Search results for 'Fictional names' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  27
    Emar Maier, Fictional Names in Psychologistic Semantics.
    Fictional names pose a difficult puzzle for semantics. We can truthfully maintain that Frodo is a hobbit, while at the same time admitting that Frodo does not exist. To reconcile this paradox I propose a way to formalize the interpretation of fiction as ‘prescriptions to imagine’ (Walton 1990) within an asymmetric semantic framework in the style of Kamp (1990). In my proposal, fictional statements are analyzed as dynamic updates on an imagination component of the interpreter’s mental state, (...)
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  2.  32
    Fiora Salis (2013). Fictional Names and the Problem of Intersubjective Identification. Dialectica 67 (3):283-301.
    The problem of intersubjective identification arises from the difficulties of explaining how our thoughts and discourse about fictional characters can be directed towards the same (or different) characters given the assumption that there are no fictional entities. In this paper I aim to offer a solution in terms of participation in a practice of thinking and talking about the same thing, which is inspired by Sainsbury's name-using practices. I will critically discuss a similar idea that was put forward (...)
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  3. Heidi Tiedke (2011). Proper Names and Their Fictional Uses. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):707 - 726.
    Fictional names present unique challenges for semantic theories of proper names, challenges strong enough to warrant an account of names different from the standard treatment. The theory developed in this paper is motivated by a puzzle that depends on four assumptions: our intuitive assessment of the truth values of certain sentences, the most straightforward treatment of their syntactic structure, semantic compositionality, and metaphysical scruples strong enough to rule out fictional entities, at least. It is shown (...)
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  4. David Braun (2005). Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names. Noûs 39 (4):596–631.
    John Stuart Mill (1843) thought that proper names denote individuals and do not connote attributes. Contemporary Millians agree, in spirit. We hold that the semantic content of a proper name is simply its referent. We also think that the semantic content of a declarative sentence is a Russellian structured proposition whose constituents are the semantic contents of the sentence’s constituents. This proposition is what the sentence semantically expresses. Therefore, we think that sentences containing proper names semantically express singular (...)
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  5.  8
    Eleonora Orlando, Fictional Names and Literary Characters: A Defence of Abstractism.
    This paper is focused on the abstractist theory of fiction, namely, the semantic theory according to which fictional names refer to abstract entities. Two semantic problems that arise in relation to that position are analysed: the first is the problem of accounting for the intuitive truth of typically fictive uses of statements containing fictional names; the second is the one of explaining some problematic metafictive uses, in particular, the use of intuitively true negative existentials.
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  6.  67
    Peter Alward (2011). Description, Disagreement, and Fictional Names. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):423-448.
    In this paper, a theory of the contents of fictional namesnames of fictional people, places, etc. — will be developed.1 The fundamental datum that must be addressed by such a theory is that fictional names are, in an important sense, empty: the entities to which they putatively refer do not exist.2 Nevertheless, they make substantial contributions to the truth conditions of sentences in which they occur. Not only do such sentences have truth (...)
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  7. Daniel Asher Krasner (2001). Reference and Fictional Names. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    Philosophical accounts of the semantics of fiction have tended to be problematic in one of two ways: either they have denied that items used in fictional discourse have their plain meaning, introducing complications into otherwise satisfactory accounts of semantics, or they have posited special kinds of entities, introducing complications into otherwise satisfactory accounts of ontology. Accounts that tried to avoid these problems by positing mere possibilia as fictional entities were thought to be hopeless inasmuch as it was thought (...)
     
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  8.  25
    Eleonora Orlando (2008). Fictional Names Without Fictional Objects (Ficción Sin Metafísica). Critica 40 (120):111 - 127.
    In this paper, I criticize Mark Sainsbury's proposal concerning the semantic analysis of fictional discourse, as it has been put forward in chapter 6 of his Reference without Referents. His main thesis is that fictional names do not refer, and hence statements containing them are genuinely false and must be interpreted in terms of true paraphrases, arrived at on a case-by-case basis. In my opinion, the proposal has a problem derived from the fact that the relation between (...)
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  9. Fred Adams, Gary Fuller & Robert Stecker (1997). The Semantics of Fictional Names. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (2):128–148.
