36 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Fiona Macpherson (Glasgow University)
  1. Fiona Macpherson (ed.) (forthcoming). Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Proceedings of the British Academy.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Fiona Macpherson (forthcoming). The Space of Sensory Modalities. In D. Stokes S. Biggs & M. Matthen (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities.
    Is there a space of the sensory modalities? Such a space would be one in which we can represent all the actual, and at least some of the possible, sensory modalities. The relative position of the senses in this space would indicate how similar and how different the senses were from each other. The construction of such a space might reveal unconsidered features of the actual and possible senses, help us to define what a sense is, and provide grounds that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Fiona Macpherson, Martine Nida-Rümelin & Fabian Dorsch (eds.) (forthcoming). Phenomenal Presence.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.) (forthcoming). Representationalism. MIT Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Fiona Macpherson (2013). The Philosophy and Psychology of Hallucination: An Introduction. In Fiona Macpherson Dimitris Platchias (ed.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. MIT Press.
  6. Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.) (2013). Hallucination. MIT Press.
    Scientific and philosophical perspectives on hallucination: essays that draw on empirical evidence from psychology, neuroscience, and cutting-edge philosophical theory.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Louise Richardson, Fiona Macpherson, Mohan Matthen & Matthew Nudds, Symposium on Louise Richardson’s “Flavour, Taste and Smell”. Mind and Language Symposia at Brains.
  8. Fiona Macpherson (2012). Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62.
    Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen (at least in certain ways that are identified in the paper) then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Katherine Hawley & Fiona Macpherson (eds.) (2011). The Admissible Contents of Experience. Wiley-Blackwell.
    This volume collects together chapters that were originally delivered at a conference on the Admissible Contents of Experience that took place at the University of Glasgow in March 2006. The original papers were first published in a special edition of The Philosophy Quarterly (July 2009). -/- Introduction (Fiona Macpherson, University of Glasgow). -- 1. Perception And The Reach Of Phenomenal Content (Tim Bayne, University of Oxford). -- 2. Seeing Causings And Hearing Gestures (Steven Butterfill, University of Warwick). -- 3. Experience (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Fiona Macpherson (2011). Cross-Modal Experiences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):429-468.
    This paper provides a categorization of cross-modal experiences. There are myriad forms. Doing so allows us to think clearly about the nature of different cross-modal experiences and allows us to clearly formulate competing hypotheses about the kind of experiences involved in different cross-modal phenomena.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Fiona Macpherson (2011). Introduction: The Admissible Contents of Experience. In , The Admissible Contents of Experience. Wiley-Blackwell.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Fiona Macpherson (2011). Individuating the Senses. In , The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
  13. Fiona Macpherson (ed.) (2011). The Admissible Contents of Experience. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content. -/- The book draws together papers by leading international philosophers of mind, including Alex Byrne (MIT), Alva Noë (University of California, Berkeley), Tim Bayne (St Catherine’s College, Oxford), Michael Tye (University of Texas, Austin), Richard Price (All Souls College, Oxford) and Susanna Siegel (Harvard University) (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Fiona Macpherson (ed.) (2011). The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    This volume is the first on the philosophy of the non-visual senses. It includes in equal measure both "classic" articles (from Aristotle to Paul Grice) which are unavailable or otherwise difficult to access, as well as new essays by well-known philosophers. It also includes an introduction by Macpherson, which draws together the centuries of philosophical thought on the senses and points to likely new directions.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Fiona Macpherson (2011). Taxonomising the Senses. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):123-142.
    I argue that we should reject the sparse view that there are or could be only a small number of rather distinct senses. When one appreciates this then one can see that there is no need to choose between the standard criteria that have been proposed as ways of individuating the senses—representation, phenomenal character, proximal stimulus and sense organ—or any other criteria that one may deem important. Rather, one can use these criteria in conjunction to form a fine-grained taxonomy of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Fiona Macpherson (2010). A Disjunctive Theory of Introspection: A Reflection on Zombies and Anton's Syndrome. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):226-265.
