Search results for 'Fictional names' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Fiora Salis (2013). Fictional Names and the Problem of Intersubjective Identification. Dialectica 67 (3):283-301.score: 222.0
    The problem of intersubjective identification arises from the difficulties of explaining how our thoughts and discourse about fictional characters can be directed towards the same (or different) characters given the assumption that there are no fictional entities. In this paper I aim to offer a solution in terms of participation in a practice of thinking and talking about the same thing, which is inspired by Sainsbury's name-using practices. I will critically discuss a similar idea that was put forward (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Heidi Tiedke (2011). Proper Names and Their Fictional Uses. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):707 - 726.score: 210.0
    Fictional names present unique challenges for semantic theories of proper names, challenges strong enough to warrant an account of names different from the standard treatment. The theory developed in this paper is motivated by a puzzle that depends on four assumptions: our intuitive assessment of the truth values of certain sentences, the most straightforward treatment of their syntactic structure, semantic compositionality, and metaphysical scruples strong enough to rule out fictional entities, at least. It is shown (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. David Braun (2005). Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names. Noûs 39 (4):596–631.score: 180.0
    John Stuart Mill (1843) thought that proper names denote individuals and do not connote attributes. Contemporary Millians agree, in spirit. We hold that the semantic content of a proper name is simply its referent. We also think that the semantic content of a declarative sentence is a Russellian structured proposition whose constituents are the semantic contents of the sentence’s constituents. This proposition is what the sentence semantically expresses. Therefore, we think that sentences containing proper names semantically express singular (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Peter Alward (2011). Description, Disagreement, and Fictional Names. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):423-448.score: 180.0
    In this paper, a theory of the contents of fictional namesnames of fictional people, places, etc. — will be developed.1 The fundamental datum that must be addressed by such a theory is that fictional names are, in an important sense, empty: the entities to which they putatively refer do not exist.2 Nevertheless, they make substantial contributions to the truth conditions of sentences in which they occur. Not only do such sentences have truth (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Eleonora Orlando (2008). Fictional Names Without Fictional Objects (Ficción Sin Metafísica). Critica 40 (120):111 - 127.score: 180.0
    In this paper, I criticize Mark Sainsbury's proposal concerning the semantic analysis of fictional discourse, as it has been put forward in chapter 6 of his Reference without Referents. His main thesis is that fictional names do not refer, and hence statements containing them are genuinely false and must be interpreted in terms of true paraphrases, arrived at on a case-by-case basis. In my opinion, the proposal has a problem derived from the fact that the relation between (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Fred Adams, Gary Fuller & Robert Stecker (1997). The Semantics of Fictional Names. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (2):128–148.score: 162.0
    In this paper we defend a direct reference theory of names. We maintain that the meaning of a name is its bearer. In the case of vacuous names, there is no bearer and they have no meaning. We develop a unified theory of names such that one theory applies to names whether they occur within or outside fiction. Hence, we apply our theory to sentences containing names within fiction, sentences about fiction or sentences making comparisons (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. R. M. Sainsbury (1999). Names, Fictional Names, and 'Really': R.M. Sainsbury. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):243–269.score: 162.0
    [R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. David Wiggins (1999). Names, Fictional Names and 'Really': David Wiggins. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):271–286.score: 162.0
    [R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Gregory Currie (1988). Fictional Names. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (4):471 – 488.score: 150.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. David Conter (1991). Fictional Names and Narrating Characters. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (3):319 – 328.score: 150.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. William G. Lycan (2006). Berger on Fictional Names. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):650 - 655.score: 150.0
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Robert M. Martin & Peter K. Schotch (1974). The Meaning of Fictional Names. Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6):377 - 388.score: 150.0
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Roger Lamb (1990). Currie on Fictional Names. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):113 – 115.score: 150.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. James D. Carney (1977). Fictional Names. Philosophical Studies 32 (4):383 - 391.score: 150.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. David Braun (2005). Empty Names, Mythical Names, Fictional Names. Noûs 39:596-631.score: 150.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Saul A. Kripke (2011). Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities. In , Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I. Oxford University Press.score: 120.0
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Fiora Salis (2010). Fictional Reports. Theoria 25 (2):175-185.score: 120.0