    In this paper we defend a direct reference theory of names. We maintain that the meaning of a name is its bearer. In the case of vacuous names, there is no bearer and they have no meaning. We develop a unified theory of names such that one theory applies to names whether they occur within or outside fiction. Hence, we apply our theory to sentences containing names within fiction, sentences about fiction or sentences making comparisons (...)
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  10.  57
    R. M. Sainsbury (1999). Names, Fictional Names, and 'Really'. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):243–269.
    [R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans (...)
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  11.  46
    David Wiggins (1999). Names, Fictional Names and 'Really': David Wiggins. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):271–286.
    [R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans (...)
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  12.  75
    Gregory Currie (1988). Fictional Names. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (4):471 – 488.
  13. Brendan Murday (2011). Two-Dimensionalism and Fictional Names. In Franck Lihoreau (ed.), Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag 43-76.
    For those who endorse Millianism and take ‘Sherlock Holmes’ to be an empty name, the sentence ‘Sherlock Holmes is clever’ may not count as expressing a complete proposition. The sentence ‘According to the fiction, Sherlock Holmes is clever’, however, should count as expressing a true proposition. I attempt to reconcile these two intuitions by arguing that ‘According to the fiction’ is a two-dimensional operator: to evaluate a statement of the form ‘According to the fiction, S’ at world @ (where @ (...)
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  14.  35
    Robert M. Martin & Peter K. Schotch (1974). The Meaning of Fictional Names. Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6):377 - 388.
  15.  40
    David Conter (1991). Fictional Names and Narrating Characters. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (3):319 – 328.
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  16.  15
    James D. Carney (1977). Fictional Names. Philosophical Studies 32 (4):383 - 391.
  17.  22
    William G. Lycan (2006). Berger on Fictional Names. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):650 - 655.
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  18.  17
    Roger Lamb (1990). Currie on Fictional Names. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):113 – 115.
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  19. Amie Thomasson (1993). The Reference of Fictional Names. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):3-12.
     
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  20. Saul A. Kripke (2011). Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities. In Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I. Oxford University Press
  21.  54
    Fiora Salis (2010). Fictional Reports. Theoria 25 (2):175-185.
    Against standard descriptivist and referentialist semantics for fictional reports, I will defend a view according to which fictional names do not refer yet they can be distinguished from one another in virtue of their different name-using practices. The logical structures of sentences containing fictional names inherit these distinctions. Different interpretations follow.
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  22.  6
    Mark Textor (2011). Sense-Only-Signs: Frege on Fictional Proper Names. Grazer Philosophische Studien 82 (1):375-400.
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  23.  8
    Paolo Leonardi (2003). Names and Illusions. Dialectica 57 (2):165–176.
    Here, I defend the view that fictional narratives are illusionary and that fictional names are to be accounted metalinguistically, a blend of Walton’s and Donnellan’s theories. Besides, I offer a remedial semantic for sentences external to the story which connects those uses back to the text of the story and to the neighborhood of its retellings.
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  24.  15
    Luke Manning (2014). Real Representation of Fictional Objects. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Cricitism 72 (1):13-24.
    Assuming there are fictional objects, what sorts of properties do they have? Intuitively, most of their properties involve being represented—appearing in works of fiction, being depicted as clever, being portrayed by actors, being admired or feared, and so on. But several philosophers, including Saul Kripke, Peter van Inwagen, Kendall Walton, and Amie Thomasson, argue that even if there are fictional objects, they are not really represented in some or all of these cases. I reconstruct four kinds of arguments (...)
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  25.  94
    Anna Bjurman Pautz (2008). Fictional Coreference as a Problem for the Pretense Theory. Philosophical Studies 141 (2):147 - 156.
    There seems to be a perfectly ordinary sense in which different speakers can use an empty name to talk about the same thing. Call this fictional coreference. It is a constraint on an adequate theory of empty names that it provide a satisfactory account of fictional coreference. The main claim of this paper is that the pretense theory of empty names does not respect this constraint.
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  26.  3
    Eleonora Orlando (forthcoming). Files for Fiction. Acta Analytica:1-17.
    In this essay, I appeal to the mental file approach in order to give an anti-realist semantic analysis of statements containing fictional names. I claim that fictive and parafictive uses of them express conceptual, though not general, propositions constituted by mental files, anchored in the conceptual world of the corresponding fictional story. Moreover, by positing a referential shift determined by the presence of a simulative referential intention characteristic of those uses, it is possible to take them to (...)
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  27. Heidi Savage, The Truth and Nothing but the Truth: The Habits of Sherlock Holmes.
    If names from fiction, names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’, fail to refer, and if all simple predicative sentences including a sentence like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ are true if and only if the referent of the name has the property encoded by the predicate, then ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ could not be literally true -- call this “non-literalism” about fictional discourse. Still, natural language speakers engage in sensible conversations using these kinds of sentences, and convey information to one another in (...)
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  28. Heidi Savage, Kypris, Aphrodite, and Venus: Another Puzzle About Belief.
    My aim in this paper is to show that the existence of empty names raise problems for the Millian that go beyond the traditional problems of accounting for their meanings. Specifically, they have implications for Millian strategies for dealing with puzzles about belief. The standard move of positing a referent for a fictional name to avoid the problem of meaning, because of its distinctly Millian motivation, implies that solving puzzles about belief, when they involve empty names, do (...)
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  29.  9
    Zsófia Zvolenszky (2016). Fictional Characters, Mythical Objects, and the Phenomenon of Inadvertent Creation. Res Philosophica 93 (2):1-23.
    My goal is to reflect on the phenomenon of inadvertent creation and argue that—various objections to the contrary—it doesn’t undermine the view that fictional characters are abstract artifacts. My starting point is a recent challenge by Jeffrey Goodman that is originally posed for those who hold that fictional characters and mythical objects alike are abstract artifacts. The challenge: if we think that astronomers like Le Verrier, in mistakenly hypothesizing the planet Vulcan, inadvertently created an abstract artifact, then the (...)
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  30.  62
    Michael McKinsey (2016). "Truths Containing Empty Names". In Piotr Stalmaszczyk & Luis Fernandez Moreno (eds.), Philosophical Approaches to Proper Names. Peter Lang GmbH 175-202.
    Abstract. On the Direct Reference thesis, proper names are what I call ‘genuine terms’, terms whose sole semantic contributions to the propositions expressed by their use are the terms’ semantic referents. But unless qualified, this thesis implies the false consequence that sentences containing names that fail to refer can never express true or false propositions. (Consider ‘The ancient Greeks worshipped Zeus’, for instance.) I suggest that while names are typically and fundamentally used as genuine terms, there is (...)
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  31.  41
    Zsófia Zvolenszky (2015). An Argument for Authorial Creation. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (4):461–487.
    Artifactualism about fictional characters, positing Harry Potter as an abstract artifact created by J. K. Rowling, has been criticized on the grounds that the idea of creating such objects is mysterious and problematic. In the light of such qualms, it is worth homing in on an argument in favor of artifactualism, showing that it is the best way to include the likes of Harry Potter in our ontology precisely because it incorporates authorial creation. To that end, I will be (...)
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  32. Heidi Savage, Four Problems with Empty Names.
    Empty names vary in their referential features. Some of them, as Kripke argues, are necessarily empty -- those that are used to create works of fiction. Others appear to be contingently empty -- those which fail to refer at this world, but which do uniquely identify particular objects in other possible worlds. I argue against Kripke's metaphysical and semantic reasons for thinking that either some or all empty names are necessarily non-referring, because these reasons are either not the (...)
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  33.  19
    Ioan-Radu Motoarca (2014). Fictional Surrogates. Philosophia 42 (4):1033-1053.
    It is usually taken for granted, in discussions about fiction, that real things or events can occur as referents of fictional names . In this paper, I take issue with this view, and provide several arguments to the effect that it is better to take the names in fiction to refer to fictional surrogates of real objects. Doing so allows us to solve a series of problems that arise on the reference-continuity view. I also show that (...)
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  34. Stacie Friend (2011). The Great Beetle Debate: A Study in Imagining with Names. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):183-211.
    Statements about fictional characters, such as “Gregor Samsa has been changed into a beetle,” pose the problem of how we can say something true (or false) using empty names. I propose an original solution to this problem that construes such utterances as reports of the “prescriptions to imagine” generated by works of fiction. In particular, I argue that we should construe these utterances as specifying, not what we are supposed to imagine—the propositional object of the imagining—but how we (...)
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  35.  81
    David Sackris (2013). A Defense of Causal Creationism in Fiction. Philosophical Writings 41 (1):32-46.
    In this paper I seek defend the view that fictional characters are author-created abstract entities against objections offered by Stuart Brock in his paper “The Creationist Fiction: The Case against Creationism about Fictional Characters.” I argue that his objections fall far short of his goal of showing that if philosophers want to believe in fictional characters as abstract objects, they should not view them as author-created. My defense of creationism in fiction in part rests on tying the (...)
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  36. Amie L. Thomasson (2003). Speaking of Fictional Characters. Dialectica 57 (2):205–223.
    The challenge of handling fictional discourse is to find the best way to resolve the apparent inconsistencies in our ways of speaking about fiction. A promising approach is to take at least some such discourse to involve pretense, but does all fictional discourse involve pretense? I will argue that a better, less revisionary, solution is to take internal and fictionalizing discourse to involve pretense, while allowing that in external critical discourse, fictional names are used seriously to (...)
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  37.  11
    Gerald Vision (1980). Fictional Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:45-59.
    Problems concerning identity in possible worlds and the view that proper names are rigid designators pose no threat to the doctrine that names of fictional characters (fictional names) are referential. Some philosophers, notably Saul Kripke and David Kaplan, have held otherwise; but a close examination of their arguments discovers fatal flaws in them. Furthermore, the most readily available proposals for the alternative functions of fictional names — that is, proposals in which fictional (...)
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  38. Stuart Brock (2002). Fictionalism About Fictional Characters. Noûs 36 (1):1–21.
    Despite protestations to the contrary, philosophers have always been renowned for espousing theories that do violence to common-sense opinion. In the last twenty years or so there has been a growing number of philosophers keen to follow in this tradition. According to these philosophers, if a story of pure fic-tion tells us that an individual exists, then there really is such an individual. According to these realists about fictional characters, ‘Scarlett O’Hara,’ ‘Char-lie Brown,’ ‘Batman,’ ‘Superman,’ ‘Tweedledum’ and ‘Tweedledee’ are (...)
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  39. Edward N. Zalta (2003). Referring to Fictional Characters. Dialectica 57 (2):243–254.
    The author engages a question raised about theories of nonexistent objects. The question concerns the way names of fictional characters, when analyzed as names which denote nonexistent objects, acquire their denotations. Since nonexistent objects cannot causally interact with existent objects, it is thought that we cannot appeal to a `dubbing' or a `baptism'. The question is, therefore, what is the starting point of the chain? The answer is that storytellings are to be thought of as extended baptisms, (...)
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  40. Alberto Voltolini (2007). Names for Ficta, for Intentionalia, and for Nothing. In María José Frápolli (ed.), Saying, Meaning and Referring: Essays on François Recanati's Philosophy of Language. Palgrave Macmillan 183-197.
    In his Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta, Recanati maintains two main theses regarding meta-representational sentences embedding allegedly empty proper names. The first thesis concerns both belief sentences embedding allegedly empty names and (internal) meta-fictional sentences (i.e., sentences of the form “in the story S, p”) embedding fictional, hence again allegedly empty, names. It says that such sentences primarily have fictive truth-conditions: that is, conditions for their fictional truth. The second thesis is that a fictive ascription (...)
     
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  41. Peter van Inwagen (2000). Quantification and Fictional Discourse. In Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence.
     
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  42. Saul A. Kripke (ed.) (2011). Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I. Oxford University Press.
    This important new book is the first of a series of volumes collecting essential work by an influential philosopher. It presents a mixture of published and unpublished works from various stages of Kripke's storied career. Included here are seminal and much discussed pieces such as “Identity and Necessity,” “Outline of a Theory of Truth,” and “A Puzzle About Belief.” More recent published work include “Russell's Notion of Scope” and “Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference” among others. Several of the works (...)
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  43.  13
    Jessie Munton (forthcoming). Frege, Fiction and Force. Synthese:1-24.