    Reflection on skeptical scenarios in the philosophy of perception, made vivid in the arguments from illusion and hallucination, have led to the formulation of theories of the metaphysical and epistemological nature of perceptual experience. In recent times, the locus of the debate concerning the nature of perceptual experience has been the dispute between disjunctivists and common-kind theorists. Disjunctivists have held that there are substantial dissimilarities (either metaphysical or epistemological or both) between veridical perceptual experiences occurring when one perceives and perceptual (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Fiona MacPherson (ed.) (2010). Hallucination. MIT Press.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Fiona Macpherson (2010). Impossible Figures. In E. B. Goldstein (ed.), SAGE Encyclopedia of Perception. Sage.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Fiona Macpherson (2009). Perception, Philosophical Perspectives. In Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    This paper provides an introduction to, and overview of, the Philosophy of Perception.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.) (2008). Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
  21. Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (2008). Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Fiona Macpherson (2007). Synaesthesia. In Mario de Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection Series: Studies in Brain and Mind, Vol. 4. Kleuwer.
    Synaesthesia is most often characterised as a union or mixing of the senses. i Richard Cytowic describes it thus: “It denotes the rare capacity to hear colours, taste shapes or experience other equally startling sensory blendings whose quality seems difficult for most of us to imagine” ([1995] 1997, 7). One famous example is of a man who “tasted shapes”. When he experienced flavours he also experienced shapes rubbing against his face or hands. ii Such popular characterisations are rough and ready. (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Fiona Macpherson (2006). Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience. Noûs 40 (1):82-117.
    Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counter-example to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judge- ments to account for Gestalt (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Fiona Macpherson (2006). Property Dualism and the Merits of Solutions to the Mind-Body Problem: A Reply to Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 10-11):72-89.
    This paper is divided into two main sections. The first articulates what I believe Strawson's position to be. I contrast Strawson's usage of 'physicalism' with the mainstream use. I then explain why I think that Strawson's position is one of property dualism and substance monism. In doing this, I outline his view and Locke's view on the nature of substance. I argue that they are similar in many respects and thus it is no surprise that Strawson actually holds a view (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Fiona Macpherson (2005). Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.
    In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional exter- nalist views about the nature of the content of propositional attitudes. Thus, colour inver- sion scenarios are more damaging to externalist (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Fiona Macpherson (2004). Review of The Problem of Perception By A.D. Smith. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 45 (3):255-257.
  27. Fiona Macpherson (2004). Review of The Problem of Perception by A. D. Smith. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 45 (3):255-257.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Fiona Macpherson (2004). Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Books 45 (3):255-257.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Fiona Macpherson (2003). Novel Colours and the Content of Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):43-66.
    I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain the nature of (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Fiona Macpherson (2002). Review of M. Tye Consciousness, Color and Content. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):619-621.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Fiona Macpherson (2002). The Power of Natural Selection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (8):30-35.
    Some naturalistic theories of consciousness give an essential role to teleology.1 This teleology is said to arise due to natural selection. Thus it is claimed that only certain states, namely, those that have been selected for by evolutionary pro- cesses because they contribute to (or once contributed to) an organism’s fitness, are conscious states. These theories look as if they are assigning a creative role to natural selection. If a state is conscious only if it has been selected for, then (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Fiona Macpherson (2000). Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character. Dissertation, University of Stirling
    This thesis is an examination and critique of naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. Phenomenal character refers to the distinctive quality that perceptual and sensational experiences seem to have; it is identified with 'what it is like' to undergo experiences. The central claims of representationalism are that phenomenal character is identical with the content of experience and that all representational states, bearing appropriate relations to the cognitive system, are conscious experiences. These claims are taken to explain both how conscious experiential (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Fiona Macpherson (1999). Perfect Pitch and the Content of Experience. Philosophy and Anthropology 3 (2).
  34. Fiona Macpherson (1999). Review of What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World by P. Jacob. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 40 (3):184-185.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Jose Luis Bermudez & Fiona Macpherson (1998). Nonconceptual Content and the Nature of Perceptual Experience. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6.
    [1] Recent philosophy of mind and epistemology has seen an important and influential trend towards accounting for at least some features of experiences in content-involving terms. It is a contested point whether ascribing content to experiences can account for all the intrinsic properties of experiences, but on many theories of experiences there are close links between the ascription of content and the ways in which experiences are ascribed and typed. The issues here have both epistemological and psychological dimensions. On the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation