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Profile: Filip Grgic (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb)
  1.  35
    Filip Grgić (2014). Investigative and Suspensive Scepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):653-673.
    Sextus Empiricus portrays the Pyrrhonian sceptics in two radically different ways. On the one hand, he describes them as inquirers or examiners, and insists that what distinguishes them from all the other philosophical schools is their persistent engagement in inquiry. On the other hand, he insists that the main feature of Pyrrhonian attitude is suspension of judgement about everything. Many have argued that a consistent account of Sextan scepticism as both investigative and suspensive is not possible. The main obstacle to (...)
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  2.  47
    Filip Grgic (2008). Sextus Empiricus on the Possibility of Inquiry. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):436-459.
    Abstract: In this paper I discuss Sextus Empiricus' response to the dogmatists' objection that the skeptics cannot inquire into philosophical theories and at the same time suspend judgment about everything. I argue that his strategy consists in putting the burden of proof on the dogmatists: it is they, and not the skeptics, who must justify the claim to be able to inquire into the nature of things. Sextus' arguments purport to show that if we consider the dogmatists' inquiry, we should (...)
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  3.  66
    Pavel Gregorić & Filip Grgić (2006). Aristotle's Notion of Experience. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 88 (1):1-30.
    Aristotle's notion of experience plays an important role in his epistemology as the link between perception and memory on the one side, and higher cognitive capacities on the other side. However, Aristotle does not say much about it, and what he does say seems inconsistent. Notably, some passages suggest that it is a non-rational capacity, others that it is a rational capacity and that it provides the principles of science. This paper presents a unitary account of experience. It explains how (...)
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  4.  41
    Filip Grgić (2002). Aristotle on the Akratic's Knowledge. Phronesis 47 (4):336 - 358.
    This paper is an analysis of Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics 7.3." Aristotle's discussion in this chapter is motivated by the Socratic doctrine, elaborated in Plato's "Protagoras," according to which it is impossible to know what is good and act against this knowledge. Aristotle wants to rebut this doctrine and show that there is a sense of "know" such that this is possible. I argue that this is all that he wants to do in EN 7.3, and that his discussion is not (...)
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  5.  34
    Filip Grgic (2006). Sextus Empiricus on the Goal of Skepticism. Ancient Philosophy 26 (1):141-160.
    In this paper I take a closer look at Sextus Empiricus’ arguments in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.25-30 and try to make sense of his account of Skepticism as a goal-directed philosophy. I argue that Sextus fails to mount a convincing case for the view that tranquility, rather than suspension of judgment, is the ultimate goal of his inquiries.
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  6.  18
    Filip Grgic (2006). Sextus Empiricus on the Goal of Skepticism. Ancient Philosophy 26 (1):141-160.
  7.  15
    Filip Grgic (1998). Aristotle Against the Determinist: Metaphysics 6.3. International Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1998):127-136.
    The article tries to show that Aristotle's refutation of causal determinism in Metaph. 6.3 is grounded mainly on two assumptions: a. that there must be a first member of any causal chain, and b. that the origin and the outcome of the chain have to be of equal status.
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  8.  13
    Filip Grgic (1999). Plato'sMenoand the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge. Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 4 (1):19-40.
    In Meno 80d5-e5, we find two sets of objections concerning the possibility of inquiry in the absence of knowledge: the so-called and the This essay first shows that the eristic argument is not simply a restatement of Meno's paradox, but instead an objection of a completely different kind: Meno's paradox concerns not inquiry as such, but rather Socrates' inquiry into virtue as is pursued in the first part of the Meno, whereas the eristic argument indicates a manner in which Meno's (...)
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  9.  11
    Filip Grgić (2011). Skepticism and Everyday Life. In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Brill
  10.  28
    Filip Grgic (2010). Casey Perin: The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 201008.
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  11.  9
    Filip Grgić (1998). Aristotle Against the Determinist. International Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2):127-136.
