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Kit Fine [120]Gail Fine [85]Arthur Fine [68]Ben Fine [29]
Agnès Fine [25]Robert Fine [18]Cordelia Fine [16]Sarah Fine [13]

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See also:
Profile: Andy Fine
Profile: Jonathan Fine (Columbia University)
Profile: Les Fine (University of Pittsburgh)
Profile: Maxine Fine (University of Alberta)
Profile: Robert Fine (University of Warwick)
Profile: Rebecca Rose (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)
Profile: Zachary Fine (Regis University)
  1. Kit Fine (2012). The Pure Logic of Ground. Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):1-25.
    I lay down a system of structural rules for various notions of ground and establish soundness and completeness.
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  2. Kit Fine (1994). Essence and Modality. Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
    It is my aim in this paper to show that the contemporary assimilation of essence to modality is fundamentally misguided and that, as a consequence, the corresponding conception of metaphysics should be given up. It is not my view that the modal account fails to capture anything which might reasonably be called a concept of essence. My point, rather, is that the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in (...)
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  3. Kit Fine (2001). The Question of Realism. Philosophers' Imprint 1 (1):1-30.
    This paper distinguishes two kinds of realist issue -- the issue of whether the propositions of a given domain are factual and the issue of whether they are fundamental. It criticizes previous accounts of what these issues come to and suggests that they are to be understood in terms of a basic metaphysical concept of reality. This leaves open the question of how such issues are to be resolved; and it is argued that this may be done through consideration of (...)
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  4. Kit Fine (2012). Guide to Ground. In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding. Cambridge University Press 37--80.
    A number of philosophers have recently become receptive to the idea that, in addition to scientific or causal explanation, there may be a distinctive kind of metaphysical explanation, in which explanans and explanandum are connected, not through some sort of causal mechanism, but through some constitutive form of determination. I myself have long been sympathetic to this idea of constitutive determination or ‘ontological ground’; and it is the aim of the present paper to help put the idea on a firmer (...)
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  5. Kit Fine (2006). The RealIty of Tense. Synthese 150 (3):399-414.
    I argue for a version of tense-logical realism that privileges tensed facts without privileging any particular temporal standpoint from which they obtain.
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  6. Kit Fine (2007). Semantic Relationism. Blackwell Pub..
    Introducing a new and ambitious position in the field, Kit Fine’s _Semantic Relationism_ is a major contribution to the philosophy of language. Written by one of today’s most respected philosophers Argues for a fundamentally new approach to the study of representation in language and thought Proposes that there may be representational relationships between expressions or elements of thought that are not grounded in the intrinsic representational features of the expressions or elements themselves Forms part of the prestigious new _Blackwell/Brown Lectures (...)
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  7. Kit Fine (2010). Some Puzzles of Ground. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (1):97-118.
    I describe some paradoxes of ground and relate them to the semantic paradoxes.
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  8. Kit Fine (2005). Modality and Tense. Oxford University Press.
  9. Kit Fine (2015). Unified Foundations for Essence and Ground. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (2):296-311.
  10. Kit Fine (2003). The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter. Mind 112 (446):195-234.
    There is a well-known argument from Leibniz's Law for the view that coincident material things may be distinct. For given that they differ in their properties, then how can they be the same? However, many philosophers have suggested that this apparent difference in properties is the product of a linguistic illusion; there is just one thing out there, but different sorts or guises under which it may be described. I attempt to show that this ‘opacity’ defence has intolerable consequences for (...)
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  11. Kit Fine (2008). Coincidence and Form. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):101-118.
    How can a statue and a piece of alloy be coincident at any time at which they exist and yet differ in their modal properties? I argue that this question demands an answer and that the only plausible answer is one that posits a difference in the form of the two objects.
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  12. Kit Fine (1975). Vagueness, Truth and Logic. Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
    This paper deals with the truth-Conditions and the logic for vague languages. The use of supervaluations and of classical logic is defended; and other approaches are criticized. The truth-Conditions are extended to a language that contains a definitely-Operator and that is subject to higher order vagueness.
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  13. Kit Fine (2009). The Question of Ontology. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press 157--177.
  14. Kit Fine (2012). Counterfactuals Without Possible Worlds. Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):221-246.
  15.  63
    Arthur Fine (1996). The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism, and the Quantum Theory. University of Chicago Press.
    In this new edition, Arthur Fine looks at Einstein's philosophy of science and develops his own views on realism. A new Afterword discusses the reaction to Fine's own theory. "What really led Einstein . . . to renounce the new quantum order? For those interested in this question, this book is compulsory reading."--Harvey R. Brown, American Journal of Physics "Fine has successfully combined a historical account of Einstein's philosophical views on quantum mechanics and a discussion of some of the philosophical (...)
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  16. Kit Fine (1995). Ontological Dependence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:269 - 290.
  17.  49
    Kit Fine (2016). Williamson on Fine on Prior on the Reduction of Possibilist Discourse. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):548-570.
    I attempt to meet some criticisms that Williamson makes of my attempt to carry out Prior's project of reducing possibility discourse to actualist discourse.
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  18. Kit Fine (2010). Towards a Theory of Part. Journal of Philosophy 107 (11):559-589.
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  19. Kit Fine (2016). Identity Criteria and Ground. Philosophical Studies 173 (1):1-19.
    I propose formulating identity criteria as generic statements of ground, thereby avoiding objections that have been made to the more usual formulations.
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  20. Kit Fine (1999). Things and Their Parts. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):61–74.
  21. Kit Fine (2002). The Limits of Abstraction. Oxford University Press.
    Kit Fine develops a Fregean theory of abstraction, and suggests that it may yield a new philosophical foundation for mathematics, one that can account for both our reference to various mathematical objects and our knowledge of various mathematical truths. The Limits ofion breaks new ground both technically and philosophically.
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  22. Kit Fine (2014). Truth-Maker Semantics for Intuitionistic Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):549-577.
    I propose a new semantics for intuitionistic logic, which is a cross between the construction-oriented semantics of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov and the condition-oriented semantics of Kripke. The new semantics shows how there might be a common semantical underpinning for intuitionistic and classical logic and how intuitionistic logic might thereby be tied to a realist conception of the relationship between language and the world.
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  23. Kit Fine (2002). Varieties of Necessity. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford Up 253-281.
    It is argued that there are three main forms of necessity --the metaphysical, the natural and the normative--and that none of them is reducible to the others or to any other form of necessity. In arguing for a distinctive form of natural necessity, it is necessary to refute a version of the doctrine of scientific essentialism; and in arguing for a distinctive form of normative necessity, it is necessary to refute certain traditional and contemporary versions of ethical naturalism.
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  24. Kit Fine (2012). A Difficulty for the Possible Worlds Analysis of Counterfactuals. Synthese 189 (1):29-57.
    I present a puzzle concerning counterfactual reasoning and argue that it should be solved by giving up the principle of substitution for logical equivalents.
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  25.  63
    Kit Fine (forthcoming). The Possibility of Vagueness. Synthese.
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  26. Jeanette Kennett & Cordelia Fine (2009). Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):77–96.
    The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature (...)
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  27. Kit Fine (2000). Neutral Relations. Philosophical Review 109 (1):1-33.
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  28. Sarah Fine (2013). Freedom of Association is Not the Answer. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Disputed Moral Issues: A Reader 3rd Edition. Oxford University Press 338-356.
  29. Cordelia Fine (2006). Is the Emotional Dog Wagging its Rational Tail, or Chasing It? Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):83 – 98.
    According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), an individual's moral judgment normally arises from automatic 'moral intuitions'. Private moral reasoning - when it occurs - is biased and post hoc, serving to justify the moral judgment determined by the individual's intuitions. It is argued here, however, that moral reasoning is not inevitably subserviant to moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Social cognitive research shows that moral reasoning may sometimes disrupt the automatic process of judgment formation described by (...)
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  30.  11
    Alex B. Fine & T. Florian Jaeger (2013). Evidence for Implicit Learning in Syntactic Comprehension. Cognitive Science 37 (3):578-591.
  31. Kit Fine (1995). The Logic of Essence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (3):241 - 273.
  32. Kit Fine (2013). Fundamental Truth and Fundamental Terms. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):725-732.
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  33.  78
    Robert Fine (2007). Cosmopolitanism. New York.
    Preface : twenty theses on cosmopolitan social theory -- Taking the "ism" out of cosmopolitanism : the equivocations of the new cosmopolitanism -- Confronting reputations : Kant's cosmopolitanism and Hegel's critique -- Cosmopolitanism and political community : the equivocations of constitutional patriotism -- Cosmopolitanism and international law : from the law of peoples to the constitutionalisation of international law -- Cosmopolitanism and humanitarian military intervention : war, peace and human rights -- Cosmopolitanism and punishment : prosecuting crimes against humanity -- (...)
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  34. Cordelia Fine, Jillian Craigie & Ian Gold (2005). The Explanation Approach to Delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):159-163.
  35. Arthur Fine (1989). Correlations and Efficiency: Testing the Bell Inequalities. [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 19 (5):453-478.
    This paper examines the efficiency problem involved in experimental tests of so-called “local” hidden variables. It separates the phenomenological locality at issue in the Bell case from Einstein's different conception of locality, and shows how phenomenological locality also differs from the factorizability needed to derive the Bell inequalities in the stochastic case. It then pursues the question of whether factorizable, local models (or, equivalently, deterministic ones) exist for the experiments designed to test the Bell inequalities, thus rendering the experimental argument (...)