    Discussion of Frege’s theory of fiction has tended to focus on the problem of empty names, and has consequently missed the truly problematic aspect of the theory, Frege’s commitment to the view that even fictional sentences that contain no empty names fail to refer. That claim prima facie conflicts with his commitment to the cognitive transparency of sense, and the determination of reference by sense. Resolving this tension compels us to recognize that fiction for Frege is a (...)
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  44.  55
    Alberto Voltolini (2014). Fiction and Indexinames. Journal of Literary Theory 8:293–322.
    In this paper, I will first of all claim that once one takes proper names as indexicals of a particular sort, indexinames for short, one may account for some tensions that affect our desiderata regarding the use of such names in sentences directly or indirectly involving fiction. According to my proposal, a proper name “N.N.” is an indexical whose character is roughly expressed by the description “the individual called ‘N.N.’ (in context)”, where this description means “the individual one’s (...)
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  45.  7
    David C. Spewak Jr (2016). A Modulation Account of Negative Existentials. Philosophia 44 (1):227-245.
    Fictional characters present a problem for semantic theorists. One approach to this problem has been to maintain realism regarding fictional characters, that is to claim that fictional characters exist. In this way names originating from fiction have designata. On this approach the problem of negative existentials is more pressing than it might otherwise be since an explanation must be given as to why we judge them true when the names occurring within them designate existing objects. (...)
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  46.  37
    Zsófia Zvolenszky, Artifactualism and Inadvertent Authorial Creation. Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics Vol. 7/2015.
    In a series of papers (two of them in previous ESA Proceedings), I have been defending a fictional artifactualist position according to which fictional characters (like Prince Bolkonsky in Tolstoy’s War and Peace are non-concrete, human created objects (which are commonly labeled abstract artifacts). In this paper, I aim to bring together from my previous work two lines of defending fictional artifactualism: that (for the fictional artifactualist) making room for (i) authorial creation and for (ii) inadvertent (...)
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  47.  79
    Jeffrey Goodman (2004). A Defense of Creationism in Fiction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1):131-155.
    Creationism is the conjunction of the following theses: (i) fictional individuals (e.g. Sherlock Holmes) actually exist; (ii) fictional names (e.g., 'Holmes') are at least sometimes genuinely referential; (iii) fictional individuals are the creations of the authors who first wrote (or spoke, etc.) about them. CA Creationism is the conjunction of (i) - (iii) and the following thesis: (iv) fictional individuals are contingently existing abstracta; they are non-concrete artifacts of our world and various other possible worlds. (...)
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  48.  85
    Eros Corazza & Mark Whitsey (2003). Indexicals, Fictions, and Ficta. Dialectica 57 (2):121–136.
    We defend the view that an indexical uttered by an actor works on the model of deferred reference. If it defers to a character which does not exist, it is an empty term, just as ‘Hamlet’ and ‘Ophelia’ are. The utterance in which it appears does not express a proposition and thus lacks a truth value. We advocate an ontologically parsimonious, anti-realist, position. We show how the notion of truth in our use and understanding of indexicals (and fictional (...)) as they appear within a fiction is not a central issue. We claim that our use and understanding of indexicals (and names) rests on the fact that their cognitive contribution is not exhausted by their semantic contribution. (shrink)
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  49.  29
    Johannes Brandl (1985). Gegenstandslose Gedanken. Grazer Philosophische Studien 25:501-531.
    Thoughts may have a subject — they may concern a certain topic —without having an object in the sense of being directed upon a referent. It is argued that, once this distinction is acknowledged, a third position between Meinong and Russell can be established. There will then be objectless thoughts which need not be false in view of the non-existence of their purported referents. But there will also be object-dependent thoughts which have their referents necessarily. Neither logically proper names (...)
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  50. Gregory Currie, Characters and Contingency.
    One way creatures of fiction seem to differ from real things is in their essential properties. While you and I might not have done many of the things we did do, Anna Karenina could not, surely, have been other than a lover of Vronsky. Is that right? Not straightforwardly: while it is true that “Necessarily, someone who was not a lover of Vronsky would not be Anna”, it is also true that “Someone who was necessarily a lover of Vronsky would (...)
     
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