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  12.  14
    Filip Grgić (2002). Aristotle on the Akratic's Knowledge. Phronesis 47 (4):336-358.
    This paper is an analysis of Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics 7.3." Aristotle's discussion in this chapter is motivated by the Socratic doctrine, elaborated in Plato's "Protagoras," according to which it is impossible to know what is good and act against this knowledge. Aristotle wants to rebut this doctrine and show that there is a sense of "know" such that this is possible. I argue that this is all that he wants to do in EN 7.3, and that his discussion is not (...)
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  13.  7
    Filip Grgić (2013). Introduction. Prolegomena 12 (2):197-197.
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  14.  18
    Filip Grgic (2010). Richard Bett, Ed., The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 30 (5):315-317.
  15.  17
    Filip Grgić (2008). Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive. [REVIEW] Prolegomena 7 (1):103-107.
    Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, xii + 209 pp.
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  16.  11
    Filip Grgić (2004). Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):403-408.
  17.  14
    Filip Grgić (2008). Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive. Prolegomena 7 (1):103-107.
    Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, xii + 209 pp.
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  18.  3
    Filip Grgić (2013). Ancient Scepticism. By Harald Thorsrud. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009. Pp. 248 + Xvi. ISBN: 978-0-520-26026-9. [REVIEW] International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (3):219-223.
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  19.  9
    Filip Grgić (2010). Review of Casey Perin, The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (8).
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  20.  6
    Filip Grgić (2012). Method and Metaphysics: Essays in Ancient Philosophy I. History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (4):381-383.
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  21.  3
    Filip Grgić (2008). Pyrrhonism and Relativism. Filozofska Istrazivanja 27 (4):823-841.
  22.  8
    Filip Grgic (2008). M. Tuominen, Apprehension and Argument: Ancient Theories of Starting Points for Knowledge. [REVIEW] Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2.
  23.  2
    Filip Grgić (2005). Aristotelians and Stoics on Money and the Good Life. Disputatio Philosophica 7 (1):27-36.
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  24.  2
    Filip Grgić (2010). Eric T. Olson, What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology. Prolegomena 9 (2):344-349.
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  25.  1
    Filip Grgić (2004). Alan Bailey, Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12:403-408.
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  26. Filip Grgić (2005). Nicholas White, Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002. Rhizai. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 2:301-305.
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  27.  1
    Filip Grgić (2008). Pironizam I Relativizam. Filozofska Istrazivanja 27 (4):823-841.
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  28. Filip Grgiç (2002). Aristotle On Knowledge And Ακρασια. Existentia 12 (1-2):209-218.
     
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  29. Filip Grgić (2004). David Sedley, The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato's Theaetetus. Rhizai. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 2:131-136.
     
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  30. Filip Grgić (2012). Jonathan Barnes: Method and Metaphysics. History and Philosophy of Logic 144:5340.
     
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  31. Filip Grgić (2007). Pironizam i relativizam: Pyrrhonism and Relativism. Filozofska Istrazivanja 27 (4):823-841.
    U ovom se radu pokušava pokazati da postoji određena vrsta relativizma koja je spojiva sa skepticizmom Seksta Empirika. Tvrdi se da se u PH I.217–219 Protagora ne shvaća kao aletički ili epistemički relativist, nego kao relativist u minimalnom smislu riječi, te da takvo stajalište nije protivno pironizmu kako ga Sekst karakterizira u PH I. Potom se pokazuje da nam prihvaćanje toga aspekta pironizma može pomoći da objasnimo neke inače problematične relativističke zaključke što ih nalazimo u Sekstovim spisima, naročito u M (...)
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  32. Filip Grgić (2007). Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians. Rhizai. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 1:209-213.
    A review of Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, translated and edited by Richard Bett, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.
     
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  33. Filip Grgić (2010). What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology. [REVIEW] Prolegomena 9 (2):344-349.
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