions. Philosophical Investigations 32 (1):65-78.
    Stephen Schiffer holds that propositions are pleonastic entities. I will argue that there is a substantial difference between propositions and fictional characters, which Schiffer presents as typical pleonastic entities. My conclusion will be that if fictional characters are typical pleonastic entities, then Schiffer fails to show that propositions are pleonastic entities.
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  15. Paisley Nathan Livingston & Andrea Sauchelli, Philosophical Perspectives on Fictional Characters.
    This paper takes up a series of basic philosophical questions about the nature and existence of fictional characters. We begin with realist approaches that hinge on the thesis that at least some claims about fictional characters can be right or wrong because they refer to something that exists, such as abstract objects. Irrealist approaches deny such realist postulations and hold instead that fictional characters are a figment of the human imagination. A third family of (...)
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  16. Zsófia Zvolenszky (2012). Against Sainsbury’s Irrealism About Fictional Characters: Harry Potter as an Abstract Artifact. Hungarian Philosophical Review (Magyar Filozófiai Szemle) (4):83-109.
  17.  6
    Stuart Brock (2016). Fictionalism About Fictional Characters Revisited. Res Philosophica 2 (93):1-27.
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  18.  22
    Min Xu (2015). The Creator-Determining Problem and Conjunctive Creationism About Fictional Characters. Dialogue 54 (3):455-468.
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  19.  86
    Laurent Stern (1965). Fictional Characters, Places, and Events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (2):202-215.
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  20. Terence Parsons (2011). Fictional Characters and Indeterminate Identity. In Franck Lihoreau (ed.), Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag 38--27.
     
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  21.  47
    Francis W. Dauer (1995). The Nature of Fictional Characters and the Referential Fallacy. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53 (1):31-38.
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  22.  28
    Alec Hyslop (1986). Emotions and Fictional Characters. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (3):289 – 297.
  23.  25
    Reina Hayaki (2011). Yagisawa on Trans-Indexical Individuals and Fictional Characters. Analytic Philosophy 52 (4):283-292.
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  24. Robert Blanchet & Margrethe Bruun Vaage (2012). Don, Peggy, and Other Fictional Friends? Engaging with Characters in Television Series. Projections 6 (2):18-41.
    As the frequent use of metaphors like friendship or relationship in academic and colloquial discourse on serial television suggests, long-term narratives seem to add something to the spectator's engagement with fictional characters that is not fully captured by terms such as empathy and sympathy. Drawing on philosophical accounts of friendship and psychological theories on the formation of close relationships, this article clarifies in what respect the friendship metaphor is warranted. The article proposes several hypotheses that will enhance cognitive (...)
     
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  25.  13
    William Flesch (2010). What We Think About When We Think About Fictional Characters. Symploke 18 (1):327-332.
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  26.  9
    R. M. Sainsbury (2012). Of Course there are Fictional Characters. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4:615-630.
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  27.  22
    Ira Newman (2009). Virtual People: Fictional Characters Through the Frames of Reality. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67 (1):73-82.
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  28.  21
    Carl Plantinga (2010). “I Followed the Rules, and They All Loved You More”: Moral Judgment and Attitudes Toward Fictional Characters in Film. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 34 (1):34-51.
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  29.  6
    Peter Keating & Alberto Cambrosio (1997). Helpers and Suppressors: On Fictional Characters in Immunology. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Biology 30 (3):381 - 396.
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  30.  2
    Edward Sankowski (1988). Blame, Fictional Characters, and Morality. Journal of Aesthetic Education 22 (3):49.
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  31.  7
    David B. Suits (1994). Fictional Characters Are Just Like Us. Philosophy and Literature 18 (1):105-108.
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  32.  1
    John Hospers (1980). Truth and Fictional Characters. Journal of Aesthetic Education 14 (3):5.
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  33. Garry L. Hagberg (ed.) (2016). Fictional Characters, Real Problems: The Search for Ethical Content in Literature. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Literature is a complex and multifaceted expression of our humanity, one dimension of which is ethical content. This striking collection of new essays pursues a fuller and richer understanding of five of the central aspects of this ethical content. These aspects are: the question of character, its formation, and its role in moral discernment; poetic vision in the context of ethical understanding; literature's distinctive role in self-identity and self-understanding; patterns of moral growth and change that emerge from the philosophical reading (...)
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  34. Dolf Rami (2015). Van Inwagen’s Argument for the Existence of Fictional Characters. An Evaluation and Critique. Metaphysica 16 (1).
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  35.  7
    Eleonora Orlando, Fictional Names and Literary Characters: A Defence of Abstractism.
    This paper is focused on the abstractist theory of fiction, namely, the semantic theory according to which fictional names refer to abstract entities. Two semantic problems that arise in relation to that position are analysed: the first is the problem of accounting for the intuitive truth of typically fictive uses of statements containing fictional names; the second is the one of explaining some problematic metafictive uses, in particular, the use of intuitively true negative existentials.
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  36.  80
    Brendan Murday (2015). Fictional Realism and Indeterminate Identity. Journal of Philosophical Research 40:205-225.
    Fictional realists hold that fictional characters are real entities. However, Anthony Everett [“Against Fictional Realism”, Journal of Philosophy (2005)] notes that some fictions leave it indeterminate whether character A is identical to character B, while other fictions depict A as simultaneously identical and distinct from B. Everett argues that these fictions commit the realist to indeterminate and impossible identity relations among actual entities, and that as such realism is untenable. This paper defends fictional realism: for (...)
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  37.  86
    Tatjana von Solodkoff (2014). Fictional Realism and Negative Existentials. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Genoveva Martí (eds.), Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence. Oxford University Press 333-352.
    In this paper I confront what I take to be the crucial challenge for fictional realism, i.e. the view that fictional characters exist. This is the problem of accounting for the intuition that corresponding negative existentials such as ‘Sherlock Holmes does not exist’ are true (when, given fictional realism, taken literally they seem false). I advance a novel and detailed form of the response according to which we take them to mean variants of such claims as: (...)
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  38.  31
    Fiora Salis (2013). Fictional Names and the Problem of Intersubjective Identification. Dialectica 67 (3):283-301.
    The problem of intersubjective identification arises from the difficulties of explaining how our thoughts and discourse about fictional characters can be directed towards the same (or different) characters given the assumption that there are no fictional entities. In this paper I aim to offer a solution in terms of participation in a practice of thinking and talking about the same thing, which is inspired by Sainsbury's name-using practices. I will critically discuss a similar idea that was (...)
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  39.  39
    David Conter (1991). Fictional Names and Narrating Characters. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (3):319 – 328.
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  40.  30
    Bill Wringe (2008). Making the Lightness of Being Bearable: Arithmetical Platonism, Fictional Realism and Cognitive Command. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 453-487.
    In this paper I argue against Divers and Miller's 'Lightness of Being' objection to Hale and Wright's neo-Fregean Platonism. According to the 'Lightness of Being' objection, the neo-Fregean Platonist makes existence too cheap: the same principles which allow her to argue that numbers exist also allow her to claim that fictional objects exist. I claim that this is no objection at all" the neo-Fregean Platonist should think that fictional characters exist. However, the pluralist approach to truth developed (...)
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  41.  19
    Ioan-Radu Motoarca (2014). Fictional Surrogates. Philosophia 42 (4):1033-1053.
    It is usually taken for granted, in discussions about fiction, that real things or events can occur as referents of fictional names . In this paper, I take issue with this view, and provide several arguments to the effect that it is better to take the names in fiction to refer to fictional surrogates of real objects. Doing so allows us to solve a series of problems that arise on the reference-continuity view. I also show that the arguments (...)
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  42.  40
    Zsófia Zvolenszky (2015). An Argument for Authorial Creation. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (4):461–487.
    Artifactualism about fictional characters, positing Harry Potter as an abstract artifact created by J. K. Rowling, has been criticized on the grounds that the idea of creating such objects is mysterious and problematic. In the light of such qualms, it is worth homing in on an argument in favor of artifactualism, showing that it is the best way to include the likes of Harry Potter in our ontology precisely because it incorporates authorial creation. To that end, I will (...)
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  43.  9
    David Friedell (2016). Abstract Creationism and Authorial Intention. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74 (2):129-137.
    creationism about fictional characters is the view that fictional characters are abstract objects that authors create. I defend this view against criticisms from Stuart Brock that hitherto have not been adequately countered. The discussion sheds light on how the number of fictional characters depends on authorial intention. I conclude also that we should change how we think intentions are connected to artifacts more generally, both abstract and concrete.
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  44.  69
    Daniel Z. Korman (2014). The Vagueness Argument Against Abstract Artifacts. Philosophical Studies 167 (1):57-71.
    Words, languages, symphonies, fictional characters, games, and recipes are plausibly abstract artifacts— entities that have no spatial location and that are deliberately brought into existence as a result of creative acts. Many accept that composition is unrestricted: for every plurality of material objects, there is a material object that is the sum of those objects. These two views may seem entirely unrelated. I will argue that the most influential argument against restricted composition—the vagueness argument—doubles as an argument that (...)
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  45.  67
    David Sackris (2013). A Defense of Causal Creationism in Fiction. Philosophical Writings 41 (1):32-46.
    In this paper I seek defend the view that fictional characters are author-created abstract entities against objections offered by Stuart Brock in his paper “The Creationist Fiction: The Case against Creationism about Fictional Characters.” I argue that his objections fall far short of his goal of showing that if philosophers want to believe in fictional characters as abstract objects, they should not view them as author-created. My defense of creationism in fiction in part rests (...)
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  46.  7
    David C. Spewak Jr (2016). A Modulation Account of Negative Existentials. Philosophia 44 (1):227-245.
    Fictional characters present a problem for semantic theorists. One approach to this problem has been to maintain realism regarding fictional characters, that is to claim that fictional characters exist. In this way names originating from fiction have designata. On this approach the problem of negative existentials is more pressing than it might otherwise be since an explanation must be given as to why we judge them true when the names occurring within them designate existing (...)
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  47.  54
    Hanoch Ben-Yami (2010). Could Sherlock Holmes Have Existed? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):175-181.
    In Naming and Necessity Kripke argued against the possible existence of fictional characters. I show that his argument is invalid, analyze the confusion it involves, and explain why the view that fictional characters could not have existed is implausible.
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  48. Wesley D. Cray (forthcoming). Abstract Generationism: A Response to Friedell. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.
    David Friedell has recently raised questions about the relation between authorial intentions and the creation of abstract artifacts, such as fictional characters. Here, I discuss how, by distinguishing different ways in which authors might generate fictional characters, we can make progress toward answering such questions.
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  49.  73
    Iris Einheuser (2009). Some Remarks on “Language-Created Entities”. Acta Analytica 24 (3):185-192.
    Some entities, such as fictional characters, propositions, properties, events and numbers are prima facie promising candidates for owing their existence to our linguistic and conceptual practices. However, it is notoriously hard to pin down just what sets such allegedly “language-created” entities apart from ordinary entities. The present paper considers some of the features that are supposed to distinguish between entities of the two kinds and argues that, on an independently plausible account of what it takes to individuate objects, (...)
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  50. Peter van Inwagen (2000). Quantification and Fictional Discourse. In Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence.
     
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