    Against standard descriptivist and referentialist semantics for fictional reports, I will defend a view according to which fictional names do not refer yet they can be distinguished from one another by virtue of their different name-using practices. The logical structures of sentences containing fictional names inherit these distinctions. Different interpretations follow.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Paolo Leonardi (2003). Names and Illusions. Dialectica 57 (2):165–176.score: 120.0
    Here, I defend the view that fictional narratives are illusionary and that fictional names are to be accounted metalinguistically, a blend of Walton’s and Donnellan’s theories. Besides, I offer a remedial semantic for sentences external to the story which connects those uses back to the text of the story and to the neighborhood of its retellings.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Mark Textor (2011). Sense-Only-Signs: Frege on Fictional Proper Names. Grazer Philosophische Studien 82 (1):375-400.score: 120.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Luke Manning (2014). Real Representation of Fictional Objects. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Cricitism 72 (1):13-24.score: 114.0
    Assuming there are fictional objects, what sorts of properties do they have? Intuitively, most of their properties involve being represented—appearing in works of fiction, being depicted as clever, being portrayed by actors, being admired or feared, and so on. But several philosophers, including Saul Kripke, Peter van Inwagen, Kendall Walton, and Amie Thomasson, argue that even if there are fictional objects, they are not really represented in some or all of these cases. I reconstruct four kinds of arguments (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Anna Bjurman Pautz (2008). Fictional Coreference as a Problem for the Pretense Theory. Philosophical Studies 141 (2):147 - 156.score: 102.0
    There seems to be a perfectly ordinary sense in which different speakers can use an empty name to talk about the same thing. Call this fictional coreference. It is a constraint on an adequate theory of empty names that it provide a satisfactory account of fictional coreference. The main claim of this paper is that the pretense theory of empty names does not respect this constraint.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Heidi Savage, Literal Truth and the Habits of Sherlock Holmes.score: 86.0
    Because names from fiction, names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’, fail to refer, and because it has been supposed that all simple predicative sentences including a sentence like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ will be true if and only if the referent of the name has the property encoded by the predicate, many philosophers have denied that the sentence or an utterance of the sentence ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ could be true, or at least, it cannot be true taken at face value. Despite (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Heidi Savage, Kypris, Aphrodite, and Venus: Another Puzzle About Belief.score: 86.0
    My aim in this paper is to show that the existence of empty names raise problems for the Millian that go beyond the traditional problems of accounting for their meanings. Specifically, they have implications for Millian strategies for dealing with puzzles about belief. The standard move of positing a referent for a fictional name to avoid the problem of meaning, because of its distinctly Millian motivation, implies that solving puzzles about belief, when they involve empty names, do (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Stacie Friend (2011). The Great Beetle Debate: A Study in Imagining with Names. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):183-211.score: 78.0
    Statements about fictional characters, such as “Gregor Samsa has been changed into a beetle,” pose the problem of how we can say something true (or false) using empty names. I propose an original solution to this problem that construes such utterances as reports of the “prescriptions to imagine” generated by works of fiction. In particular, I argue that we should construe these utterances as specifying, not what we are supposed to imagine—the propositional object of the imagining—but how we (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. David Sackris (2013). A Defense of Causal Creationism in Fiction. Philosophical Writings 41 (1):32-46.score: 76.0
    In this paper I seek defend the view that fictional characters are author-created abstract entities against objections offered by Stuart Brock in his paper “The Creationist Fiction: The Case against Creationism about Fictional Characters.” I argue that his objections fall far short of his goal of showing that if philosophers want to believe in fictional characters as abstract objects, they should not view them as author-created. My defense of creationism in fiction in part rests on tying the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Heidi Savage, Four Problems with Empty Names.score: 72.0
    Empty names vary in their referential features. Some of them, as Kripke argues, are necessarily empty -- those that are used to create works of fiction. Others appear to be contingently empty -- those which fail to refer at this world, but which do uniquely identify particular objects in other possible worlds. I argue against Kripke's metaphysical and semantic reasons for thinking that either some or all empty names are necessarily non-referring, because these reasons are either not the (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Ioan-Radu Motoarca (forthcoming). Fictional Surrogates. Philosophia:1-21.score: 72.0
    It is usually taken for granted, in discussions about fiction, that real things or events can occur as referents of fictional names (e.g. ‘Napoleon’ in War and Peace). In this paper, I take issue with this view, and provide several arguments to the effect that it is better to take the names in fiction to refer to fictional surrogates of real objects. Doing so allows us to solve a series of problems that arise on the reference-continuity (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Amie L. Thomasson (2003). Speaking of Fictional Characters. Dialectica 57 (2):205–223.score: 60.0