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  36.  39
    Cordelia Fine (2013). Is There Neurosexism in Functional Neuroimaging Investigations of Sex Differences? Neuroethics 6 (2):369-409.
    The neuroscientific investigation of sex differences has an unsavoury past, in which scientific claims reinforced and legitimated gender roles in ways that were not scientifically justified. Feminist critics have recently argued that the current use of functional neuroimaging technology in sex differences research largely follows that tradition. These charges of ‘neurosexism’ have been countered with arguments that the research being done is informative and valuable and that an over-emphasis on the perils, rather than the promise, of such research threatens to (...)
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  37.  49
    Sarah Fine (2014). Non-Domination and the Ethics of Migration. In Iseult Honohan & Marit Hovdal-Moan (eds.), Domination, Migration and Non-Citizens. Routledge 10-30.
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  38.  1
    Gina Rippon, Rebecca Jordan-Young, Anelis Kaiser & Cordelia Fine (2014). Recommendations for Sex/Gender Neuroimaging Research: Key Principles and Implications for Research Design, Analysis, and Interpretation. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
  39. Kit Fine (2008). In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83 (62):1-16.
  40.  81
    Kit Fine (2016). Angellic Content. Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (2):199-226.
    I provide a truthmaker semantics for Angell’s system of analytic implication and establish completeness.
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  41. Arthur Fine (1986). Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and Instrumentalist Attachments to Science. Mind 95 (378):149-179.
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  42.  18
    Gail Fine (2016). The ‘Two Worlds’ Theory in the Phaedo. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (4):557-572.
    ABSTRACTAt least in some dialogues, Plato has been thought to hold the so-called Two Worlds Theory, according to which there can be belief but not knowledge about sensibles, and knowledge but not belief about forms. The Phaedo is one such dialogue. In this paper, I explore some key passages that might be thought to support TW, and ask whether they in fact do so. I also consider the related issue of whether the Phaedo argues that, if knowledge is possible at (...)
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  43. Ben Fine & Dimitris Milonakis (2009). From Economics Imperialism to Freakonomics: The Shifting Boundaries Between Economics and Other Social Sciences. Routledge.
    Is or has economics ever been the imperial social science? Could or should it ever be so? These are the central concerns of this book. It involves a critical reflection on the process of how economics became the way it is, in terms of a narrow and intolerant orthodoxy, that has, nonetheless, increasingly directed its attention to appropriating the subject matter of other social sciences through the process termed "economics imperialism". In other words, the book addresses the shifting boundaries between (...)
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  44. Arthur I. Fine (1984). The Natural Ontological Attitude. In J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism. University of California Press 261--77.
  45.  37
    Cordelia Fine & Jeanette Kennett (2004). Mental Impairment, Moral Understanding and Criminal Responsibility: Psychopathy and the Purposes of Punishment. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):425-443.
    We have argued here that to attribute criminal responsibility to psychopathic individuals is to ignore substantial and growing evidence that psychopathic individuals are significantly impaired in moral understanding. They do not appear to know why moral transgressions are wrong in the full sense required by the law. As morally blameless offenders, punishment as a basis for detention cannot be justified. Moreover, as there are currently no successful treatment programs for psychopathy, nor can detention be justified on grounds of treatment. Instead, (...)
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  46.  95
    Sarah Fine (2013). The Ethics of Immigration: Self‐Determination and the Right to Exclude. Philosophy Compass 8 (3):254-268.
    Many of us take it for granted that states have a right to control the entry and settlement of non‐citizens in their territories, and hardly pause to consider or evaluate the moral justifications for immigration controls. For a long time, very few political philosophers showed a great deal of interest in the subject. However, it is now attracting much more attention in the discipline. This article aims to show that we most certainly should not take it for granted that states (...)
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  47.  3
    Alan Fine (1988). The Ethics of Fetal Tissue Transplants. Hastings Center Report 18 (3):5-8.
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  48.  76
    Kit Fine (2000). A Counter-Example to Locke's Thesis. The Monist 83 (3):357-361.
  49. Kit Fine (2008). The Impossibility of Vagueness. Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):111-136.
    I wish to present a proof that vagueness is impossible. Of course, vagueness is possible; and so there must be something wrong with the proof. But it is far from clear where the error lies and, indeed, all of the assumptions upon which the proof depends are ones that have commonly been accepted. This suggests that we may have to radically alter our current conception of vagueness if we are to make proper sense of what it is.
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  50. Kit Fine (2011). An Abstract Characterization of the Determinate/Determinable Distinction. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):161-187.
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