    The challenge of handling fictional discourse is to find the best way to resolve the apparent inconsistencies in our ways of speaking about fiction. A promising approach is to take at least some such discourse to involve pretense, but does all fictional discourse involve pretense? I will argue that a better, less revisionary, solution is to take internal and fictionalizing discourse to involve pretense, while allowing that in external critical discourse, fictional names are used seriously to (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Gerald Vision (1980). Fictional Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:45-59.score: 60.0
    Problems concerning identity in possible worlds and the view that proper names are rigid designators pose no threat to the doctrine that names of fictional characters (fictional names) are referential. Some philosophers, notably Saul Kripke and David Kaplan, have held otherwise; but a close examination of their arguments discovers fatal flaws in them. Furthermore, the most readily available proposals for the alternative functions of fictional names — that is, proposals in which fictional (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Alberto Voltolini (2014). Fiction and Indexinames. Journal of Literary Theory 8:293–322.score: 58.0
    In this paper, I will first of all claim that once one takes proper names as indexicals of a particular sort, indexinames for short, one may account for some tensions that affect our desiderata regarding the use of such names in sentences directly or indirectly involving fiction. According to my proposal, a proper name “N.N.” is an indexical whose character is roughly expressed by the description “the individual called ‘N.N.’ (in context)”, where this description means “the individual one’s (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Stuart Brock (2002). Fictionalism About Fictional Characters. Noûs 36 (1):1–21.score: 54.0
    Despite protestations to the contrary, philosophers have always been renowned for espousing theories that do violence to common-sense opinion. In the last twenty years or so there has been a growing number of philosophers keen to follow in this tradition. According to these philosophers, if a story of pure fic-tion tells us that an individual exists, then there really is such an individual. According to these realists about fictional characters, ‘Scarlett O’Hara,’ ‘Char-lie Brown,’ ‘Batman,’ ‘Superman,’ ‘Tweedledum’ and ‘Tweedledee’ are (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Edward N. Zalta (2003). Referring to Fictional Characters. Dialectica 57 (2):243–254.score: 54.0
    The author engages a question raised about theories of nonexistent objects. The question concerns the way names of fictional characters, when analyzed as names which denote nonexistent objects, acquire their denotations. Since nonexistent objects cannot causally interact with existent objects, it is thought that we cannot appeal to a `dubbing' or a `baptism'. The question is, therefore, what is the starting point of the chain? The answer is that storytellings are to be thought of as extended baptisms, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Alberto Voltolini (2007). Names for Ficta, for Intentionalia, and for Nothing. In María José Frápolli (ed.), Saying, Meaning and Referring: Essays on François Recanati's Philosophy of Language. Palgrave Macmillan. 183-197.score: 54.0
    In his Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta, Recanati maintains two main theses regarding meta-representational sentences embedding allegedly empty proper names. The first thesis concerns both belief sentences embedding allegedly empty names and (internal) meta-fictional sentences (i.e., sentences of the form “in the story S, p”) embedding fictional, hence again allegedly empty, names. It says that such sentences primarily have fictive truth-conditions: that is, conditions for their fictional truth. The second thesis is that a fictive ascription (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Peter van Inwagen (2000). Quantification and Fictional Discourse. In Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence.score: 54.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Stefano Predelli (2002). 'Holmes'and Holmes—a Millian Analysis of Names From Fiction. Dialectica 56 (3):261–279.score: 50.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Rod Bertolet (1984). Inferences, Names, and Fictions. Synthese 58 (2):203 - 218.score: 50.0
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. T. Hofweber & A. Everett (eds.) (2000). Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence. CSLI Publications.score: 50.0
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Peter van Inwagen (2000). Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence.score: 50.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Saul A. Kripke (2013). Reference and Existence. The John Locke Lectures. Oxford University Press.score: 48.0
    Reference and Existence, Saul Kripke's John Locke Lectures for 1973, can be read as a sequel to his classic Naming and Necessity. It confronts important issues left open in that work -- among them, the semantics of proper names and natural kind terms as they occur in fiction and in myth; negative existential statements; the ontology of fiction and myth (whether it is true that fictional characters like Hamlet, or mythical kinds like bandersnatches, might have existed). In treating (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Jeffrey Goodman (2004). A Defense of Creationism in Fiction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1):131-155.score: 40.0
    Creationism is the conjunction of the following theses: (i) fictional individuals (e.g. Sherlock Holmes) actually exist; (ii) fictional names (e.g., 'Holmes') are at least sometimes genuinely referential; (iii) fictional individuals are the creations of the authors who first wrote (or spoke, etc.) about them. CA Creationism is the conjunction of (i) - (iii) and the following thesis: (iv) fictional individuals are contingently existing abstracta; they are non-concrete artifacts of our world and various other possible worlds. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Eros Corazza & Mark Whitsey (2003). Indexicals, Fictions, and Ficta. Dialectica 57 (2):121–136.score: 40.0
    We defend the view that an indexical uttered by an actor works on the model of deferred reference. If it defers to a character which does not exist, it is an empty term, just as ‘Hamlet’ and ‘Ophelia’ are. The utterance in which it appears does not express a proposition and thus lacks a truth value. We advocate an ontologically parsimonious, anti-realist, position. We show how the notion of truth in our use and understanding of indexicals (and fictional (...)) as they appear within a fiction is not a central issue. We claim that our use and understanding of indexicals (and names) rests on the fact that their cognitive contribution is not exhausted by their semantic contribution. (shrink)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Eros Corazza & Mark Jago (2003). Indexicals, Fictions, and Ficta. Dialectica 52 (2):121-136.score: 40.0
    We defend the view that an indexical uttered by an actor works on the model of deferred reference. If it defers to a character which does not exist, it is an empty term, just as ‘Hamlet’ and ‘Ophelia’ are. The utterance in which it appears does not express a proposition and thus lacks a truth value. We advocate an ontologically parsimonious, anti-realist, position. We show how the notion of truth in our use and understanding of indexicals (and fictional (...)) as they appear within a fiction is not a central issue. We claim that our use and understanding of indexicals (and names) rests on the fact that their cognitive contribution is not exhausted by their semantic contribution. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. John Woods, Fiction Preface.score: 40.0
    The logic of fiction has been a stand-alone research programme only since the early 1970s.1 It is a fair question as to why in the first place fictional discourse would have drawn the interest of professional logicians. It is a question admitting of different answers. One is that, since fictional names are “empty”, fiction is a primary datum for any logician seeking a suitably comprehensive logic of denotation. Another answer arises from the so-called incompleteness problem, exemplified by (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Peter Alward, Reading, Writing, and Speech Act Theory: Prolegomena to Any Future Logic of Fiction.score: 40.0
    meaning of a proper name is simply its referent.[1] This thesis, however, brings with it a whole host of problems. One particularly thorny difficulty is that of negative existentials, sentences of the form ‘N does not exist’ (where ‘N’ is a proper name). Intuitively, some such sentences are true, but the direct reference theory seems to imply that they must be either false or meaningless. After all, if the meaning of a name is just its referent, then a sentence such (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Timothy C. Wong (forthcoming). The Name" Lao Ts' an" in Liu E's Fiction. Journal of the American Oriental Society.score: 40.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Francesco Berto (2008). Modal Meinongianism for Fictional Objects. Metaphysica 9 (2):205-218.score: 38.0
    Drawing on different suggestions from the literature, we outline a unified metaphysical framework, labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM), combining Meinongian themes with a non-standard modal ontology. The MMM approach is based on (1) a comprehension principle (CP) for objects in unrestricted, but qualified form, and (2) the employment of an ontology of impossible worlds, besides possible ones. In §§1–2, we introduce the classical Meinongian metaphysics and consider two famous Russellian criticisms, namely (a) the charge of inconsistency and (b) the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Saul A. Kripke (ed.) (2011). Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I. Oxford University Press.score: 36.0
    This important new book is the first of a series of volumes collecting essential work by an influential philosopher. It presents a mixture of published and unpublished works from various stages of Kripke's storied career. Included here are seminal and much discussed pieces such as “Identity and Necessity,” “Outline of a Theory of Truth,” and “A Puzzle About Belief.” More recent published work include “Russell's Notion of Scope” and “Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference” among others. Several of the works (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Alberto Voltolini (2011). How Creationism Supports for Kripke’s Vichianism on Fiction. In F. Lihoreau (ed.), Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag. 38--93.score: 36.0
    In this paper, I want to show that a reasonable thesis on truth in fiction, Fictional Vichianism (FV)—according to which fictional truths are true because they are stipulated to be true—can be positively endorsed if one grounds Kripke’s justification for (FV), that traces back to the idea that names used in fiction never refer to concrete real individuals, into a creationist position on fictional entities that allows for a distinction between the pretending and the characterizing use (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Alberto Voltolini (2013). Contexts, Fiction and Truth. In A. Capone, M. Carapezza & F. Lo Piparo (eds.), Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy. Springer. 489-500.score: 36.0
    In this paper I want to hold that contextualism – the position according to which wide context, i.e., the concrete situation of discourse, may well have the semantic role of assigning truth-conditions to sentences – may well accommodate (along with some nowadays established theses about the semantics of proper names) three data about fiction, namely, the facts that as far as discourse involving fiction is concerned, i) sentences about nothing are meaningful ii) they may be true in fiction iii) (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Stavroula Glezakos (forthcoming). Truth and Reference in Fiction. In Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Routledge.score: 34.0
    Fiction is often characterized by way of a contrast with truth, as, for example, in the familiar couplet “Truth is always strange/ Stranger than fiction" (Byron 1824). And yet, those who would maintain that “we will always learn more about human life and human personality from novels than from scientific psychology” (Chomsky 1988: 159) hold that some truth is best encountered via fiction. The scrupulous novelist points out that her work depicts no actual person, either living or dead; nonetheless, we (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000